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Craig Alfred v The Information Commissioner

court decision 2026-10-23 17 444 characters Personal data
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Background

1.The Appellant made a complaint to the Information Commissioner (“IC”), reference IC-428303-Z7T5 which has ultimately led to the Appellant making an application under s. 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 and these proceedings.

2.This case has a complicated administrative history which is set out in detail in the CMD’s issued by Judge Harris on 5 October 2026 and so will not be repeated here.

3.In paragraph 13 of those CMDs the Appellant was put on notice that the Tribunal was minded to consider striking out the GRC3 application of its own motion under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with it and/or Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding. This was to a significant degree because the Appellant in a GRC5 form dated the 22 September 2026 stated “I accept the Judge's conclusion in the Case Management Note dated 13 January 2026 that, because the Information Commissioner's complaints process had concluded, there was no outstanding complaint capable of being progressed by an order under

section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018

”.

4.The Appellant was invited to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out, which he did on the 6 October 2026 with 4 pages of reply and argument focused on arguing that because further material was supplied after outcomes had been provided, and the matter remained, closed then arguably further appropriate steps should have been taken.

Legal Framework

5.Section 166 of the DPA 2018 provides the Tribunal with a narrow power that is explicitly limited to the supervision of procedural matters rather than substantive ones. The Upper Tribunal in the judgment of Killock & Veale & others v Information Commissioner

[2021] UKUT 299 (AAC)

stated at [74] that “ [i]t is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under s.166

, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the s.166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a Tribunal from the procedural failings listed in s.166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by Tribunals

”

6.Section 166 does not provide any power for considering or reviewing the substance of any decision made by the Commissioner. Even where s.166 is engaged, the powers of the Tribunal are limited to procedural ones, such as requiring the Commissioner to take appropriate steps to provide the required notification. Even as regards what such ‘appropriate steps’ are the Commissioner benefits from a very wide discretion with caselaw confirming that this even “ allows the Commissioner to decide, after investigating a complaint to a limited extent, that no further action should be taken

” whether the complaint is spurious or not (see paragraphs 66 and 70 of R (on the application of Delo) v Information Commissioner and Wise Payments Ltd [2022]

EWHC 3046 (Admin)

). It is established that neither s.165 nor s.166 of the DPA 2018 require the Commissioner “determine the merits of complaints” (See para 78, R (on the application of Delo) v Information Commissioner and Wise Payments Ltd

[2023] EWCA Civ 1141

)

.

7.Furthermore, there is a significant difference between cases where the Commissioner has provided an ‘outcome’ and ones where the ‘outcome’ is still pending. An outcome is a conclusive determination that marks the end of the Commissioner's handling of the relevant complaint. See para 60 of Smith v Information Commissioner

[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)

) where it was stated “ the scope for finding that an “appropriate step” has been omitted once an ‘outcome’ has been produced is limited … That is for two main reasons: first, because

section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner,

section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an “appropriate” step has been omitted is limited”.

8.Where an outcome has been provided the scope of s.166 is necessarily much more limited. As noted in Killock at para 87 “ s.166 is a forward-looking provision, concerned with remedying ongoing procedural defects that stand in the way of the timely resolution of a complaint. The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate "steps to respond" and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial Regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court). It will do so in the context of securing the progress of the complaint in question

”.

9.This position has since been reinforced by the case of Delo at the High Court in para 130 where it was ruled that “ if an outcome has been pronounced, I would rule out any attempt by the data subject to wind back the clock and to try by sleight of hand to achieve a different outcome by asking for an order specifying an appropriate responsive step which in fact has that effect. The Upper Tribunal rightly identified in [77] that if an outcome was pronounced which the complainant considered was unlawful or irrational then they can seek judicial review in the High Court ”.

10.Once an outcome has been issued there is extremely limited power for the Tribunal to seek to order the Respondent to take some ‘appropriate step’ retrospectively, especially where such a step could lead to a substantive change in outcome. The appropriate forum for challenging whether steps taken to investigate the complaint were appropriate or whether relevant evidence was considered or taken into account as regards cases where an outcome has been provided is Judicial Review in the High Court.

