360 Recruitment Limited v Samuel Amos & Anor

1.This is my judgment following the trial of this action which took place on 14, 15, 16 and 17 July 2026.

The Parties

2.The Claimant ( 360 ) is a specialist recruitment agency, which supplies temporary and permanent staff to nationwide clients across a range of industries, including construction, engineering and manufacturing. 360 was incorporated in 2010 and operates from offices in London and Nottingham. The company’s directors are Greg Tyler ( Mr Tyler ), Leigh Osborne ( Mr Osborne ) and Maxine Osborne ( Ms Osborne ).

3.The First Defendant ( Mr Amos ) is a recruitment consultant who was employed by 360 from 14 July 2021 until 27 March 2026 under a written contract of employment dated 15 July 2021 ( the Employment Contract ).

4.The Second Defendant ( Barker Ross ) is a specialist recruitment agency operating from offices in Nottingham. It provides temporary and permanent staff to clients across the country, including in the construction industry.

The Facts

5.Mr Amos began his employment with 360 in July 2021. His case is that he initially worked as a Resourcer, registering and interviewing candidates and dealing with other administrative tasks. His salary was £24,000 per annum, together with a modest bonus of 5% of the margin on any job which he helped to fill.

6.Mr Amos says that the following year he became a Recruitment Consultant after a short period as a Trainee Recruitment Consultant. He was promoted subsequently on more than one occasion. He became a Senior Recruitment Consultant in 2025, and then a Principal Recruitment Consultant in 2026. However, the Employment Contract was not updated, and his core terms of employment remained the same throughout.

7.The Employment Contract referred to Mr Amos as a Recruitment Consultant. It contained a 4-week notice period, express obligations relating to confidentiality, an obligation to delete and/or deliver up data belonging to 360 on leaving its employment and post-termination restrictive covenants of 6 months’ duration (inclusive of any period of garden leave).

8.The covenants included non-solicitation and non-dealing covenants relating to 360’s clients and prospective clients, non-poaching covenants (relating to 360’s employees and to temporary workers), a non-competition covenant and a covenant prohibiting Mr Amos from representing himself as being associated with 360 or its group of companies. The contract also provided for Mr Amos to notify 360 if he were to be approached to work for a competitor.

9.On any view, Mr Amos was a high performer. He brought in substantial revenue for 360. He had a budgeted turnover of approximately £2 million per annum. In his last 12 months at 360, he generated revenue of approximately £262,000 in terms of gross profit. He specialised in the waste, aggregates and prefabricated concrete sector and he had autonomy to build, develop and manage client accounts within that sector. He had responsibility for 25 to 30 clients. He operated alone at 360 in this area and, as Mr Tyler observed, “360 had no clients that [he] could inherit on joining, so all of his clients had to be developed from scratch.” He was, in effect, 360’s waste, aggregates and prefabricated concrete department. He reported to the Board of 360.

10.Mr Amos built a number of strong relationships with 360’s clients, including with Unbrako Pre-cast Concrete Limited ( Unbrako ) and Oranmore Precast (Lound) Limited ( Oranmore ). In his last 12 months at 360, he placed 35 candidates at Oranmore and 48 candidates at Unbrako.

11.360 apparently had concerns about Mr Amos’s performance in 2024, leading to a disciplinary hearing on 16 October 2024, which was attended by Mr Amos, Mr Tyler and 360’s Client Development Manager, Sam Ryan ( Mr Ryan ). The meeting focused on issues of administration, compliance, attendance and performance. It appears to have been conducted amicably and it did not lead to any formal sanctions being imposed on Mr Amos.

12.At some point in August or September 2025, 360 decided to monitor Mr Amos’s activities at work. Mr Tyler says that he took this decision with Ms Osborne but that they did not document it. The monitoring began on 1 September 2025. 360 used systems known as Teramind and Arc-Titan , which, according to Mr Tyler, are able to observe “every single interaction made while a user is operating a company device.” The software enabled 360 to monitor in real time, or to play back, screen recordings of the computer use of the employee being observed.

13.360’s case is that this surveillance was entirely legitimate. Mr Amos had signed a single page document on 14 July 2021 and 15 November 2022, which stated: -

“ Use of computers (see company handbook)

The Company’s IT, Communication and Monitoring Policy, is designed to protect the Company’s computer equipment, prevent inappropriate use and protect confidential data stored on computer files. Every employee must ensure that his/her conduct conforms to the standards set out in this policy”.

14.360 has not been able to produce copies of the 2021 or 2022 versions of its IT, Communication and Monitoring Policy which correspond to the documents signed by Mr Amos. The 2025 version has been disclosed, and it contains the following: -

“All IT systems, devices, and data created, stored, sent, or received using company systems are the property of [360]. Employees should have no expectation of privacy when using company systems, except where required or protected by law.

Any monitoring is conducted in accordance with UK GDPR; Data Protection Act 2018 ; Guidance issued by the Information Commissioner’s Office…

All monitoring is: Proportionate; Relevant to business needs; and not excessive or intrusive beyond necessity.”

15.On 8 October 2025, Mr Amos contacted his friend, Leah Fryett ( Ms Fryett ) who worked for Barker Ross, making it clear that he was looking to leave 360 because “it’s very toxic and there’s no support and I just need somewhere new.” Later that day, Ms Fryett reported back to Mr Amos that Barker Ross’s CEO, Paul Ross ( Mr Ross ) wanted to meet him.

16.Shortly afterwards on 8 October 2025, Mr Amos was in contact by WhatsApp message with Barker Ross’s Regional Director, Laura Knight ( Ms Knight ), when he told her “it’s definitely certain that I will be working elsewhere by early next year. Yes of course you’re one of my biggest competitors…”

17.Mr Amos met Mr Ross and Ms Knight in a bar on 13 October 2025 to discuss working with them.

18.On 24 October 2025, Ms Knight left a voice note for Mr Amos, saying “we’re absolutely keen and delighted that you’re happy and wanting to progress as well.”

19.In November 2025, Mr Amos was in contact with his friend, Shane Bannister ( Mr Bannister ), who worked for Net Temps, a competitor of 360 and Barker Ross. He made clear to Mr Bannister that he was unhappy in his role at 360. He was evidently exploring the possibility of a move to Net Temps, which had employed him before he worked at 360. Mr Bannister warned him about contacting clients because he would not be able to take their business with him when he left 360. Mr Amos replied: -

“I’ll make it work mate don’t worry they don’t even know anything about what I do. Never took the time to learn and that will be the best thing when I leave.”

20.On 13 November 2025, Mr Amos sent an email from his work address at 360 to his personal email address, attaching copies of statements evidencing the commission which he had been paid by 360 ( the Commission Statements ). They contained a breakdown of the commission which he had received in relation to each relevant client. The email contained the line “Hi Laura”, from which it later became apparent that he intended to send the Commission Statements to Ms Knight.

21.The same day, he forwarded those statements to Ms Knight, saying,

“These are my commission statements from a few months that I can find.

I have not cherry picked them and they should all be pretty similar as I do about £20,000- £25,000 on average. Max £30,000 per month.

Do you want anything else from me?”

22.The Commission Statements contained what has been described as the Margin Report Information, which has been defined in the Particulars of Claim as “the costs incurred including the cost rate per hour, the margin, the percentage margin per hour for each of [those] clients.”

23.Ms Knight emailed the Commission Statements to Mr Ross shortly afterwards, without comment.

24.Ms Knight sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Amos on 3 December 2025, saying that she was happy to “discuss, amend and finalise the budget so it works to suit.” She suggested a meeting the following week with a view to Barker Ross formalising an offer to him.

25.Mr Amos replied on 5 December 2025 saying, “obviously it’s daunting with [covenants] but I’m up for a challenge and excited for it all!!”

26.Mr Amos had a further meeting with Ms Knight on 11 December 2025.

27.Ms Knight sent Mr Amos a WhatsApp message on 22 December 2025, telling him, “we’ve finalised your budget for Year 2”.

28.Ms Knight sent a further WhatsApp message to Mr Amos on 5 January 2026, saying that she had noted from WhatsApp that he had been promoted at 360 and asking whether that development had changed his plans. Mr Amos replied, telling her that he had received a substantial pay rise but that he had already known that he was to be promoted. He subsequently spoke to Ms Knight and, on 8 January 2026, she sent him a message, telling him that Mr Ross “still feels there is a deal to be done to suit us all.”

29.There was a further meeting between Mr Amos, Ms Knight and Mr Ross on 12 January 2026.

30.It appears that an agreement in principle was reached at that meeting. The following day, Ms Knight confirmed to Mr Amos that she would have a contract sent to him. The same day, Mr Amos sent the Employment Contract to Ms Knight, who replied that she would forward it to Barker Ross’s adviser for review.

31.There was mention in the messages of a “strategy plan” which Mr Amos said had “sealed the deal of me leaving”.

32.Barker Ross produced a “welcome letter” for Mr Amos (which was apparently not given to him until he joined the company). It expressed the company’s commitment to Mr Amos being a “good leaver” and not breaching his covenants with 360.

33.A formal contract was sent to him on 13 January 2026.

34.On 19 January 2026, Ms Knight wrote to Mr Amos, as follows:-

“…I spoke to Paul and he’s said to reassure there’s nothing in there we haven’t seen before – but we’ll run it by our solicitors just to belt and braces. He said to mention we’re a team on that and as long as you do only what we agree between us to be the best way forward then we will be absolutely backing you and will shield you from anything we can.”

35.Mr Amos replied:-

“…they’re pretty brutal here so will tread carefully as if anything goes wrong I don’t want either of us to be threatened with a bill!!”

