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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: оспаривание экспериментального постановления о дорожном движении

PETER STEVENS ESTATES LIMITED v NORTH YORKSHIRE COUNCIL

судебное решение 2026-11-12 59 857 знаков Телеком и инфраструктура
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Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-11-13.

Mr Justice Sheldon :

1.The Claimant, Peter Stevens Estates Limited, challenges the making of an Experimental Traffic Regulation Order (“ETRO”) by North Yorkshire Council (“the Council”) on 13 February 2026. The challenge is brought under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (‘ the 1984 Act ’).

2.The Council has agreed to suspend the introduction of the ETRO pending the outcome of the Claimant’s challenge. The effect of the ETRO would be to introduce timed weight restrictions on Hambleton Grove, Knaresborough, prohibiting goods vehicles in excess of 7.5t (which I will refer to as Heavy Goods Vehicles, or HGVs) between the hours of 07:00-09:30am and 15:00-16:30pm Monday-Friday, with no exemption for access.

3.The Claimant is the landlord of industrial premises on Hambleton Grove. The businesses on those premises receive deliveries from Heavy Goods Vehicles throughout the period of the day when the use of HGVs is permitted under management plans: HGVs are restricted to arriving between 7:30 am and 4:30 pm.

4.The Claimant alleges that the decision to make the ETRO was unlawful on three grounds:

i.

The Council was materially misled by the report of the Council’s Assistant Director of Highways and Infrastructure (“the Officer Report”) which wrongly reported the peak pm (afternoon) times for HGV movements in the traffic data. The decision maker was given the misleading impression that the HGV peak pm movements occurred outside of the proposed timing restrictions when, in fact, they occurred within the proposed timing restrictions.

ii.

The Council failed to carry out the required balancing exercise under section 122 of the 1984 Act , as it did not establish or consider what “reasonable access” would be to the Claimant’s premises, and thus could not have properly considered the factors at s.122(2) of the 1984 Act , including the desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access to the premises.

iii.

The Council failed to comply with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (“ the 2010 Act ”), as it did not properly consider or identify the impact that the ETRO would have on those with the protected characteristic of ‘age’, and so failed to have due regard to the equality objectives. The Council is said to have been informed of a clear impact on the Manor House Care Home of the proposed ETRO, but failed to gather enough information about this matter.

Factual Background

5.Hambleton Grove, Knaresborough, is a local access road for residential properties, Hambelton Grove Industrial Estate and a nursing home: the Manor House Care Home. There are two points of entry and exit for Hambelton Grove. The road has an average width of 7.4m, and there is on-street parking on both sides of the road sporadically throughout its whole length. Hambleton Grove is in close proximity to Knaresborough St John C of E Primary School. Peak traffic and pedestrian volumes occur in the morning and early afternoon.

6.The Council announced its proposal to introduce the ETRO in early 2024, and carried out a non-statutory consultation. The Claimant, among others, made an objection to the proposed ETRO. In a letter dated 30 April 2024, the Claimant stated that for business on the Industrial Estate “to operate in a viable manner they need to have regular HGV deliveries between 7.30am to 4.30pm”; “The effect of the ETRO – given the number of HGVs requiring access to the Estate will not change – will be to condense HGV traffic into shorter operation hours”; and “Hambleton Grove is the only way to access the Estate and the ETRO will prevent access during key times of the working day (bearing in mind access is already limited to between 7.30am to 4.30pm).” The proposed ETRO was said to have detrimental effects:

“in what is already a tough business environment – making the businesses on the Estate unviable and will eventually force them to move away taking the employment they provide with them. This is not a hypothetical. The dispute and threats of residents has already forced one occupier – Myers Building Supplies – to leave the Estate. This will increase if the ETRO is brought in – even on an 18-month basis.”

7.On 28 November 2025, the Council’s Assistant Director of Highways and Infrastructure produced the Officer Report, recommending approval of the proposed ETRO. The Officer Report stated that the ETRO would seek to address “a recurrent and long-standing issue concerning the use of heavy goods vehicles” in Hambleton Grove. The ETRO was said to be “Experimental” and would allow the Council to trial a restriction in a “live” situation for up to 18 months. It was explained that a consultation period would run alongside the trial for the first six months and this “allows for immediate feedback and minor changes within the first six months, if changes were made, the 6-month consultation period would start again.” It was also explained that a decision on making the scheme permanent or removing would need to be taken within 18 months of the ETRO first coming into force.

8.The Officer Report explained that vehicle tracking had been carried out on Hambleton Grove which showed that there was

“a risk of conflict due to the spacing of the parking bays where if vehicles are parked on both sides of the road, the road width is restricted to allow only one vehicle to pass at any one time. Vehicles can then come into conflict with each other on the road which would require a vehicle to reverse (potentially out of a junction) which creates a situation that is prejudicial to highway safety.”

9.The Officer Report described the collection of traffic data from April 2024 which indicated that the morning (AM) traffic peak was 08:00-08:59, and the afternoon (PM) traffic peak was 15:00-15:59. It was said that “At these peak times, there is an increased likelihood of vehicle conflict which can result in unsafe highway manoeuvres, such as vehicles reversing in the highway or out of junctions.”

