Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales
DR EBENEZER ADODO v ARGOS LIMITED
LADY JUSTICE ANDREWS:
INTRODUCTION
1.This case concerns the scope of Regulation 28(3)(b) of the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3134 (“the Regulations”) which precludes a consumer from exercising their right to cancel a “distance contract” under Part 3 of those Regulations:
“in the case of a contract for the supply of sealed audio or sealed video recordings or sealed computer software, if the goods become unsealed after delivery.”
2.The Appellant, Dr Adodo, was looking for a new laptop. On 31 August 2024, he saw a model that he liked on the Argos website (a Lenovo IdeaPad, preloaded with Windows 11 operating software) and decided to purchase it. He placed an online order for what was described as “Lenovo IdeaPad 1 15.6in Ryzen 5 16GB 512GB Laptop Bundle” for £379, and for a mouse pad for £9.99; paid the total price of £388.99 for the items online using his card; and indicated that he wished to avail himself of Argos’ “click and collect” service to pick them up from the designated Argos collection point in his local Sainsbury’s store. Argos confirmed the order by email timed at 11.14 am, thanked Dr Adodo for his custom, and told him that he could collect his order at any time before 9.30 am on 10 September 2024.
3.Dr Adodo collected the goods later the same day, and took them home. He took the laptop out of its box and switched it on to check whether its functioning met his IT needs. He discovered that there were issues regarding its compatibility with the software he used in his work at Leicester University. He also found the mouse pad was too large to fit on the computer table. He therefore put the computer and the mouse pad back in their respective boxes, and on 5 September 2024 took them back to the Argos collection desk where he had picked them up, and asked for a refund. He was told by a member of staff that under Argos’ terms and conditions for returns, he could not return the items because the boxes had been opened and he had turned on the laptop. Dr Adodo referred to his rights under the Regulations, but to no avail.
4.Dr Adodo therefore issued proceedings in Leicester County Court, arguing that Argos were in breach of their obligations under the Regulations, which entitle a consumer to “cancel” a distance contract within 14 days, without reason, irrespective of whether there is anything wrong with the goods. The claim was allocated to the small claims track.
5.Argos initially sought to argue that the contract was not a distance contract and that the Regulations did not apply to it. The District Judge was persuaded by that argument, but on appeal HH Judge Hedley (“the Judge”) found that she was wrong, and that the contract of sale was concluded remotely by Argos’ acceptance of Dr Adodo’s offer by its order confirmation. The fact that property did not pass until delivery did not affect the time at which the contractual bargain was made. That analysis is plainly correct. The Judge found that Dr Adodo was therefore entitled to a refund for the mouse pad.
6.However, the Judge accepted Argos’ contention that, by switching the computer on and activating Windows 11, what was described in a witness statement made by Lauren Hunt, a Legal Assistant at the Sainsbury’s Group, as a “digital seal”, was unsealed or broken after delivery, and consequently the right to cancel ceased to be available at that stage.
7.Dr Adodo brings this second appeal with the permission of Falk LJ. He contends that the Judge erred in law in classifying the laptop as falling within Regulation 28(3)(b), and in applying Argos’ standard terms and conditions to the contract without due regard to Regulation 34 of the Regulations.
8.For the reasons set out in this judgment, I agree with Dr Adodo, and I would allow his appeal. The contract was a contract for the supply of a computer which was preloaded with an operating system to make it functional. It was not a contract for the supply of “sealed computer software” within the meaning of Regulation 28(3)(b). Argos’ expansive interpretation of that provision would deprive a consumer of the right to cancel almost any contract for the sale of a computer, phone or other electronic gadget which has operating software pre-installed, as most such items do, as soon as the consumer switched on the item and set the software running. Given that many items of that nature are bought online, that would seriously undermine the protection afforded to consumers by the Regulations.
THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
9.The Regulations were promulgated to implement Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 (“the Directive”), whose terms are directly transposed into the Regulations, often word for word (though the numbers of the Articles of the Directive and the Regulations do not correspond). By virtue of section 2(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“the Withdrawal Act”), such EU-derived legislation continues to have the same force as it did prior to IP Completion Day.
10.The correct approach to interpretation of such a statutory instrument was explained by Lord Sales at paragraphs 44 to 47 of his lead judgment in the Supreme Court in CG Fry and Sons Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government
[2025] UKSC 35 ; [2026] 1 All ER 615 , with which all the other members of the constitution agreed. The court is no longer bound by the principles set out in Case C-106/89
Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 1-4135. It must apply ordinary domestic principles of statutory construction, construing the language having regard to its context (which of course includes the fact that it was intended to implement the terms of an EU Directive), and with a view to giving effect to Parliament’s purpose.
