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MD v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

court decision 2026-10-19 35 670 characters Digital identity and public services Social networks
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1.The Appellant, a citizen of Turkey, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision of 16 January 2025 to refuse their protection claim made on 21 September 2024. As such, ss30 -39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘ the 2022 Act ’) apply. His wife is a dependent on his claim.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

2.I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.

Background

3.The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

4.The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return due to his race, political opinion as a supporter of the HDP and imputed political opinion as a person perceived as being a supporter of the PKK. Alternatively, he claims that he is entitled to humanitarian protection and that the Respondent’s refusal breaches his rights under Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR.

Immigration History

5.The Appellant asserts that he left Turkey by lorry on 8 September 2024. He passed through various countries, before ultimately making the journey to the UK via small boat from France on 21 September 2024. He claimed asylum shortly after arrival.

The Appellant’s Claim and the Reasons for Refusal Letter.

6.The Appellant’s account is set out in detail in the documentation contained on myHMCTS. The Appellant had a screening interview on 22 September 2024 and an asylum interview on 24 January 2025. The Appellant has provided witness statements, dated 4 June 2025, 27 January 2026 and 1 October 2026 during the course of this appeal and gave oral evidence at the hearing. I do not therefore propose to set out the Appellant’s claim in significant detail in this decision. In brief terms, the Appellant asserts that:(i)

He is a national of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity.

(ii)

He worked as a barber for many years in a shop below an HDP party office. Many of his customers were members and supporters of the HDP and he regularly engaged with them. He attended a demonstration in 2018. Around 2021 he began more actively to support the HDP and placed their party brochures in his shop where he also began to host members and cook food for them.

(iii)

He was approached by the police in 2022 and asked to inform on the HDP, he refused to do so and was physically assaulted by a police officer. He was approached by the police on numerous occasions and asked to spy on the HDP but refused and regularly received death threats from the police. The police shot his dog and he was so angry and upset that he posted comments on Twitter (X) stating that the police were fascists and that they killed his dog and are hunting Kurds. He received continued threats and was attacked and stabbed by the same police officer and received hospital treatment for his injuries. He was subsequently taken in a car by the police, told that he was going to be killed and subjected to beating and violence.

(iv)

After that incident, he immediately began preparations to flee the country for his safety and left Turkey on the back of a lorry paid for by his family on 8 September 2024.

(v)

Since leaving Turkey, the police have continued to search for the Appellant and have carried out searches at his home and the home of his brother.

7.Within the RFRL, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity but did not accept the Appellant was a supporter of the HDP or that he had received adverse attention from the Turkish authorities. The Respondent considered that the Appellant had provided an account which was both internally and externally inconsistent without reasonable explanation and lacking in detail. The Respondent concluded that the Appellant had been inconsistent as to when he was first introduced to the HDP, and the reasons he has given for deciding to support the party are regarded by the Respondent to be unreasonable. The Respondent also considered that the Appellant did not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the HDP party when asked about its aims and that the reason he gave for displaying HDP brochures in his shop was unreasonable. The Respondent further considered that his account of receiving threats from 8 different police officers on multiple occasions lacks credibility because it is considered unreasonable that the police would not act on the threats sooner and she asserts that he failed to provide evidence that he would be at risk of persecution for his political activities in Turkey. The Respondent concluded that the Appellant would not be at risk on return and that the protection claim should therefore be refused. The Respondent further concluded that the refusal did not breach Article 8.

HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE

8.The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings. I verified that the parties had uploaded all evidence upon which they intended to rely to myHMCTS and it was all included within the Stitched Bundle (SB).

Issues

9.Ms Carrington-Wolf confirmed that a standalone Article 8 claim is not pursued. The Respondent has accepted that sufficient protection and internal relocation would not be available if the Appellant’s account were accepted.

10.The parties agree that the following issues remain in dispute:

(a)

Credibility (b)

Risk on return

Evidence and Submissions

11.I heard evidence from the Appellant who adopted his statements and was then cross examined by Ms Kavanagh.