11.A rare example of such an exceptional post-outcome ‘appropriate step’ is given in Paragraph 61 of the case

Smith v Information Commissioner

[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)

)

. Where the position is considered of two severable matters in a combined complaint and an outcome is provided in one, but as regards another where the ICO has not dealt with the second matter at all (because of an oversight or some other mistake). In that scenario there has in effect been no outcome for the severable matter, but as a matter of fact there has been an outcome in the case as a whole, because there was one issued relating to the combined complaint (albeit being partial in coverage). The Tribunal in such a circumstance retains the power to issue an order requiring ‘appropriate steps’ as regards that limited severable matter that has yet to be dealt with. It is noteworthy that the Upper Tribunal is at pains to point out that the retained ability to order appropriate steps is tied to a matter that has not been considered (rather than one that has been considered even just to a limited extent and then dismissed or not further actioned).

12.In Killock & Veale & others v Information Commissioner [2021] UKUT 299 (AAC) ), another hypothetical example is given of a potential post-outcome ‘appropriate step’ in paragraph 86 where the scenario of ordering that a Complainant should receive a response in Braille is discussed.

13.In demonstrating the very limited scope for post-outcome orders, it is notable that both of these examples are very clearly focused on procedural-administrative matters separate from substantive issues of regulatory judgment. The authorities tread a clear path on the very particular and circumscribed power of the Tribunal to order ‘appropriate steps’.

Analysis

14.The Appellant declined the invitation to withdraw the matter and opposes the strike out application. I considered the entirety of the reply and other documentation but have focused only on the most relevant parts for this decision.

15.The Appellant raises two core arguments.

16.Firstly, that in the Appellant’s view applying the statutory test objectively the Respondent did not take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint.

17.Secondly, that although it is accepted outcomes were provided (On the Appellant’s case this was on 10 and 13 August 2026) there was subsequently further material provided on 20 August 2026 in relation to the complaint that “ ... concerned the further, specific question [of] Sussex Police's handling, for ROA 5606/26, of personal data contained in, considered in, or generated through the May 2026 NRAC assessment”.

The Appellant goes on in the reply to say

“An outcome issued before that material was supplied cannot, without evidence that the issue had already been considered, establish that this later issue was assessed and answered”.

18.The Appellant also is keen to assert that they do “ not seek an order determining whether Sussex Police acted unlawfully, nor an order prescribing the substantive conclusion the Commission must reach. That limitation is jurisdictional discipline, not an admission that the Commission acted lawfully, reasonably or appropriately”.

19.Dealing with the first issue raised of “appropriate steps” as is clearly set out in the law and caselaw this term has a particular and narrow meaning that is limited to procedural matters that advance the handling of a matter towards an outcome. There is no jurisdiction for the Tribunal to undertake qualitative assessments as to whether any particular measure is appropriate or not in terms of the consideration of the substantive points of any particular complaint. The ‘appropriate’ term here is solely in regard to the subject neutral matter of whether the handling of a complaint is or is not being advanced towards an outcome (see in particular

Killock as quoted above). Furthermore the caselaw is very clear that the Respondent has an exceptionally wide discretion and is not required to determine the merits of a complaint (see

Delo above) and can legitimately decide to take no further action on a complaint after only investigating it to a limited extent and there would be no grounds for ‘further appropriate steps’ to be sought. In light of the above I am satisfied that the Appellant has misconstrued the scope of what can amount to an ‘appropriate step’ in the context of a s.166 application far beyond the limited forward looking procedurally advancing nature such orders are limited to.

20.On the second issue raised of the alleged incompleteness of the outcome provided there are a number of points to be considered.

21.Taking the Appellant’s case at its highest the position asserted at paragraph 9 and following of the reply to the SO is that “ The Respondent relies on the complaint of 21 May 2026, the outcome of 10 August 2026 and the review outcome of 13 August 2026

.

The Respondent's own chronology records that further material was supplied on 20 August

2026, after both outcomes, and was added to the complaint file while the matter remained closed. The distinction is concrete. The pre-13 August complaint had already produced the outcomes on which the Respondent relies. The 20 August material came afterwards ... An outcome issued before that material was supplied cannot, without evidence that the issue had already been considered, establish that this later issue was assessed and answered. The Response does not identify a later assessment or communication addressing the specific issue concerning Sussex Police's handling, for ROA 5606/26, of personal data contained in, considered in, or generated through the May 2026 NRAC assessment. The Applicant's case is accordingly not merely that the Commission investigated inadequately. It is that the evidence relied upon by the Respondent does not establish that the Commission took the antecedent step of considering and responding to that later issue at all.”

