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Федеральный верховный суд Гонконга: право на конфиденциальную юридическую консультацию при расследовании преступлений
HKSAR v. CHIU, KA WAI, [2026] HKCFI 6124, HCMA473/2023
HCMA473A/2023 HKSAR v. CHIU, KA WAI
HCMA 473/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6124
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 473 OF 2023
(ON APPEAL FROM WKCC 3625 OF 2021)
BETWEEN
HKSAR
Respondent and CHIU, KA WAI (趙嘉慧)
Applicant
Before:
Deputy High Court Judge Edmond Lee in Court
Written Submission by the Applicant:
28 August 2026
Written Submission by the Respondent:
11 September 2026
Date of Decision:
2 November 2026
DECISION
Background
1. The Applicant was originally charged with four counts of fraud contrary to s. 16A(1) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210 (Charges 1, 2, 3 and 5) and one count of attempted fraud contrary to s. 16A(1) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210 and s. 159G of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200 (Charge 4), to which she pleaded not guilty and was convicted of all of them after trial.
2. All the charges were related to the Applicant’s previous employment under the Hong Kong Design Centre Limited (“HKDC”) sponsored by the HKSAR Government. It was alleged that the Applicant when working as a manager of HKDC concealed from and failed to disclose to HKDC that her husband had direct and indirect financial interests in certain suppliers and induced HKDC to engage those suppliers to provide services to HKDC.
3. The Applicant appealed against all those convictions. The appeal was dismissed under my judgment dated 27 July 2026 (“Appeal Judgment”).
Proposed Questions of Law
4. The Applicant now, pursuant to s. 32 (2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, seeks to certify five points of law of great and general importance to enable her to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Those five proposed points of law are [1] :- Question 1 : Does the right of a Hong Kong resident under Article 35 of the Basic Law to “confidential legal advice” and “timely protection of their lawful rights and interests” only arise where the resident has been taken into the law enforcement agency’s custody or his/her freedom of action has been significantly curtailed by an arrest or physical detention, but does not include the situation where the resident has been officially named as a suspect, has his/her home entered into and searched by law enforcement agency under a court warrant, cautioned for an offence, and also has his/her mobile devices seized purportedly under legal authority?
Question 2 : Should Question 1 be answered in the negative, does the right under Article 35 of the Basic Law to “timely protection of their lawful rights and interests” afford the Hong Kong resident suspect above such protection as to impose on the law enforcement agency conducting the search a legal obligation not to request from him/her the password to a mobile device seized until he/she has been informed of the constitutional right to confidential legal advice, and provided with an adequate opportunity for that right to be exercised? And is that legal obligation absolute?
Question 3 : Does the conduct of law enforcement agency, in the absence of exigent circumstances, deferring the service of the Notice to Person under investigation on the Hong Kong resident suspect above until after he/she had been asked to provide the password to electronic devices seized constitute an infringement of the resident’s right to “timely protection of their lawful rights and interests” within Article 35 of the Basic Law?
Question 4 : Does a search warrant authorizing the physical search of premises for electronic devices therein, which mentions the seized devices will be examined for their digital contents, but does not by itself explicitly authorize such an examination, afford to the law enforcement agency the implicit authority to do so without the need to obtain another specific warrant for that purpose, thereby satisfying the requirement of Article 30 of the Basic Law for the law enforcement agency to “inspect communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet the needs of investigation into criminal offences”?
Question 5 : Do the ICAC officers who are properly authorized under section 10C(l)(c) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance, Cap. 204, Laws of Hong Kong, thereby have the statutory power conferred on them to examine the digital contents of mobile devices seized pursuant to that section in the absence of any court warrant where it is reasonably practicable for such a warrant to be obtained?
5. Though both the trial and the appeal proceedings of this case were conducted in Chinese, the Applicant asked for, and the Respondent agreed, that this application should be done in English and that it could be disposed of by paper.
6. As required under s. 32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484:-
“Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal or the Court of First Instance, as the case may be, that a point of law of great and general importance is involved in the decision or it is shown that substantial and grave injustice has been done.”
7. The relevant principles for this application are usefully summarised by Zervos JA for the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Kwan Tat Yee
[2] . The grant of a certificate by the immediate appellate court is the first step in the process of applying for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on a point of law of great and general importance involved in its decision pursuant to s. 32(2) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484. The certifying court needs to be satisfied that the point of law (a) is involved in its decision; (b) is reasonably arguable; and (c) of great and general importance: Lee Kin Pong v HKSAR [3] ; HKSAR v Fong Kwok Shan Christine [4] .