36.On 20 January 2026, Mr Amos sent a LinkedIn message to Mr Bannister, indicating that he would not be taking up any offer of employment with Net Temps because it worked for the same clients as he did.

37.On 6 February 2026, in a LinkedIn conversation with his friend Monty Woodward ( Mr Woodward ), Mr Amos wrote that he didn’t “have any [covenants] as well as they already deal with my clients.”

38.Mr Amos received a formal offer of employment from Barker Ross on 6 February 2026 in which it was suggested that he would be engaged in a new area of work, piling and ground engineering.

39.Mr Amos resigned from his role at 360 on 27 February 2026, indicating that his last day was to be 28 March 2026. He had given Ms Knight advance warning that he was going to give notice to 360.

40.On 2 March 2026, Ms Fryett sent emails to Rikki Mann ( Mr Mann ) of Oranmore, Jamie Lodge ( Mr Lodge ) of Unbrako and to ABM Precast Solutions Limited ( ABM ), another client with which Mr Amos had worked closely, attaching client account forms to be completed.

41.Mr Tyler conducted a “one-to-one” handover of work with Mr Amos over 3 days at the beginning of March 2026.

42.Emails were sent to Mr Amos’s key clients in his name on 3 March 2026 informing them that he was leaving 360. Mr Tyler was the author of the final paragraph of the email, which read: -

“While the business makes the right decision about who to appoint as my replacement, my colleague Sam Ryan will take over the daily running of your account and once 360 have identified a suitable replacement he will be in touch to introduce them and to continue our long-standing relationship.”

43.360 placed Mr Amos on garden leave on 4 March 2026. Lewis Railton ( Mr Railton ) was appointed as Mr Amos’s successor the following week.

44.It is 360’s case that it launched an internal investigation and that its suspicions and concerns were aroused by the draft “Hi Laura” email, the communications which Mr Amos had had with Mr Bannister (indicating in their view an intention to take clients from 360), the fact that he had sent PAYE calculators ( PAYE Excels ) and marketing communications ( the Electronic Marketing Materials ) to his private email address from his 360 email address and the fact that he appeared to have removed hard copy marketing materials ( the Hard Copy Marketing Materials ) from 360’s premises.

45.360’s solicitors ( JMW ) sent an 8-page letter to Mr Amos on Friday, 27 March 2026, setting out 360’s concerns and demanding a response and undertakings by 4pm on Wednesday, 1 April 2026.

46.The Defendants’ solicitors ( SM ) provided a holding reply on 1 April 2026, objecting to the timescale imposed by JMW, the content of JMW’s letter and 360’s failure to comply with the applicable pre-action protocol.

47.SM provided a substantive reply to JMW’s letter on 8 April 2026.

48.On 13 April 2026, JMW wrote to Barker Ross seeking undertakings from it.

49.SM replied on behalf of Barker Ross the following day, 14 April 2026, refusing to provide the undertakings being sought.

Procedural Background

50.On 5 May 2026, 360 issued these proceedings and an application for injunctive relief, which I heard on 18 May 2026. At that hearing ( the Interim Hearing ), 360 was represented by Tina Ranales-Cotos of Counsel and the Defendants were represented by Ms Donnelly KC.

51.I refused the interim injunction application on the basis that I was prepared to accept the undertakings which had been offered by the Defendants shortly before the hearing. Mr Amos undertook not to solicit or attempt to solicit the business of various named clients and prospective clients of 360 and not to employ or attempt to employ any of 360’s senior employees until 4 September 2026 or, if earlier, the date on which this judgment was to be handed down.

52.Mr Amos and Barker Ross also undertook to produce, within 2 days of any request by 360 to do so, a signed statement confirming that they had not made use of any of the information contained in the Commission Statements, that they would erase irretrievably the Commission Statements and that they would produce statements confirming that they had done so and that they did not hold any information or property belonging to 360.

53.However, 360 did not request the signed statements until 10 June 2026, shortly after the Defences had been served, highlighting the absence of such a request. The statements were then signed and served by the Defendants on 13 June 2026.

54.At the Interim Hearing, I also made a conventional directions order and I listed the expedited liability trial.

55.On the first day of the trial I began to hear the Defendants’ application for permission to rely on the witness statement of Sophie McQueen ( Ms McQueen ), who is Mr Amos’s partner and has at all material times been (and continues to be) employed by 360. Ms McQueen’s statement was served with a hearsay notice. She was unable to attend trial because she had given birth 3 weeks before the trial began.

56.The application was opposed by 360 but was compromised by consent at the hearing, with 360 agreeing to withdraw certain parts of some of its witness statements on the basis that only a limited section of Ms McQueen’s evidence would be admitted into evidence.

57.360 had made an application for specific disclosure which was resolved by agreement. The costs of both applications were reserved until the end of the trial.

58.Following closing submissions, I reserved judgment, and I circulated my draft judgment to the parties’ legal representatives on 27 August 2026.

The Parties’ Positions

59.360 alleges that Mr Amos is liable for breaches of contract, his implied duty of good faith and fidelity, his implied duty of trust and confidence and his equitable duty of confidence in respect of confidential information. At this stage, 360 seeks injunctive relief against Mr Amos. It also claims damages and equitable compensation, to be assessed in due course.

60.360’s claim against Barker Ross is for procuring breaches of Mr Amos’s contract, breach of its equitable duty of confidence, and knowing receipt in relation to the Commission Statements. 360 seeks damages in due course, along with springboard injunctive relief at this stage.

61.Mr Amos and Barker Ross deny all aspects of 360’s claim.

Assessment of the witnesses’ evidence

62.360 relies on the evidence of Mr Tyler, Mr Railton, Mr Ryan, its Senior Team Leader, Scott Merrell ( Mr Merrell ), and its Principal Consultant, Elena Marchetti ( Ms Marchetti ). The Defendants rely on the evidence of Mr Amos, Ms Knight, Mr Ross, Ms Fryett, Ms McQueen, Ricki Mann of Oranmore ( Mr Mann ) and Jamie Lodge of Unbrako ( Mr Lodge ). I heard oral evidence from all the witnesses, save for Ms McQueen.

63.In assessing the reliability of the witnesses’ oral evidence, I have reflected on the much-quoted observations of Leggatt J (as he then was) in Gestmin SGPS S.A. v Credit Suisse Limited [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) and on his focus on the extent to which memory is reliable, the need to exercise caution when placing weight on witnesses’ recollections, particularly when they relate to events occurring some years in the past and the importance of basing factual findings on documentary evidence and known facts.

64.I remind myself to be cautious about oral recollection and only to make findings of fact after considering all the evidence, both oral and documentary, and after reflecting on the inherent probability of the evidence.

65.I bear in mind the helpful guidance given in Phipson on Evidence 20 th Ed at 45.18, namely that, when assessing the reliability of a witness’s evidence, I should take account of the following matters: -

(1)the consistency or otherwise of the witness’s evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred.

(2)the internal consistency of the witness’s evidence.

(3)the consistency of a witness’s evidence with statements made by that witness on other occasions.

(4)the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation.

(5)lies established in evidence or in the context of proceedings.

(6)the demeanour of the witness, and

(7)the inherent probability of the witness’s account being true.

66.I have been greatly assisted by the documents to which I have been referred, and I am grateful to the parties’ solicitors for the production of helpful trial bundles.

67.I need to make findings of fact. I remind myself that I may only find a fact proved if I am satisfied, on the evidence which I have heard and read, that it is more likely than not to be true. In other words, each such fact must be proved on the balance of probabilities.

Analysis and Conclusions

The Witnesses

68.I shall begin by making some observations about the evidence given by the witnesses.

69.Although Mr Tyler was, in large part, a reasonable witness, there were aspects of his evidence which caused me concern.

70.At times, he appeared to be wedded to the case advanced on behalf of 360, with the result that he found it difficult to be objective in his responses to Ms Oldham’s skilful cross-examination. This was particularly evident when he was asked to explain what was particularly confidential about the PAYE Excels and when his understanding of GDPR issues was explored. I found his evidence on those issues to be unsatisfactory. In relation to the latter issue, he appeared not to appreciate the significance of 360’s decision to monitor so many of its employees without ensuring that it was lawful and appropriate to do so.

71.Mr Tyler struck me as evasive when he was responding to questions relating to 360’s surveillance of Mr Amos. In particular, he struggled to give a clear and persuasive explanation for why the decision was made to implement that surveillance.

72.I also found it noteworthy that Mr Tyler appeared relatively unconcerned by the suggestion that Mr Merrell and Mr Amos had not been discouraged from acting in breach of the contractual restrictions to which they remained subject after joining 360, particularly given the strong language which he used in his statement for the Interim Hearing.

73.Mr Railton was a very straightforward and honest witness. It must have been daunting for him to come to Court to give evidence but he did so well and with care. His answers to Ms Donnelly KC’s questions were clear and helpful to me.

74.I found Mr Merrell to be a less straightforward and transparent witness, particularly concerning the claim intimated against him by his former employers and the conversation he is said to have had with Ms McQueen. His evidence on those issues caused me concern and I did not find it persuasive.

75.Ms Marchetti was an impressive witness. Her evidence was straightforward and clear. At one point she was asked by Ms Donnelly KC to comment on the fairness or otherwise of a restrictive covenant. She seemed uncomfortable answering that question, which was entirely understandable. Her response served as a reminder that she was giving evidence as an employee of 360, rather than as an independent witness. However, I did not regard that as undermining the reliability of her evidence.

76.Mr Ryan was a credible and candid witness who, in my judgment, came to Court to give me honest responses to the questions which were put to him.

77.I found Mr Amos to be a reliable, honest and open witness. He responded to the questions put to him without prevarication or hesitation. In my judgment, his evidence was a broadly accurate account of events as he recalled them.