11.The court is bound to consider case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) prior to IP Completion Day under section 6(1)(a) of the Withdrawal Act, and it may consider such case law and other EU aids to interpretation decided or issued after that date (section 6(2)) if it considers them to be relevant. However, none of the EU authorities to which we were taken is directly concerned with the issue of interpretation of Regulation 28(3)(b) (or its equivalent in the Directive, Article 16(i)), which is at the heart of this appeal.
12.Argos have sought to rely on a guidance document on the Directive published by the Directorate-General for Justice in June 2014 (“the DG Guidance”) and on Guidance issued by the European Commission in 2021 (post-withdrawal) (“the Commission Guidance”). However, as I will explain, they are of limited assistance, and such assistance as they do provide supports Dr Adodo’s case.
13.As the Commission Guidance explains, there are four types of contract covered by the Directive, namely: sales contracts; service contracts (including contracts for digital services); contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (to which the Commission refers as “contracts for online digital content”); and certain contracts for the supply of public utilities such as water, gas or electricity, which there is no need to mention further. Although many provisions of the Directive apply generally to all those types of contract, there are some rules that apply only to a specific type of contract. For example, the start of the 14-day period during which the right of withdrawal conferred by Article 9 of the Directive may be exercised will differ, depending on which type of contract was made.
14.The Recitals to a Directive are a very important guide to its interpretation, as they will shed light on the objectives which the Directive sets out to achieve. Recitals 1 and 2 explain that the Directive replaced and consolidated into a single Directive two previous consumer protection Directives, one of which related to contracts negotiated away from business premises (“off-premises contracts”). The other related to distance contracts, defined by Article 2 of the Directive as:
“any contract concluded between the trader and the consumer under an organised distance sales or service-provision scheme without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer, with the exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the time at which the contract is concluded.”
15.Recital 2 goes on to explain that the Directive lays down standard rules for the common aspects of distance and off-premises contracts, moving away from the minimum harmonisation approach taken in the previous Directives. Recital 3 refers to Article 169(1) and point (a) of Article 169(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) which provide that “the Union is to contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection.” Recital 4 explains that the harmonisation of certain aspects of consumer distance and off-premises contracts “is necessary for the promotion of a real consumer internal market striking the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, while ensuring respect for the principle of subsidiarity”. Recital 7 explains that full harmonisation of some key regulatory aspects should considerably increase legal certainty for consumers and traders. It adds: “Furthermore, consumers should enjoy a high common level of protection across the Union.”
16.Recital 34 states, among other matters, that the trader should give the consumer clear and comprehensible information before the consumer is bound by a distance or off-premises contract. Recital 35 makes it clear that the provision of such information is mandatory.
17.Recital 37 is significant. It states as follows:
“Since in the case of distance sales, the consumer is not able to see the goods before concluding the contract, he should have a right of withdrawal. For the same reason, the consumer should be allowed to test and inspect the goods he has bought to the extent necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and the functioning of the goods … Withdrawal from the contract should terminate the obligation of the contracting parties to perform the contract.” [Emphasis added].
18.Recital 47 states that:
“some consumers exercise their right of withdrawal after having used the goods to an extent more than necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and the functioning of the goods. In this case the consumer should not lose the right to withdraw but should be liable for any diminished value of the goods.
In order to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the consumer should only handle and inspect them in the same manner as he would be allowed to do in a shop.
For example, the consumer should only try on a garment and should not be allowed to wear it. Consequently, the consumer should handle and inspect the goods with due care during the withdrawal period. The obligations of the consumer in the event of withdrawal should not discourage the consumer from exercising his right of withdrawal.” [Emphasis added].
19.Recital 49 addresses exceptions from the right of withdrawal. So far as contracts for the sale of goods are concerned, it provides that:
“Certain exceptions from the right of withdrawal should exist, both for distance and off-premises contracts. A right of withdrawal could be inappropriate for example given the nature of particular goods or services. That is the case for example with wine supplied a long time after the conclusion of a contract of a speculative nature where the value is dependent on fluctuations in the market (“vin en primeur”). The right of withdrawal should neither apply to goods made to the consumer’s specifications or which are clearly personalised such as tailor-made curtains, nor to the supply of fuel, for example, which is a good by nature inseparably mixed with other items after delivery…”
20.There is no dispute that Argos is a “trader” and Dr Adodo is a “consumer” as defined by Regulation 4, and there is no longer any dispute that the contract between them was a distance contract, made online. It was also a contract for the sale/supply of goods.
21.The obligations of the trader to provide information to the consumer before a distance or off-premises contract is concluded are set out in Article 6 of the Directive, which is in Chapter III. The right of withdrawal is set out in Article 9, which is also in Chapter III. Article 9(1) provides as follows:
“Save where the exceptions provided for in Article 16 apply, the consumer shall have a period of 14 days to withdraw from a distance or off-premises contract, without giving any reason and without incurring any costs other than those provided for in Article 13(2) and Article 14.”