10.At paragraph 4.6, the Officer Report stated (with my emphasis) that:

The current proposal is to implement an ETRO prohibiting goods vehicles in excess of 7.5t between the hours of 07:00-09:30am and 15:00-16:30pm Monday-Friday on Hambleton Grove, Knaresborough. These timings have been selected to address the peak overall vehicle movements in the area, which also incorporates the times for the school drop off and pick up times, where there is an increase in vulnerable road users in the area. It should be noted that the HGV pm peak movement is outside of this time (see table 1 below), this represents the balance considered in ensuring that the times where the majority of HGV movements take place would not be impacted but seeks to remove this movement when the network is busier with vulnerable users. Officers consider the experimental restrictions to be expedient for achieving the objectives of highway safety in this area. The practical advantage of reducing the HGV movements at the identified times will address the risk of the largest vehicles coming into conflict with other highway users at peak traffic times on Hambleton Grove. addressing the safety of pedestrians, particularly during the times of higher pedestrian activity such as at the school pick up and drop of times, improving accessibility of traffic movements which is currently restricted and impacted by the movement of Heavy Goods Vehicles. The measure will also improve the amenity and character of the area and residential street.

Table 1: Traffic Data Summary

Site 1 (east of access to Hambleton Grove Industrial Estate)

Site 2 (near the junction with Stockwell Road)

11.At paragraph 4.7 of the Officer Report, it was stated that “The detailed breakdown of vehicle classes can be found in Appendix B.”

12.The Officer Report set out a summary of the various objections that had been made to the proposal and set out an “Officer response”:

Objection Theme

Officer Response

Proposal could result in HGVs waiting on adjacent streets until the restrictions are out of operation

This could happen but timings of deliveries using HGVs could be targeted outside of the operating hours of the restriction. This is also why the proposal is an experiment so this can be monitored during operation and changes made where appropriate

Increased concentration of HGVs using

Hambleton Grove outside of the restrictions

This is again why the proposal is experimental in nature. Traffic counters will be placed on street during the first initial 6 months consultation so a monitor on traffic volumes can be carried out throughout the experiment and changes can be made if required

The negative impact on business and reasonable access to properties

This can be evidenced during the initial six month consultation on the experiment what the business impact is with the arrangement in place. This would then be a consideration as part of any decision making on the proposal.

Legal basis for making the ETRO/TRO

The legal process has been followed and due regard has been given to S122 of the Road

Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ( RTRA 1984 ), as addressed in Section 7 and 11 of this report

The benefit of the Order

The Council is proposing a measure which balances the needs of businesses against the amenity of the local area. The proposal is not a complete ban of HGV usage but targeted to times where the risk of the interaction between vehicles and vulnerable users is at its greatest. Reducing the movement of vehicle over 7.5t between the times of 07:00- 09:30am and 15:00-16:30pm Monday-Friday will ensure the risk of conflict between vehicles and vulnerable pedestrians is significantly reduced.

The viability of the industrial estate in this area, potential loss of jobs/employment as a result in the area

This can be evidenced during the initial six month consultation on the experiment what the business impact is with the arrangement in place. This would then be a consideration as part of any decision making on the proposal

13.The Officer Report also responded to the concern expressed by objectors that the proposed ETRO was only being put forward as a result of requests from residents. It was said that:

“Officer site observations identify that the existing condition of the highway network considers that the width of the public highway, when considering the existing residential parking is not sufficient to accommodate heavy traffic and consequently causes safety concerns and loss in amenity value and intended character of the residential area. The current junctions with Stockwell Road and Stockwell Lane are of reduced dimensions to accommodate significant HGV use. The proposal within the ETRO is seeking to remove HGV movements from the times of the day where it is recognised, they pose most risk to the community.”

14.At paragraph 5.5, the Officer Report addressed the response from the Manor House Care Home:

“Whilst not considered a formal objection questions have been raised by the care home regarding food deliveries early in the morning which occurs three times a week and could be affected by the proposal. They also receive collections for refuse and clinical waste which could be impacted by the proposal. The timing of deliveries will be impacted by this proposal as the ETRO proposes prohibition of 7.5t vehicles without access. Deliveries would need to be facilitated either side of the timings proposed or in a smaller vehicle.”

15.The full wording of the response from the care home was set out in Appendix C to the Officer Report:

“We receive food deliveries 3 x week – some early morning. This could affect our operation as the food is often needed for that morning or lunch.

Refuse collection, clinical waste collection usually happens around 7am and I am unsure if these times could be moved to 930am or later.

We fully understand the reasons for the proposal as many large lorries go up/down Hambleton Grove and some go too fast.”

16.The Officer Report set out the alternative options that had been considered. One option was for a “Full time 7.5t environmental weight restriction”. It was reported that:

“This option was considered as it would offer a more residential space along the street and resolves the risk of any HGV clashes with vehicles. However, this was not taken forward as access would need to be maintained for the businesses as Hambleton Grove is their sole means of access and there would need to be an exemption in place for access which would make the restriction less viable. Officers are therefore not recommending this option for the reason that access to businesses will need to be maintained and a full-time restriction such as this would have detrimental impacts to people’s sole means of access.”

17.The Officer Report explained that a “Permanent timed 7.5t environmental weight restriction” was not being proposed as officers needed “to understand and evidence what impact the restriction will have to residents and businesses.”

18.The Officer Report set out the “Justification” for the proposed ETRO, asking whether the proposed order satisfied the “qualifying purpose” and then whether it was “expedient” for the Council to make the ETRO in light of the objections. This involved the Council considering its duty under section 122 of the 1984 Act . It was explained that a number of purposes would be served by the proposed ETRO, including: preventing danger, facilitating traffic passage and preserving amenities. At paragraph 7.4 of the Officer Report, it was stated that:

“The purpose of implementation is to address the risk of the largest vehicles coming into conflict with other highway users at peak traffic times on Hambleton Grove, addressing the safety of pedestrians, particularly during the times of higher pedestrian activity such as at the school pick up and drop of times, improving accessibility of traffic movements which is currently restricted and impacted by the movement of Heavy Goods Vehicles”.