8.
Both at the trial and at the appeal, one of the key issues or the major dispute was about the admissibility of certain WhatsApp messages among the Applicant, her husband and her brother in their respective mobile phones (“WhatsApp messages”). The Magistrate at the trial ruled them to be admissible despite the defence objection on the main ground of infringements of the Applicant’s constitutional rights under Article 35 (right to confidential legal advice for timely protection of lawful rights and interests)
[5]
and Article 30 (protection of privacy of communication and no infringement except inspection in accordance with legal procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into criminal offences)
[6]
of the Basic Law (hereinafter to be respectively referred to as “BL35” and “BL30”).
9. The Magistrate’s said ruling on the admissibility of the WhatsApp messages was appealed against in this Magistracy Appeal. It was argued both at the trial and at the appeal that the ICAC officers investigating in this case were in breach of BL35 and BL30 when examining the WhatsApp messages and subsequently seizing and producing them as exhibits. Those relevant grounds of appeal (Ground 1 and Ground 2) had been considered and eventually dismissed by me at the appeal. [7]
10. It is now submitted by the Applicant that all the above five questions are points of law of great and general importance. Each of them concerns fundamental constitutional rights of all Hong Kong residents under the Basic Law. Questions 1 to 3 relate to right to confidential legal advice and timely protection of it under BL35 whereas Questions 4 and 5 relate to freedom and privacy of communications protected under BL30. It is submitted that those questions have not been authoritatively decided by the Court of Final Appeal or the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong. Those questions, as submitted, directly affect the operational procedures of all law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong (Questions 1 to 4) and concern the proper interpretation of a statutory provision that is central to the operational powers of ICAC (Question 5), and have profound implications for the admissibility of digital evidence in criminal proceedings.
11. The Respondent, on the other hand, objects to this application. It is submitted that the relevant legal principles underlying those proposed questions are well-settled. It is submitted that the proposed questions concern only the application of the settled law to the particular facts of the present case and that none of them are reasonably arguable.
My Decision
12. There was in fact no or little dispute over the facts relating to the examination and the seizure of the WhatsApp messages. In summary, at the material time, two teams of ICAC officers equipped with search warrants went respectively to the home of the Applicant and her husband as well as the home of the Applicant’s brother to arrest them. Whilst at their respective residences, the ICAC officers cautioned them and asked them if they were willing to provide passwords to their mobile phones. They all did voluntarily. They were subsequently taken to the ICAC office where they were served with notices to person under investigation and were allowed to have private meetings with their counsel and solicitor.
13.
The defence version
[8]
was that, though the Applicant, her husband and her brother accepted that the ICAC officers had cautioned them, explained to them the contents of the search warrants and that they provided the passwords to their mobile phones voluntarily, they were at the material time under the belief that the ICAC officers had the powers to seize their phones and check the contents therein. They claimed that they thought they had no choice but to provide the passwords otherwise they would have contravened the search warrants. They claimed they did not know that they had the right to legal advice on that matter of providing passwords until they were subsequently taken to the ICAC office and served the notices and then had the opportunity to meet their lawyers.
14.
On that special issue of admissibility of the WhatsApp messages, the trial magistrate found the ICAC officers to be honest and reliable and accepted all their evidence, and at the same time, rejected all the evidence of the Applicant, her husband and her brother given in the alternative procedure
[9]
. In particular, the trial magistrate rejected the defence version that the Applicant and the others were ignorant of their rights to legal advice at the material time and that they would have first consulted their lawyers before deciding on whether or not to provide their passwords to their mobile phones. The trial magistrate had also considered the defence constitutional challenge under BL35 and BL30 and eventually ruled that the WhatsApp messages were admissible as evidence.
Questions 1, 2 and 3
15. As Questions 1, 2 and 3 are all related to BL35 which is about the right to confidential legal advice for timely protection of an individual’s lawful rights and interests, those questions can be conveniently considered and dealt with together.
16. It is apparent that the present case was and is never about the issue of whether an individual has the right to confidential legal advice, which must be answered in the affirmative. The real issue was and is about when and/or under what circumstances that particular right should arise so as to satisfy the constitutional requirement of “timely” protection of an individual’s lawful rights and interests under BL35.