22.Parts 2 and 3 of the Regulations incorporate into domestic legislation the provisions of Chapter III of the Directive. Part 2 is concerned with the provision of mandatory information to consumers, and Part 3 with the right of withdrawal, as it is termed in the Directive. The Regulations use the phrase “right to cancel” to describe the right to withdraw after the contract has been concluded (so as to distinguish it from the right of the consumer to withdraw an offer to enter into a distance or off-premises contract). The concept of “cancellation” in the Regulations is the same as the concept of “withdrawal” under Article 9 of the Directive.
23.Regulation 13, which is in Part 2, obliges the trader to provide the information set out in Schedule 2 before the consumer is bound by any distance contract, and Regulation 14 makes specific provision for certain of that information to be provided in a particular way if the distance contract is concluded by electronic means. Regulation 17 provides that if there is a dispute about the trader’s compliance with those Regulations, the burden of proving compliance rests on the trader. Regulation 18 provides that every contract to which Part 2 applies is to be treated as including a term that the trader has complied with the provisions of, inter alia, Regulations 13 and 14. This means that the consumer can sue the trader for breach of contract if the information is not provided. Those are not the only potential consequences of failure to supply the requisite information, but it is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to consider them all.
24.The information which the trader must supply, which is set out in Schedule 2, includes under point (l), where a right to cancel exists, the conditions, time limit and procedures for exercising that right in accordance with Regulations 27 to 38; and under point (o), where under Regulation 28 there is no right to cancel or the right to cancel may be lost, the information that the consumer will not benefit from a right to cancel, or the circumstances under which the consumer loses the right to cancel.
25.Where applicable, points (v) and (w) require information to be supplied on the functionality, including applicable technical protection measures, of digital content; and any relevant compatibility of digital content with hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected to have been aware of.
26.By virtue of Regulation 27, Part 3 of the Regulations applies to distance contracts of all types between a trader and a consumer, subject to the exclusions in Regulation 27(2) and (3), Regulation 6 and Regulation 28. Of these, the only exception that could possibly apply to the present case is Regulation 28(3)(b).
27.“Goods” are defined by Regulation 5 as meaning “any tangible moveable items…” “Digital content” is defined as meaning data which are produced and supplied in digital form.
28.The Regulations make specific provision for contracts for the supply of digital content not on a tangible medium, see e.g. Regulation 12(5); Regulation 16(3); Regulation 30(2)(b); and Regulation 37. Such “contracts for the supply of online digital content”, as the EU Commission terms them, are neither treated as contracts for services nor as sales contracts but as a separate, third category. I will adopt the same shorthand as the Commission when I refer to them in this judgment.
29.Regulation 29, which implements Article 9 of the Directive, provides, so far as material, as follows:
“(1)
The consumer may cancel a distance or off-premises contract at any time in the cancellation period without giving any reason, and without incurring any liability except under these provisions – …
(b)
regulation 34(9) (where value of goods diminished by consumer handling)
(c)
regulation 35(5) (where goods returned by consumer)
…”
Regulation 35(5) provides for the consumer to bear the direct costs of returning the goods unless the trader has agreed to bear them, or has failed to provide the consumer with information about the consumer bearing those costs in accordance with Part 2 of the Regulations.
30.By Regulation 30(2)(a), if the contract is for the supply of services , the cancellation period terminates at the end of 14 days after the day on which the contract was entered into. The period within which a consumer may cancel a contract for the supply of online digital content likewise terminates at the end of 14 days after the day on which the contract is entered into: Regulation 30(2)(b).
31.It follows that if the digital content is supplied on a tangible medium, the digital content (together with the medium upon which it is supplied) will be treated as “goods” and a distance contract for the supply of the digital content on that tangible medium will be a sales contract to which the period of cancellation under Regulation 30(3) applies. This provides that if the contract is a sales contract which is not specifically covered by sub-paragraphs (4), (5) or (6), the cancellation period ends at the end of 14 days after the day on which the goods came into the physical possession of the customer.
32.That analysis is in keeping with Recital 19 to the Directive, which relevantly provides that:
“Digital content means data which are produced and supplied in digital form, such as computer programs, applications, games, music, videos or texts, irrespective of whether they are accessed through downloading or streaming from a tangible medium or through any other means. Contracts for the supply of digital content should fall within the scope of this Directive. If digital content is supplied on a tangible medium, such as a CD or DVD, it should be considered as goods within the meaning of this Directive…”
33.The Commission Guidance, commenting upon Recital 19, says this:
“Recital 19 also clarifies that the Directive considers as “goods” digital content supplied on a tangible medium . It refers to digital content supplied on CD or a DVD as examples, but the same approach applies also to digital content supplied on other carriers or on a smart device, such as a gaming console with pre-installed games. Regardless of the type of the tangible medium, the contract for such digital content falls under the rules of the [Directive] on the right of withdrawal applicable to sales contracts. ” [Emphasis in the original].