12.I heard submissions from Ms Kavanagh and Ms Carrington-Wolf. I reserved my decision.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

13.To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act , in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK ( s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a)

Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a Convention reason?

(b)

Does the Appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

14.If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c)

The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;

(d)

There would not be sufficient protection available; and (e)

The Appellant could not internally relocate.

15.To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds, the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

FINDINGS

Appeal on Asylum Grounds

Credibility

16.The assessment of credibility is a holistic exercise of judgement which requires the Tribunal to consider all the relevant evidence in reaching a conclusion. An assessment of credibility can only be properly made against the background evidence. An individual’s account must also be assessed on the basis of its cultural and societal context.

17.The approach to the assessment of future risk is a single-stage process of evaluating all the evidence for what it is worth ( Karanakaran v Home Secretary

[2000] 3 All ER 449 ). The approach to the evidence as set out in that case does not entail the decision maker purporting to find ‘proved’ facts, whether past or present about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, but means that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future, unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur.

18.In KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan

[2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) , the Upper Tribunal held that the ‘Credibility Indicators’ identified in the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction, Assessing credibility and refugee status Version 3.0, 6 January 2015 (which can be summarised as comprising sufficiency of detail; internal consistency; external consistency; and plausibility), provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment. However, they are merely indicators, not necessary conditions; they are not an exhaustive list; assessment of credibility being a highly fact-sensitive affair, their main role is to help make sure, where relevant, that the evidence is considered in a number of well-recognised respects; making use of these indicators is not a substitute for the requirement to consider the evidence as a whole or “in the round”.

Objective Evidence and Country Guidance

19.I have been referred to the following CPINS:i)

CPIN Turkey: Kurdistan People’s Democratic Party (HDP) October 2023.

ii)

CPIN Kurds, Turkey, July 2025

20.I give weight to the CPINs which were prepared using a number of external sources, which have all been explicitly referenced within the documents themselves.

21.In the Turkey Country Guidance case of IK (Returnees, Records, IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 312, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal restated the list of potential risk factors from IA & Ors (Risk, Guidelines, Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034.

“The following are the factors which we consider to be material in giving rise to potential suspicion in the minds of the authorities concerning a particular claimant.

a)

The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.

b)

Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.

c)

Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.

d)

Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.

e)

The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.

f)

Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP.

g)

How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.

h)

Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.

i)

Kurdish ethnicity.

j)

Alevi faith.

k)

Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.

l)

Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.

m)

Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.

n)

Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.

o)

If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return. Following Sepet of course this alone is not a basis for a refugee or human rights claim.”

22.Both

IK and the Respondent’s October 2023 CPIN confirm that large numbers of supporters and members of HDP have been arrested, detained and ill-treated by the authorities. I note that these can include low level individuals [12.4] and those involved with leafleting [12.4.5], attending gatherings and demonstrations [12.4.10] can lead to arrests and detention. ‘Ordinary’ members are most likely to come to adverse attention of the authorities in the context of attending demonstrations or rallies or otherwise vocalising their political belief [3.1.4] and those who canvas for the party may attract the attention of the authorities [12.4.5]. I bear in mind that the Appellant contends that he first came to the adverse attention of the police after displaying the party’s literature in his shop

.

The CPIN also cites several sources who state that the government perceives those with links to HDP to also be involved with the PKK [9.4] or indeed anyone who spoke out against the government could be perceived as supporting the PKK.

23.The October 2023 CPIN also contains numerous references and hyperlinks to the Respondent’s own Fact-Finding Mission report of 1 October 2019 (entitled ‘Turkey: Kurds, the HDP and the PKK). That document further evidences the conflation between the PKK and HDP. The report confirms that anyone who speaks out against the government on issues of Kurdish rights could, in the current context, be seen to be supporting the PKK [1.3.2]. Several sources pointed to the government seeking a link between the HDP and the PKK [3.1.1]. An HDP MP perceives that the government considers HDP supporters as terrorists and Kurds as supporters of the HDP. The report again reiterates that low-level members of the HDP are targeted by the authorities and anyone who criticises the president is likely to be arrested, detained, imprisoned and criminalised [3.2.1]. The report also confirms the propensity of authorities in Turkey to attempt to recruit Kurds as informants [7.18.3].