17. Put it in another way, in the context of the present case, the question was and is, whether the ICAC officers had infringed the said constitutional right of the Applicant and the others under BL35 by not having informed them of that right in a “timely” manner, that is, not informed them at their respective residences but only at a later stage at the ICAC office and not informed them before they were asked for their passwords to their mobile phones.
18. The different scenarios referred or alluded to in Questions 1, 2 and 3 seek to put those questions in the context of the factual matrix of the present case. In essence, all those questions seek to raise the same fundamental issues, namely (a) at what stage of the investigation and/or under what circumstances the law enforcement agent is under an obligation to inform the subject person of investigation of his/her right to legal advice (either verbally or by serving a notice to person under investigation); and (b) whether that particular right to timely legal advice is absolute.
19.
As far as the protection of the relevant rights under BL35 is concerned, I when deciding this appeal had considered and taken the view that the relevant law had been well-settled basically under the judgment of the English Supreme Court in Ambrose v Harris
[10]
where the analogous provisions under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention on Human Rights” or “ECHR”)
[11]
had been canvassed at length
[12]
. Those analogous provisions under ECHR and the relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights had also been considered and accepted by the Court of Final Appeal when deciding on the rights protected under BL35, though for a different purpose and in a different context, in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd & Another
[13]
and Leung Chun Ying v Ho Chun Yan Albert
[14]
.
20.
Those legal principles enunciated in Ambrose v Harris were endorsed and applied by the High Court of Justiciary, Appeal Court of Scotland in the relatively recent case of Mclean v HM Advocate
[15]
where the facts were similar to those of the present case. The law in this subject area remains valid in or is consistent with the subsequent or other relevant case law in the United Kingdom and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, see the summaries of cases in paragraphs 15-34 to 15-36 of Archbold Hong Kong 2026
, paragraphs 16-116 to 16-120 of the United Kingdom edition of Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice 2026 and paragraphs D1.55 to D1.62 and F18.36 to F18.37 of Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2026
.
21.
In summary, a law enforcement officer is under an obligation to inform an individual of that relevant right to legal advice only when that individual is (a) a suspect; (b) being kept in custody by the law enforcement officer or his freedom of action being significantly curtailed (when the circumstances become oppressive and intimidating); and (c) being subject to interrogation (in the sense of being questioned with a view to extracting confession or eliciting an incriminating response). The mere fact that a suspect is not free to leave a particular place discloses no significant curtailment of his/her freedom of action. Enquiring with or questioning a suspect if he/she is willing to provide password to a mobile device is similar to asking him/her to open a lockfast place which does not amount to interrogation
[16]
. That particular right to legal advice is not absolute and always subject to the effectiveness and efficiency of investigation of crimes. It may be subject to limitations which pursue a legitimate aim, are proportionate and are not such as to impair the very essence of the right. A reasonable balance has to be struck between safeguarding the individual rights of a suspect and the public interest of ensuring efficient investigation of crimes
[17]
.
22.
What happened in the present case as referred or alluded to under Questions 1, 2 and 3, as discussed and decided by me in this appeal
[18]
, did not satisfy the said requirements, that is, the Applicant and the others though being suspects during the house search under search warrants were not being kept in custody or their freedom of action not being significantly curtailed and they not being subject to interrogation. It follows that that particular right to legal advice was not engaged at the time when the Applicant and the others were asked for and they in response voluntarily provided to the ICAC officers passwords to their respective mobile phones.
23. Also, it is important to note that the Applicant and the others had been properly cautioned and informed of their right to silence from the outset. That was never disputed by the defence. The defence version of “misunderstanding” or “mistaken belief” on the part of the Applicant and the others of having no option but to provide passwords to the officers and they being ignorant of their right to access to a lawyer and so on had been duly considered and eventually rejected by the trial magistrate [19] , which in my view could not be faulted.
24. There were no exigent or unusual circumstances at the material time of this case which obligated the investigating ICAC officers to inform the Applicant and the others of their right to legal advice when asking them for passwords to their mobile phones at the time of the house search after proper caution had been administered. The officers’ compliance with the usual practice of serving on the Applicant and the others the standard notices to person under investigation back in the ICAC office, in the circumstances of this case, did not cause them or result in any unfairness.