A footnote to the last sentence of that commentary says:
“the relevant limitations will also apply, such as the exception for a right of withdrawal under point (i) of the first paragraph of Article 16 with respect to the supply of sealed audio or sealed video recordings or sealed computer software which were unsealed after delivery.”
34.Failure to provide the consumer with information about the right to cancel will mean that the period for cancellation will be extended to 14 days after the provision of that information, subject to a longstop of 12 months after the day on which the period for cancellation would have ended under Regulation 30 (Regulation 31).
35.Regulation 32 provides that in order to exercise the right to withdraw or cancel, the consumer must inform the trader of the decision to withdraw from or cancel the contract. There is no dispute that Dr Adodo complied with this obligation within the cancellation period.
36.Regulations 33 to 35 set out the consequences of cancellation. First, the cancellation ends the obligations of the parties to perform the contract. Secondly, the trader must reimburse all payments received from the consumer (subject to a cap on the amount to be reimbursed in respect of payments for delivery) within a specified timeframe; and thirdly, the consumer must return the goods, or if it is the trader’s responsibility to collect them, the trader must do so.
37.Article 14(2) of the Directive provides that (in the event of withdrawal from the contract):
“The consumer shall only be liable for any diminished value of the goods resulting from the handling of the goods other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods…”
That provision is reflected in Regulation 34 of the Regulations, which provides as follows:
“(9)
If (in the case of a sales contract) the value of the goods is diminished by any amount as a result of handling of the goods by the consumer beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods, the trader may recover that amount from the consumer, up to the contract price.
…
(12)For the purposes of paragraph (9) handling is beyond what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the goods if, in particular, it goes beyond the sort of handling that might reasonably be allowed in a shop.”
38.The commentary on Article 14(2) in the Commission Guidance addresses the comparator situation where the consumer goes into a physical shop to purchase the goods, and gives examples of what a consumer who purchased them remotely may or may not be allowed to do to test them. It says that:
“before purchasing audio/video and recording equipment, the consumer would normally be able to test the image or sound quality …
The consumer would not be able to configure software on a computer; hence reasonable costs for any resetting of such equipment would also constitute diminished value.
…
In principle, the consumer should be able to open the packaging to access the content(s) inside if similar goods are normally displayed in shops in unpacked condition … however, any protective films applied to the item should only be removed where strictly necessary to test it.”
“Configuring” software means the process of adjusting built-in settings, parameters, and preferences to tailor a program's behaviour, functionality, and appearance to specific user or organisational needs, without changing its underlying source code.
39.Regulation 28(3) provides as follows:
“The rights conferred by this Part cease to be available in the following circumstances – (a)
in the case of a contract for the supply of sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons, if they become unsealed after delivery.
(b)
in the case of a contract for the supply of sealed audio or sealed video recordings or sealed computer software, if the goods become unsealed after delivery.
(c)
in the case of any sales contract, if the goods become mixed inseparably (according to their nature) with other items after delivery.”
Those provisions have their genesis respectively in Article 16(e), (i) and (f) of the Directive.
40.There is a different, express exception in Article 16(m) for:
“the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium if the performance has begun with the consumer’s prior express consent and his acknowledgment that he thereby loses his right of withdrawal.”
That situation is catered for by Regulation 37(1) and (2).
41.The DG Guidance and the Commission Guidance both address the exception in Article 16(e) (the equivalent of Regulation 28(3)(a)). They agree that for an item to be exempt under that provision, there should be genuine health protection or hygiene reasons for using a seal, which may consist of a protective wrapping or film. Both sets of guidance give as an example cosmetic products such as lipstick; the Commission Guidance adds a further example of toothbrushes, shavers and similar personal hygiene items.
42.That Guidance also refers to case C-681/17
Slewo v Ledowski [2019] 3 CMLR 18 (“ Slewo ”), which was decided after the DG Guidance was published. The CJEU was asked for a preliminary ruling on the question whether goods (such as a mattress) that when used as intended could come into direct contact with the human body, but could nevertheless be made saleable again by a trader upon return, fell within the exception in Article 16(e) if the protective film in which they were wrapped was removed by the consumer after delivery.
43.The CJEU held that such goods fell outside the exception. Its analysis began by considering the legal context in which the exception arose, quoting, among other provisions, Recitals 3, 4, 7, 34, 37, 47 and 49. The starting point was that Article 9 of the Directive gave the customer 14 days to withdraw from a distance contract without giving any reason, unless one of the exceptions applied. The wording of Article 16(e) did not provide any detail as to the exact scope of the concept of “sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons and were unsealed after delivery”. Therefore the Court had to interpret those words in the light of the context of the provision and the objective pursued by the rules of which it forms part. In context, it was clear that the Directive aims to provide a high level of consumer protection. That accorded with wider EU policy of protecting consumers (who are more vulnerable and have weaker bargaining power than traders) which is enshrined, inter alia, in Article 169 TFEU. The right of withdrawal is “intended to offset the disadvantage for the consumer resulting from a distance contract by granting him an appropriate period for reflection during which he can examine and test the goods acquired.”