78.His evidence was consistent with his witness statement, the documentation to which I was referred and the position which he has adopted throughout these proceedings. He had a firm grasp of the issues in the litigation and he had evidently paid attention to the evidence which was given by the witnesses who were in the witness box before him.

79.He made concessions where it was appropriate to do so, notably in relation to his disclosure to Barker Ross of the Commission Statements.

80.He was a confident witness who focused on the questions being put to him. I do not accept any suggestion that he was evasive or deliberately untruthful in his evidence.

81.Ms Knight was a careful and persuasive witness whose evidence I found to be fair and balanced. I found her to be straightforward, thoughtful and honest. Her recollection of events was good.

82.Her answers to Mr Bradley KC’s questions were clear and focused. She was measured and confident in the witness box. She sought clarification of the questions being put to her when she was unsure of what was being asked of her.

83.Ms Knight appeared to me to have a very comprehensive familiarity and understanding of her industry and of the background issues in this litigation.

84.Mr Ross was a helpful witness.

85.I formed the impression that his involvement with Mr Amos was more high-level than that of Ms Knight. He did not appear to have her familiarity with the detail of the chronology and events which were addressed at the trial.

86.I make no criticism of him for that. He is the Chief Executive and founder of the company and I would expect his involvement in matters such as recruitment to have been more peripheral than that of Ms Knight.

87.Mr Ross appeared to adopt an entrenched position in relation to these proceedings, which is entirely understandable given that his company is one of the defendants. He also appeared, at times, to misinterpret some of the questions being put to him. My impression was that this reflected a desire to explain his deeply held views rather than an attempt to avoid the question being asked.

88.However, I have no hesitation in rejecting any suggestion that he was anything other than an honest and reliable witness. I accept that he was seeking to help me to the best of his recollection.

89.Ms Fryett was an intelligent, confident and robust witness. She gave her evidence in a calm and clear way. She was only in the witness box for a short period, but I found her evidence to be truthful and reliable.

90.Mr Mann was also only on oath briefly. Even so, he struck me as a reliable witness. He had no axe to grind. He may be friendly with Mr Amos, but he owes no allegiance to Barker Ross. In any event, I found his evidence to be very straightforward. That said, perhaps understandably given his detachment from them, he did not have a strong recollection of events and dates, although he was candid about that.

91.Mr Lodge appeared to struggle with some of the questions put to him by Mr Bradley KC. My impression was that he was not always clear about what was being asked of him. So much so, I intervened at one point. I found some of his answers to be confused and confusing. However, I have no doubt that he was an honest witness.

92.There is a common thread in the evidence of Mr Mann and Mr Lodge. Neither of them has a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation. Mr Amos may well be someone with whom they are friendly, but I do not accept that either of them would tailor their evidence to support his case or indeed that they would act in a dishonest or underhanded way in a Court, business or any other setting.

93.In assessing the evidence generally, where there are differences in recollection, I have taken particular account of the documentary evidence, which I regard as the most reliable guide to the relevant facts.

Findings of Fact

94.Taking account of those observations, I shall now make factual findings on what I consider to be the key background issues.

95.It is common ground that Mr Amos had been employed by 360 since 2021, that he enjoyed a successful career at the company during which he had been promoted from his initial role ultimately to the position of Principal Consultant and that, in effect, he came to constitute 360’s waste, aggregates and concrete division.

96.To the extent that there is any dispute on the point, I accept that Mr Amos was initially employed as a Resourcer. Whilst his role may have been described in the Employment Contract as that of a Recruitment Consultant, I accept his evidence, supported by his LinkedIn profile, that he worked as a Resourcer for approximately the first six months of his employment with 360. Mr Ryan accepted that in his evidence and this is consistent with paragraph 5 of the Amended Particulars of Claim.

97.Mr Amos sent the Commission Statements to Ms Knight by email on 13 November 2025. This is common ground and I have seen a copy of that email.

98.It is uncontroversial that, before doing so, Mr Amos had sent the Commission Statements to his personal email address from his work email address.

99.I accept that Mr Amos was not contravening any requirements or prohibitions imposed on him by 360 by doing so.

100.The Commission Statements contained evidence of the commission which Mr Amos had earned and he was, therefore, entitled to retain them and to send them to himself for tax and other purposes. No company policy has been brought to my attention prohibiting him from doing so and Mr Tyler did not refer to any such policy.

101.I accept the evidence of Ms Knight that the Commission Statements were formulated in such a way as to include information which was arguably confidential to 360, and that Barker Ross does not include such information in its consultants’ commission statements. The key information which Mr Amos required could plainly have been included in commission statements which excluded sensitive client details.

102.I also accept and find that Mr Amos ought not to have sent the Commission Statements to Barker Ross, because they contained information which 360 might have considered confidential. The confidential nature of some of the information which appeared in the Commission Statements is accepted by the Defendants, and, to reinforce the point, Mr Amos’s evidence is that he panicked at some point after he realised what he had sent to Barker Ross.

103.I find and accept that Barker Ross did not make use of the information sent to it, other than by taking account of it in evaluating Mr Amos’s income with a view to making an offer of employment and remuneration to him. I also accept that the Commission Statements were not later circulated by Ms Knight or Mr Ross to anyone else at Barker Ross or outside the organisation.

104.Firstly, this was the evidence of Ms Knight whom I found to be a persuasive and reliable witness. Secondly, it was the evidence of Mr Ross whom I also found to be a truthful witness. Thirdly, there is no evidence to the contrary. In fact, the documents disclosed do not reveal Barker Ross undercutting 360’s prices and, as Ms Oldham and Ms Donnelly KC have pointed out, the prices it charged to Oranmore and Unbrako were higher than those charged by 360. Lastly, for the reasons which follow, I accept that Barker Ross took Mr Amos’s covenants seriously and was anxious to ensure that he complied with them.

105.My conclusion is reinforced by Ms Knight’s very candid evidence that, although she retained the Commission Statements, she gave no thought to them after she had considered them for the purposes of offering Mr Amos a role at Barker Ross until allegations were made against Barker Ross ahead of these proceedings. I have no hesitation in accepting that evidence and I reject the suggestion that Barker Ross concealed receipt of the Commission Statements.

106.I also find that Mr Amos sent the Commission Statements to Barker Ross purely to evidence the commission which he had earned at 360 during the course of employment and salary negotiations.

107.This is apparent from the content of the email which Mr Amos sent to Ms Knight on 13 November 2025 which makes clear the purpose of sending the Commission Statements to her. Mr Amos was keen to point out that he had not “cherry-picked” the statements which he was sending to Ms Knight, a clear reference to his aim of disclosing those statements which might give an accurate picture of his income. In any event, I accept Mr Amos’s evidence on this point for the reasons I have already given.

108.I find that it is likely that Barker Ross would have known the identity of 360’s key clients or at least that it could have established their identity with some limited investigation.

109.The most compelling evidence on this issue came from Ms Knight. She was very clear that a proficient recruitment consultant would be able to identify their competitors’ clients. She told me that she would have known who Mr Amos’s clients were before she met him to discuss a role at Barker Ross, especially given that he was a key competitor in the market. I accept that she has a detailed grasp of the market and I have little doubt that her evidence on this issue was candid and truthful.

110.My conclusion is reinforced by the advertisements which Mr Tyler introduced into the evidence. He conceded on cross-examination that his competitors would be able to identify his clients from such advertisements and that it was common knowledge in the industry that, for example, Oranmore was a client of 360.

111.Ms Marchetti told me that clients would be open with her about which other agencies they are using and sometimes about competitors’ charging rates. Mr Amos’s evidence on this point was consistent with that of Ms Marchetti and he said that any recruitment consultant “worth their salt” would know the identity of their competitors’ clients.

112.It was also apparent from Mr Mann’s evidence that it is routine for clients to instruct more than one recruiter to undertake an assignment for them.

113.It appears that there was, and remains, little mystery surrounding the identity of recruitment agencies’ clients in this sector.

114.Turning to the PAYE Excels, I do not accept that they were confidential documents. In any event, it is not entirely clear to me from 360’s pleaded case what aspects of the documents it maintains are confidential.

115.There is a paragraph in Mr Tyler’s witness statement prepared ahead of the Interim Hearing in which he complains that almost all of 360’s competitors are miscalculating the costs of employing people via agencies. I do not accept that evidence.

116.Firstly, the proposition strikes me as inherently improbable. In my view, it is unlikely that 360 happened on a correct arithmetical formulation which had escaped much of the rest of the industry.

117.Secondly, when cross-examined on this point by Ms Oldham, Mr Tyler’s explanation was far from convincing. He struggled to justify the position which he had adopted in his first witness statement. He fell well short of persuading me that the documents contained “highly confidential information and…a ready-made highly confidential formula” (paragraph 20.9 of the Particulars of Claim).

118.Thirdly, I have seen no evidence that 360 highlighted to Mr Amos that the PAYE Excels were confidential in nature or the product of private collaboration.

119.Fourthly, Mr Amos’s evidence on the point, which I accept, was that the formula and information used in the PAYE Excels were unremarkable and were readily ascertainable from online sources.

120.I also accept Mr Amos’s evidence that the PAYE Excels were used primarily by him on account of the nature of his work, that he sent them to himself on 22 February 2026 for legitimate work purposes, that he deleted them before he joined Barker Ross and that at no stage were they provided to Barker Ross.

121.Firstly, that was his evidence and I found him to be a reliable witness.

122.Secondly, there is no credible evidence that Mr Amos took with him any documents which belonged to 360. If he had chosen to do so, it seems particularly unlikely that he would have chosen to take the PAYE Excels.

