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Sue Heselton v The Information Commissioner

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Background to the appeal

1.This appeal concerns a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “ IC ” ) dated

17 June 2024, reference IC-286965-G5W5 (the “ Decision ” ).

The Decision was in connection with a request for information from the Office of the Public Guardian (“OPG”). The OPG is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (“the MOJ”), so the MOJ is the relevant public authority for this appeal.

2.The Appellant made an information request to the MOJ on 14 January 2024 (the “Request”) in the following terms:

“ Please may I have the exact parts of all policies, protocols, procedures, codes and legislations/Acts covering why any details of information gained/disclosed by OPG investigations in 2015 cannot be disclosed to the person being investigated in SARs [Subject Access Requests]?”

3.The Tribunal notes that the wording of the Request is disputed by the Appellant at paragraph 10 in her grounds of appeal, as she says there was no reference to SARs. We find as a matter of fact that this was incorrect; the wording of the email sent by the Appellant at 10.24 on 14 January 2026 was as reproduced above.

4.The MOJ responded on 25 January 2024 and advised it would not be taking the Appellant’s Request dated 14 January 2024 forward. It referred to its previous correspondence, sent to the Appellant on 19 May 2021, in which the MOJ had explained that it deemed her previous requests (dated 8 April 2021, 25 April 2021, 26 April 2021 and 4 May 2021) to be vexatious because of the burden they placed on the authority and the frequent and overlapping nature of the requests that she had made.

5.The refusal notice provided on 19 May 2021 had also informed the Appellant that the MOJ considered that any further requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000

(“FOIA”) relating to her underlying case would be vexatious in accordance with section 14(1) of FOIA. As a result, the MOJ advised the Appellant that it would not respond to any further FOIA requests associated with the subject matter of the previous requests. It stated that, under section 17(6) of FOIA, it would not issue refusal notices in response to any such requests but confirmed that the Appellant was “ at liberty to make Freedom of Information requests to the MOJ in the future which are not in the scope of topics made vexatious in this response

”.

6.The Appellant requested an internal review from the MOJ on 25 January 2024 (of the response to the Request, which also included a further FOIA request for:

“… a copy of the OPG guidance that states what information was allowed to be disclosed outside the OPG about people the OPG were investigating in 2015 ”?

7.The MOJ responded on 31 January 2024 as follows:

“ I can only reiterate my previous message – we informed you on 19 May 2021 that under section 17(6) of FOIA we will not respond to further FOI requests relating to your case.

I consider that your recent requests fall within the scope of the May 2021 refusal notice and therefore we will not be taking the matter further.”

8.The Appellant contacted the IC on 7 February 2024 to complain about the way her Request had been handled. She said she had not submitted FOIA requests about her case before May 2021, rather that her correspondence comprised letters to civil servants that the MOJ had “ turned into FOIA requests so they would not have to deal with them ”. The IC acknowledges that requests for recorded information need to be considered under the terms of FOIA.

9.The complete grounds of the Appellant’s complaint were relayed to the MOJ by the IC as part of his investigation – this included her statement that she had “gained a huge amount of new information ” of which she did not give further details.

10.On

17 June 2024, the IC issued the Decision Notice. In this, he decided that the Request was vexatious in accordance with section 14(1) of FOIA and that the MOJ was entitled to rely on section 17(6) to decline to issue a further refusal notice.

Abbreviations used in this decision

“the Decision ”

and the “ Decision Notice ” or “DN”

mean the IC ’ s decision dated 17 June 2024 reference

IC-286965-G5W5

“Disputed/withheld Information” means the withheld information which is the subject of this appeal

“FOIA” means the Freedom of Information Act 2000 . All references to sections are references to sections of this Act unless otherwise specified

“IC” means the Information Commissioner, the Respondent

“MOJ” means the Ministry of Justice, the public authority in this appeal.