19.The Officer Report stated that officers were satisfied that the proposed ETRO would meet the “qualifying purpose” under the 1984 Act , and that officers considered that it would be expedient to make the proposed ETRO. Implementing the proposed ETRO:

“provides the benefit of improving pedestrian safety and amenity of the local area, ensuring the intended character of the residential area is maintained as historically intended. Prohibiting vehicles in excess of 7.5t at the proposed times will ensure larger vehicles are removed from the local network at times where the interaction with vulnerable users is most significant. Leaving the area as it is without considered improvements could cause harm to the multiple users, the area would see an increasing risk of conflict between vehicles and pedestrians, conflict between larger vehicles and parked cars and a negative impact on local amenity.”

20.In a section of the Officer Report detailing the “Legal Implications” of the proposed ETRO it was stated at paragraph 11.7 that:

“The Council has carefully considered the balance required to be struck by Section 122 of the RTRA 1984 and is of the view that an experimental traffic regulation order would be an appropriate measure to seek a balance between the provision of suitable and adequate parking facilities, the effect on the amenities of the locality affected and the effect on accessibility for businesses and residents on Hambleton Grove.”

21.The Officer Report contained a section concerned with “Equalities Implications”. At paragraph 12.1 it was stated that:

“Consideration has been given to the potential for any adverse equalities impact arising from the recommendations of this report. It is the view of officers that the recommendations included in this report do not have any adverse impacts on any of the protected characteristics identified in the Equalities Act 2010 or NYC’s additional agreed characteristics. The completed Equalities Impact Assessment screening form can be found in Appendix D. Equalities issues will be monitored and kept under review once the ETRO is in place.”

22.The Appendices to the Officer Report included tables of traffic data for Sites 1 and 2 (which I have edited to highlight the relevant material). “R2” is an identifier for a type of Heavy Goods Vehicle; “LGV” represents a light goods vehicle. The “%HGV” column represents the percentage of HGV movement of the overall vehicle movement at a particular time of day:

For Site 1 (near bend)

Site 2 (near end of road)

23.Appendix C to the Officer Report set out each of the objections that had been made to the proposed ETRO and then provided an “Officer Response”. One objection (number 10) referred to the judgment in Trail Riders Fellowship v Hampshire County Council

[2018] EWHC 3390 (Admin)

[2019] EWCA Civ 1275 . The objection highlighted the duty at section 122 of the 1984 Act and underlined one of the factors to which the traffic authority was required to have regard: “the desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access to premises”. The Officer Response to this objection was that:

“The proposed order is timed for to maintain reasonable access whilst balancing the impact on amenity of the locality and reducing the likelihood of vehicles coming into conflict during peak traffic hours. Alternative means of access can be achieved during the hours of operation from vehicles less than 7.5t.”

24.Another set of objections concerned the application of the decision of Carnwath J (as he then was) in UK Waste Management Ltd v West Lancashire DC [1996] 3 WLUK 280. Objection number 17 was described as:

“What is clear is that the authority must at least consider the desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access and in doing so they must ask themselves what reasonable access would entail. Only when they have done that can they proceed to the balancing exercise which section 122 involves, however precisely it is interpreted

Reasonable access under section 122 has to be considered in the circumstances as they are and under which the site owners have to operate.”

The Officer Response was stated to be:

“This too can be measured and assessed during the process of the experiment. The councils duty has been considered as part of it’s reasoning under S122 on Section 10 of this report.”

25.Another objection (number 21) contended that the proposed ETRO arose from residents’ concerns that they were unhappy living near to an established industrial estate and that residents were “now trying to prevent the lawful HGV access of the Estate by businesses to render them unviable.” The Officer Response was that:

“The council is proposing a measure which balances the needs of businesses against the amenity of the local area. The proposal is not a complete ban of HGV usage but targeted to peak times to provide that balance between the two uses.”

26.A further objection (number 48) was that the proposed ETRO was not a genuine experiment. The Officer Response to this objection was that the proposed ETRO was experimental because it would monitor the impact on surrounding streets, and:

“It is also important to consider the impact on traffic movements and potential increase as a result of the order by using smaller vehicles which includes increase in vehicle movements may not be an acceptable outcome from the implementation of this order, hence why the council considers this to be experimental in nature.”

27.At Appendix D to the Officer Report, officers annexed the “Initial equality impact assessment screening form”. This included a list of protected characteristics, and asked whether there was a “Potential for adverse impact” for each of those characteristics. It was explained that “If for any characteristic it is considered that there is likely to be an adverse impact or you have ticked ‘Don’t know/no info available’, . . . a full EIA should be carried out where this is proportionate.” All of the protected characteristics, including that of “Age”, were marked as “No” under the heading “Potential for adverse impact”.

28.On 28 November 2025, the Corporate Director of Environment, in consultation with the Executive Member for Highways and Transportation, approved the officer’s recommendation and made the decision to introduce the ETRO. The reasons for the decision were stated to be:

“The proposals seek to address the longstanding issues of detriment of amenity arising from HGV usage on Hambleton Grove. In discussions during the meeting, safety of vulnerable road users at peak times was also seen to be addressed by this proposal and subsequent recommendation. An ETRO will allow the restriction to be trialled in a "live" situation for up to 18 months, with the consultation period running alongside the trial for the first six months. The proposals are supported by the local member for this location. Measures for Success were presented in the meeting as the following:

•No adverse impact on surrounding streets (such as Stockwell Road / Park Street and Stockwell Lane) and a recognised reduction in idling vehicles impacting Stockwell Road and Stockwell Lane

•Traffic volumes haven’t increased significantly on Hambleton Grove as a result of smaller vehicles being used instead of HGVs

•Amenity has improved during operating hours of the restriction, particularly during school drop off/pick up times (this will be quantified by feedback during the consultation period within the experimental order)

•From the consultation period, an improvement is noted for residential amenity during the time the order is in effect

•To ensure the businesses, care home and residents can operate without significant impact”.