44.Therefore, the CJEU said at [34], an exception to the right of withdrawal is, as a provision of EU law which restricts the rights granted for reasons relating to protection, to be interpreted strictly. It referred to Recital 49, which states that an exception to the right of withdrawal may be justified by the nature of the particular goods. It follows that in the context of Article 16(e) it is the nature of the goods which may justify their packaging being sealed for health protection or hygiene reasons, and accordingly the unsealing of the packaging deprives the goods inside of the guarantee in terms of health protection or hygiene. The exception therefore only applies where the unsealing of the packaging means the goods contained therein are no longer in a saleable condition due to genuine health protection or hygiene reasons.
45.There can be little doubt, therefore, that “sealed goods” in Regulation 28(3)(a) means physically sealed. Unless the context obviously requires otherwise, one would normally treat the same word as having the same meaning throughout the Regulations, especially if it is used in a different sub-paragraph of the same Regulation.
46.Neither set of guidance contains a commentary on Article 16(i), which specifies that the contract must be one of three types: a contract for the supply of sealed audio recordings; a contract for the supply of sealed video recordings; or a contract for the supply of sealed computer software. “Sealed” audio or video recordings will be the subject of a relevant contract even if they have no digital content, for example, a newly pressed vinyl album, or a fresh 35mm print of a classic film.
47.Article 16(m), the text of which is set out at [40] above, concerns the curtailment of the right of withdrawal where the contract is for the supply of online digital content. The DG Guidance, in a commentary about Article 16(m) at paragraph 12.2, states that:
“Article 16(m) pursues an objective similar to that of the rule in Article 16(i) exempting sealed tangible data carriers (CDs, DVDs etc.) from the right of withdrawal if the customer unseals them. This means that in both these cases, unlike that of the withdrawal from the provision of services, the consumer has no right to “test” the digital content during the right of withdrawal period.
Accordingly, the consumer would lose the right of withdrawal as soon as the performance of the contract has begun with his consent and acknowledgment of the loss of this right, such as at the start of the downloading or streaming of a video or audio file. If a trader provides a web link to launch streaming or downloading, the consumer would only lose the right of withdrawal after activating that link.”
48.To similar effect the Commission Guidance, in a commentary at section 5.7 about Article 16(m), says this:
“Point (m) of the first paragraph of Article 16 pursues an objective similar to that of the rule in point (i) of the first paragraph of Article 16 exempting sealed tangible data carriers (CDs, DVDs etc) from the right of withdrawal if the consumer unseals them. This means that in both these cases, unlike that of the withdrawal from the provision of services … the consumer has no right to “test” the digital content during the right of withdrawal period.”
49.In footnote 34 to his Opinion in the Slewo case, the Advocate General referred to the passage in the DG Guidance indicating that the consumer has no right to “test” the digital content on what he termed “sealed data hardware devices (CD, DVD, etc)” during the right of withdrawal period. He expressed the opinion that “the prohibition on returning the goods after removing the seal is thus linked to grounds (such as the possibility of single use or copying content) other than the possibility of compromising the integrity of the goods themselves (health and hygiene reasons) which justify the exception set out at Article 16(e).” That is the nearest that anyone could find to an identification of the “objective” that the DG and the Commission agree is shared by Article 16(i) and Article 16(m).
WHAT IS MEANT BY “A CONTRACT FOR THE SUPPLY OF SEALED COMPUTER SOFTWARE”?
50.The starting point, as with the construction of any statute, is the ordinary meaning of the words used. The word “sealed” is not defined, but in this context it is plainly being used in the sense of closed, secured or protected. What must become “unsealed” after delivery are “the goods”. In context “the goods” must be a reference back to the sealed goods that are the subject-matter of the contract of supply.
51.Of the three types of contract falling within Regulation 28(3)(b) and Article 16(i) of the Directive there is little difficulty in understanding what is meant by a “sealed audio recording” or a “sealed video recording”. In such cases the object of the contract is a recording, whether digital or analogue, and the seal must be a reference to the retail packaging of the tangible medium on which the recording appears – be it a vinyl record or a CD, a cassette tape, a DVD or Blu-ray.
52.It is possible for a consumer to purchase computer software which, like a recording, will be supplied on a tangible data carrier such as a CD, USB stick or key card, in sealed packaging. Dr Adodo exhibited to his witness statement screenshots from the Argos website advertising computer software, such as anti-virus protection programs, for sale in pre-packed boxes covered in protective plastic wrapping. Computer games are another example.
