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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: отказ в возбуждении жалобы против органа по защите данных
Katherine Bishop v The Information Commissioner
1.These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaint against Wirral University Teaching Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (“the Trust”) regarding its handling of a data subject access request (“DSAR”). The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 25 January 2025 and was dealt with under reference IC-311062-X1B2.
2.On 26 November 2025, the IC wrote to the Applicant. The case officer expressed the view that the Trust had infringed its data protection obligations because it had not provided a response and copy of the personal data requested in response to the Applicant’s DSAR within the statutory one-month time frame. They noted that the Trust had confirmed that they had now responded to the DSAR with a copy of the personal data to which the Applicant was entitled. The Trust had also explained that redactions were applied to exclude third party data. The IC stated that it did not require the Trust to take any further action in relation to the Applicant’s complaint. The case officer advised that the IC had asked the Trust to review its data protection policies, procedures and staff training to ensure that in the future staff can recognise, refer and respond to DSARs fully within the legislative timeframe. The case officer told the Applicant that the IC would keep a record of her complaint and advised her of her right to take civil action against the Trust, but that the IC was unable to assist further with this.
3.The Applicant wrote to the IC on 13 January 2026 advising that the Trust had ignored a request for particular data within the DSAR and failed to provide any legal grounds for exempting that personal data.
4.The IC wrote to the Applicant on 21 January 2026. The case officer explained that under data protection legislation the IC’s responsibility is to consider data protection concerns to the extent that he deems to be appropriate and to provide individuals with any outcome. The IC is not able to reach personalised resolutions for individuals, force organisations to release personal data or resolve matters to their satisfaction. The case officer stated that they had considered the Applicant’s concerns and provided an outcome to the complaint on 26 November 2025 offering their view that the Trust had infringed their obligations under data protection legislation (in relation to their handling of the Applicant’s DSAR). The Trust had confirmed to the IC that they had now responded to the DSAR providing the Applicant with all the personal data that she was entitled to and that the IC had asked the Trust to correspond directly with the Applicant concerning her DSAR. The case officer explained that the IC acknowledged the Applicant’s concerns but did not deem that it is an appropriate or proportionate use of his resources to take any further action. The case officer explained that the IC uses data protection complaints to help him improve the information rights practices of organisations, primarily through providing compliance and guidance advice. He can take regulatory action, but this is only in the most serious cases, when it is appropriate and proportionate to do so. He does not normally take regulatory action for individual complaints. The case officer concluded that they did not deem that any further action (including enforcement) action was reasonable, proportionate or appropriate. Finally the IC advised the Applicant of her right to take court action and recommended independent legal advice before doing so.
5.The Applicant wrote again to the IC on 23 January 2026 explaining that she remained concerned that the Trust has not provided the personal data requested and that there may be additional data which had not been provided.
6.The IC’s case officer wrote again to the Applicant on 28 January 2026. The case officer reiterated a number of arguments set out in the letter dated 21 January 2026. They reiterated that the Trust had confirmed that it had now provided the Applicant with a copy of the personal data she was entitled to, explaining that redactions had been applied to exclude third party personal data. They noted that following provision of an outcome on 26 November 2025, the IC had closed its case at that time and would not seek to reopen or revisit these matters. The case officer again concluded that they did not deem that any further action (including enforcement) action was reasonable, proportionate or appropriate, reminding the Applicant of her right to take court proceedings against the Trust
The Application
7.The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC3 dated 4 February 2026. She stated that the outcome she was seeking was as follows:
“to make an order requiring the Commissioner to take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint, by way of issuing an enforcement notice to the Trust .”
8.In her grounds for the Application, the Applicant explained that she had made a separate application (the “First Application”) under
section 166 to the Tribunal in relation to the IC’s failure to act, which was later determined by the Tribunal on 10 March 2026. The current Application is concerned with the IC’s failure to take appropriate steps to respond to the further complaint raised by the Applicant after the IC’s letter dated 26 November 2026 that the Trust had not complied with her DSAR and provided her with all the data to which she was entitled, with no justification for its absence. She stated that the Trust had “ clearly withheld personal data which they hold about me, having confirmed they have the data and yet directly ignored the instructions of the ICO to release it and to communicate with me. The ICO are obligated to act in such an instance of DPA 18 breach
”.