The Grounds of Application

29.The Claimant contends that the decision of the Council to make the ETRO was unlawful on 3 grounds. I shall consider each of these grounds in turn.

i.

The Council was materially misled (a)

Submissions

30.The Claimant contended that the Council was materially misled by the Officer Report which wrongly reported the peak pm times for HGV movements in the traffic data. It was said by Mr Riley-Smith, on behalf the Claimant, that the decision maker was given the misleading impression that the HGV peak pm movements occurred outside of the proposed timing restrictions when, in fact, they occurred within the proposed timing restrictions. This was said to give false comfort to the decision-maker when carrying out the statutorily required balancing exercise under

section 122 of the 1984 Act

, as it downplayed the concern of the Claimant as to the impact that the restriction would have on its business at a peak time. This error was said by Mr Riley-Smith to be one that might have made a difference and, consequently, the decision had to be quashed.

31.The Council accepted that it was factually erroneous for the Officer Report to have stated at paragraph 4.6 that HGV peak pm movement was outside the times of restriction in the ETRO. Nevertheless, it was contended by Mr Evans, for the Council, that the error was minor and not materially misleading when read in the context of the report as a whole and with full account taken of the circumstances.

32.First, Mr Evans contended that the actual underlying statistics were available to the decision-maker within Appendix B, and so the error in the Officer Report could be corrected by the decision-maker anyway. Second the error was not material because the numbers of HGVs were relatively low in any event, and whilst the data showed 4 HGVs in the period between 15:00-16:00 (within the proposed restricted period), the next highest number of HGVs in the afternoon at Site 2 was 3 HGVs at 14:00-15:00, a time period outside of the proposed restricted period. The difference, therefore, was of one HGV only. Third, it is clear from reading the Officer Report as a whole that the primary purpose of the proposed ETRO was to ensure that HGVs could not access Hambleton Grove at the time of peak travel, so and to minimise contact between HGVs as vulnerable road users. This would have weighed most heavily in the balance that needed to be applied by the decision-maker, and the error in the Officer Report would not have made any material difference.

(b)

Discussion

33.It was common ground between the parties that in considering the impact of an error the legal framework for the Court’s analysis was that set out by Lindblom LJ in Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council

[2017] EWCA Civ 1314 at [42]. That case was concerned specifically with the reports of planning officers to members of a local authority’s planning committee, but I accept that the principles should apply by analogy to a report concerning Traffic Regulation Orders under the 1984 Act

. An officer’s report to a planning committee is very similar to, and serves a similar purpose to, a report under the 1984 Act

. Both sets of reports will be written by officers experienced or specialised in a particular field, and which set out the relevant facts, the pros and cons of a particular proposal, and then the legal basis for the recommended decision-making. The decision-maker will be expected to rely heavily on the report, although the final decision is that of the decision-maker who, in both situations, will be assumed to carry out their functions conscientiously.

34.In Mansell at [42], Lindblom LJ stated that:

(2). . . Planning officers’ reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge. Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer’s recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave. The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has materially misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. Minor or inconsequential errors may be excused. It is only if the advice in the officer’s report is such as to misdirect the members in a material way – so that, but for the flawed advice it was given, the committee’s decision would or might have been different – that the court will be able to conclude that the decision itself was rendered unlawful by that advice.

(3)Where the line is drawn between an officer’s advice that is significantly or seriously misleading – misleading in a material way – and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact, or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy. There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law. But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer’s advice, the court will not interfere.

(Emphasis added. I have removed the citations given by Lindblom LJ to improve clarity; they are not necessary for this judgment).

35.In this case, the error in the Officer Report was to note at paragraph 4.6 that “the HGV pm peak movement is outside of this time (see table 1 below)”: that is, outside of the proposed time for the restrictions in the afternoon. The table that was set out in the report showed erroneously that, for Site 2, the peak pm movement for HGVs was between 13:00-13:59, when in fact it was between 15:00-15.59. From the raw data collected by the Council’s traffic officers in one week in April 2024, it can be seen that the highest number of HGV vehicles during the course of the afternoon was actually 4 HGV vehicles between 15:00-16:00.

36.I should say in passing that there was a further error in the table as it showed that, for Site 1, the peak pm movement of HGVs was between 12:00-12:59, when in fact it was 14:00-14.59 and 15:00-15.59: there was the movement of 2 HGVs in each of these time periods. This was not alleged by the Claimant to have been a material error, however, as the peak pm time applied both within and without the proposed restricted times for the afternoon, and I say no more about this matter.

37.There is nothing in the evidence before the Court to indicate that the error made at paragraph 4.6 of the Officer Report was corrected before the decision was made. There is, for instance, nothing mentioned in the decision document of 28 November 2025 to suggest that the decision-maker appreciated a mistake had been made, nor is there a witness statement to suggest the same. Accordingly, even if (as I assume to have been the case) the decision-maker looked at the appendices, including Appendix B which set out the raw data, there is nothing to suggest that the decision-maker realised that an error had been made and that, in fact, the peak pm HGV traffic for Site 2 occurred during the proposed restricted period and not otherwise.