25. The Applicant, whether in the Magistracy Appeal or in this application, did not provide any legal authority contradicting or undermining the said legal principles which in my view are well-settled law in this subject matter of right to timely legal advice. The Applicant’s emphasis on the mere fact that there has not been any authoritative decision of the Court of Final Appeal or Court of Appeal on those proposed questions of law and that they concern the fundamental constitutional rights of all Hong Kong residents do not bring home this application. It must also be shown that they are reasonably arguable.
26. I am of the view that the relevant law under Questions 1, 2 and 3 are well-settled and that the scenarios referred or alluded to therein concern only the application of the well-settled law to the particular facts of the present case. The answers must be case-specific. Questions 1, 2 and 3 are not points of law of great and general importance which are reasonably arguable.
Questions 4
27. Now I proceed to consider Question 4 which concerns the search warrants in this case and freedom and privacy of communications protected under BL30.
28. The two search warrants in this case specifically stated:
“
IT IS ORDRED THAT
: CHU Wai-po, an investigating officer of the [ICAC] and any other ICAC investigating officers are empowered to enter
… the specified premises …
and to search
…
for …
electronic devices
, records or data processed or stored in computers or other electronic devices including mobile phones
, which are or contain evidence of the aforesaid offence or offense.
The digital contents of the mobile phones
, or any record or data processed or stored in computers or other electronic devices, upon seizure, will be examined for , among other things, communication records including call records, records of instant messaging applications and emails, digital documents, multi-media files and any other files or documents. …” (Emphasis added.)
29.
The terms of the two warrants made it clear that “IT IS ORDERED THAT”, inter alia
, (a) the ICAC officers are authorised to “search for any electronic devices including mobile phones” and (b) the digital contents of the mobile phones “will be examined”. The Applicant suggested under Question 4 that the subject search warrants “does not by itself explicitly authorize such an examination” of the electronic devices and their digital contents is misconceived. Contrary to what the Applicant contended, those search warrants not only “mentioned the seized devices will be examined” but they also “authorised” the examination of the “digital contents”. The clear wordings of the search warrants were that “IT IS ORDERED THAT”, inter alia
, the digital contents of the mobile phones “will be examined”.
30. I have also considered in the Appeal Judgment [20] that it is well-settled law that implicit in the power to “search” is the power to “examine” the contents, as it was held by the Court of Appeal in Sham Wing Kan v Commissioner of Police [21] that:
“91. Implicit in the power to search is the power to examine the contents of ‘any newspaper, book or other document or any portion or extract therefrom and any other article or chattel’ seized. For without the power to examine the contents, the power to search is quite meaningless in furtherance of the purpose of s.50(6).”
31. I therefore agree with the Respondent’s submission that Question 4 is wrongly premised upon the assumption contended by the Applicant that the two search warrants in the present case did not explicitly authorise examination of the digital contents of the mobile phones of the Applicant and the others. In any event, that power to examine is implicit in the power to search. It follows that Question 4 is not reasonably arguable.
Question 5
32. I now move on to deal with Question 5 which concerns the statutory powers of the investigating ICAC officers in this case under section 10C(1)(c) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance (Cap. 204) (“ICACO”) to examine the digital contents of mobile devices seized pursuant to that section in the absence of any court warrant.
33.
It was my decision after consideration in the Magistracy Appeal that the digital contents of the mobile phones seized in the present case were examined pursuant to the two search warrants which were issued before the examination and remained valid at the time of examination
[22]
. Apart from or in addition to that, I also accepted the Respondent’s two alternative or fall-back positions in the Magistracy Appeal that, (a) the ICAC officers were also empowered to seize and examine the digital contents of the mobile phones in question under that section 10C(1)(c) of the ICACO and (b) that the Applicant and the others had voluntarily provided their passwords to their respective mobile phones and consented to examination by the officers of the digital contents therein
[23]
.
34. It appears that Question 5 is premised on the assumption that I was wrong in my primary ruling by accepting that the examination of the digital contents of the mobile phones of the Applicant and the others were authorised by the search warrants executed in this case, then whether the ICAC officers were empowered and therefore authorised under section 10C(1)(c) of the ICACO to conduct the relevant examination.
35.