“OPG” means the Office of the Public Guardian

“SAR” means Subject Access Request

“the Request” means the information request made by the Appellant to the MOJ on 14 January 2024

“UT” means the Upper Tribunal, Administrative Appeals Chamber

Procedural matters concerning the hearing

11.The Tribunal considered an OPEN bundle of documents (1145 pages). In this decision we refer to page numbers of documents in this bundle with the prefix OB. The Appellant did not have a copy of the bundle which she could access during the hearing due to difficulties in downloading this, but was content to proceed when we confirmed that all the information she had submitted was before the Tribunal. We were satisfied that that the Appellant had seen all the documents previously because the vast majority (OB D294 to E1145) were submitted by her in support of the appeal and the remainder consisted of the Request, documents relating to the IC’s decision and appeal documents from the Tribunal so had either been sent by her or provided to her as part of those processes. The panel did not need to refer to any specific documents when asking questions of the Appellant.

12.The Appellant also submitted a number of documents including a statement in advance of the hearing. We considered that these were relevant to matters the Tribunal needed to consider so it was in the interests of justice to admit this as late evidence.

The Appeal

13.The Appellant appealed the Decision to the Tribunal on 17 July 2024.

Her grounds of appeal (44 pages), in summary, raised the following points:

a.

The IC wrongly agreed with the MOJ that her requests were vexatious. She argues that her requests had genuine and serious purposes, namely obtaining information about actions taken by the OPG and understanding why those actions were taken. She argues that a request should not be regarded as vexatious merely because previous dealings with the public authority have been so regarded.

b.

The IC was provided only with the MOJ’s version of events and did not seek further information from the Appellant before issuing the Decision Notice. She contends that if the IC had known the full circumstances, he might have exercised its discretion differently.

c.

Her purpose in making the Request was, in essence, to:

i.

Understand what information existed concerning the wider context of the request;

ii.

Discover why investigations were conducted;

iii.

Obtain information relevant to ongoing litigation and other legal proceedings;

iv.

Obtain justice for her family;

v.

Correct allegedly inaccurate information; and vi.

Prevent similar events happening to others.

d.

Disclosure of the information requested would not just benefit the Appellant but would also be of public value because it concerns matters including the operation of the OPG, information governance and assurance practices, safeguarding procedures and transparency and accountability of public authorities. The value of the information sought outweighs any burden on the MOJ.

e.

The IC failed to comply with the spirit and requirements of a number of provisions of FOIA, including sections 45 and 46 (codes of practice and public access) and section 47 (the IC’s duty to promote good practice).

f.

The Appellant disagrees with a number of factual findings in the Decision Notice. She states that one request was wrongly characterised as an SAR rather than a FOIA request. She denies that her requests were overlapping in the way alleged and argues that new requests were prompted by newly acquired information rather than repeated grievances.

g.

She alleges that there was misconduct by the OPG, including failure to follow legal duties, internal policies and procedures, particularly in relation to complaints, and safeguarding responsibilities.

h.

The Appellant argues that the MOJ was not entitled to rely on section 17(6) of FOIA to avoid issuing a further refusal notice because:

i.

Circumstances had changed materially;

ii.

Significant new information had emerged; and iii.

She had been told she retained the right to make FOIA requests.

i.

She concludes that the IC’s Decision Notice was not in accordance with the law and the IC should have exercised its discretion differently. She maintains that her requests were not properly characterised as vexatious and that the IC should issue a fresh Decision Notice.

The IC’s response to the Appeal

14.The IC filed a Response to the appeal on 8 October 2024, in which he opposed the appeal and maintained his position, relying on his Decision Notice.

15.The Appellant did not file a formal Reply to the Response.

Legal Framework

Section 14

16.Section 14(1)

of FOIA provides: ”

Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. ”

17.There is no further guidance on the meaning of “vexatious” in the legislation. The leading guidance is contained in the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) decision in Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012]

UKUT

440 (AAC), as upheld and clarified in the Court of Appeal ( “ CA ” ) in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another & Craven v Information Commissioner and another [2015]

EWCA

Civ

454 (CA).

18.As noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the CA in Dransfield , the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one:

“…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious .” (para 68).

19.Judge

Wikeley ’ s decision in the UT decision on Dransfield sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the CA. The ultimate question is, “ is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA ?” (para 43). It is important to adopt a “ holistic and broad ” approach, emphasising “ manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests .” (para 45). Arden LJ in the CA also emphasised that a “ rounded approach ” is required (para 69), and all evidence which may shed light on whether a request is vexatious should be considered.