38.I consider that the language used in the first part of the offending sentence in paragraph 4.6 of the Officer Report, combined with the subsequent table, gave a misleading impression to the decision-maker that the proposed restriction would not apply at a time when there was peak pm HGV traffic on Hambleton Road. This was a significant matter as the decision-maker was considering what impact the proposed ETRO would have on the movement of HGV traffic to and from the Industrial Estate. I consider that the error would have engendered a false sense of comfort in the decision-maker that the proposed restriction would not impact so negatively on businesses working from the Industrial Estate, as the restriction would not apply at a time when they had the highest HGV usage each afternoon.

39.That is not the end of the analysis, however. It is necessary to go on to consider whether (applying Lindblom LJ’s approach in Mansell ) “but for the flawed advice it was given, the [decision-maker’s] decision would or might have been different”.

In assessing that matter, the Court needs to ask itself what the decision-maker’s decision would have been, or might have been, had the correct advice been provided.

40.The starting point must, therefore, be what the correct advice should have been. Here, the Officer Report should have stated that “It should be noted that the HGV pm peak movement is within this time (see table 1 below)” (my emphasis), and the table would have shown that the peak pm time for Site 2 was 15:00 to 16:00. There would not, however, have had to be any amendment to the rest of the sentence at paragraph 4.6 of the Officer Report, other than to include a qualifying word such as ‘however’ or ‘nevertheless’.

41.The rest of the sentence reads:

“this represents the balance considered in ensuring that the times where the majority of HGV movements take place would not be impacted but seeks to remove this movement when the network is busier with vulnerable users.”

In using the language “the majority of HGV movements”, Mr Riley-Smith contended that the report writer was referring to the hour that was busiest, building on the (erroneous) point that the peak pm time for HGV movements fell outside of the restricted period, and reflecting the tables that subsequently appear in the Officer Report. I agree. Although this is not the normal meaning of the term “the majority”, it is the only way in which the sentence can be read, consistent with the error that has been made and with the subsequent tables.

42.If the error had not been made, however, then the remainder of the sentence would take on a different, and more typical, meaning of the term “the majority”. The raw data in Appendix B illustrates that the “majority of HGV movements” would not be impacted by the restrictions. At Site 2, 10 out of 16 HGV movements clearly took place outside of the proposed restricted times (2 of the movements took place in the period of an hour which included part of the proposed restriction, and it is not possible to say whether the movement fell within the restricted period or not, so I am erring on the side of caution). At Site 1, 3 out of 8 HGV movements clearly took place outside of the proposed restricted times (I am erring on the side of caution with respect to 2 HGV movements which might have been within the restricted period or not). Overall, therefore, 13 out of 24 HGV movements clearly took place outside of the proposed restricted times: that is the majority of HGV movements.

43.It is clear to me, therefore, that had the error in the first part of the sentence (and as reflected in the table) been corrected, the Officer Report would have gone on to make the point that was set out in the second part of the sentence about “the majority”. The second part of the sentence was important for the report writer in explaining the balancing exercise under

section 122 of the 1984 Act

. The only addition would have been to add a qualifying word to explain that although, or whereas, the peak pm time for HGV movements fell within the proposed restricted period, the majority of HGV movements fell outside that period.

44.It is also possible that, had the error not been made, the report writer would have pointed out that, whereas the peak pm HGV movement for Site 2 was within the proposed restricted period, the numerical difference was slight – one vehicle only. That is, there were 4 HGV vehicles between 15:00-16:00, but 3 in the previous hour which fell outside the proposed restricted period. I cannot say, however, that this would necessarily have been added by the report writer, or that the decision-maker would have interrogated the data and acknowledged this point.

45.Had the error not been made in paragraph 4.6 of the Officer Report, I cannot say that the decision-maker would necessarily have made the same decision as was in fact made. The decision under section 122 of the 1984 Act involves an evaluative judgment, balancing out a number of factors including the “desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access to premises”. On the basis of the materials that would have been before the decision-maker if the error had not been made, I cannot say that there was only one permissible or possible decision that could have been made.

46.The decision-maker would have been aware that the proposed ETRO did not involve a complete ban on HGV use, but only restricted the times of HGV movements. The decision-maker would have been aware that the majority of HGV movements would not be impacted by the restrictions. The decision-maker would also have been aware of the primary purpose of the proposal – to remove the movement of HGV vehicles “when the network is busier with vulnerable users”. Nevertheless, the decision-maker might have been concerned by the fact that the highest HGV activity in the afternoon occurred during what would be the restricted period. This factor may well have made the decision-maker think harder about the impact of the proposed ETRO on the users of the Industrial Estate and might have tilted the balancing exercise against making the ETRO.

47.Accordingly, this ground of challenge succeeds.

ii.

The Council failed to carry out the required balancing exercise under section 122 of the 1984 Act (a)

Submissions

48.Mr Riley-Smith, for the Claimant, contended that the Council erred by failing to carry out the required balancing exercising under

section 122 of the 1984 Act

, as the Council did not establish or consider what “reasonable access” would be to the Claimant’s premises, and thus could not have properly considered the factors at s.122(2)

including the desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access to premises. Determining what “reasonable access” would be is said to be a prerequisite to the carrying out of the balancing exercise. Mr Riley-Smith submitted that the most benevolent reading of the Officer Report was that the relevant officer merely asserted what “reasonable access” would be, but did not determine it. In reality, Mr Riley-Smith submitted that the Officer Report deferred consideration of that determination until the experimental period had commenced.

49.Mr Evans, for the Council, did not accept that there was such a pre-condition. He submitted that it was not necessary for there to be sequential decision-making, so long as the proper balancing exercise under

section 122 of the 1984 Act was carried out. In any event, it could be inferred from the Officer Report that the officer had considered what “reasonable access” was – use of HGVs in the non-restricted period, along with lighter vehicles in the restricted period -- and the balancing exercise was properly carried out. Mr Evans submitted that it was difficult to see what more could have been said in this case.

