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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: обжалование решений Информационного комиссара

Emma Ashfield v The Information Commissioner

судебное решение 2026-10-07 17 159 знаков Персональные данные
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Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-10-08.

Introduction

1.On 8 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”). The application arose from complaints made to the Information Commissioner concerning Knowl Hill School’s handling of personal data and the Commissioner’s response to those complaints.

2.The Commissioner filed a response dated 24 September 2026 and applied for the Appellant’s application to be struck out. The Commissioner submits that outcomes were provided on 26 August 2025 and 13 February 2026, and that a further final outcome was provided on 18 September 2026. The Commissioner contends that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to revisit the merits of those outcomes and, alternatively, that the application has no reasonable prospect of success.

3.The Applicant opposes strike out. She accepts that section 166 is not a means of appealing against an outcome merely because she disagrees with it. She submits, however, that when she made her application, significant aspects of her complaint remained outstanding and were still being considered by the Commissioner. She relies in particular on the further work undertaken after 8 August 2026 and the further final outcome of 18 September 2026.

4.The Tribunal has considered the notice of application, the Commissioner’s response and annexes, the Applicant’s written reply, her supporting chronology and the diagram supplied with her reply. The strike out application can fairly be determined without a hearing. The Applicant has had a proper opportunity to respond to the grounds advanced by the Commissioner.

Legal Framework

5.Under Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.

6.Under Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.

7.Section 165 DPA sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the Commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:

166 Orders to progress complaints

(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner (a)

fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)

fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c)

if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.

(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner (a)

to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b)

to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.

8.The Tribunal can only make an order as prescribed by section 166(2) , it does not have the power to make an order beyond the scope of s166(2) , and even then, only if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Some key decisions are:

a.

Scranage v Information Commissioner [2020] UKUT 196 (AAC) , paragraph 6

- "In my experience – both in the present appeal and in many other cases – there is a widespread misunderstanding about the reach of section 166 . Contrary to many data subjects’ expectations, it does not provide a right of appeal against the substantive outcome of the Information Commissioner’s investigation on its merits. Thus, section 166(1) , which sets out the circumstances in which an application can be made to the Tribunal is procedural rather than substantive in its focus." (emphasis in original).

b.

Killock v Information Commissioner

[2022] 1 WLR 2241

, Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 - "…

It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under

section 166

, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory

Notes to the Act which regard the

section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in

section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals

."

9.The Tribunal’s task in this application is therefore not to decide whether the school processed inaccurate personal data, whether the school was entitled to characterise the Applicant as vexatious or disruptive, whether information was improperly disseminated, or whether the Commissioner’s conclusions were correct. The question is whether there remains any procedural failure within section 166 for which the Tribunal could grant the statutory remedy.

Background

10.On 27 June 2025, the Applicant complained to the Commissioner. The complaint was allocated reference IC-398401-M8Q3. It initially concerned an email sent by Knowl Hill School to the whole school parent body containing sensitive and confidential information about a named child who was not the Applicant’s child. It also concerned the school’s handling of the incident after the Applicant notified the school and made a formal complaint.

11.The Commissioner considered that the disclosed personal data did not relate to the Applicant or her child, and that section 165 did not impose a duty to consider a complaint about another data subject’s information. The Commissioner nevertheless considered the Applicant’s concerns about the school’s response, transparency and corrective action.

12.On 26 August 2025, the Commissioner issued an outcome. The Commissioner stated that the information provided had been considered under the published casework framework, decided not to undertake a more detailed investigation, recorded the complaint and made recommendations to the school about improving its data protection practices. Those points were repeated in correspondence dated 3 September 2025.

13.The Applicant then supplied further information. This included allegations about the disclosure of information concerning pupils and special educational needs, the school’s response to the reported breach, and the processing of information concerning the Applicant and her family. The scope and presentation of the concerns developed through substantial subsequent correspondence.

14.The Applicant requested a review. On 13 February 2026, the Commissioner issued a review outcome. The review upheld the earlier handling in material respects but also indicated that further information was required concerning an allegedly inaccurate record and that the matter would be raised with the school.

15.The Applicant maintained that inaccurate factual information had been created and used to support an adverse narrative about her. The matters relied upon included statements that she had raised eight formal complaints, had conducted a campaign of disruption to secure an education otherwise than at school package, and had made a complaint on 7 November 2025 which she says did not exist.

16.The Applicant also maintained that information was disseminated beyond the school, including to West Sussex County Council, Surrey County Council, parents at the school, the Department for Education and the Independent Schools Inspectorate, and was then accepted and relied upon by others. She says that this affected decisions concerning her family and caused educational, financial and psychological consequences.

17.On 8 August 2026 the Applicant made the present application. By an order dated 26 August 2026, Judge Harris permitted the application to proceed out of time. In doing so, the Tribunal referred to delay by the Commissioner and to the fact that the complaint appeared still to be ongoing, while recognising that there appeared to have been a review outcome in February and that a strike out application might follow. That order did not determine the merits of the present application.

18.After the present application was made, the Commissioner continued to consider material supplied by the Applicant. The Commissioner reviewed further information during August 2026, identified further steps in September, contacted the school and considered matters relating to the accuracy of the school’s records.