On that, I agree with the Respondent’s submission that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Apple Daily Ltd v Commissioner of the ICAC (No 2)
[24]
and the subsequent decision of the Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal in dismissing the application for leave to appeal
[25]
have provided a conclusive answer. In that case, the search warrant issued under section 17(1A) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Cap.201) (“POBO”) authorised on its face an act beyond the scope of that section. That search warrant purportedly authorised the named ICAC officers to “seize and retain” various materials whereas that section 17(1A) only empowered the officer to “enter” and “search” the premises in question. The ICAC officer in that case sought to rely upon his authorisation and the powers to seize and retain under section 10C(1)(c) of ICACO.
36.
The Court of Appeal explained the relevant proposition of the law
[26]
that if the requirements for a valid warrant have been met, the fact that the warrant purports to authorise acts which the warrant cannot authorise does not render the warrant invalid if little or no prejudice has been caused to the persons affected by the issue of the warrant; and despite the fact that the warrant purported to authorise the seizure and retention of materials, because the ICAC officers had been lawfully authorised by another route to seize and detain the materials under section 10C(1)(c) of the ICACO, no prejudice occurred. Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that section 10C(1)(c) of the ICACO authorises not only seizure but also examination of the materials seized because the wording “or to contain” in the section permits ICAC officers to seize the files and the filing cabinets in which documents contained in them and to inspect them at a proper pace
[27]
.
37. I had considered and taken the view that, in the present case, the above reasoning for examination of physical materials seized should also be applicable to digital contents of mobile devices [28] .
38.
The Appeal Committee of the Court of Final Appeal later on in that Apple Daily Ltd case dismissed that applicant’s application for leave to appeal and upheld the above decision of the Court of Appeal, commenting that the contrary was not arguable
[29]
. In particular, the Appeal Committee expressed that the law did not require the search warrant to recite the further fact that the ICAC officers, having lawfully gained entry, proposed to exercise their power of seizure under s.10C(1)(c) of the ICACO and that the judge who issued the warrant could not have been ignorant of the fact that the officers had such power
[30]
.
39. I therefore take the view that, not only that the legal issue under Question 5 is premised on the assumption that I was wrong on my primary finding but, in any event, the relevant law is also well-settled. Question 5 is not reasonably arguable.
40.
It is worth mentioning that, during my consideration and determination of this appeal, I had also considered
[31]
that, assuming the investigating ICAC officers’ conduct had infringed the constitutional rights of the Applicant and the others under BL35 and BL30, I would still rule the WhatsApp messages admissible as evidence by exercising the discretion of the Court as required under
HKSAR v Muhammad Riaz Khan
[32]
and SJ v Lam Tat Ming and another
[33]
. Finally, I had also considered and decided that, even if taking the view most favourable to the Applicant and assuming all those WhatsApp messages were inadmissible, there was still sufficient evidence to support the convictions of the Applicant including the only reasonable inference that the Applicant was at all material times aware of her husband’s financial interests in the suppliers to the Applicant’s employer
[34]
.
41. For the above reasons, I am not convinced that the requirement under s. 32(2) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 has been satisfied. I therefore decline to issue a certificate for the five proposed questions of law or any of them and this application is refused.
(Edmond Lee)
Deputy High Court Judge
Mr. Raymond Cheng SADPP, Ms. Audrey Parwani SPP and Mr. Ivan Sin SPP(Ag) of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent
Mr. Joseph Tse SC and Mr. Vincent CC Chan, instructed by Ivan Tang & Co., for the Applicant
[1] See Notice of Motion dated 3 August 2026
[2] CACC 213/2018, unreported, judgement dated 24 March 2023, at paragraph 14
[3] [1998] 1 HKLRD 182 at paragraph 183F
[4] FAMC 29/2016, unreported, judgment dated 8 February 2017, at paragraph 3
[5] Article 35 of the Basic Law provides, “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to confidential legal advice, access to the courts, choice of lawyers for timely protection of their lawful rights and interests or for representation in the courts, and to judicial remedies. Hong Kong residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts against the acts of the executive authorities and their personnel.”
[6] Article 30 of the Basic Law provides, “The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents shall be protected by law. No department or individual may, on any grounds, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of communication of residents except the relevant authorities may inspect communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into criminal offences.”