(b)

Discussion

50.I consider that this ground of challenge is academic in light of my finding on Ground 1. If, as I have already explained, the decision was made on the basis of a flawed understanding of the evidence as to HGV peak pm movements, then the balancing exercise under section 122 of the 1984 Act is necessarily flawed. Any determination by the Council as what “reasonable access” meant would have been predicated on an erroneous basis: that peak pm HGV movements occurred outside of the restricted period.

51.As the matter was fully argued before me, however, and as it may be of some use to the Council if it re-takes the decision in light of this judgment, I will address the points that were made – on the hypothetical assumption that the error was not made.

52.The legal basis for Mr Riley-Smith’s contention is the decision of Carnwath J (as he then was) in Waste Management

. In that case, Carnwath J considered the same regime for an experimental traffic regulation order under the 1984 Act as applies to the decision under challenge in this case. That case concerned a waste disposal site known as the Holiday Moss landfill site near Rainford in Merseyside. The site fell within the area of St. Helens Metropolitan Borough Council, and was very close to the border with West Lancashire District Council. The sole access to the site was from a road called Crawford Road which ran between the villages of Crawford and Rainford, the former being in the West Lancashire district area, the latter being in the St. Helens area. The traffic to and from the site necessarily had to proceed along that road and necessarily had to go either through Crawford or through Rainford.

53.The site was licensed for disposal of putrescible waste. Associated with the relevant grant of planning permission was an agreement made by the owners of the site with St. Helens Borough Council under

section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 regulating various matters relating to the use of the site. In particular, that agreement limited movements of traffic through Rainford village to 140 movements per day during the week and 70 on Saturdays. In the years leading up to the making of the ETRO, there had been increased traffic to deal with the movement of clay on the site. Because of the limits on movements through Rainford, however, most of the increased traffic had to go through the West Lancashire area and Crawford. The proposed ETRO would prevent heavy goods traffic to the site using the road through Crawford.

54.In the report to the local authority in support of the ETRO, the officers stated that they had taken into account “the existence of several other routes to Holiday Moss. Your officers consider that the routes to Holland Moss tip through Rainford offer reasonable access to it.”

55.Carnwath J found that the ETRO was unlawful because it was not genuinely experimental. Carnwath J also considered a further matter: whether the duty under section 122 of the 1984 Act to have regard to the desirability of maintaining reasonable access to premises had been complied with. In considering the latter matter, Carnwath J observed that:

“What is clear is that the authority must at least consider the desirability of securing and maintaining reasonable access and in doing so they must ask themselves what reasonable access would entail. Only when they have done that can they proceed to the balancing exercise which section 122 involves, however precisely it is interpreted.”

(Emphasis added).

56.On the facts of the case, Carnwath J identified that access to the site was:

“complicated by the peculiar requirements of a waste disposal operation, aggravated in this case by the special short term need for clay importation and the limited alternative accesses. These were all matters which were essential considerations in determining what reasonable access required. They are referred to by the District Council in the report but they are not resolved in any way. The answer given by the officers in the report was that, in effect, it was a problem for St. Helens. They saw it as their job simply to see how things were going to work out within their area; it was then a matter for St. Helens to sort out what was going to happen in their area.”

57.Carnwath J also noted that the evidence suggested that there might be a similar ban on heavy goods movements in Ranford which would have the effect that:

“there would be no heavy goods movements to this site at all.

It seems to me that the Council were adopting an unrealistic approach. . .

The report asserts that the officers consider the routes to the Holiday Moss tip through Rainford to offer "reasonable access to it" but such an assertion is simply not enough when the District Council knows quite well that the Rainford access, given the existing legal constraints, is not adequate for the heavy goods requirements of the site.

(…)

The problem here is the question of access in the context of a particular site, and a particular problem which is of public as well as private importance. The local authority paid lip service to the problem but made no attempt to grapple with it and to resolve the serious difficulties which the order would create.”

58.The observations of Carnwath J with respect to what was required when carrying out the balancing exercise under section 122 of the 1984 were obiter . Nevertheless, they have been followed in a number of other cases. Thus, in Trail Riders Fellowship v Hampshire County Council

[2019] EWCA Civ 1275 , under the sub-heading of “The Law”, Longmore LJ quoted at [31] from Carnwath J’s judgement in Waste Management , including the quotation set out at paragraph 55 above. Longmore LJ also referred to the comments of Cranston J in Trail Riders Fellowship v Powys County Council

[2013] EWHC 3144 (Admin) at [25], where Carnwath J’s observations were referred to approvingly. I therefore regard Carnwath J’s observations as binding on me. In any event, I would have reached the same conclusion myself on construing section 122 of the 1984 Act .

59.In the instant case, there is no explicit statement by the Council as to what “reasonable access to [the] premises” of the Claimant would be. It is implicit, however, that the officer, and by necessary implication the decision-maker, considered that “reasonable access” would be for HGVs to be permitted outside of the restricted period and for light goods vehicles within the restricted period. This is referred to in numerous places within the Officer Report. For instance, in the response to objection 21; and in setting out the benefit of the order in the table at (see paragraph 12 above), it was stated that:

“The council is proposing a measure which balances the needs of businesses against the amenity of the local area. The proposal is not a complete ban of HGV usage but targeted to peak times to provide that balance between the two uses.”

