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Peter Stead v The Information Commissioner

court decision 2026-10-23 24 356 characters Personal data
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BACKGROUND

1.This is an appeal by Mr Peter Stead against Decision Notice IC-407347-P6Y7 issued by the Information Commissioner (the Commissioner) on 31 March 2026. The appeal was heard in public by remote means. The Appellant attended and made oral submissions in support of his appeal. We are grateful to him for the clear and careful manner in which he presented his case. The Commissioner did not attend and was not represented at the hearing.

2.The Tribunal had before it the Commissioner's written Response and supporting documentation. We were satisfied that the Commissioner's position was fully set out in those documents and that the appeal could fairly be determined in his absence.

3.The hearing was listed before a panel of three members, but one member was unable to attend. The relevant practice direction

Senior President of Tribunals, Practice Direction, Composition of the First-tier Tribunal in relation to matters that fall to be decided by the General Regulatory Chamber , 19 May 2023.

permits the Tribunal in a case such as this to proceed with a judge and one member with substantial experience of data protection or freedom of information rights, and we decided to proceed in that way. The situation was explained to Mr Stead and he did not object.

THE REQUEST

4.On 10 March 2024 the Appellant made a request for information to the University of York under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA). The request sought professional or academic emails and attachments exchanged between an academic member of the University (who we will refer to as W) and three named individuals, (who we will refer to as X, Y and Z), from 1 January 2023 onwards.

5.The request specified that communications should be disclosed irrespective of whether they originated from University email accounts or accounts connected with the Creative Industries Independent Standards Authority (CIISA).

6.The University initially refused the request under section 14(1) FOIA. Following earlier proceedings before this Tribunal in March 2025 (FT/EA/2024/0351), the University was required to reconsider the request and provide a fresh response.

7.In its revised response the University disclosed a number of email chains whilst withholding limited information pursuant to section 40(2) FOIA.

8.The Appellant sought an internal review on the basis that the redactions were excessive and that further information falling within the scope of the request had not been disclosed. During the review process, and thereafter following further representations from the Appellant, the University identified and disclosed additional emails and attachments. The Appellant remained dissatisfied and complained to the Commissioner.

THE DECISION NOTICE

9.The Commissioner issued the decision notice on 31 March 2026. The decision notice records the history of the request and the University's revised consideration of it following the earlier Tribunal proceedings. The Commissioner noted that additional information had been disclosed during the internal review process and during his own investigation. One feature of the Appellant's complaint was that the piecemeal nature of those disclosures demonstrated that the University's searches had been inadequate and that further information continued to be held. The Commissioner therefore investigated the adequacy of the searches undertaken by the University.

10.In the course of that investigation the Commissioner obtained evidence concerning the University's records management arrangements, the locations in which relevant information would be expected to be held, the searches undertaken and the methodology employed. The University explained that information falling within the scope of the request would be expected to be held within W’s email account and associated electronic records. The University described searches undertaken using relevant search terms and searches directed towards communications involving the named individuals.

11.The Commissioner considered the significance of the University's earlier failures to identify all information falling within scope. He accepted that those failings were relevant, and justified careful scrutiny of the University's later explanations. However, having reviewed the evidence obtained during his investigation, the Commissioner concluded that the subsequent searches had been sufficiently detailed and targeted to identify information falling within the request.

12.The Commissioner recognised that it was not possible to establish with certainty that no further information existed. Applying the balance of probabilities test, however, he concluded that the available evidence did not support a finding that further information was held by the University. The Commissioner therefore found that, on the balance of probabilities, the University did not hold any further information falling within the scope of the request.

13.The Commissioner also considered the University's reliance on section 40(2) FOIA. Having reviewed the withheld information, he concluded that it comprised personal data relating to third parties, including identifying details, contact information and information relating to individuals who were not the focus of the request. The Commissioner concluded that the substantive content of the communications had already been disclosed. He found that disclosure of the remaining personal data would add little or nothing to public understanding of the matters under discussion. The Commissioner therefore concluded that disclosure would contravene the data protection principles and that the exemption provided by section 40(2) FOIA was engaged.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

General right of access

14.Section 1(1) FOIA provides that any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled:(a)

to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b)

if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

15.Where a dispute arises as to whether information is held by a public authority, the Tribunal must determine that issue on the balance of probabilities.