24.I reiterate that whilst I have not summarised the same in great detail, I have considered the various objective evidence available at length – to include that contained in the Appellant’s bundle and referenced in the ASA. I find that several aspects of the Appellant’s account are consistent with the objective evidence, which weighs in favour of the overall credibility of his account. I expand upon that reasoning in my consideration of some of the specific points raised by the Respondent below.

Appellant’s Evidence

25.I have carefully considered the Appellant’s interviews, statements and oral evidence. I find that the Appellant has given a broadly consistent account of his involvement with the HDP and the adverse attention that he claims to have received since his first contact with immigration services on arrival in the UK. He has maintained, for example, ever since screening interview that he has always been a supporter of the HDP without a formal role. His account of the adverse attention he and his family have received from the police has also been relatively detailed. This broad consistency weighs in favour of the Appellant’s account. I also find that many aspects of his account are externally consistent with the Respondent’s own objective evidence and report – to include the attempts to recruit him as an informant and his criminalisation by suggestion that he is involved with the PKK because of his involvement with the HDP and his social media posts speaking out against the government with reference to Kurdish rights.

26.Turning to the matters raised by the Respondent in the RFRL, Review and submissions: i)

I do not accept that the Appellant has been inconsistent about when he was introduced to the party and why he decided to support the party. The reasons given by the Appellant during his asylum interview are consistent with what he has stated in his witness statement and in oral evidence. It is entirely credible and plausible that, as a barber with a shop below the HDP office, the vast majority of his clientele would be supporters or members of the HDP party whom he would build up relationships over many years and that he would be introduced to the party and become a supporter in that way. He explains how he built up trusted friendships, particularly with one individual in the party who helped him with money to purchase a bike when he could not get a loan from elsewhere, which made him feel indebted and loyal to them. That led to him deciding fully to support the HDP and agreeing to display their literature in his shop, whilst understanding that it involved some risk. The Respondent asserts that it is unreasonable that he would not be able to remember when he was first introduced to the party and that he gave an unreasonable explanation for deciding to display HDP brochures. I do not find that assertion made out. The Appellant has given an entirely plausible and sensible explanation of how he became involved as a supporter of the HDP with reference to his own particular circumstances, and in some detail, and I find his account entirely plausible and credible.

ii)

The RFRL asserts the Appellant had been unable to give a detailed answer about aims of HDP party which damages his credibility, with reference to AIR 54. This ignores the fact that the Appellant goes on in the same interview, at AIR 66 and AIR 67, to answer questions about the HDP campaigning for equality of Kurdish people and in what respects those aims if realised would impact his life as a Kurdish man – in circumstances where the CPIN describes the HDP as a pro-Kurdish party. I do not accept that the Respondent has established that, when read as a whole, the interview is indicative of a lack of knowledge about the party. I also, as a general principle, do not accept that a person needs to have a sophisticated or in-depth political knowledge to be a supporter of a political party in any event and that a mere desire to support Kurdish rights could clearly be sufficient motivation to support the party.

iii)

The RFRL asserts that the Appellant’s account in his asylum interview of receiving threats from 8 different police officers on multiple occasions lacks credibility because it is considered unreasonable that the police would not act on the threats sooner. However, the Appellant has given detailed evidence about the threats and violence he received from the police following his repeated refusals, including being choked by an officer, his dog being shot and killed, being stabbed outside his shop and being taken away by police and assaulted. I do not find the Respondent’s assertion made out. At hearing, Ms Kavanagh submitted that the Appellant’s evidence about the number of times the police made attempts to recruit him as an informer was inconsistent which damages his credibility. She submitted that in his witness statement the Appellant had said 4 or 5 times but in his asylum interview had said it was 8. However, the asylum interview record is clear that the Appellant said that 8 separate officers approached him, not that the police came to his shop 8 times. He explained during cross-examination when asked about this, that the police attended at his shop about 5 times and, on those visits, he was asked more than once. That explanation is entirely reasonable, and I do not find any inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence on that matter.