53.One would not naturally describe a contract for the purchase of a computer (or any other electronic item, such as a mobile phone) which happens to have preloaded operating software on it, as a contract for the supply of computer software, let alone as a contract for the supply of sealed computer software. The software is supplied as an incidental aspect of the contract for the supply of the computer. The expression “contract for the supply of sealed computer software” would more naturally be understood to mean a contract for the supply of the software itself, albeit that it is supplied to the consumer through the medium of a tangible data carrier, where both the data carrier and the software on it will be delivered in a sealed package.
54.As the CJEU made clear in Slewo , because the aim of the Directive is to achieve a high level of consumer protection, and it is intended that consumers who enter into distance contracts should have the same opportunity to test the goods they are buying as they would have had if they had bought the same goods in a shop, the exceptions must be construed strictly. That approach was endorsed by the CJEU in the specific context of construing Article 16(m) of the Directive in Case C-641/19
EU v PE Digital GmbH [2020] Bus LR 2410 at paragraph [43].
55.It is therefore necessary to consider the justification for the exception in question, and whether Argos’ proposed construction of the exception goes beyond what is necessary to achieve it. Having regard to Recital 49 of the Directive, the rationale for the loss of the right of withdrawal under Article 16(i) must be something which, having regard to the nature of the goods that are the subject matter of the contract, makes it inappropriate to allow the consumer to return them after the consumer has broken the seal.
56.That rationale is not spelt out anywhere in the Directive or in the Commentaries, possibly because it was regarded as too obvious. As the Advocate General in Slewo pointed out, it cannot be to do with the compromise of the integrity of the goods themselves. A CD or DVD which is in a case or housing whose plastic wrapper has been removed may be in pristine condition and perfectly resaleable. The primary concern is not so much about the data supplied on the tangible data carrier becoming corrupted, as about it being copied. Article 16(i) – and Article 16(m), its counterpart when the digital content is supplied online – must both be concerned with protection of intellectual property rights. The former addresses the risk that data, including digital content, on a tangible medium will be copied, and the latter the risk that digital content supplied over the internet will be copied. Thomas Samuels, who appeared with Julie Leenane for Argos on this appeal, agreed that this was a probable explanation for the exception.
57.A subsidiary concern in the case of recordings, and also in the case of certain types of software (games, for example) again mentioned by the Advocate General in Slewo , is that allowing the consumer to return the CD or DVD after the package has been opened and the content could have been played, would be tantamount to giving the consumer licence to treat the trader as a free lending library, which is not only economically undesirable but likely to infringe intellectual property rights by depriving at least one person, and possibly several people, of royalties.
58.Both concerns provide justification for the decision that it is not possible to “test” the digital content of the tangible medium in that type of case.
59.Comparing the situation if the goods were not purchased online, if a consumer went to a high street store to purchase a recording, they would not be allowed to unwrap a CD on display and play it, though some stores may still have a “booth” facility to listen to particular recordings by playing test CDs kept behind the counter. In terms of testing the functionality of the CD, the consumer who purchases the same CD online is no worse off than their high street counterpart. Accordingly a consumer cannot return an audio or video cassette, or a CD or a DVD which is supplied in a plastic case or housing, and sealed in a film wrapper, as is usually the case, once the outer wrapper has been opened, unless of course it is discovered to be faulty.
60.The same position would apply if the consumer purchased pre-packaged anti-virus software or a digital game which could be played on a games console. Once out of its wrapping, the risk of copying and/or use and return without payment arises. However, neither of those concerns about protection of intellectual property rights would justify precluding a consumer from powering up a laptop and activating its operating software to test the computer’s functionality.
61.Tellingly, both the DG Guidance and the Commission Guidance assume that, for the purposes of Article 16(i), what is “sealed” is the tangible data carrier or medium carrying the software, and not the software itself. The Advocate General took the same approach in Slewo . That assumption also accords with the natural meaning of the words used. If the contract is for the supply of “sealed computer software” the “goods” must mean the software taken together with the tangible medium on which it appears. However, it was not Argos’ case that opening up the box and taking the computer out of its packaging was enough to trigger the operation of Regulation 28(3)(b). Indeed, Mr Samuels went further, and accepted that Dr Adodo was entitled to turn the computer on. However, he submitted that Dr Adodo could not do anything that would activate the operating system. That would necessarily mean that Dr Adodo would be unable to test the computer’s functionality.
62.Mr Samuels was constrained to accept that preventing someone from activating the operating software on their newly purchased computer in order to test the functionality of the computer was unlikely to do anything to protect anyone’s intellectual property rights, but he submitted that this was a deliberate policy choice. He submitted this was part of striking the right balance between a high level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises, which was the aim of the Directive, as referred to in Recital 4. He described this as a “strict liability” regime, and pointed to the fact that, unlike Regulation 28(3)(a), the words “ which are not suitable for return …” are missing from Regulation 28(3)(b). Parliament therefore chose not to require it to be shown that the “unsealing” had any detrimental impact on the sealed recording or computer software.