123.Thirdly, there is no evidence to the contrary.

124.Fourthly, by the time he was leaving 360, it had been made very clear to him by Barker Ross that he was expected to respect, and adhere to, his contractual obligations to 360.

125.360 initially alleged that Mr Amos had taken the Hard Copy Marketing Materials with him when he left the company. It abandoned that allegation in opening and so I make no finding on that issue.

126.Allied to these issues, I accept and find that Barker Ross took Mr Amos’s covenants seriously and that it was anxious to ensure that he should comply with them.

127.Barker Ross had requested a copy of Mr Amos’s contract and covenants at around the time it had made the offer of employment to him. Ms Knight told me that they took legal advice in relation to those restrictions. That conduct is inconsistent with a company disregarding its prospective employee’s contractual obligations.

128.Secondly, Ms Knight evidently perceived that 360 had a reputation for being litigious in relation to its employees’ contractual restrictions. It would make little sense for Barker Ross to provoke 360 at a time when one of its key employees was joining the business.

129.Thirdly, the documentary evidence supports this finding. As early as 5 December 2025, Mr Amos wrote to Ms Knight: -

“Obviously, it’s daunting with [covenants] but I’m up for a challenge and excited for it all!.”

130.On 19 January 2026, Ms Knight sent a message to Mr Amos (referred to above but which is worth repeating):-

“…I spoke to Paul and he’s said to reassure there’s nothing in there we haven’t seen before – but we’ll run it by our solicitors just to belt and braces. He said to mention we’re a team on that and as long as you do only what we agree between us to be the best way forward then we will be absolutely backing you and will shield you from anything we can.”

131.The following day, Mr Amos wrote:-

“…they’re pretty brutal here so will tread carefully as if anything goes wrong I don’t want either of us to be threatened with a bill!!”

132.In my view, the most plausible interpretation of these messages is that Barker Ross would support Mr Amos provided that he did not seek to breach his obligations to 360 and that he was content with that arrangement.

133.Mr Amos received a welcome letter from Barker Ross. It was dated 19 January 2026 but was apparently only given to him when he joined the company. In the letter, Ms Knight wrote:-

“We also fully respect and wholeheartedly support your intention to be regarded as a good leaver from your current employer. Professional integrity is something we value highly at Barker Ross, and we are committed to conducting ourselves in a fair, ethical, and professional manner throughout your transition.

In line with this, we will not permit any solicitation of clients from your previous employer, and we will work closely with you to ensure that your onboarding and future activities are managed appropriately and professionally. Our focus is on helping you establish success in your new role through the strength of your own capabilities and future opportunities within Barker Ross.”

134.Fourthly, compared with his billing at 360, the budgets produced by Barker Ross for Mr Amos contained relatively modest income projections, presumably based on Mr Amos establishing himself with new clients before being able to work for his contacts at 360 after the expiry of his restrictive covenants.

135.Finally, the restrictions in Mr Amos’s contract were only of 6 months’ duration. It would have been of little benefit to Barker Ross to have risked litigation with 360 for the sake of generating additional income over such a limited period. Barker Ross evidently considered Mr Amos to be a key hire, given its high-level engagement with him at the recruitment stage. He was plainly regarded as a medium- or long-term asset for the business.

136.Mr Ross made this point in a compelling way in the witness box, when he said that “6 months in a recruiter’s life is a short space of time and we really didn’t feel the need to profit from 360’s business in that period.” In my view, that is an entirely credible and reasonable proposition.

137.Related to this finding, I reject the allegation that Mr Amos and Barker Ross agreed a plan whereby, contrary to his contractual obligations, Mr Amos would essentially seek to divert work from 360 to Barker Ross while Barker Ross, amongst other things, would create misleading documents in order to conceal their true intentions.

138.Firstly, such a finding would be entirely inconsistent with the impression which I have formed and expressed of the evidence given by Mr Amos, Ms Knight, and Mr Ross. This is perhaps best illustrated by Ms Knight’s WhatsApp message to Mr Amos on 8 October 2025:-

“…honesty and integrity always. It’s how Paul has managed to build such a long-lasting business. Don’t always help with quick wins but it certainly helps build a sustainable business.”

139.Secondly, in my view there is no proper basis for concluding that Barker Ross (and Mr Amos) would manufacture emails and other correspondence with a view to protecting their position in the event that a dispute or litigation were to ensue. The documents in question all have a far more credible explanation. For example, I accept that it was intended that Mr Amos was to work in piling during the period of his contractual restrictions. That made commercial sense. There was an opportunity for him to be engaged in the Sizewell C project which ultimately did not materialise. Mr Amos explained that there were synergies between piling and precast. It was inevitable that he and Barker Ross would want to maximise his productivity in his new role, especially whilst he was precluded from working with his former clients.

140.Thirdly, I have already made a finding that Barker Ross took Mr Amos’s contractual obligations seriously.

141.Fourthly, 360 has not relied on any evidence from any client that Mr Amos asked or encouraged them to redirect their work after he resigned from, or left, 360. Mr Railton accepted, on cross-examination, that no client had told him that Mr Amos had done so. The only evidence from 360’s clients came from Mr Lodge and Mr Mann, both of whom gave evidence which I accept on this issue, rejecting the suggestion that they had been complicit in a covert plan to redirect 360’s work. In any event, Oranmore and Unbrako continued to engage with 360 after it became known that Mr Amos was to leave 360.

142.Furthermore, it is clear that both Oranmore and Unbrako had existing relationships with Barker Ross. I fully accept Ms Knight’s evidence that any pause or reduction in work from those clients flowed from the strength of their relationships with Mr Amos.

143.Lastly, despite extensive surveillance of Mr Amos’s activities, no evidence has come to light of any such collusion.

144.I should also observe that I attach little significance to the unguarded messages which Mr Amos sent to Mr Bannister and Mr Woodward. Those communications were likely no more than bravado and are outweighed by the other evidence.

145.Similarly, the reference in the emails passing between Ms Knight and Mr Amos to a “strategy plan” was explained to my satisfaction by Mr Amos. It related to a plan prepared by his colleague at 360 which he found to be uninspiring. I accept that explanation. There is no evidence to the contrary.

146.I accept that, when Mr Amos met his key clients in February 2026, he told them that he was leaving 360 but he did not share with them the identity of his new employer.

147.Firstly, that was his evidence, which I accept, for the reasons I have already given.

148.Secondly, that was the evidence of both Mr Mann and Mr Lodge and I accept that they were being truthful on that point.

149.Mr Mann’s evidence was perhaps the most compelling on this issue. He remembers telephoning Mr Amos after receiving his departure letter. That evidence appeared to me to be genuine and reliable.

150.Thirdly, there is no evidence to the contrary despite the very extensive surveillance undertaken by 360 of Mr Amos’s work activities.

151.Lastly, 360 has not been able to call any evidence from its clients to contradict Mr Amos’s position.

152.I accept and find that Mr Amos did not ask any of 360’s clients to divert their work to Barker Ross.

153.Firstly, that was Mr Amos’s evidence, which I accept.

154.Secondly, that was the evidence of both Mr Mann and Mr Lodge. Mr Mann was particularly affronted when this proposition was put to him by Mr Bradley KC, explaining that, if Mr Amos had done so, he would have been taking advantage of their friendship.

155.Thirdly, by that time, Barker Ross had made it abundantly clear to Mr Amos that it was imperative that he should comply with his covenants and obligations to 360.

156.Fourthly, there is no persuasive evidence that any downturn in the work which 360 received from its key clients was caused by Mr Amos redirecting work elsewhere. As was clear from the evidence, and particularly from that of Ms Knight, Mr Amos was highly regarded in the industry and he had very strong relationships with his clients. Moreover, as Mr Bradley KC was anxious to point out in his opening, Mr Amos was, in effect, a one-man band in his sector at 360. He was also, on any view, a high performer. It was unsurprising that 360 would experience a reduction in work if he chose to leave the organisation. That would not flow from any foul play on his part, but rather from the fact of his departure. This was amply illustrated by the suggestion by Mr Tyler that, if Mr Brend were to leave the company, the income which he generated would be lost.

157.The graphs produced by 360 are, in any event, far from determinative of the point it seeks to make. They reveal a mixed pattern of peaks and troughs and do not demonstrate that Mr Amos was redirecting work.

158.The account forms sent to Oranmore and Unbrako on 2 March 2026 reveal nothing about whether Mr Amos was seeking to redirect work from 360. Ms Knight gave very persuasive evidence on this issue. She made clear that, in the fast-moving world of recruitment, it was necessary to explore commercial opportunities as they arose. Ms Fryett was clearly aware that Mr Amos was leaving 360 and she would have shared that information with her colleagues. I accept that this had nothing to do with Mr Amos.

159.Furthermore, Mr Lodge’s evidence, which I accept, was that he does not have the same level of rapport with Mr Railton as he had with Mr Amos and that his decision to use other agencies had no connection with Mr Amos’s conduct. In any case, it is apparent from the evidence that 360 had a relationship with Unbrako after Mr Amos’s departure. 360’s allegations relating to Oranmore only came to light when it amended its statement of case to allege that Mr Amos had been in contact with Mr Ashpole.

160.I also accept Mr Mann’s evidence that he has continued to place business with 360.

161.I attach little significance to Mr Amos’s interaction with Hadyn Campbell on 4 March 2026. I accept the timings given by Mr Amos in the witness box and I am satisfied that there was nothing untoward about his interaction with Mr Campbell.