20.The UT set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious:

a.

The burden imposed on the public authority by the request . This may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings between the parties. “… the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor .” (para 29).

b.

The motive of the requester . Although FOIA is motive-blind, “ what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority .” (para 34).

c.

The value or serious purpose . Lack of objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own, but is part of the balancing exercise – “ does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought? ” (para 38).

d.

Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff . This is not necessary in order for a request to be vexatious, but “ vexatiousness may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive .” (para 39).

21.Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “ protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA ” (UT para 10), subject always to the high standard of vexatiousness being met.

Section 17(6)

22.When a public authority relies on section 14, the obligations under section 17 to give notice of refusal differ from the section 17 obligations when a public authority relies on an exemption in Part II relating to the duty to confirm or deny or a claim that the information is exempt information.

23.Where a request is vexatious, a public authority is not obliged to comply with section 1(1)(a) or (b). It is not obliged to confirm or deny if it holds any information. Nor is it obliged to issue a substantive refusal notice under section 17(1) or 17(3) setting out the reasons for refusal. If section 17(6) applies, the public authority is not obliged to issue any refusal notice.

24.Section 17(6) states that the public authority is not required to issue a refusal notice where:

a.

the public authority relies on a claim that section 14 applies, b.

it has given the applicant a notice in relation to a previous request for information stating that it is relying on such a claim, and c.

it would in all the circumstances be unreasonable to expect the authority to serve a further notice in relation to the current request.

The Role of the Tribunal

25.The Tribunal’s remit is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the IC’s decision involved exercising discretion, he should have exercised it differently. If we are satisfied that the IC’s Decision Notice is in error of law or involves an inappropriate exercise of discretion then we will allow the appeal and may substitute a decision notice for that of the IC. The Tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the IC and may make different findings of fact from the IC.

Evidence and submissions

26.We heard oral evidence and submissions from the Appellant in the hearing primarily about the background and wider context for her request.

Issues

27.The issues before the Tribunal were:

a.

Whether the request was vexatious under section 14 of FOIA; and b.

Whether the MOJ were entitled to rely on section 17(6) of FOIA.

28.We explained in the hearing to the Appellant that it is always the request rather than the requester who is vexatious, but that consideration of section 17(6) required the Tribunal to consider not just the request which is the subject of the appeal but also previous requests in order to determine if the MOJ was entitled to rely upon it. We also explained that subject access requests made under the Data Protection Act 2018 were not the subject of this appeal, so we would be making no findings about these.

Discussion and conclusions

29.In

Kennedy v Charity Commission

[2014] 2 WLT 808, Lord Sumption, with whom Lord Neuberger and Lord Clarke agreed, said as follows, at para 153:

30.“The

Freedom of Information Act 2000

… introduced a new regime governing the disclosure of information held by public authorities. It created a prima facie right to the disclosure of all such information, save in so far as that right was qualified by the terms of the Act or the information in question was exempt. The qualifications and exemptions embody a careful balance between the public interest considerations militating for and against disclosure.

The Act contains an administrative framework for striking that balance in cases where it is not determined by the Act itself. The whole scheme operates under judicial supervision, through a system of statutory appeals.”

31.It is important to remind ourselves of those observations. FOIA creates a prima facie right to disclosure of information held by public authorities, save in so far as that right is qualified by the terms of FOIA or the information in question is exempt. Further, we remind ourselves that the qualifications and exemptions embody a careful balance between the public interest considerations militating for and against disclosure.

32.The purpose of section 14 is “ to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA .” (UT, Dransfield , para 10). In order to achieve this purpose, as the Court of Appeal noted (CA, Dransfield , para 68), Parliament has chosen to use a strong word, and therefore the hurdle of satisfying it is high.

33.Section 14 must not be interpreted in a way that in effect introduces a ‘public interest’ threshold that all requests have to pass. If no exemption is engaged, there is a right to disclosure of information held by public authorities whether or not there is any public interest in disclosure.

34.Nor should section 14 be interpreted in such a way that it operates as a ‘catch all’ exemption. It should not be used to avoid the need to consider whether the authority is entitled to rely on an exemption to withhold the information, even where it might appear obvious to the authority, the IC or the Tribunal that the requested information ought to be withheld either in the public interest or for some other reason. Parliament has chosen which exemptions to include and determined how those exemptions operate in order to embody the ‘careful balance’ identified above.