63.Mr Samuels suggested that the regime for the provision of information, and in particular information which traders have to provide under points (v) and (w) of Schedule 2, went some way to mitigating the harshness of the approach he was advocating. However, the provision of such information under Part 2 of the Regulations before the contract is concluded is mandatory in every case where it is relevant, irrespective of what happens after the computer is delivered, and cannot possibly be viewed as some kind of quid pro quo for curtailing a consumer’s right of cancellation under Part 3. Self-evidently, informing someone about how a computer is supposed to function is not the same as giving them the opportunity to test that functionality for themselves.
64.Mr Samuels also submitted that the fact that the software was preloaded onto the laptop did not preclude it from being “sealed computer software”. It is clear from Recital 19 to the Directive that digital content supplied via a tangible medium falls within the definition of “goods” for the purposes of the Directive. Mr Samuels contended that in this case the tangible medium was the computer, and drew an analogy with the example in the Commission Guidance of the gaming console preloaded with games.
65.Whilst it is true, as the Commission Guidance explained, that the regime for withdrawal/cancellation applies to contracts for the supply of digital content on a tangible medium, such as a gaming console with pre-installed games, it does not follow that all such “goods” fall within the meaning of the expression “sealed computer software”. The definition of “goods” as “tangible moveable items” is not changed. The software is treated as “goods” only because it is an integral part of the tangible medium on or through which it is supplied. If it were not supplied on a tangible medium it would not qualify as “goods” and if it fell within the Directive and Regulations at all, the contract would instead be a contract for the online supply of digital content.
66.The Commission Guidance does nothing more than confirm that contracts for the supply of digital content on a tangible medium fall within the regime of the Directive, that they are to be treated as contracts for the supply of goods, and that the right of withdrawal will apply to such contracts unless and until this particular exception comes into operation. The Guidance appears to envisage that there will be some such contracts which are not within that exception, whereas Argos’ approach would apply it to all or virtually all of them, and render the right to test the product meaningless. The Guidance is silent on the question of whether the exception applies to a contract for the supply of a computer which has been preloaded with operating software.
67.The Judge found at [29] that:
“once the software is loaded it becomes linked to the computer and that computer alone. For those reasons, in my judgment, District Judge Asjad was entitled to reach the view that the exemption did apply.”
68.Dr Adodo, who skilfully represented himself, contended that the Judge fell into error by addressing the wrong question, namely, whether the operating software which was already loaded on the laptop was “sealed computer software” within the meaning of Regulation 28(3)(b). The right question was whether the distance contract was a contract for the supply of “sealed computer software” within the meaning of the Regulation. He submitted that that expression in the Regulation did not encompass a contract for the supply of a computer with its associated operating software. The effect of Argos’ interpretation would be to deprive him of the rights which the Directive (and therefore Parliament in promulgating the Regulations) intended him to have, because he could not test the functionality of the computer without doing what he did.
69.Dr Adodo drew a comparison with the situation if he had gone into a shop to purchase a Lenovo laptop. The high street retailers who sell computers will usually put different models on display for consumers to examine and try out. If he had gone into such a shop he would have been allowed to turn on the computer and boot it up to test its functionality. That would necessarily have activated its preloaded operating system. He might also have been able to ask a sales assistant to demonstrate aspects of its functionality to him.
70.In this regard, the commentary in the Commission Guidance on Article 14(2) of the Directive (the equivalent of Regulation 34(9) and (12)), to which I have referred at paragraph 38 above, supports Dr Adodo’s position. It envisages that a consumer should be entitled to test a computer for functionality. However, it gives the configuration of software on a computer as an example of something the consumer would not be entitled to do in a shop, and thus of handling beyond what is necessary for such testing, and it states that the reasonable costs for any resetting of such equipment (to reverse that configuration) would constitute diminished value. The Guidance therefore necessarily assumes that even by doing something more than simply activating and running the software, such as adapting it for their own use, the consumer will not lose the right of withdrawal/cancellation, though they may have to pay for any cost incurred by the trader in reversing the adaptation.
71.I do not consider that on the findings of fact (the District Judge recorded in her order that he “tried to use the software”) what Dr Adodo did could be described as “configuring” the preloaded operating software. But even assuming that what he did could be so described, the Commission envisages that the consequences of “configuration” are that the consumer still has the right to return the computer without giving any reason, but the trader can charge the reasonable costs of reversing the “configuration” by restoring the computer to its factory settings (if, in the particular circumstances, that involves more than simply pressing a button). No attempt was made by Argos to establish the existence or amount of any such cost in this case.
72.In the light of the Commission Guidance, irrespective of whether it was appropriate to describe the act of booting up the computer and activating Windows 11 on it as the breaking of a digital seal on the software, that cannot be what Regulation 28(3)(b) is concerned with at all.