162.Lastly on this point, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was a decline in the work which 360 received after Mr Amos left the company. Mr Railton was his successor and he acknowledged that he had no experience in the precast arena and that his previous experience was in white collar construction. Impressive though I found him to be, he did not have Mr Amos’s experience in the field and he could not be described as a like-for-like replacement at the time when he joined 360. This was perhaps compounded by 360’s decision to place Mr Amos on garden leave before Mr Railton began in his role, denying Mr Railton a proper opportunity to benefit from his knowledge and experience in the sector.

163.The email to 360’s clients, which Mr Tyler drafted in part, will have done little to inspire confidence. It made clear that, at that point, 360 was yet to find a replacement for Mr Amos.

164.Furthermore, the evidence disclosed by 360 is insufficient to justify a finding that Mr Amos solicited 360’s prospective clients with a view to diverting their business to Barker Ross.

165.The high-water mark of that evidence is that, as a result of its surveillance, 360 has identified LinkedIn messages from Mr Amos to Acretek (and four other organisations) before he left 360 and that those organisations were not then registered on 360’s CRM system.

166.I accept Mr Amos’s evidence that he did not meet with any of those organisations; that he has not been in contact with them since he left 360; that he has not sought to redirect them to Barker Ross; and that none of them are clients of Barker Ross. There is no compelling evidence to the contrary. It has been a feature of this case that Mr Amos’s administrative adherence to the CRM system was, at times, less than rigorous.

167.Even so, 360 does not appear to have contacted Acretek or the other identified prospective clients, either to pursue a business relationship or to obtain evidence in support of these proceedings.

168.Mr Ryan accepted that he had never heard of Acretek notwithstanding his position as 360’s Client Development Manager.

169.Barker Ross’s disclosure indicates that Acretek is not one of its clients. Mr Tyler suggests that Barker Ross might not have undertaken its search properly, but there is no proper evidential basis for reaching that conclusion.

170.Accordingly, I do not find that Mr Amos’s LinkedIn messages, or 360’s wider disclosure, demonstrate that Mr Amos attempted to divert prospective business away from 360.

171.I do not need to make any findings concerning the allegation that Mr Amos sought to entice Mr Brend from 360. Mr Bradley KC withdrew that allegation in opening.

172.In relation to temporary workers, 360’s pleaded case relates to Keith Ashpole.

173.I do not find that Mr Amos contacted Mr Ashpole and offered him a role with Oranmore.

174.The only person who has been able to give any persuasive evidence relating to Mr Ashpole was Mr Amos and I accept what he has told me, namely that he spoke to Mr Ashpole, but that Mr Ashpole made it clear that he was seeking a role with the local Council. Mr Ashpole mentioned Oranmore and Mr Amos’s reply was that he had seen online that Oranmore was recruiting. In any event, Mr Amos was not working with Oranmore at that time in his role at Barker Ross.

175.Mr Amos’s evidence on this point was fortified by his having volunteered information about his contact with Faz Reece. That evidence supports his contention that he was taking his obligations seriously.

176.The evidence given by Mr Railton on this issue is hearsay. As he accepted on cross-examination, he was in no position to challenge Mr Amos’s account of his interaction with Mr Ashpole.

177.360 has not called Mr Ashpole to give evidence on the point.

178.Lastly, I am not able to accept on the balance of probabilities that Mr Amos deliberately entered incorrect information on 360’s CRM system with a view to disrupting 360’s business and concealing his own misconduct.

179.Firstly, Mr Amos denies this allegation and I have already noted that I found his evidence reliable and truthful. Given the impression which I formed of Mr Amos, I would be very surprised if he had sought to disrupt 360’s business in any way. I am satisfied that he intended to be what has been termed a good leaver.

180.Secondly, Mr Amos sat with Mr Tyler over three full working days undertaking a handover. That appears to have been a period of intensive activity. It is perhaps unsurprising that the occasional error was made in inputting data during that time. This point was amply illustrated during Mr Ryan’s cross-examination and in the Particulars of Claim generally.

181.Thirdly, Mr Tyler has been consistent, both in his statements and in the witness box, that 360 had concerns about Mr Amos’s administrative lapses in terms of recording information. This point was reinforced by Mr Ryan, Ms Marchetti and Mr Amos himself and it had played a part in the disciplinary procedure in October 2024.

182.Fourthly, on cross-examination, Ms Marchetti accepted that she does not always upload LinkedIn messages to 360’s CRM system.

183.Lastly, there has been no compelling evidence to the contrary.

184.Similarly, I am not satisfied that Mr Amos falsified his work diaries. I accept his evidence on this point. He may have exercised a degree of flexibility concerning the timing of meetings but I consider that to be entirely consistent with the practical realities of working in a busy sales/recruitment role.

185.Taking account of the findings which I have made above, I am satisfied that Mr Amos endeavoured to leave 360 on good terms without breaching his obligations to that company.

186.I shall finish this section of my judgment by making a general observation about the surveillance to which Mr Amos was subjected during the latter part of his employment with 360.

187.Every aspect of his work appears to have been subject to surveillance from September 2025 until he left 360 on or around 4 March 2026.

188.I find it very surprising that there is no documentary evidence of the decision taken by 360 to place Mr Amos under such extensive and intrusive scrutiny. Mr Tyler told me that the surveillance was agreed at a meeting and yet the decisions made in that meeting were not reduced to a documentary record. 360 has not even disclosed any emails or WhatsApp/text messages which might have been sent by Mr Tyler or his colleagues on the issue.

189.Essentially, Mr Tyler told me that the basis of the decision was his “gut feeling” that 360 might uncover information of benefit to it. On any view, that was not a compelling reason to begin such extensive surveillance and it is inconsistent with 360’s case that such monitoring is only undertaken when there is “a specific reason to do so.”

190.In any case, Mr Tyler accepted that it was, and is, a regular occurrence for employees to be placed under surveillance and that, at the time he was in the witness box, there were three employees under surveillance. He accepted that 360 had monitored Mr Ryan and Ms McQueen in the past, although he was unable to say what prompted it to do so.

191.I probed Mr Tyler about his knowledge and appreciation of GDPR and I am satisfied that he lacks any meaningful understanding of the requirements of those regulations. He told me that he has undergone no GDPR training and, when I asked him to provide me with an overview of the principles of GDPR, he was unable to do so accurately.

192.Even so, he was the person who authored 360’s GDPR policy and, whilst he told me that one of his colleagues assists him with GDPR issues, she was not called to give evidence and I am not aware of any significant reference to her in the documents which have been disclosed during this litigation.

193.I do not find it necessary to determine whether there has been a breach of GDPR. That may be a matter to be taken up elsewhere. However, I do not accept that it has been demonstrated by 360 that Mr Amos was given adequate notice of the nature and extent of the surveillance to which he was liable to be subjected. The versions of the IT, Communication and Monitoring Policy from 2021 and 2022 have not been produced. Further, the current version of that document does not explain the level of monitoring to be undertaken or the nature of 360’s monitoring software. It also claims that any surveillance would be “Proportionate; Relevant to business needs; and Not excessive or intrusive beyond necessity”. In my view, 360 has not been able to demonstrate that its surveillance of Mr Amos (and others) complied with those stated principles.

194.Even so, the extensive surveillance of Mr Amos generated very little evidence supportive of 360’s case and, if anything, tended to support his position that he had done little, if anything, wrong.

Conclusions on the key factual issues

195.It follows that I have rejected 360’s core allegations of conspiracy and deliberate concealment. I have not found that there was an agreement between Mr Amos and Barker Ross that he should evade his contractual obligations to 360, nor that Barker Ross misled 360 (or others) about Mr Amos's intended role or created a false paper trail. I have also rejected the allegations that Mr Amos diverted, or sought to divert, business opportunities away from 360 and that he sought to entice away clients, prospective clients or temporary workers.

196.I have accepted that Mr Amos sent the Commission Statements to Barker Ross.

197.However, I have not found that Barker Ross used or circulated the Commission Statements or sought to retain them for its own benefit.

198.I shall now consider the various causes of action advanced by 360.

Claims against Mr Amos

A.

Employees’ duties of good faith and fidelity and mutual trust and confidence

The Law

199.Employees owe a duty of good faith and fidelity to their employers as contractual duties, the scope of which, from an employee’s perspective, was summarised by Haddon-Cave LJ in QBE v Dymoke [2012] EWHC 80 (QB) at paragraph 169:-

“The general principles relating to employees’ duties of good faith and fidelity are settled and can be summarised in the following propositions:

It is indisputable that an employee owes his employer a contractual duty of “fidelity,” but how far it extends will depend on the facts of each case…;

The more senior the staff, the greater the degree of loyalty, fidelity, and diligence required…;

The Court’s first task is to identify the nature of the employee’s duty of fidelity and then to decide whether the employee’s activities are in breach…;

It is a breach of the duty of fidelity for an employee to solicit another employee to act in competition with the employer…;

Attempts by senior employees to recruit junior employees constitute particularly serious misconduct…;

It is a breach of the duty of fidelity for an employee to misuse confidential information belonging to the employer…; and The Court should ask whether the employee’s activities affect his ability to serve his employer faithfully and honestly and to the best of his abilities.”

200.Employers and employees also owe each other an implied duty of trust and confidence, requiring them not to conduct themselves, without proper excuse, in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between them.

Application to the Facts

201.I have not been taken to any specific authorities which might assist me to determine whether the disclosure of the Commission Statements amounts to a breach of the duty of good faith and fidelity which Mr Amos owed to 360.

202.However, applying the principles above, I am not satisfied that 360 has established a breach.

203.Firstly, and crucially, this was an isolated disclosure. It was not part of any pattern of conduct or wider course of dealing by Mr Amos. An isolated disclosure may amount to a breach of duty, but it will not necessarily do so.