Section 14 is not designed to avoid the need to consider the application of individual exemptions.

35.Although the four broad issues or themes identified by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield are not exhaustive and are not intended to create a formulaic checklist, they are a helpful tool to structure our discussion, although some elements do not fit neatly under one heading. In adopting this structure, we have taken a holistic approach, and we bear in mind that we are considering whether or not the request was vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA.

Was the request vexatious under section 14?

The burden imposed on the public authority by the request

36.The Appellant made the following points in her grounds of appeal (OB A35ff):

a.

“I am not questioning that the MOJ/OPG found the request a “burden” for many different reasons… ” (paragraph 2)

b.

“ since my right to make FOIA requests was reinstated on 7-4-22, until this year I did not make one FOIA request ” (paragraph 65)

c.

“ If you consider the FOIA requests I put in from the start of this case in A ugust 2015 overall, I do not believe that overall there are that many, as some were to the OPG and some to the whole of the MOJ… I do not believe that my FOIA requests were overlapping in nature ” (paragraph 69)

d.

“ To me I am not writing about “the same issues”…the “issues” I was corresponding about were regarding whatever new information I had just become aware ” (paragraph 78)

37.As recorded in paragraph 24 of the Decision Notice, the MOJ provided the IC with an Excel spreadsheet detailing 25 requests from the Appellant and the various questions asked within each of those requests which appears at page OB B186. Attached to this were two examples of actual FOIA requests made by the Appellant for illustration. This covers the period from 18 July 2020 to 25 January 2024; the last two requests post-date the request to which this appeal relates. The MOJ also provided details of a previous data protection complaint from the Appellant concerning the same subject matter to which it had responded on 4 October 2021 (page OB B179).

38.In its letter to the IC dated 28 May 2024 (OB B171), the MOJ stated the following:

a.

The MOJ noted that the Appellant had submitted “ frequent and extensive correspondence about the same issues, with no significant change in approach to structuring questions despite previous responses seeking clarification and suggesting refocusing the questions

”. It stated “

OPG has processed a number of FOIs and SARs for Ms Heselton over the past several years, providing her with all the information she was entitled to. Our responses explained the reasons why any information was withheld in these disclosures. Accordingly, we view her request as a continuation of her complaints against OPG in relation to how we dealt with the underlying case some years ago and as such constitutes misuse of the right of access to recorded information under FOIA

.”

b.

In the period from 18 July 2020 to 4 May 2021, the Appellant “ submitted 17 separate pieces of correspondence to OPG containing 173 questions which were considered under FOIA. These requests included extensive repetition with some received before there was any opportunity to respond to the previous one.”

This was in addition to significant volumes of correspondence from the Appellant which did not fall under FOIA. In the same period, the Appellant wrote to multiple officials within OPG and MOJ with requests for information, which were referred to OPG to process. As quoted in the DN at paragraph 27, to illustrate this, the MOJ cited an example of one FOIA request received in February 2021 which consisted of 5,786 words and 36 questions that it was able to identify. The MOJ stated that the time and effort taken to interpret the Appellant’s correspondence to identify the most appropriate legal regime with which to formulate responses, if any, has been “ a highly time-consuming task

”.

c.

The MOJ stated that “ this placed an oppressive burden on OPG to review and respond to all requests, impacting on the availability of the subject matter experts within the OPG team to respond to any other work requests. This did not represent fair or effective use of public money .”

d.

It went on to note that “ the volume and extent of her correspondence increased significantly from the 2020-21 financial year, throughout 2021 and early 2022, resulting in Ms Heselton sending multiple emails to officials both in OPG and MOJ HQ, often attaching voluminous letters running to thousands of words each.”

e.

It stated “Ms Heselton has been advised that she has exhausted the OPG complaints procedure and it is our view that she is seeking to reopen her complaints via the FOIA route. Despite OPG attempting to provide comprehensive answers to her correspondence prior to May 2021, Ms Heselton continues to raise the same issues again and again. MOJ consider this to be unreasonable behaviour and causes significant disruption to the department’s business. OPG considers Ms Heselton’s complaints about the underlying case to be closed, and we cannot reopen correspondence on this matter.”

f.