60.The matter was also addressed at paragraph 6.7 of the Officer Report, in explaining why a full-time 7.5t environmental weight restriction was not being proposed. It was explained that “access would need to be maintained for the businesses as Hambleton Grove is their sole means of access”. Further, the Officer Report addressed the objection made about section 122 of the 1984 Act by stating that “Alternative means of access can be achieved during the hours of operation from vehicles less than 7.5t.”

61.I do not consider that all of these references were mere “assertions” by the Council, as suggested by Mr Riley-Smith. They reflect a thoughtful consideration being given to the access that would be needed to the businesses on Hambleton Grove. This is in stark contrast to the situation presented to Carnwath J in Waste Management where officers had failed to grapple with the issue of reasonable access in any meaningful sense, deferring that question to what another local authority might do, and in the knowledge that the other authority may decide to ban heavy goods vehicles entirely.

62.Furthermore, whilst I note that the Officer Report did say in response to the specific objection that the question of reasonable access had to be determined before the balance under

section 122 of the 1984 Act could be struck that “This too can be measured and assessed during the process of the experiment”, the response continued by saying that “The councils duty has been considered as part of it’s reasoning under

S122 on Section 10 of this report”. The reference to section 10 must be a typographical error as that section concerns “Financial Implications”, and it is section 11 that deals with

section 122 of the 1984 Act

. In paragraph 11.7, the Officer Report states that:

“The Council has carefully considered the balance required to be struck by Section 122 of the RTRA 1984 and is of the view that an experimental traffic regulation order would be an appropriate measure to seek a balance between the provision of suitable and adequate parking facilities, the effect on the amenities of the locality affected and the effect on accessibility for businesses and residents on Hambleton Grove.”

This paragraph has to be read with the other parts of the Officer Report which (as set out above) discuss accessibility for businesses on Hambleton Grove. Accordingly, read in its proper context, the Officer Report was not saying that the determination of what was reasonable access was being deferred; rather that it already been determined, but would be examined again once the ETRO was in operation.

63.In the circumstances, had this ground of challenge not been academic, and had the error detailed in ground 1 not been made, this ground of appeal would have been dismissed.

iii.

The failure to comply with the public sector equality duty (a)

Submissions

64.Mr Riley-Smith, for the Claimant, contended that the Council failed to comply with the public sector equality duty when making the ETRO as the decision-maker did not properly consider or identify the impact that the ETRO would have on those with the protected characteristic of ‘age’, and so failed to have due regard to the equality objectives. The Council is also said to have failed to act reasonably in obtaining information about the impact from the Manor House Care Home.

65.Mr Evans resisted this challenge for the Council. He contended that the public sector equality duty was carried out. He submitted that it is clear from the documentation that equality issues were expressly considered. This is evidenced by the screening opinion, which assessed there to be no potential or likely impacts on the various protected characteristics, including age. Further, Mr Evans submitted that the substantive concern raised by the Manor House Care Home was expressly referred to and addressed in the Officer Report.

66.Mr Evans also contended that there was no error in the Council not seeking to obtain further information from the Manor House Care Home. Whether or not further information should be sought is a matter for the local authority in the first place, and can only be interfered with if the failure to seek out that information was unreasonable. An important part of the consideration in this case was that the ETRO was experimental, and the Council expressly stated that it would continue to monitor the equalities issues. In this regard, Mr Evans relied on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sheakh v Lambeth London Borough Council

[2022] EWCA Civ 457 , a case that concerned the public sector equality duty in the context of the introduction of an experimental traffic regulation order. In that case, the Court of Appeal explained at [56] that:

“The authorities show that the concept of “due regard” is highly sensitive to facts and context. How intense the “regard” must be to satisfy the requirements in section 149 will depend on the circumstances of the decision-making process in which the duty is engaged. What is “due regard” in one case will not necessarily be “due regard” in another. It will vary, perhaps widely, according to circumstances: for example, the subject-matter of the decision being made, the timing of that decision, its place in a sequence of decision-making to which it belongs, the period for which it will be in effect, the nature and scale of its potential consequences, and so forth. When the decision comes at an early stage in a series of decisions, and will not fix once and for all the impacts on people with protected characteristics, the level of assessment required to qualify as “due regard” is likely to be less demanding than if the decision is final or permanent. This may especially be so if the decision is also experimental, and is itself conducive to a more robust assessment of equality impacts later in the process.”

(b)

Discussion

67.The relevant principles for considering whether or not a public authority has complied with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 are well known: see Sheakh at [109]-[110] discussing McCombe LJ’s analysis in Bracking v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

[2013] EWCA Civ 1345 . Of particular importance in this case are the principles that: (i) the duty under section 149 of the 2010 Act is imposed on the decision-maker, and is not delegable; (ii) the duty is one of substance and not form, but there must be evidence that the public authority decision-maker has grappled rigorously with the equality issues that may arise; and (iii) public authorities need to be properly informed about the equality impacts before taking a decision.

68.There was clearly material before the Council of a potential adverse effect on a cohort of elderly persons living in the Manor House Care Home. The correspondence from the care home identified that the proposed restricted times for HGV movement could impact on their operations, and by implication the service offered to the residents: food deliveries as well as refuse and clinical waste collection. With respect to the former, what was being said was that the proposal “could affect our operation as the food is often needed for that morning or lunch”. With respect to the latter, the writer stated that he was “unsure if these times could be moved to 930am or later”.

69.The matters being referred to were not trivial: the delivery of food, and the collection of refuse and clinical waste are important matters. These are not matters that the elderly residents could be expected to sort out for themselves. Rather, they rely on the administration of the Care Home to organise.