iv)

In submissions on behalf of the Respondent, Ms Kavanagh submitted that the Appellant had been inconsistent about being detained or arrested as his answer in his screening interview was that he had not been, yet he described being “arrested” in his first witness statement and, when asked about this incident in cross-examination, agreed with Ms Kavanagh when she suggested that he had been detained. However, the Appellant’s own evidence at hearing was that this was not an official arrest. He was told to say goodbye to his family, taken by the police to a remote, unofficial, location and severely beaten and left there. Ms Kavanagh submitted that the fact that the Appellant has provided an arrest warrant for a date later that same month (dated 19/9/24), but that there is no documentary evidence about his arrest or detention that he has described on 7/9/24 undermines the credibility of his account. I do not find any inconsistency in his account. The words arrested, detained, taken, are used interchangeably by the Appellant to describe what happened when the police came and took him away in a police car to an isolated area near a dam. He clearly means that he was detained unofficially, rather than any formal arrest or detention procedure being instigated by the police. I find that there is no inconsistency in the Appellant’s account and nor do I find it implausible that there is no arrest warrant for the 7/9/24 in circumstances where the police were conducting an unofficial arrest or detention.

v)

In her submissions, Ms Kavanagh raised a point about an apparent discrepancy in the timeline of events set out by the Appellant in his asylum interview and his first witness statement which she submitted undermined the Appellant’s credibility. The Appellant has stated that the attack on him outside his shop when he was stabbed and received hospital treatment was on 30/1/23. His evidence is that the devastating earthquake in Turkey happened a week later. The Appellant refers to the earthquake which had a huge impact on the country, which he describes in his asylum interview as being “upside down”, and also a huge impact on the Appellant himself who lost many relatives and who had to move with his family to live in a container. In his asylum interview and his first witness statement, the Appellant describes the unofficial arrest when he was taken to the isolated area and beaten as happening around 8-9 months later. According to that timeline, it would have been around September 2023. However, his second witness statement states that it was in September 2024, and the Appellant was certain in his oral evidence that the incident took place on 7 th and 8 th

September 2024, and not a year earlier. The Appellant’s narrative and detailed description of what happened has remained consistent and he clearly talks about that incident being the event which prompted him to leave Turkey immediately for his safety I am satisfied that there has been an error in the stated timeline, most likely something was lost in translation during interview, with the Appellant stating a year and 8-9 months but that being recorded as 8-9 months, and that error then was replicated in his first witness statement. I am satisfied that, despite this error in the stated timeline, the final attack in Turkey was on 8 September 2024 and the Appellant left the country immediately after that.

Supporting Documentary Evidence

27.In considering the documentary evidence provided, I have adopted the approach in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] Imm AR 318. Documentary evidence along with its provenance needs to be weighed in the light of all the evidence in the case. Documentary evidence does not carry with it a presumption of authenticity, which specific evidence must disprove, failing which its content must be accepted. What is required is its appraisal in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and in the light of all the other evidence in the case, especially that given by the Appellant.