73.Taking all those matters into account, it seems plain to me that Regulation 28(3)(b) should be afforded a strict and narrow interpretation as covering only those contracts where (i) the audio recording, the video recording or the computer software is the specific object of the contract of sale (rather than being something incidental to and/or essential to the functioning of an item purchased remotely) and (ii) the medium of the recording or tangible data carrier is physically sealed in packaging which must be opened by the consumer in order to give access to the contents. It does not address the situation where operating computer software has been preloaded onto the computer or other device which the consumer has purchased, and where the act said to constitute the opening of the software involves the consumer taking the necessary steps to test the computer’s functionality.
74.Whilst a contract of the type into which Dr Adodo entered is a contract by which the trader supplies, and is obliged to supply, the operating software as well as the hardware on which it has been preloaded, it is still quintessentially a contract for the supply of a computer. A consumer does not, and does not need to, purchase a computer in order to acquire a copy of Windows 11. However, they can buy that or other software separately, and if they do, the contract will be a contract for the supply of that software. The “seal”, in respect of all three types of goods covered by the exception in Regulation 28(3)(b), is a physical seal created by the outer packaging of the tangible medium, and not some notional internal digital barrier to use of the data stored on that medium which is “broken” when the software is activated.
75.The interpretation propounded by Dr Adodo accords with the natural meaning of the words used. It adequately addresses the reasons for the exception associated with the nature of the purchased recordings or software (their vulnerability to being copied or duplicated illicitly, and the risk of their being watched or played without paying royalties). It adequately protects the intellectual property rights of others, and the economic interests of the trader, whilst maintaining the high level of protection afforded to the consumer. It avoids the difficulties inherent in Argos’ case by which the “unsealing” of Windows 11 leads to the loss of the right not simply to return the previously “sealed” software, but the laptop as well. It is supported by the approach of the Commission to the interpretation of what, in domestic law, has become Regulation 34(9) and (12).
76.Most importantly, it does not undermine the high level of consumer protection that the Directive and the Regulations were designed to achieve, and there is no reason to suppose that it creates any unacceptable imbalance between that level of consumer protection and the competitiveness of enterprises. It also ensures that a consumer knows when they are taking the legally significant act of breaking the seal – something which is not true of a so-called “digital seal” which is said to be “broken” by the act of starting up the laptop and activating the software.
CONCLUSION
77.For those reasons, despite the attractive manner in which Mr Samuels presented the arguments on behalf of Argos, I have been unable to accept them. The contract between Argos and Dr Adodo did not fall within Regulation 28(3)(b) and the steps he took to try out his new computer did not preclude him from exercising his rights under Regulation 29(1). The process of reasoning by which I have reached this conclusion has made it unnecessary to consider an application by Dr Adodo to adduce fresh evidence.
78.I would therefore allow this appeal and order Argos to refund Dr Adodo the price of the computer, together with interest starting 14 days from the date on which Dr Adodo unsuccessfully sought to return it to them, 5 September 2024.
LORD JUSTICE FOXTON:
79.I agree.
LADY JUSTICE KING:
80.I also agree.
Details
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Body | Courts of England and Wales |
| Type | court decision |
| Language | en |
| Document date | 2026-11-13 |
| Size | 48 929 знаков |
| Versions | 1 |
| First seen | 2026-11-14 |
| Last checked | 2026-11-16 05:27 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] EWCA Civ 1462 |
| court | The Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division) |
Topics
Why this document is in the base
Selection matched on the following, total weight 32.
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…service contracts (including contracts for digital services); contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (to which the commission refers as “contracts…
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…ot supplied on a tangible medium (to which the commission refers as “contracts for online digital content”); and certain contracts for the supply of public utilities such as water, gas or electri…
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…be supplied on the functionality, including applicable technical protection measures, of digital content; and any relevant compatibility of digital content with hardware and software that the tr…
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…able technical protection measures, of digital content; and any relevant compatibility of digital content with hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can reasonably be expected to h…
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…(b). 27. “goods” are defined by regulation 5 as meaning “any tangible moveable items…” “digital content” is defined as meaning data which are produced and supplied in digital form. 28. the re…
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digital content
текст
E-commerce and payments
…gital form. 28. the regulations make specific provision for contracts for the supply of digital content not on a tangible medium, see e.g. regulation 12(5); regulation 16(3); regulation 30(2)(b…
Dropped as boilerplate or single passing mentions: digital servicesadvertisingintellectual propertyintellectual propertyintellectual propertyintellectual property
Found by query: «personal data» (caselaw_uk)
Summary
Суд рассмотрел вопрос о праве потребителя отменить дистанционный договор купли-продажи компьютера с предустановленным программным обеспечением. Было установлено, что активация операционной системы не является нарушением условия о сохранении целостности упаковки товара, позволяющего потребителю отказаться от договора в течение 14 дней. Решение защищает высокий уровень защиты потребителей, предусмотренный законодательством о дистанционной торговле.