16.Absolute certainty will rarely be possible. The Tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence, including the nature and extent of the searches undertaken, the systems searched, the explanations provided by the public authority and any evidence tending to indicate that further information exists.

17.The issue is not whether further information might conceivably exist but whether, on the evidence before the Tribunal, it is more likely than not that further information is held. The position was explained in the case of Linda Bromley and Information Commissioner v Environment Agency EA/2006/0072 at paragraph 13, as follows:- There can seldom be absolute certainty that information relevant to a request does not remain undiscovered somewhere within a public authority's records….The Environment Agency…argued (and was supported in the argument by the Information Commissioner) that the test to be applied was not certainty but the balance of probabilities. This is the normal standard of proof and clearly applies to Appeals before this Tribunal in which the Information Commissioner's findings of fact are reviewed. We think that its application requires us to consider a number of factors including the quality of the public authority's initial analysis of the request, the scope of the search that it decided to make on the basis of that analysis and the rigour and efficiency with which the search was then conducted. Other matters may affect our assessment at each stage, including, for example, the discovery of materials elsewhere whose existence or content point to the existence of further information within the public authority which had not been brought to light. Our task is to decide on the basis of our review of all of these factors, whether the public authority is likely to be holding relevant information beyond that which has already been disclosed.

Section 40(2) FOIA

18.Section 40(2) FOIA provides an exemption where requested information constitutes personal data of a person other than the requester and disclosure would contravene any of the data protection principles.

19.Personal data is defined by section 3(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 as any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. In determining whether section 40(2) FOIA applies, the Tribunal must consider (a) whether the information is personal data; (b) whether disclosure under FOIA would amount to processing of that data; and (c) whether disclosure would contravene one of the data protection principles.

20.In this appeal the relevant principle is the first data protection principle, namely that personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner.

21.Lawfulness requires the existence of a lawful basis for processing under Article 6 UK GDPR.

22.Where disclosure is sought under FOIA, the relevant basis will commonly be Article 6(1)(f), namely processing necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the requester or by the public generally.

23.The Tribunal must therefore consider (a) whether a legitimate interest exists; (b) whether disclosure is necessary to meet that interest; and then (c) whether the legitimate interest is outweighed by the rights and freedoms of the data subjects.

24.In carrying out that balancing exercise, the Tribunal may consider the nature of the information, the reasonable expectations of the individuals concerned, the consequences of disclosure and the extent to which disclosure would advance transparency and accountability.

25.If disclosure would be unlawful because no lawful basis exists under Article 6 UK GDPR, or because the rights and interests of the data subjects outweigh the legitimate interests relied upon, disclosure would contravene the first data protection principle and section 40(2) FOIA will be engaged.

THE APPEAL

26.The Appellant advances a number of related grounds of appeal.

27.First, he submits that the repeated discovery of additional information following his challenges demonstrates that the University's searches cannot be relied upon. He argues that the history of the request gives rise to a real possibility that further undisclosed information remains held.

28.Secondly, he places particular emphasis upon references in the University's evidence to searches using ‘relevant email addresses’. He submits that his request was not confined to particular email accounts and argues that this phrase suggests that potentially relevant sources of information (in relation to email addresses not deemed to be ‘relevant’) were excluded from the searches.

29.Thirdly, he relies upon references contained within disclosed emails which, he submits, point towards the existence of additional correspondence that ought to have been located. Thus, he asks us to consider the emails that have been disclosed with a view to finding that it is more likely than not, from their contents, that more emails should have been found.

30.Finally, he challenges the Commissioner's acceptance of the University's reliance on section 40(2) FOIA, and asks the Tribunal to consider the withheld material carefully to decide whether section 40(2) FOIA has been correctly applied.

THE COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSE

31.In his written Response the Commissioner supports the reasoning contained in the decision notice and submits that the appeal identifies no error of law, fact or evaluative judgment.

32.The Commissioner accepts that the University's earlier failures to disclose all responsive information naturally gave rise to concern on the part of the Appellant. However, he submits that those failings do not themselves establish that further information remains held. The Commissioner emphasises that the correct question is whether, at the date of the decision notice, it was more likely than not that further information was held by the University.