19.On 18 September 2026, the Commissioner issued a further final outcome. The Commissioner treated the description of the Applicant as “vexatious” as an opinion held by the school. The Commissioner nevertheless asked the school to update its records to reflect that the Applicant had not sent the alleged complaint of 7 November 2025. The Commissioner stated that any concern about information disclosed to West Sussex County Council should first be raised with the school as a new data protection matter and, if necessary, submitted to the Commissioner as a new complaint. The Commissioner stated that the original decision stood and that no further action would be taken in that case.

Parties’ submissions

20.The Commissioner submits that the statutory conditions for an order are not met. The Commissioner has taken steps to investigate and respond, issued the outcome of 26 August 2025, the review outcome of 13 February 2026 and the further outcome of 18 September 2026. The relief sought would require the Tribunal to examine the adequacy, scope and substance of the investigation and to require the Commissioner to revisit its regulatory judgment. That is outside section 166 .

21.The Applicant submits that her application should not be characterised as an attempt to obtain a different substantive outcome from a completed investigation. When she applied on 8 August 2026, matters were still outstanding. The Commissioner’s own chronology demonstrates that substantive consideration continued and culminated only in the further final outcome of 18 September 2026.

22.The Applicant says that her core complaint has been obscured by the volume of correspondence. Her diagram presents the complaint as one connected chain: inaccurate information was created or recorded; it was used to support an adverse narrative; it was disseminated to third parties; recipients accepted and relied upon it; decisions and treatment were affected; and consequences followed. She submits that correcting the school’s own record does not resolve the problem if inaccurate information has already been shared and relied upon elsewhere.

23.The Applicant accepts that the Commissioner has now taken further steps and issued a further outcome. She says, however, that the further outcome still did not address the substance of the complaint as a whole, particularly the relationship between the inaccurate data, the adverse narrative, and onward dissemination and use. She asks the Tribunal not to treat the application as retrospectively hopeless merely because the Commissioner progressed matters after proceedings were commenced.

Conclusions

24.The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant’s diagram and reply provide a clear account of the case she wishes the Commissioner to address. The Tribunal also accepts that, when the application was made on 8 August 2026, aspects of the matter were still being considered. The Commissioner’s subsequent actions and the further final outcome of 18 September 2026 demonstrate that further work was in fact undertaken.

25.It does not follow, however, that the proceedings can now result in an order under section 166 . The Tribunal must consider the present position and the relief which remains legally available. The only orders available are those specified in section 166(2) : an order to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or an order to provide information about progress or the outcome within a specified period.

26.The Commissioner has provided an outcome, a review outcome and a further final outcome. There is no outstanding failure to notify the Applicant of progress or of an outcome. Nor is there any further procedural step which the Tribunal could direct without prescribing the content, scope or result of the Commissioner’s consideration.

27.Contrary to the expectations of the Applicant, section 166 does not provide a right of appeal againt the scope or conduct of the Commissioner’s investigation. The Tribunal is bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner, as described by the Chamber President in Barbara Rogers v ICO EA/2021/0348:

’14…In the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations he should undertake into any particular issue, and how he should conduct those investigations. This will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as his own registry priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and his judgement on how to deploy his limited resources most effectively: Killock & Ors v Information Commissioner

[2021] UKUT 299 . The obligation of the Commissioner is to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint’.

28.The Applicant’s remaining complaint is that the Commissioner did not address the alleged chain of processing as a whole and wrongly separated the accuracy of the underlying records, the adverse characterisation, the onward disclosures and subsequent reliance. That is, in substance, a criticism of the adequacy and scope of the Commissioner’s investigation and of the reasoning and conclusions in the outcomes.

29.Section 166 does not empower the Tribunal to decide that the Commissioner should have understood or framed the complaint differently, investigated additional recipients, treated several matters as one complaint, required correction by third parties, or reached a different regulatory conclusion. An order requiring the Commissioner to investigate the six-stage chain shown in the Applicant’s diagram would amount to directing how the Commissioner should reconsider the merits. The Tribunal has no power to make such an order.

30.The fact that the Commissioner corrected, or asked the school to correct, one underlying factual record does not leave an unperformed procedural duty within section 166 . It may support the Applicant’s view that the underlying factual accuracy mattered. It does not permit the Tribunal to supervise the sufficiency of the Commissioner’s further outcome or require broader investigation of dissemination and consequences.

31.The Tribunal has also considered the apparent reference in the Commissioner’s response to investigation of actions by “the Council”, whereas the Applicant’s complaint concerns Knowl Hill School and refers to councils as alleged recipients of information. That wording may reflect an error or lack of precision. It does not alter the jurisdictional position. The Commissioner has issued outcomes dealing with the complaint, and section 166 does not authorise the Tribunal to set those outcomes aside or direct reconsideration because the Applicant says the complaint was misunderstood.

32.The Tribunal therefore distinguishes between the position when the application was lodged and the remedy now available. The application may have raised an arguable complaint about delay or incomplete consideration at the time it was made. Since then, the Commissioner has taken further steps and issued a further final outcome. The Tribunal cannot now grant effective relief under section 166 .

33.The Applicant’s dissatisfaction is genuine and the issues she raises are important to her and her family. However, neither the importance of the underlying allegations nor the consequences asserted can enlarge the Tribunal’s statutory powers. The Tribunal cannot determine the underlying data protection dispute, the accuracy of the school’s records, the lawfulness of onward disclosure, or any alleged resulting loss or harm in these proceedings.

34.Accordingly, there is no reasonable prospect of the application, or any part of it, succeeding. The proceedings are struck out under rule 8(3)(c).

Signed: Judge Peri Mornington Date: 6 October 2026

Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 08.10.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.