28.The RFRL submitted that newspaper articles submitted by the Appellant in support of his claim were of little weight because they had not been translated. The Appellant has provided official translations for this appeal. One of the articles is an article about the incident outside the Appellant’s shop when he was stabbed and taken to the hospital for treatment. The article names the Appellant, using the initials he is known by, and describes the incident consistently with the Appellant’s account. Ms Kavanagh suggested that, because it does not name the police being involved, that undermines the credibility of the account. Ms Carrington-Wolf submitted that a Turkish newspaper is hardly likely to report police being involved in an incident where one of their officers stabbed a citizen. The Respondent in her Review states that, although the Appellant has submitted photos of his injuries, there is no medical documentation to explain the nature, cause or timing of these injuries or who they were caused by. However, the Appellant has provided the hospital report of the same date which includes details of the injuries he was treated for, which are corroborative of the Appellant’s own account of the injuries he sustained, and the report also makes reference to the Appellant having stated that he was assaulted by plainclothes police officers, which is consistent with the Appellant’s account.

29.The Respondent’s Review comments that witness statements from the Appellant’s brother and mother are uncorroborated and vague, with no documentary evidence to substantiate their claims. The Review also asserts, whilst noting that the Appellant has submitted photographs of a news article showing a photo of a dead dog, a news article about the police shooting a dog, there is no evidence to demonstrate any connection between the dog’s death and any claimed adverse attention from the authorities.

30.Ms Kavanagh further highlighted the Appellant’s failure to submit the Twitter (X) message posts that he claims to have made following his dog being shot and submitted that his explanation for no longer having access to these messages has been inconsistent and lacks credibility.

31.The Appellant has, however, submitted a number of documents accessed from his e-devlet account in Turkey and also included witness statements explaining the provenance of these documents. The documents and official translations are at SB 272-311 and include an arrest warrant for the Appellant, the hospital medical report, investigation reports from the public prosecutor’s office and reports of raids and searches conducted at the Appellant’s home address. The documents include the e-devlet barcode for authentication and link to the site. This evidence has not been challenged by the Respondent and I place significant weight on this evidence.

32.Although the Appellant has not submitted the Twitter posts from his own account, which he has explained he deleted following his discovery of the arrest warrant, the official documents taken from his e-devlet account refer to the posts and replicate some of these verbatim. The posts clearly refer to the Appellant’s dog being killed by the police, the Appellant having been stabbed and his shop being located beneath the HDP office. It is clear that the documents relate to the Appellant and corroborate his account. They also include investigation reports of searches conducted for the Appellant at his mother’s house, which corroborate the accounts given by the Appellant and his witnesses. The documents from the public prosecutor’s office state the reasons why the Appellant is considered to be suspected of committing offences of insulting the state and issuing propaganda of a terrorist organisation, with express reference to the Appellant’s social media posts. I find, contrary to the Respondent’s assertion in her Review summarised at paragraph 29 above, that the Appellant has provided corroborative documentary evidence and the authenticity of that evidence has not been challenged by the Respondent.

33.The Appellant’s third witness statement refers to a package left at the door of his family home in August 2026, which included bullets and a USB drive. He has provided a video of what was on the USB drive and translation of the audio text, and there is a further witness statement from his brother explaining the circumstances and outlining a further police raid on the family home in September 2026, accompanied by photographs which show the Appellant’s brother in the street engaging with the police, said to be outside his home during the raid, and translations of related WhatsApp messages. Ms Kavanagh submitted that it is speculative that the person in the USB drive video is linked to the police as there are no identifiable features to link the man in the video to the police, given his face cannot be seen, and there could be numerous reasons for the police attending the street outside the Appellant’s house. The Appellant’s evidence is that he recognised the voice of the man in the video as the police officer who had previously attacked him. Applying Tanveer Ahmed , I do place weight on this supporting documentary evidence as corroborative of the Appellant’s account.

Credibility conclusion

34.I have considered the evidence as a whole and in the round. I have accepted that there is support for the Appellant’s account in the objective evidence. I have found that whilst those with a lower political profile are generally less likely to come to adverse attention, the Appellant’s claimed experiences, in terms of his support for the HDP, his canvassing for them by offering HDP literature in his barber’s shop, the police attempts to recruit him as an informer, his claimed ill-treatment, his criminalisation following posts critical of treatment of Kurds and ongoing surveillance action are all, in my view, externally consistent. I find that this weighs in favour of the Appellant’s account.