33.The Response relies upon the enquiries undertaken during the Commissioner's investigation and the explanations obtained from the University concerning its searches and records. In relation to the Appellant's reliance on references to ‘relevant email addresses’, the Commissioner submits that undue significance is attached to a phrase which, read in context, merely describes the searches undertaken to identify communications involving the named individuals. The Commissioner does not accept that the evidence indicates the application of any undisclosed limitation on the scope of the searches.

34.As to the references within disclosed correspondence which the Appellant says point towards further records, the Commissioner submits that those references amount largely to evidence that further communications may once have existed rather than evidence that further recorded information remains held. The Commissioner relies upon the principle that FOIA does not require a public authority to prove with certainty that no further information exists.

35.In relation to section 40(2) FOIA, the Commissioner submits that the withheld information comprises personal data of third parties and that disclosure would add little to the public understanding of the issues raised by the request.

36.The Commissioner accordingly submits that the appeal should be dismissed.

THE HEARING

37.At the hearing the Appellant sought to identify a specific evidential basis for his submission that it is likely that further emails are held. He placed some evidence on two emails from W to X dated 24 January 2023 and 31 January 2023.

38.He submitted that the email of 24 January 2023 is an introductory communication from W to X. W explains that she obtained X’s details from another person, introduces her research project, explains why the findings might assist CIISA, asks whether X would be willing to disseminate information about the study through relevant networks and concludes by inviting further discussion, stating: ‘Please let me know if you have any questions, or if you'd be willing to have a chat at any point’.

39.There is no reply from X to W in the disclosed emails but, there is another email on 31 January 2023 from W to X. This begins: ‘Great to speak to you just now!’ and proceeds on the basis that a discussion has already taken place between W and X.

40.Read together, those two emails appear to mark the beginning and end of a discussion or process rather than the whole of the discussion or process itself. The first email contains an invitation to engage; the second follows a conversation which has already occurred.

41.The Appellant submits that natural inference is that there would ordinarily have been at least some intervening communication between those two points. A response from X in reply to the first email from W would be expected indicating whether X was willing to engage with W’s proposal. The Appellant submitted that it would ordinarily be expected to see communications arranging the proposed discussion, whether by agreeing a date and time, proposing alternatives, exchanging contact details, confirming arrangements or otherwise organising the conversation that plainly occurred.

42.The Appellant notes that paragraph 28 of the decision notice records the University's position that no relevant information had been deleted or destroyed, and so that cannot explain for the absence of other emails.

43.The Appellant points out that he expressly raised the issue with the University in his email of 4 June 2025. He pointed out that the two disclosed emails appeared to comprise only one half of a conversation and specifically noted the absence of emails which would explain the setting up of the telephone call referred to in the 31 January email.

44.The Appellant argues that despite the issue having been expressly raised by him (as recorded in the Commissioner’s letter to him on 29 January 2026), the decision notice does not address it. Paragraphs 10-11 of the decision notice records the fact that the Appellant identified apparently missing correspondence and that additional emails were subsequently found. Paragraphs 33-35 acknowledge the Appellant's concern that further emails referred to in the disclosed correspondence existed. But the Appellant submits that the Commissioner does not grapple with the significance of the January 2023 emails themselves or explain why the inference advanced by the Appellant was rejected and notes only that ‘the mere reference to other correspondence within disclosed emails does not, in itself, demonstrate that further recorded information falling within the scope of the request is held’ (paragraph 35).

45.The Appellant also submits that there is no evidence that the Commissioner put that specific issue to the University. The investigation letter to the University simply asked whether there were any further emails held. The University's response on 25 February 2026 asserts that no further emails are held and refers the Commissioner to the standard section 1 questionnaire. The questionnaire itself provides only very limited information about the searches undertaken (effectively W was provided with the request and she searched her account) and does not address the January 2023 exchange, the apparent gap in the correspondence or any targeted follow-up searches undertaken as a consequence of the Appellant's analysis.

46.The Appellant complains that the same limited approach is taken in the Commissioner’s Response to his appeal where at paragraph 26 the Commissioner reiterates the point that ‘it does not follow that every reference to ‘other materials’ proves that further recorded information within scope is held’ but does not engage with the particular evidential issue arising from the January 2023 emails.