204.Secondly, I am satisfied that the disclosure was entirely inadvertent. It was neither deliberate nor reckless. It was the result of an honest mistake. The Commission Statements were disclosed to Barker Ross to enable it to consider whether to make an offer of employment to Mr Amos, not for the purpose of providing Barker Ross with access to information which might assist it to compete with 360.

205.Thirdly, in any event, I am not satisfied that the information sent to Barker Ross would have provided it with a material commercial advantage. This is illustrated by the evidence of Ms Knight and Mr Ross, who both confirmed that they neither used the information nor shared it internally within their organisation. I have also found that the identity of 360’s clients was already known, or readily ascertainable, by Barker Ross.

206.The core obligation underpinning the duty of good faith and fidelity is loyalty. The facts of this case are far removed from those cases in which a finding of breach might ordinarily be expected to be made, such as those involving deliberate disloyalty, misuse of confidential information, competition with the employer, solicitation of clients, solicitation of employees or conduct for personal advantage at the employer’s expense. In any event, Mr Amos was neither a director nor a very senior employee of 360.

207.The overarching question highlighted in Dymoke is whether the employee’s activities affect his ability to serve his employer faithfully and honestly and to the best of his abilities. I would answer that question in the negative on the facts of this case.

208.In the circumstances, I have concluded that the disclosure of the Commission Statements (and Mr Amos’s conduct overall) did not amount to a breach of the duty of good faith and fidelity which Mr Amos owed to 360.

209.For substantially the same reasons, the inadvertent disclosure of the Commission Statements, which resulted in no practical or material prejudice to 360, does not justify a finding that there was a breach of the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence. In my judgment, it was not conduct calculated or likely to seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between 360 and Mr Amos.

B.

Confidential Information and duties of confidence

The Law

210.The Employment Contract contains an express contractual provision (Clause 16) setting out a duty of confidence both during the course of Mr Amos’s employment and afterwards.

211.Employers are not permitted to use an express contractual provision to deem as confidential information which is part of an employee’s general knowledge and skill or which is not confidential in nature. (Ixora Trading Inc v Jones [1990] FSR 251 ).

212.There is also an implied duty of confidence relating to trade secrets and information of equivalent confidentiality. That duty continues after the employment has come to an end.

213.In Faccenda Chicken Limited v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 , the Court of Appeal distinguished three categories of confidential information:- Information which, on account of its trivial character or ready accessibility from public sources of information, could not be regarded by a reasonable person or by the law as confidential at all;

Information which an employee is told is confidential or which is, by its nature, obviously confidential, which the employee ought not to disclose while employed, but which he is generally free to disclose after his employment ends;

Information which is highly confidential, akin to a trade secret, and must not be disclosed even after employment has ended.

214.In Coco v A. N. Clark Engineers Limited [1969] RPC 41 , Megarry J identified three requirements for a sustainable claim for a breach of the equitable duty of confidence:that the information has the “necessary quality of confidence about it”;

that it has been “imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence” namely that where “any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that upon reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should suffice to impose on him the equitable duty of confidence”.

and that there must have been an unauthorised disclosure (or threatened use) of that information to the detriment of, or without the consent of, the party communicating it.

Application to the facts

215.360’s claims concerning confidentiality have focused on: - The Commission Statements;

The PAYE Excels;

The Electronic Marketing Materials; and The Hard Copy Marketing Materials.

216.360’s complaint relating to the PAYE Excels fails for the reasons set out in my factual findings.

217.360 has withdrawn its claim relating to the Hard Copy Marketing Materials.

218.In my judgment, there is nothing in the Electronic Marketing Materials (being CVs produced by Mr Amos during his employment with 360) which can be said to amount to confidential information. I note that the materials were circulated publicly whilst Mr Amos worked for 360. It is clear from their content that there is nothing confidential about them.

219.That only leaves the Commission Statements for consideration.

220.The Defendants have conceded that some of the information contained in the Commission Statements was confidential in nature and I shall proceed on that basis. That said, for the reasons I have already given, the information did not constitute a trade secret nor was it of equivalent character.

221.Turning to the test set out in Coco, I accept that the information contained in the Commission Statements had the quality of confidence about it. It did not form part of Mr Amos’s general knowledge. It was not publicly available. It is acknowledged by both Defendants to be confidential in nature to some extent.

222.There is no evidence that 360 actively sought to restrict the dissemination of the information or took any practical steps either to highlight its confidential nature to employees or to discourage its disclosure to third parties. However, in my judgment, a reasonable person in Mr Amos’s position would, or ought to, have realised that the information was confidential. This is supported by Mr Amos’s acknowledgement that he panicked when he realised what he had sent to Barker Ross.

223.Moreover, the information was disclosed without 360’s permission.

224.I am, therefore, satisfied that there has been a breach of the equitable duty of confidence which Mr Amos owed to 360.

225.Given my conclusion that Mr Amos breached the equitable duty of confidence, it is unnecessary to determine the parties’ dispute concerning the enforceability of the express contractual provisions, as the issue would not affect liability.

226.To the extent that Mr Amos was in breach of any equitable duty of confidence (and, if applicable, the express duty), I regard that breach as having been innocent and purely technical. It is very unlikely to have caused any loss or damage to 360. In those circumstances, it is doubtful that the matter merits further enquiry or consideration, and it is likely that 360 would be entitled to nominal damages only in respect of the breach. That said, this trial has been confined to issues of liability. If 360 elects to pursue the matter further, then it would not be appropriate for me to preclude it from doing so at this stage in the absence of further submissions.

C.Other alleged contractual breaches

227.360 has advanced a range of allegations of breach of contract against Mr Amos. It has not always been apparent to me which remain pursued and which do not. That said, I am confident that the principal allegations have been addressed above.

228.There is a pleaded allegation that Mr Amos breached his contractual obligation to disclose to 360 any offer or approach from a competitor (Clause 21.5). Again, it is not entirely clear to me whether 360 continues to pursue that allegation.

229.Clause 21.5 is drafted in very broad terms. Its practical effect is to require Mr Amos to provide 360 with details of any “approach or offer” made to him by a competitor and then to provide that competitor with a copy of Clause 21.

230.In my judgment, if the point is still advanced, the clause is not qualified by reference to any identifiable legitimate business interest and extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect any such interest. In effect, the clause operates as an unjustified restraint on the employee’s freedom to pursue alternative employment with a competitor.

231.I also note that Mr Tyler accepted that he did not ask Mr Amos to identify his new employer, even though he had substantial contact with him immediately after his resignation and during the work handover.

232.Accordingly, my conclusion is that Mr Amos is not in breach of Clause 21.5 on the basis that it is unenforceable. Alternatively, if I am wrong in that conclusion, then any breach caused no loss and had no material consequences.

233.Clause 20.1 of the Employment Contract provides that “on termination of the Appointment”, Mr Amos was to “immediately deliver up” 360’s books and other documents and to irretrievably delete 360’s and its Group’s information and provide a signed statement that he had done so. In my view, Mr Amos complied with that obligation within a reasonable timeframe by deleting the Commission Statements (and CVs) and by serving his statement following the Interim Hearing (the intervening period having been occupied by correspondence between the parties’ solicitors concerning this and related matters). Even if I am wrong in that analysis, any breach was merely technical, no loss could reasonably have flowed from it and it would warrant no more than an award of nominal damages.

234.I have not been addressed in any depth on the balance of the pleaded allegations of breach of contract but, in light of my conclusions, I do not find that any such breaches have been established. For example, based on my findings, there is no basis for accepting that Mr Amos made a secret profit, diverted business opportunities, failed to retain business opportunities which came his way at 360, competed with 360 or assisted its competitors.

D.Restrictive Covenants

The Law

235.The principles to be applied in relation to the enforcement of restrictive covenants are well established.

236.A restrictive covenant is prima facie void as being an unlawful restraint of trade unless the employer demonstrates that it protects a legitimate business interest and that the restriction imposed is no wider than is reasonably necessary to protect that interest. (Herbert Morris Limited v Saxelby [1916] AC 688 , HL).

237.The party seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant has the burden of establishing that it goes no further than reasonably necessary to protect their legitimate business interests.

238.The validity of a restrictive covenant is to be assessed at the time the contract is entered into (Allan Janes LLP v Johal [2006] EWHC 286 (Ch) ).

239.Cox J set out the approach to be adopted in TFS Derivatives Ltd v Morgan [2004] EWHC 3181 (QB) , where she observed:-

“In assessing reasonableness, there is essentially a three-stage process to be undertaken.

Firstly, the court must decide what the covenant means when properly construed.

Secondly, the court will consider whether the former employers have shown on the evidence that they have legitimate business interests requiring protection in relation to the employee’s employment….

Thirdly, once the existence of legitimate protectable interests has been established, the covenant must be shown to be no wider than is reasonably necessary for the protection of those interests. Reasonable necessity is to be assessed from the perspective of reasonable persons in the position of the parties as at the date of the contract, having regard to the contractual provisions as a whole and the factual matrix to which the contract would then realistically have been expected to apply.”

240.In Coppage v Freedom Security Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 1176 , the Court of Appeal noted, at paragraph 9, that :-

“non-solicitation clauses are…more favourably looked upon than non-competition clauses, for an employer is not entitled to protect himself against mere competition on the part of a former employee.”

241.The Court may have regard to whether a narrower covenant would have been sufficient to protect the interests of the party seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant (Office Angels v Rainer-Thomas [1991] IRLR 214 (CA)).

242.In Tillman v Egan Zehnder Ltd [2019] UKSC 32 the Supreme Court concluded that the Court may remove offending words from a covenant where:the unenforceable provision is capable of being removed without the necessity of adding to or modifying the wording of what remains – known as the “blue pencil” test.

the remaining terms continue to be supported by adequate consideration.