Finally it noted “ if we no longer relied on s14(1), it is highly likely that, given the lengthy history in this case, that Ms Heselton’s correspondence would again increase to the levels seen in 2020-22 and cause significant disruption to the department’s business .”

39.The IC at paragraphs 39-40 of the Decision Notice stated:

“39.

In summary, the Commissioner is satisfied that this request can be traced back to the complainant’s underlying case with the OPG/MOJ. That matter has been examined and re-examined and it was made clear to the complainant in May 2021 that further FOIA requests about her underlying case would be treated as vexatious.

40.Despite this, the complainant has submitted three further FOIA requests to the Commissioner’s knowledge (two of which post-date the request under consideration here but which illustrate her persistence). It is apparent that the complainant seems determined to continue to submit FOIA requests about her underlying case despite having been advised that they will be treated as vexatious and will not be responded to. The Commissioner is satisfied that continuing to interpret and respond to the complainant’s requests about her underlying case would constitute an oppressive burden, particularly given the frequency and extensive content of some of those requests. “

40.We consider that this evidence, in particular the spreadsheet referred to at paragraph 37 above provides a clear snapshot of the state of communication between the Appellant and the MOJ at the time of the request in January 2024. We considered that many of the requests were overlapping in nature and arose out of the same facts and matters which make up the wider context of the Appellant’s requests. The fact that there was a period during which no requests were made does not alter the fact that the requests which were made overlapped to a significant degree and asked for the same or very similar information on a number of occasions.

41.While we have some sympathy with the Appellant’s frustration that she felt she was not getting the answers she wanted, despite her persistence, on the balance of probabilities we were satisfied this volume of correspondence in relation to the issues raised in her underlying case would have placed an unreasonable burden on the OPG/MOJ in the time up to and including the Request.

The motive of the requester

42.The Appellant made the following points in her grounds of appeal (OB A35ff):

a.

“ previously in my letters and/or FOIA requests I was asking questions to try and understand why everything was wrong with this case each time I gained new information ” (paragraph 26)

b.

She stated that she had been told by the OPG that she was “ at liberty to make Freedom of Information requests to the MOJ in the future which are not in the scope of topics made vexatious in this response .” She therefore believed that she was allowed to make new FOIA requests to the OPG “ as they are new topics, as they are based on new information .” (paragraph 27)

c.

“ At no time have I behaved unreasonably or out of “vengeance”; I have just wanted the truth in order to understand and make myself safe ” (paragraph 31)

d.

As summarised in paragraph 13(c) above and explained in paragraph 43 of the grounds of appeal (with similar points raised at paragraph 113), the purpose of making the request was, in essence, to get justice for her family, understand the information which existed in the wider context of the request and obtain information in relation to ongoing litigation and other legal proceedings.

43.The MOJ, in its letter dated 28 May 2024 (OB B171), stated that “ Ms Heselton has been advised that she has exhausted the OPG complaints procedure and it is our view that she is seeking to reopen her complaints via the FOIA route .”

44.The IC in paragraph 38 of the DN stated: “ Whilst he acknowledges the complainant’s position, the Commissioner is satisfied that the matters which resulted in her request have been fully considered by the MOJ and they have not been substantiated. The complainant therefore appears to be attempting to ‘re-open’ matters that have already been thoroughly considered, and to be requesting a significant amount of information in the hope that she might find something to further her personal aims .”

45.The Appellant was clear in her submissions in the hearing that her reasons for making the request in question was that she wants to obtain justice for the wrongs that she felt had happened in the past. She also made it clear that she does not wish others to suffer as she has and wishes to be able to live her life feeling safe. In addition, she wants to obtain information which will assist her with ongoing litigation related to the wider context of this appeal. We found that the Appellant felt these things strongly and was sincere in her belief as to why she felt that she needed to make the request.