The strike-out directions
9.Due to an administrative oversight, the Application was not processed by the Tribunal promptly. On 27 August 2026, I directed the Tribunal’s administration to admit the Application.
10.On the same date, I made directions for the progress of this matter. In the reasons for those directions I noted the following:
“
Upon reading the form GRC3 and supporting documentation in the Second Application, it appears to me that the Applicant is seeking to challenge the Respondent’s decision not to investigate her complaint further and that the step the Applicant wishes the Tribunal to take is to order the Respondent to issue an Enforcement Notice to the data controller. Challenges to a decision not to investigate should be brought by way of judicial review in the High Court, as the Tribunal has no power on a
section 166 application to require the Information Commissioner to investigate or take enforcement action. Alternatively, if the Applicant is seeking compliance by the data controller, this would be more properly dealt with by the civil courts under
section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018
, as the Tribunal cannot make such orders. As the outcomes sought appear to me not to be ones which the Tribunal can grant, it appears that there may be no reasonable prospect of the proceedings being successful. It also appears to me that the Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter under
section 166
DPA 2018 because an outcome to the complaint has been issued, as recorded in the decision on the First Application. For these reasons I am currently minded to strike out the Second Application
.”
11.I directed that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 14 September 2026 under Rule 8(4), which period was extended by the Chamber President to 28 September 2026.
12.The Applicant provided a response dated 20 September 2025, which deals with the strike-out application, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows:
a.
The Application is in relation to the IC’s failure to respond to the Applicant’s further complaint on 26 November 2025 that:
•
Further data concerning her existed;
•
The Trust had acknowledged this in its own response to her complaint;
•
The data she requested had not been provided in response to her DSAR;
•
Despite her bringing these matters to the IC’s attention, the IC did not investigate further.
b.
She no longer pursues an order that the IC should issue an enforcement notice.
c.
Instead she is seeking an order requiring the IC to take appropriate steps in response to the specific complaint she made about the missing data after the earlier investigation had concluded, which she argues falls within the Tribunal’s section 166 jurisdiction.
d.
She recognises that the IC provided an outcome on 21 January 2026 but contends that the IC did not investigate whether the missing data existed, whether it constituted her personal data, whether it fell within the scope of her DSAR or what legal exemption was relied upon for withholding it. Instead the IC relied on the Trust’s previous statement that all relevant personal data had been provided. She argues that there is at least an arguable question as to whether that amounted to taking appropriate steps in response to the further complaint.
e.
She says that the existence of a potential remedy against the Trust under section 167 does not remove the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider whether the IC properly dealt with the complaint. She contends that her application cannot properly be said to have no reasonable prospect of success merely because the IC had previously issued an outcome.
Legal framework
13.Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:
“Orders to progress complaints
(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner a.
fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b.
fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c.
if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.
(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner d.
to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e.
to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”
14.The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.
15.Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that:
“(4)
If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.
(5)The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”
16.In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner
[2022] 1 WLR 2241
, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - "
…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under
section 166
, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the
section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in
section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."
17.Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner
[2023] 1 WLR 1327
, paragraph 57 - "
The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...
”.
18.Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141
) – “
For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint
.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).
19.The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner
(UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both
Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of
section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “
The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of
section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under
section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.”
(paragraph 33).
20.The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner
[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)
, noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because
section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner,
section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I n considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick
“when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”
21.Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “
However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”
Discussion and conclusions
22.I have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing, noting that the Applicant wished her Application to be dealt with without a hearing and that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing.
23.Turning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint insofar as it related to issues about compliance with the DSAR which she raised after the original outcome on 26 November 2025. I find that the IC provided the Applicant with a response to this aspect of her complaint on 21 January 2026, with a further response on 28 January 2026.
24.I am satisfied that, when taken together, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint which post-dated the original outcome dated 26 November 2025, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.