DISCUSSION

Whether further information is held

47.The Appellant's concerns in this case are understandable. The University failed on more than one occasion to identify information which was within the scope of the request. However, we agree with the Commissioner that the issue before the Tribunal is not whether the University's initial handling of the request was deficient. The issue is whether the Commissioner was entitled to conclude that, by the time of his investigation and decision notice, no further information was held on the balance of probabilities.

48.Having carefully read the emails from W to X on 24 January 2023 and 31 January 2023 it is our clear view that, as submitted by the Appellant at the hearing that further emails (in particular in response from X to W, and then emails setting up a conversation) would be expected to exist. We accept that there may be alternative explanations for the absence of additional emails responding to W’s request and organising a telephone discussion. However, we have not been provided with these by the University or the Commissioner, even though the specific points were raised by the Appellant.

49.In our view we need to consider the position in the light of the history of the response to the request. The University has already revised its position on what information was held on more than one occasion. Information and attachments originally said not to exist, or not identified as falling within scope, have been discovered following challenges by the Appellant. The University's account of the information it held had therefore proved unreliable on a number of occasions, even though the University stated the W had searched her email accounts while being fully aware of the terms of the request.

50.Evidence concerning the searches ultimately undertaken was sparse. The Commissioner accepted a description which amounted to little more than a statement that W searched her account using the email addresses of the named individuals. No detailed search methodology search terms or search strings was were provided. No explanation was given as to why searches which had previously failed to identify multiple responsive emails should now be regarded as exhaustive.

51.Looking at the evidence in relation to the communications at the end of January 2023, we are not able to conclude on the balance of probabilities that no further information falling within the scope of the request is held by the University. We disagree with the Commissioner on this point and note that, as the Appellant submits, the Commissioner fails to consider in the decision notice the specific points made by the Appellant in relation to these emails. Therefore the Appellant’s appeal on the issue as whether further information is held by the University is allowed.

52.For completeness, we are not persuaded by the Appellant's submissions concerning the phrase ‘relevant email addresses’. Read fairly and in context, that phrase appears to describe the method by which communications involving the named individuals were identified. We do not consider that it provides evidence of any undisclosed restriction upon the searches undertaken. Nor has any evidence been produced suggesting that additional known repositories of relevant information were omitted from those searches.

Section 40(2) FOIA

53.The Appellant asked us to consider the redactions made relying on s40(2) FOIA and we have done so. We are satisfied that the withheld information constitutes personal data relating to identifiable third parties. Disclosure under FOIA would amount to disclosure to the world at large and would therefore constitute processing of personal data.

54.We accept that there is a legitimate public interest in understanding the communications that formed the subject matter of the request and in permitting appropriate scrutiny of those communications. However, the substantive content of those communications has already been disclosed.

55.The remaining redactions comprise personal contact details, identifying details and limited personal information relating to individuals who are not themselves the focus of the request. We agree with the Commissioner that disclosure of that material would contribute little, if anything, to the transparency interests relied upon by the Appellant. The legitimate public interests and the interests of the Appellant engaged are substantially met by the information already disclosed. By contrast, the individuals concerned would have a reasonable expectation that their personal details would not be disclosed into the public domain under FOIA.

56.We therefore conclude that disclosure is not necessary to meet the legitimate interests relied upon by the Appellant or, alternatively, that any such interests are outweighed by the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Disclosure would therefore be unlawful under Article 6 UK GDPR and would contravene the first data protection principle.

57.We accordingly agree with the Commissioner that section 40(2) FOIA applies to the remaining withheld information.

CONCLUSION

58.Having considered the decision notice, the Commissioner's Response, the documentary evidence and the oral submissions made by the Appellant, we conclude that the Commissioner was not entitled to find that the University does not hold any further information falling within the scope of the request.

59.In relation to this issue our substituted decision notice will require the University to carry out the search for information anew. The University should explain what searches have been undertaken and how it has ensured that all the available information has been disclosed. In relation to the position at the end of January 2023, if it is the case that no further emails are held (in circumstances where it appears likely that such further emails should be held), an explanation as to how the meeting between W and X was arranged without further email communication should be provided.

60.We further conclude that the Commissioner was entitled to uphold the University's reliance on section 40(2) FOIA in relation to the remaining withheld information. Thus the conclusions in the decision notice on this issue are upheld.

Stephen Cragg KC

Judge of the First-tier Tribunal

Date: 16 October 2026.