46.While we can understand that the Appellant was frustrated in not getting the answers she wanted through other channels and was trying to use the FOIA mechanism as another way to obtain the information she sought, we have to consider this in the context of the course of dealings between the Appellant and the MOJ. If we view the request itself in the context of the dealings between these parties, the fact that the Appellant had asked very similar questions previously and had kept asking them through FOIA requests when she did not get answers, this weighs in favour of the request itself being vexatious. We note that other mechanisms than FOIA could have been used to seek this information, such as civil action and that the Appellant is now pursuing some of these avenues.

The value or serious purpose

47.The Appellant made the following points in her grounds of appeal (OB A35ff):

a.

At paragraph 29 she said the information sought was of value to her as she was trying to get justice for her family and clear her name.

b.

At paragraph 37 she said that the information would be of value to her in her various litigation claims against several bodies, particularly as the OPG will not allow her to make a complaint or supply the information (paragraph 39). She makes a similar observation at paragraph 65.

c.

At paragraph 40 she said that the information would be of value to the public especially if seen in the context of the underlying case. She continued at paragraph 41 to explain that there is public interest in how public authorities’ information governance systems can be misused and at paragraph 42 that there is public interest in openness and transparency of public bodies.

48.In her statement for the hearing, the Appellant said that the information she is seeking would be of great value to her in enabling her to correct disinformation in the wider context of this appeal. She argued that information about how the OPG conducts investigations is of public interest, as is her experience of the process.

49.The MOJ in its letter dated 28 May 2024 (OB B171), stated that “ Ms Heselton has exhausted the OPG complaints procedure and appears to be seeking to use FOIA to continue her disagreement with the actions we took in relation to our cas e”.

50.The IC in paragraph 38 of the DN stated, “ Having been made aware of the background, history and context of this request, the Commissioner is satisfied that there is no wider benefitto thee general public that would flow from the MOJ responding to the complainant’s request of 14 January 2024 ”.

51.We concluded that whilst the information sought was clearly of significant personal value to the Appellant, there was no wider public benefit in disclosure of the specific information sought by the request in question. Public benefit in the sense of being something that would benefit the public at large is not the same as something about which the public would be interested or curious. We considered that there was limited if any public benefit in disclosing the MOJ policies and procedures sought by this specific request without disclosing the wider context to the public.

Any harassment of, or distress cause to, the public authority’s staff

52.The Appellant made the following points in her grounds of appeal (OB A35ff):

a.

“ I have not caused anyone in the MOJ/OPG harassment or distress, nobody has ever asked me to stop any behaviour ” (paragraph 65)

53.In its letter to the IC dated 28 May 2024 (OB B171), the MOJ commented on the effect on team members, but did not elaborate further.

54.The

UT decision in Dransfield makes it clear that this element is not necessary in order for a request to be vexatious.

On balance of probabilities, we consider there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that there has been harassment of or distress caused to the MOJ’s staff.

55.In summary, we consider that several limbs in the test in Dransfield are met, and that accordingly the MOJ was entitled to rely on the request being vexatious to refuse to comply with

it. This means that the MOJ is able to rely on section 14(1) of FOIA to refuse the request on the basis it was vexatious.

We therefore consider that the part of the IC ’ s Decision Notice finding that the MOJ could rely on section 14(1) of FOIA was made in accordance with the law

Was the MOJ entitled to refuse to issue a refusal notice under section 17(6)?

56.As set out above, there are three parts to this issue which need to be considered.

Did the MOJ rely on a claim that section 14 applies?

57.The IC at paragraph 45 of the DN accepted that the MOJ has relied on a position that the request is vexatious and was justified in doing so.

58.We find as a matter of fact that the MOJ did rely on its position that section 14(1) applied and that the request was vexatious.

Had the MOJ given the Appellant a notice in relation to a previous request for information stating that it is relying on such a claim?

59.The IC at paragraph 46 of the DN stated “The second criteria has also been met as the MOJ had informed the complainant in May 2021 that her request was vexatious in accordance with section 14(1) of FOIA and issued a refusal notice. It advised the complainant that it would not issue a refusal notice to any future FOIA requests associated with her underlying case in accordance with section 17(6) of FOIA. The complainant had the opportunity to complain to the Commissioner about that response, but did not do so .”

60.We find that the MOJ had given the Appellant such a notice in relation to a previous request stating that it was relying on such a claim, so this part of the test is met.