25.It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint.
In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator expressed in his letters dated 21 and 28 January 2026 that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.
26.The Applicant accepts both that an outcome was provided to her original complaint concerning the DSAR on 26 November 2025 and that an outcome was provided in relation to her subsequent complaints on 21 January 2026. In essence, the Applicant is seeking further appropriate steps to be taken after the IC’s handling of her complaint had concluded. It appears to me that this falls squarely within the situation envisaged the case of Smith and Cortes referred to at paragraphs 19 and 20 above. What the Applicant seeks, in essence, is for the data controller properly to comply with its obligations and provide her with the information to which she considers she is entitled. As envisaged in Smith and outlined in my directions dated 27 August 2026, the appropriate mechanism for enforcing compliance with a DSAR is civil action against the data controller or judicial review. The
section 166 application procedure before the Tribunal does not provide an alternative to those courses of action or an opportunity to obtain the same result by the “back door”.
27.The Tribunal has no power under section 166 to direct the Trust to make disclosure to the Applicant. Its powers are limited to ordering the IC to progress its handling of the Applicant’s complaint.
28.The outcome sought by the Applicant is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision.
In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.
29.Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.
30.The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.
Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 02.10.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.
Реквизиты
| Страна | Великобритания |
| Орган | Суды Англии и Уэльса |
| Вид | судебное решение |
| Язык | en |
| Дата документа | 2026-10-01 |
| Объём | 22 641 знаков |
| Редакций | 1 |
| Впервые увидели | 2026-10-02 |
| Проверен | 2026-11-16 05:37 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] UKFTT 01363 (GRC) |
| court | United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
Темы
Почему документ в базе
Отбор сработал на этих совпадениях, суммарный вес 39.
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data protection
текст
Персональные данные
…these proceedings concern an application (the “application”) under section 166(2) of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”) for an order to progress the applicant’s complaint against wirral u…
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data protection
текст
Персональные данные
…te to the applicant. the case officer expressed the view that the trust had infringed its data protection obligations because it had not provided a response and copy of the personal data requeste…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…ed its data protection obligations because it had not provided a response and copy of the personal data requested in response to the applicant’s dsar within the statutory one-month time frame.…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…d that the trust had confirmed that they had now responded to the dsar with a copy of the personal data to which the applicant was entitled. the trust had also explained that redactions were ap…
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data protection
текст
Персональные данные
…icant’s complaint. the case officer advised that the ic had asked the trust to review its data protection policies, procedures and staff training to ensure that in the future staff can recognise,…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…articular data within the dsar and failed to provide any legal grounds for exempting that personal data. 4. the ic wrote to the applicant on 21 january 2026. the case officer explained that u…
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dsa
текст
Цифровые платформы и сервисы
…foundation trust (“the trust”) regarding its handling of a data subject access request (“dsar”). the complaint was submitted to the information commissioner (“ic”) on 25 january 2025…
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dsa
текст
Цифровые платформы и сервисы
…rovided a response and copy of the personal data requested in response to the applicant’s dsar within the statutory one-month time frame. they noted that the trust had confirmed that t…
Найден по запросу: «personal data» (caselaw_uk)
Аннотация
Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина на действия органа по защите данных (Information Commissioner) относительно обработки запроса доступа к персональным данным (DSAR). Жалоба касалась задержки предоставления информации и отсутствия обоснования исключения персональных данных третьих лиц. Орган по защите данных провел расследование и пришел к выводу об отсутствии нарушений со стороны организации. Гражданин обратился в трибунал с просьбой обязать орган по защите данных принять дополнительные меры или выдать предписание контролеру данных. Суд отклонил жалобу, указав, что трибунал не обладает полномочиями требовать от органа по защите данных проведения дополнительного расследования или выдачи предписания контролеру данных. Вместо этого гражданину рекомендовано обратиться в суд общей юрисдикции за защитой своих прав.
Редакции документа
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| Редакция 1 открыта | 2026-10-02 01:58 | xml | 22 641 зн. | txt |