[7] See paragraphs 105 to 238 of the Appeal Judgment
[8] As put forward by the evidence of the Applicant, her husband and her brother given for the special issue during the alternative procedure
[9] See paragraph 62 of the Appeal Judgment
[10] [2011] 1 WLR 2435, by a 4:1 majority judgment
[11]
Article 6.1 of ECHR provides, “In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law…”; Article 6.3 provides, “ Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: … (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; …”; and that the right to a fair trial includes the right to access to a lawyer (see
Salduz v Turkey
(2009) 49 EHRR 421, at paragraph 55 of the judgment), right to be notified of defence rights, right to legal assistance etc. (see
Ibrahim and others v The United Kingdom
Application nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 40351/09 of ECHR (Grand Chamber), at paragraphs 216-217 of the judgment)
[12] See my summary of the legal principles at paragraph 120 of the Appeal Judgment
[13] (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1, at paragraph 73 of the judgment
[14] (2013) 16 HKCFAR 735, at paragraph 41 of the judgment
[15] [2023] HCJAC 16
[16]
See paragraphs 120 to 136 of the Appeal Judgment
[17] See paragraphs 121 and, 138 to 145 of the Appeal Judgment
[18] See paragraphs 146 to 155 of the Appeal Judgment
[19] See paragraphs 61 to 62 of the Appeal Judgment
[20] See paragraphs 171 to 172 of the Appeal Judgment
[21] [2020] 2 HKLRD 529
[22] See paragraphs 158 to 187 of the Appeal Judgment
[23] See paragraphs 188 to 207 of the Appeal Judgment
[24] [2000] 1 HKLRD 647
[25] (2000) 3 HKCFAR 26
[26] At paragraphs 666I-667A
[27] At paragraphs 670D-F
[28] See paragraphs 190 to 193 of the Appeal Judgment
[29] At paragraph 30H
[30] At paragraph 30E-F
[31]
See paragraphs 210 to 237 and 265(a) of the Appeal Judgment
[32] (2012) 15 HKCFAR 232
[33] (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168
[34] See paragraphs 245 to 255 and 265(b) of the Appeal Judgment
Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 05.11.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.
Реквизиты
| Страна | Гонконг |
| Орган | Судебная система Гонконга |
| Вид | судебное решение |
| Язык | en |
| Дата документа | 2026-11-02 |
| Объём | 30 235 знаков |
| Редакций | 1 |
| Впервые увидели | 2026-11-04 |
| Проверен | 2026-11-16 07:35 |
| case_no | HCMA473/2023 |
| ncn | [2026] HKCFI 6124 |
| parties | HKSAR v. CHIU, KA WAI |
| lang | English |
| uploaded | 2026-11-02 |
| organ | Судебная система Гонконга |
Темы
Почему документ в базе
Отбор сработал на этих совпадениях, суммарный вес 14.
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…electronic devices therein, which mentions the seized devices will be examined for their digital contents, but does not by itself explicitly authorize such an examination, afford to the law enfor…
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…204, laws of hong kong, thereby have the statutory power conferred on them to examine the digital contents of mobile devices seized pursuant to that section in the absence of any court warrant whe…
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…ng mobile phones , which are or contain evidence of the aforesaid offence or offense. the digital contents of the mobile phones , or any record or data processed or stored in computers or other el…
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…are authorised to “search for any electronic devices including mobile phones” and (b) the digital contents of the mobile phones “will be examined”. the applicant suggested under question 4 that th…
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…t by itself explicitly authorize such an examination” of the electronic devices and their digital contents is misconceived. contrary to what the applicant contended, those search warrants not only…
-
digital content
текст
Электронная коммерция и платежи
…d the seized devices will be examined” but they also “authorised” the examination of the “digital contents”. the clear wordings of the search warrants were that “it is ordered that”, inter alia ,…
Отброшено как шаблонные обороты или одиночные упоминания: privacyprivacyprivacyprivacyprivacy
Аннотация
Суд рассмотрел пять вопросов права, касающихся конституционных прав жителей Гонконга на конфиденциальную юридическую помощь и защиту законных интересов, а также защиты конфиденциальности коммуникаций. Рассматривались вопросы о том, когда возникает право на конфиденциальность юридической консультации, требуется ли уведомление подозреваемого до запроса паролей от устройств, которые были изъяты, и может ли обыск включать осмотр цифровых содержаний без отдельного ордера. Суд отклонил запрос о выдаче сертификата для рассмотрения этих вопросов судом высшей инстанции.
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