Would it, in all the circumstances, be unreasonable to expect the MOJ to serve a further notice in relation to the current request?

61.At paragraphs 48 to 52 of the DN, the IC set out his reasoning as follows:

48.Whilst the Commissioner notes that, at the point the request was received, it had been almost three years since the MOJ had last issued a refusal notice, he also notes that the request relates to the same matter and that nothing significant had changed during the intervening period. Whilst the complainant made reference to having “gained a huge amount of new information” in her submitted grounds of complaint, she has not elaborated on this. Furthermore, the Commissioner considers that FOIA is not the correct channel through which to try to raise concerns about her personal underlying case, particularly given any disclosure under FOIA is effectively made to the ‘world at large’.

49.The First Tier Tribunal in Scranage v Information Commissioner EA/2020/01534 cautioned against assuming that the mere passage of time would materially affect whether or not a public authority may continue to rely on section 17(6) of FOIA. The Tribunal noted that the purpose of this part of the legislation was designed to protect scarce public resources from individuals who repeatedly abuse their right of access.

50.The Commissioner notes that, despite not issuing further refusal notices, the complainant continues to send correspondence to the MOJ on the subject of her underlying case. He further notes that she has made at least two further FOIA requests on this subject since the request under consideration here.

51.The Commissioner agrees that, in the circumstances, it would have been unreasonable to have expected the MOJ to have issued a fresh refusal notice. Simply refusing the earlier requests as vexatious had clearly not brought matters to a close and therefore the MOJ is entitled to draw a line in the sand.

52.Continuing to issue further refusal notices would, in the Commissioner’s view, only serve to prolong the correspondence further whilst diverting the MOJ’s staff away from their core functions ”

62.The Appellant made the following points in her grounds of appeal (OB A35ff):

a.

“ In these circumstances it would have been perfectly reasonable to have “issued a fresh refusal notice” ”(paragraph 121) OB A75 b.

She stated that the MOJ/OPG had sent her a letter on 7 April 2022 reinstating her right to make FOIA requests (paragraph 121). From that point on she considered that she had the right to have her FOIA requests processed (paragraph 126). This document was not before the Tribunal.

c.

She disagrees that the Scranage case applies to her circumstances, as “ it is not just the “mere passage of time”, it is the many events, new information, 4 court cases commenced and the 7-4-22 letter from the Public Guardian, Head of Information Assurance and Law that has “materially” affected that that the OPG/MOJ could “continue to rely on section 17(6) of FOIA ””(paragraph 122)

d.

She says that the MOJ/OPG did not issue further refusal notices so she was allowed to continue to submit FOIA requests. She stated that “ these requests are not based on my “underlying case”, which was only actioned up to 2016, or if you include my last complaint reply letter which was April 201 8.” (paragraph 123).

e.

The IC did not know all the circumstances as he “ did not come back to me to discuss the OPG/MOJ reply/evidence, so they could not find out the correct version of circumstances/background contained in [the grounds of appeal] “ (paragraph 124)

f.

She contends that respecting people’s rights under data protection legislation and FOIA, as well as having robust Information Assurance systems are core functions of the MOJ (paragraph 125). She stated that members of the public pay their taxes partly to the MOJ expecting it to have robust systems to comply with law such as the Equality Act, Human Rights Act, the Care Act and other statutes and to follow their own policies.

63.Whilst we agree that the public do have an expectation that public authorities will have robust systems for legal compliance, we find as a matter of fact that the Appellant had sent further requests and correspondence after having been advised that no further refusal notices would be sent. It was clear from the evidence before us that previous refusals had not brought an end to this correspondence. In all the circumstances, therefore, we consider that it was not unreasonable for the MOJ to refuse to issue a further decision notice in this instance.

Conclusion

64.For the reasons set out above, we are satisfied on balance of probabilities that the Request dated 14 January 2024 was vexatious and that the IC’s conclusion that the MOJ was entitled to rely on section 14(1) of FOIA to refuse to comply with it was in accordance with the law.

65.We are also satisfied on balance of probabilities that the MOJ was entitled to refuse to issue a further refusal notice under section 17(6) of FOIA, because the test set out in that section is met.

66.We therefore dismiss the appeal.