The removal of the provision would not generate any major change in the overall effect of all the post-employment restraints in the contract. The employer bears the burden of establishing this.

243.The jurisdiction to grant an injunction depends on the existence of an enforceable right, coupled with circumstances which make it equitable to grant relief. A claimant need not wait until his rights have been infringed, but the Court should be satisfied that there is a real risk of future interference. If there is no such risk, it will not normally be equitable to grant relief. (Snell’s Equity, 18-008 and 18-009).

244.In Dymoke, Haddon-Cave J (as he then was) observed: -

“Even if the covenant is held to be reasonable, the Court will decide whether, as a matter of discretion, the injunctive relief sought should in all the circumstances be granted having regard, amongst other things, to its reasonableness at the time of trial”.

245.Equitable relief may be refused to a claimant who does not come to equity with clean hands. This may apply, for example, to a claimant who has misled the defendant and the Court, or to a contracting party who fails to perform his part of the contract. (Snell’s Equity 18-039).

246.Just as is the case for any other restrictive covenant, post-termination confidentiality clauses are subject to the restraint of trade doctrine.

247.In Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr, Straughton LJ considered the nature of confidential information which is capable of being protected by a restrictive covenant:-

“…a trade secret is information which, if disclosed to a competitor, would be liable to cause real (or significant) harm to the owner of the secret. I would add first, that it must be information used in a trade or business, and secondly that the owner must limit the dissemination of it or at least not encourage or permit its widespread publication.”

248.In Invista Textiles (UK) Limited and Invista Technologies Sarl v Botes and Others [2019] EWHC 58, Birss J (as he then was) set out the position with regard to the enforceability of post-termination covenants relating to confidential information.

“The defendants say that the only information that can be protected post-termination by clause 1.2 is trade secrets (or information of a nature akin to trade secrets) as defined in Faccenda Chicken v Fowler [1987] 1 Ch 117 . The relevance of that case is that in it the courts drew a distinction between three classes of information. The first class is highly confidential information akin to trade secrets. The second class is information which is confidential, but which does not fall into the first class. One example in the second class is information which has formed part of the employee’s stock of skill and knowledge. The third class is information which is not really confidential at all. The court held that the first class can be protected by an implied term in the contract which would be a reasonable restraint of trade because it protects the subject matter which is subject to the non-contractual duty of confidence… The court also held that the post-employment use of information in the second class could not be restrained by a restrictive covenant… The three classes in Faccenda were identified by Goulding J at first instance and the distinction was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Application to the Facts

249.There is limited utility in determining the issues concerning the enforceability of the post-termination restrictive covenants, given that they are due to expire shortly, namely on 4 September 2026.

250.In any event, I have found that Mr Amos neither solicited nor attempted to solicit business from any existing clients ( Restricted Customers ) or prospective clients ( Restricted Prospects ) and that he did not seek to entice away any temporary workers ( Restricted Persons ). It is no longer argued that he sought to encourage employees (who would have fallen within the definition of Restricted Persons) to leave 360.

251.In those circumstances, it would be inequitable to grant injunctive relief against Mr Amos, as there has been no infringement of 360’s rights in these respects, nor was there any real risk of such infringement at the time of the trial. There is, therefore, no proper basis upon which the restrictive covenants should be enforced against him.

252.If, contrary to my primary conclusion, it were necessary to determine enforceability, I would have held that the covenants are unenforceable for the following reasons.

253.Firstly, the restrictive covenants were contained in a contract which Mr Amos entered into when he was a Resourcer. Their validity must be assessed by reference to the circumstances existing at that time. Whilst it may well have been anticipated that he would progress to be a Recruitment Consultant, he ultimately was promoted to more senior positions without any change to the terms of his contract. 360 has not established that the advancement achieved by Mr Amos was objectively reasonably foreseeable at the beginning of his employment. I am not satisfied that restrictions which it might be reasonable to impose on a Principal Recruitment Consultant were reasonable when imposed on Mr Amos, who was a Resourcer at the beginning of his career with the business.

254.Ms Marchetti explained that a Principal Recruitment Consultant would typically enjoy far closer relationships with clients than a Senior Recruitment Consultant who, in turn, would have stronger client relationships than a Recruitment Consultant. The burden is on 360 to demonstrate that the restrictions are reasonable. In my view, in endeavouring to discharge that burden, 360 has not sufficiently differentiated between the various roles to which the restrictive covenants applied.

255.Secondly, whilst there appears to be no dispute about the meaning of the covenants and whilst I accept that 360 had a legitimate business interest to protect, namely its business connections, in my judgment the covenants are wider than reasonably necessary to protect those interests.

256.The Restricted Customer definition (relating to Clauses 21.1.1- non-solicitation and 21.1.6- non-dealing) covers “any firm, company or person who was a customer of any Group Company with whom you had contact in the course of your employment with a view to generating revenue”. The phrase “with whom [Mr Amos] had contact… with a view to generating revenue” is very broad. It is not confined to customers with whom Mr Amos had substantial dealings, ongoing responsibility or a genuine commercial relationship. It could capture brief or isolated interactions of little or no commercial significance.

257.A similar point can be made in relation to the Restricted Prospects definition (relating to Clauses 21.1.2 – non-solicitation and 21.1.7 – non-dealing) which captures “any firm, company or person who was a prospective customer of any Group Company with whom you had contact in the course of your employment with a view to generating revenue.” It is also of note that, according to Mr Amos, most of the Prospective Customers which featured in Mr Amos’s undertakings were identified as a consequence of cold-call LinkedIn messages sent out by Mr Amos, reflecting the sheer extent of those caught by the clause.

258.In addition, in both cases there is what has been termed a 12-month “look-back” provision. Whilst not determinative, I note that this period is materially longer than the equivalent 6-month provisions relied on by Barker Ross and Net Temps. Even so, 360 has not demonstrated why a 12-month look-back period was reasonably necessary in the circumstances of its business. Again, the burden is on 360 to show that the clauses are no wider than reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate business interests and, in my judgment, it has failed to do so on the evidence before the Court.

259.It follows that the 12-month look-back provision in relation to Restricted Persons (Clause 21.1.3) is also longer than reasonably required to protect 360’s legitimate business interests. Moreover, there is no material restriction on the scope of the definition of Restricted Persons with whom Mr Amos had dealings such as, for example, those whom he had placed or attempted to place in a role, reinforcing that the clause goes beyond genuine business connections.

260.Lastly, I agree with Ms Donnelly KC and Ms Oldham that, properly construed, Clause 21.2.3 only applies to the non-competition covenant at Clause 21.1.5 (which is not pursued by 360) and not to the covenants which remain in issue. The wording of Clause 21.2.3 is that “None of the restrictions in clause 21.1 shall prevent you from:-

21.2.3being engaged or concerned in any business concern, provided that your duties or work shall relate solely to services or activities of a kind with which you were not concerned to a material extent in the 12 months before Termination.”

261.In my view, that qualification should be interpreted to relate to the non-competition covenant which prohibits Mr Amos from being involved “in any Capacity in any business concern which is in competition with any Restricted Business.” This language is directed to participation in a competing business, rather than to the restrictions on engaging with clients, prospective clients or temporary workers.

262.360 does not invite me to sever any part of the relevant provisions. The only severance proposed in 360’s Reply concerns the definition of Restricted Persons and would exclude any reference to temporary workers. That proposal is now redundant.

263.To the extent that 360 seeks injunctive relief against Mr Amos in relation to its confidentiality covenant, I would refuse such relief. The information contained in the Commission Statements cannot be said to amount to a trade secret and was not of equivalent status. I am satisfied on the evidence that there was an isolated breach of confidence, which was committed innocently and inadvertently. It is noteworthy that it was contained in a document which was not marked confidential and which could reasonably be anticipated to be used by Mr Amos in different contexts. There is no proper basis for granting equitable relief.

264.In any event, the clause on which 360 relies does not define clearly the scope of information which it sought to protect after the end of Mr Amos’s employment.

Claims against Barker Ross

E.

Breach of equitable duty of confidence

265.There are circumstances in which an employer of a new recruit may be subject to an equitable duty of confidentiality.

266.In Travel Counsellors Ltd v Trailfinders Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 38 , Lord Justice Arnold observed [at 28 and 29]:-

“28.

Accordingly, in my judgment, if the circumstances are such as to bring it to the notice of a reasonable person in the position of the recipient that the information, or some of it, may be confidential to another, then the reasonable person’s response may be to make enquiries. Whether the reasonable person would make enquiries, and if so what enquiries, is inevitably context- and fact-dependent. If the reasonable person would make enquiries, but the recipient abstains from doing so, then an obligation of confidentiality will arise.

29.Counsel for TCL argued that nothing less than blind-eye knowledge that the information was confidential would suffice. I do not accept this. Blind-eye knowledge is to be equated with actual knowledge and is subjective. Whether a person has notice is an objective question to be assessed by reference to the standards of the reasonable person…”

267.Accordingly, where a reasonable person in the position of the recipient would have made enquiries, but the recipient fails to do so, an equitable duty of confidence may arise. The test is objective and highly fact sensitive.

Application to the Facts

268.I do not accept that such a duty arises on the particular facts of this case.

269.It is common ground that the Commission Statements contained some confidential information. However, I do not accept that a reasonable person in the position of Ms Knight and Mr Ross would, or ought to, have recognised that fact or to have made further enquiries or taken further steps.

270.I have found that the Commission Statements were provided to Barker Ross for the purpose of enabling it to assess whether it should make an offer of employment to Mr Amos and, if so, on what terms. A reasonable person in the position of Ms Knight, and subsequently Mr Ross, would not have been scrutinising the documents for insights into a competitor’s operations.