22.This argument is obviously and clearly distinguishable from the scenario identified in the case of Smith that the Appellant seeks to rely on. Where a complaint is raised that involves multiple severable parts, and the contents of that original complaint is only partially investigated and an outcome produced, then it remains plausible for an order to be made that further appropriate steps should be taken to advance the production of an outcome in the unresolved elements of the original complaint. For example a complaint covers three separate disclosures made by an organisation to three different individuals (A, B and C), the Respondent investigates this complaint but only as regards the first two disclosures and their recipients A and B and produces an outcome stating that they have concluded no further action needs to be taken as regards the disclosure to A and B. In that scenario the disclosure to C remains outstanding and wholly unconsidered, there is no outcome for C and no appropriate steps have been taken. There remains a possibility for a s.166 order to be made to advance the original complaint (or at least one part of it) as per the reasoning set out in Smith.

23.However, even on the Appellant’s case at its highest this is not the position here. The point and information the Appellant alleges has not been considered did not feature in the original complaint but was only raised subsequent to the outcome being produced. Continuing the analogy it is as if the Appellant’s original complaint solely covered the disclosures to A and B, the Respondent investigated and produced an outcome on those disclosures, and now the Appellant seeks to argue that by raising after the event the issue of the disclosure to C, the Respondent has failed to take appropriate steps to investigate and produce an outcome to the original complaint that only covered disclosures to A and B. Such a position is both illogical and entirely inappropriate. This argument would essentially hold the Respondent to an impossible standard that would require them to anticipate every possible issue that could potentially be raised (but critically hasn’t yet) as regards any complaint they receive and seek to exhaustively address these unknown and unraised issues in an anticipatory manner, or otherwise be susceptible to an order requiring further appropriate steps and an outcome as regards issues that were never put before them either in the original complaint or before they produced an outcome. It would essentially make it possible for any complaint to be extensively re-opened and extended almost at will and would incentivise the drip feeding of evidence and complaints encouraging delay, inefficiency and outcomes contrary to the overriding objective to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost.

24.The wording of s.166 is very clear and specific. The obligation under s.166(1)

(a) to take appropriate steps to respond is not as regards an issue or a particular incident but instead is strictly and deliberately limited to “the complaint” the data subject has made. Likewise the obligation under s.166(1)

(b) is to provide an outcome to “the complaint” the data subject had made to the Respondent, not an outcome to an incident or to any and all concerns the data subject may have. I am therefore satisfied that the appropriate measure by which the Tribunal must assess whether the Respondent has taken appropriate steps and produced an outcome is primarily the content of the original complaint, and (as appropriate) any further relevant and clarificatory information obtained during the course of the investigation prior to an outcome being issued.

25.Taking that approach the factual position asserted by the Appellant (taking their case at its highest) does not support the proposition advanced that “an appropriate step remained outstanding” at the date the outcome was provided. ‘The complaint’ as identified in the legislation had been responded to, as acknowledged by the Appellant themselves in the GRC5 form dated 22 September 2026. The matters potentially raised by any material arising after the outcome had been produced and that are not part of the original complaint are therefore outside of the scope of the s.166 power.

26.The Appellant has sought to dress up these arguments in a way that does not explicitly offend the established law and precedent regarding s.166 , however these are very thinly veiled arguments that are to my mind exactly the sort of ‘sleight of hand’ that is referred to in the Delo case.

27.Where the Appellant believes that the Respondent has acted in some way that is procedurally flawed or improper, this might be because they acted unlawfully or because they acted irrationally, then the proper jurisdiction for such a challenge is the High Court in Judicial Review not the Tribunal.

28.In light of the above I find that there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant being able to successfully argue that the Tribunal should make an order pursuant to the power found in s.166(2) DPA 2018. It is therefore ordered that this case is struck out under Rule 8(3)(c).

Signed Judge T Barrett Date: 21/10/2026