70.According to the Officer Report, the screening opinion that was carried out did not identify these matters as giving rise to a potential adverse effect on a protected characteristic. Indeed, the section of the Officer Report headed “Equalities Implications” stated that the view of officers was that the proposed ETRO would not have “any adverse impacts on any of the protected characteristics”. I cannot be certain that the officers considered that the comments made by the Manor House Care Home raised equality considerations, but discounted them, as there is no indication from the Officer Report (or from any other material before the Court) that the care home’s comments were treated as equality matters. There is a paragraph of the Officer Report dealing with those comments, but it appears in the section of the report under the heading “Consultation Undertaken and Officer Response”, and no specific mention is made in that paragraph (5.5) to equalities.

71.In paragraph 5.5, the Officer Report asserts that “Deliveries would need to be facilitated either side of the timings proposed or in a smaller vehicle”. In making that statement, the officer is making an assumption: that it is feasible for alternative arrangements to be made. The basis for making that assumption is not set out, even though the observations made by the care home were that they were “unsure” if the times for the clinical waste and refuse collections “could be moved to 930am or later”.

72.In my judgment, there has been a failure of the Council to comply with the public sector equality duty. I assume that in exercising their functions the decision-maker relied on the Officer Report. The Officer Report does not, however, grapple sufficiently with the potentially adverse effect of the proposed ETRO on those residing in the Manor House Care Home and who share the protected characteristic of age.

73.First, the conclusion reached in the Officer Report under the heading “Equalities Implications” – that there were no adverse impacts on any of the protected characteristics – was not a reasonable one to have been arrived at. The concerns expressed by the Manor House Care Home clearly identified potential adverse effects on the operations of the care home with respect to, in particular, the collection of refuse and clinical waste, and without investigating the matter further it was simply not possible for the report writer to conclude that collections could be made outside of the restricted times or in lighter vehicles. There was no evidence to support that. Rather, the report writer should have made inquiries of the Manor House Care Home to see what alternatives were practically available. The failure to make these inquiries was, in my judgment, in contravention of the Tameside duty ( Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council

[1977] AC 1014 ), which is inherent in the “due regard” duty under section 149 of the 2010 Act .

74.Second, in any event, whilst the matters raised by the care home were considered (at paragraph 5.5), they were not analysed through the lens of section 149 of the 2010 Act : that is, whether or not the effect of the proposed ETRO would eliminate discrimination against a cohort of elderly persons, and/or advance equality of opportunity between a cohort of elderly persons and others who do not share that protected characteristic.

75.I do not consider that the Council can rely on the fact that the restrictions are experimental and that there is the possibility of modifying the restrictions during the first six months of the ETRO’s operation. The Council had been presented with a clear concern that there could be an adverse effect on a cohort of elderly people and a doubt was expressed as to whether it could be mitigated. There was no “urgency” about the introduction of the ETRO, as compared with the situation in Sheakh where the traffic measures were being introduced urgently, against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic which, per Kerr J in the Administrative Court (cited in the Court of Appeal at [60]): propelled the local authority “to curtail its research and truncate the timescale, using ETOs”.

76.Furthermore, I note that in Sheakh

, a “provisional” conclusion that the measures would not disproportionately affect people with one or more of the protected characteristics had been reached, rather than a definitive conclusion. In those circumstances, it was reasonably expected that the experimental traffic measures would provide the local authority with the necessary information on the equality impact to feed into the permanent decision on those measures. In the instant case, however, the conclusion reached by the Council (as reflected in the Officer Report) was that there were no potentially adverse impacts and the wording in paragraph 5.5 was about the measures that would “need to be facilitated”.

77.As for Mr Evans’ contention that the Claimant cannot complain about a breach of the public sector equality duty in circumstances where there is no suggestion that the landlord itself, or any of the businesses that occupy its premises, share any of the protected characteristics with the residents of the Manor House Care Home, this would have some purchase if these were judicial review proceedings and that was the only ground of challenge raised. That is not this case, however.

78.First, this a statutory application brought under paragraph 35 of Schedule 9 to the 1984 Act . This provides that:

“If any person desires to question the validity of, or of any provision contained in, an order to which this Part of this Schedule applies, on the grounds— (a)

that it is not within the relevant powers, or (b)

that any of the relevant requirements has not been complied with in relation to the order, he may, within 6 weeks from the date on which the order is made, make an application for the purpose to the High Court . . .”.

There is nothing within the statutory language which restricts an appellant to a ground of appeal which directly impacts on them.

79.Second, in any event, the Claimant has raised other grounds of challenge about the Council’s decision that it clearly has standing to raise. In those circumstances, there is nothing inappropriate about the Administrative Court, which has jurisdiction to supervise the lawfulness of public authority decision-making, going on to consider whether a particular decision is also infected by a failure to comply with the statutory obligation under section 149 of the 2010 Act .

80.Accordingly, this ground of appeal succeeds.

Conclusion

81.For the foregoing reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed.

82.At the hearing before me, it was contended by Mr Evans that the Court had a discretion as to whether to grant relief to the Claimant even if their appeal was successful, and to determine what relief was appropriate. I consider that relief should be granted to the Claimant in this case, and the appropriate relief is to quash the decision of the Council.

83.I exercise my discretion in this way because I cannot say that the same decision would, or was highly likely to, have been reached if the identified errors had not been made. With respect to the factual error which I have found to be materially misleading, I have already determined that the decision “might” have been different.

84.As for the breach of the public sector equality duty, I am unable to decide that the same conclusion would, or was highly likely to, have been reached if the errors had not been made. First, there is no material before the Court as to what the Manor House Care Home would have said had further information been sought as to the feasibility of later refuse and clinical waste collections or the use of smaller vehicles. Second, the Court cannot say what decision would have been reached had there been a proper focus on the equality issues raised by the care home.

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