271.That conclusion is reinforced by Ms Knight’s evidence, which I accept, that one would not ordinarily expect commission statements of this kind to contain confidential commercial information.

272.Ms Knight paid no further attention to the information, and nor did Mr Ross. They are very experienced businesspeople. Although the applicable test is objective, their lack of reaction to the content of the Commission Statements provides support for the conclusion that a reasonable recipient would not have appreciated that the documents contained confidential commercial information. The documents were disclosed openly by Mr Amos. They were not marked as confidential.

273.Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the circumstances were such as to put a reasonable recipient on notice that the documents may have contained confidential information requiring further enquiry.

274.Moreover, the point in time at which Barker Ross received the Commission Statements is also relevant. Their discussions with Mr Amos were at a very early stage. They were not even in a position to make an offer of employment to him. Questions concerning confidentiality were likely to assume greater significance at a later stage in the process, once Barker Ross had made an offer of employment and begun to address explicitly how seriously it expected Mr Amos to take his obligations to his employer.

275.Lastly, this was an isolated incident. It did not form part of a wider course of conduct which, taken cumulatively, might have put a reasonable person in Barker Ross’s position on notice that further investigation was required.

276.After 360’s solicitors raised the issue with Barker Ross in April 2026, Barker Ross took legal advice on the content of the correspondence and subsequently deleted the Commission Statements on 13 May 2026. In my judgment, the timescale was reasonable in all the circumstances. The issue did not arise in isolation. Several other allegations and accusations, many of which were very serious, were being made against Barker Ross at that time. Given both the threat of Court proceedings and the robust stance adopted by 360, it was entirely appropriate that Barker Ross should obtain detailed legal advice before deciding how to respond to the matters raised by 360’s solicitors and before taking further action.

277.Taking these matters together, I am not satisfied that the circumstances were such as to impose on Barker Ross an equitable duty of confidence in relation to the Commission Statements.

F.

Inducing a breach of contract

The Law

278.Ms Donnelly KC and Ms Oldham referred me to the summary of the relevant principles set out by Popplewell LJ in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha v James Kemball Ltd [2021] 1 CLC 284 at [20] and [21], concerning the tort of procuring or inducing a breach of contract:-

“In Global Resources Group v Mackay [2008] 148; 2009 SLT 104, Lord Hodge, then sitting in the Outer House, articulated the tort (or delict in Scotland) in these terms at paragraph 11: “A commits the delict or tort of inducing breach of contract where B and C are contracting parties and A, knowing of the terms of their contract and without lawful justification, induces B to break that contract.”

He went on to identify the essential ingredients of the tort, namely:- There must be a breach of contract by B.

A must induce B to break his contract with C by persuading, encouraging or assisting him to do so.

A must know of the contract and know his conduct will have that effect.

A must intend to procure the breach of contract either as an end in itself or as a means by which he achieves some further end; and If A has a lawful justification for inducing B to break his contract with C, that may provide a defence against liability.”

279.Moreover, per Lord Hoffman in OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at [43], there can be no liability where a breach is “neither an end in itself nor a means to an end, but merely a foreseeable consequence.”

Application to the Facts

280.In light of my findings of fact, I am not satisfied that the essential elements of the tort have been established.

281.Even on the basis that Mr Amos was in breach of his contract with 360 by providing Barker Ross with the Commission Statements, I am not satisfied that Barker Ross persuaded, encouraged or assisted him to do so. He sent the Commission Statements to Barker Ross of his own initiative. On my findings of fact, the decision to disclose the Commission Statements was made by Mr Amos and was not caused or brought about by any request or conduct on the part of Barker Ross. Barker Ross was simply seeking proof of his income.

282.In any event, at that time Barker Ross did not have knowledge of the contractual obligations alleged to have been breached, nor can I conclude that it ought reasonably to have inferred that there had been such a breach. Accordingly, the knowledge requirement of the tort is not established.

283.In addition, I am not satisfied that Barker Ross intended to procure a breach of contract. Any breach occurred as a consequence of Mr Amos’s unilateral actions.

284.For all those reasons, the claim for inducing or procuring a breach of contract fails.

G.

Knowing Receipt

The Law

285.The requirements for a successful claim in knowing receipt were summarised by Hoffmann LJ in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 2 All ER 685 : -

“the plaintiff must show, first, a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets he received are traceable to a breach of fiduciary duty.”

286.The defendant must have received an asset recognised in law as property. The receipt of confidential information, even where it may confer some benefit to the recipient, will not ordinarily constitute the receipt of property for these purposes - Snell’s Equity 30-070.

Application to the Facts

287.The claim fails at the threshold. It is founded on Barker Ross’s receipt of confidential information. However, confidential information does not ordinarily constitute property capable of supporting a claim in knowing receipt.

288.Further, and in any event, the knowledge requirement has not been established. In light of my findings of fact, the claim is unsustainable. Barker Ross did not know that the Commission Statements which it received from Mr Amos were traceable to any breach of duty on his part.

289.Accordingly, the claim in knowing receipt is dismissed.

H.

Springboard Relief

The Law

290.The purpose of springboard relief is to neutralise any unlawful competitive advantage or “head start” gained as a result of the misuse of confidential information or any other unlawful conduct.

291.In QBE v Dymoke (supra), Haddon-Cave J summarised the principles applicable to springboard relief, as follows:-

“First, where a person has obtained a “head start” as a result of unlawful acts, the Court has the power to grant an injunction which restrains the wrongdoer, so as to deprive him of the fruits of his unlawful acts. This is often known as springboard relief.

Second, the purpose of a “springboard” order as Nourse LJ explained in Roger Bullivant v Ellis [1987] ICR 464 is “to prevent the defendants from taking unfair advantage of the springboard which [the Judge] considered they must have built up by their misuse of the information”.

Third, “springboard” relief is not confined to cases of breach of confidence. It can be granted in relation to breaches of contractual and fiduciary duties… and flows from a wider principle that the court may grant an injunction to deprive a wrongdoer of the unlawful advantage derived from his wrongdoing…

Fourth, “springboard” relief must, however, be sought and obtained at a time when any unlawful advantage is still being enjoyed by the wrongdoer.

Fifth, “springboard” relief should have the aim “simply of restoring the parties to the competitive position they each set out to occupy and would have occupied but for the defendant’s misconduct… It is not fair and just if it has a much more far-reaching effect than this, such as driving the defendant out of business…”

Sixth, “springboard” relief will not be granted where a monetary award would have provided an adequate remedy to the Claimant for the wrong done to it…”

Seventh, “springboard” relief is not intended to punish the Defendant for wrongdoing. It is merely to provide what is fair and just protection for unlawful harm on an interim basis. What is fair and just in any particular circumstances will be measured by (i) the effect of the unlawful acts upon the Claimant; and (ii) the extent to which the Defendant has gained an illegitimate competitive advantage…The seriousness or egregiousness of the particular breach has no bearing on the period for which the injunction should be granted…

Eighth, the burden is on the Claimant to spell out the precise nature and period of the competitive advantage. An “ephemeral” and “short term” advantage will not be sufficient…

“The Court must assess the actual advantage gained by wrongdoers as a result of their unlawful activities and grant appropriate relief. Springboard injunctive relief is for unlawfully “stealing a march” on competitors. The essential question is therefore: how much of a march have the Defendants in this case, in fact, stolen on the Claimant as a result of their wrongdoing?”

292.Similar principles were applied by Simler J (as she then was) in De Vere Holding Company Ltd v Belgravia Wealth Management Europe KFT [2014] EWHC 3189 where she observed:-

“Even if…the defendants…have made unlawful use of material belonging to the claimants, that is not enough to found a claim for springboard relief. The claimants must show that the defendants have gained an unfair competitive advantage over the claimants and that that advantage still exists and will continue to have effect unless the relief sought is granted. It is clear from the authorities that the court should exercise considerable caution both as to whether to grant such an injunction at all and, if so, as to its form and duration. In particular, the duration of such an injunction should not extend beyond the period for which the defendants’ illegitimate advantage may be expected to continue because such injunctions are granted to protect against and to prevent further loss, rather than being used to punish past breaches of contract.”

Application to the Facts

293.It follows from the conclusions which I have reached that the claim for springboard relief must fail. I have not found that Barker Ross achieved any competitive advantage or “head start” as a result of receiving the Commission Statements from Mr Amos. On the contrary, I have accepted that the statements were neither circulated within Barker Ross nor used for any purpose. I have also found that they were of no material advantage to Barker Ross. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that Barker Ross achieved any unlawful competitive advantage as a result of Mr Amos’s conduct.

294.Furthermore, even if I had found that Barker Ross had achieved some limited advantage (which I have not), 360 has not established that there is any continuing advantage capable of being neutralised by springboard relief.

Disposal

295.The claims against Mr Amos for breach of the implied duties of good faith and fidelity and mutual trust and confidence are dismissed.

296.Save that no order is made in relation to the claim against Mr Amos for breach of his contractual duties of confidence (it having been unnecessary to determine that claim), the claims against Mr Amos for breach of contract are dismissed. However, 360 succeeds in its claim that Mr Amos breached the equitable duty of confidence by disclosing the Commission Statements. At this stage, it is difficult to see how that breach could justify anything other than an award of nominal damages.

297.The claim against Barker Ross for breach of an equitable duty of confidence is dismissed.

298.The claim against Barker Ross for procuring or inducing a breach of contract is dismissed.

299.The claim against Barker Ross in knowing receipt is dismissed.

300.The claims for injunctive relief, including any claim for springboard relief against Barker Ross, are dismissed.