35.I similarly find that the Appellant’s account has been broadly internally consistent. I have given limited weight to a number of the matters raised by the Respondent in the RFRL and Review.

36.In considering the usual credibility indicators, I have found that as regards the core of his account, the Appellant has demonstrated sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility.

37.Having viewed all of the evidence holistically, I find the Appellant’s account to be credible. I accept his account of events in Turkey even on the higher standard of the balance of probabilities. I accept his account of having been asked to be an informer for the HDP, his repeated refusals and his subsequent ill-treatment, including his dog being shot and him being threatened and physically assaulted. I accept that he made social media posts online that referred to these events and that these have resulted in an arrest warrant being issued alleging terrorism offences. I accept that the Appellant left Turkey after he was detained or taken by the police and attacked in September 2024 and that it is plausible that the authorities have retained an interest in him.

Risk on Return

38.I consider the risk of return in light of my findings above. There was no dispute that the non-exhaustive list of potential risk factors set out in IA continues to apply or of the ongoing relevance of IK . In respect of those factors:i)

The Appellant is a Kurd.

ii)

I have accepted that there is a past history of detention involving ill-treatment.

iii)

I have accepted that the Appellant was asked to report back to the police and had been asked to provide some specific information to them (and refused to do so).

iv)

There is evidence before me that enquiries have continued to be made as to his whereabouts after departure.

v)

The Appellant left Turkey relatively quickly after his last detention.

vi)

I accept the Appellant does not have his Turkish passport vii)

The Appellant has completed his compulsory military service and would not be treated as a military evader on return viii)

The Appellant has family members in Turkey, to include parents and siblings but there is no evidence that they have come to the adverse attention of authorities.

ix)

The Appellant has not attended HDP or Kurdish political activities in the UK. The Appellant does not rely upon the same in assessing risk.

39.The question of risk must, in my view, be considered in the context of the Appellant no longer having access to his passport, such that he would require emergency travel documents.

IK contains a detailed discussion of the questions that may be faced on return and in circumstances where I have found that the Appellant has genuine political opinions and beliefs, he could not be expected to lie to such questions.

IK also deals with the information available to police at the airport and the ability they have to make further enquiries. There is also the extant arrest warrant which states that, after his statement has been taken, the Appellant shall be detained.

40.I have borne in mind that 3.1.5 of the CPIN suggests that “being arrested and detained is not the same as, and does not automatically equate to, a well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of harm”. I have considered the position carefully but in view of my findings above, both as to the past ill-treatment that the Appellant has endured (which is relevant to Paragraph 339K), the circumstances of his departure, the circumstances in which he would return and my analysis of the IA factors, I am satisfied that on the facts of this appeal, the threshold is met.

Asylum Claim – Overall Conclusion

41.The legal framework section above sets out the questions I must consider.

42.In considering whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason, I remind myself that JCK emphasises that this question does involve an evaluation of risk. The question should be evaluated on the evidence in the round, but care should be taken not to reject a claimed characteristic, by reference to the overall credibility of the claim

. I have accepted that the Appellant was politically active in Turkey and a supporter of the HDP. In view of the objective evidence, I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason.

43.I have found that the Appellant is credible and have accepted his account of events in Turkey. In light of those findings, I am satisfied that he does, on the balance of probabilities, fear persecution. I also find that it is reasonably likely that he would be persecuted on return to Turkey. The Respondent has conceded that sufficient protection and internal relocation are not available. It follows therefore that the asylum appeal must succeed. I accordingly dismiss the Humanitarian Protection appeal.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal on asylum grounds is allowed.

The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.

ANONYMITY ORDER

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and/or any member of his family, is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

As I have allowed the appeal, I have considered whether or not to make a fee award. I have decided to make a fee award in respect of any fee which has been paid or is payable because there is no reason for the fee award not to follow the outcome of the appeal.

Signed V Davies Date 19 October 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge V Davies