Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales
Alan Hudson v The Information Commissioner
1.These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaint against the Football Association (“FA”) regarding its handling of and response to his Data Subject Access Request ("DSAR”). The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (now the Information Commission (“IC”) on 28 January 2026 and was dealt with under reference IC-474084-P7L2.
2.On 27 August 2026, the IC’s case officer wrote the Applicant’s representative. The case officer proceeded to summarise the Applicant’s complaint which concerned the FA’s handling of his SAR, and their position that due to records being both historic and “unstructured”, they did not fall within the ambit of his DSAR, which he disputed on the basis that a reasonable search was not conducted by the FA. The case officer explained the legislative requirements concerning SARs in terms of eligibility, time limits, application of relevant exemptions, and most importantly, its applicability to a structured filing system, and its non-applicability where the records in question are unstructured. The case officer went onto conclude that having considered all of the relevant material provided, he was unable to determine whether the FA had infringed the Applicant’s rights under data protection legislation. However, given the concerns raised by the Applicant, the case officer had written to the FA in order that they provide an additional response to the Applicant’s DSAR and provide copies of any additional personal data to which he was entitled. As a consequence of the above actions, the case officer confirmed no further action would be taken on the complaint but that it would record the complaint to allow it to monitor the FA’s practices.
3.On the same day, the case officer wrote to the Data Protection Team of the FA in the similar terms as they had to the Applicant. The case officer requested that the FA review its handling of the Applicant’s DSAR and to ensure that that they provide copies to him of all of the personal data that he is entitled to under data protection legislation. In the event that the FA was unable to comply with all or a part of the request, it was to cite the appropriate exemption that had been applied and to do so within one month.
4.On 28 August 2026, the Applicant’s representative wrote to the IC with a number of queries regarding its letter of the previous day.
5.On 2 September 2026, the case officer responded, clarifying that the Applicant’s further correspondence did not change the outcome that had been provided, which remained that no further action would be taken. In response to the Applicant’s queries, the case officer clarified that the IC had not requested that the FA provide the IC with a copy of any further response, as the IC does not act on behalf of individuals to resolve matters but rather uses information to fulfil its regulatory functions. They further clarified that an individual’s right of access under data protection legislation entitles individuals to request a copy of their personal data held by an organisation. However, an organisation is not required to create new information to respond to a DSAR or provide detailed explanation of the process followed when handling an individual request. The case officer also clarified that the appropriate remedy, if the Applicant considered that the FA had infringed his rights under data protection legislation was to apply for a compliance order under section 167 of the DPA 2018. The Applicant requested a review on the same day.
6.On 3 September 2026, the case officer acknowledged the request for a review and advised the Applicant that he would receive a response within 30 days.
7.On 18 September 2026, the IC wrote to the Applicant’s representative following a review of the Applicant’s complaint. The IC’s reviewing officer stated that they had considered the points raised and the relevant information held about the case and concluded that the case officer dealt with the case reasonably, appropriately and in line with case handling procedures. They noted the information provided by the FA to the Applicant and concluded that there is no compelling evidence within this case indicating that the FA’s relevant archived records are held in a relevant filing system from which specific personal data about Mr Hudson is readily accessible. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary there is no reason to disbelieve the FA’s description of the nature of the archive records involved in this case. The reviewing officer expressed the view that the available evidence demonstrates that the FA has already gone beyond its obligations under data protection law by undertaking searches of unstructured information, to which data protection does not apply, in 2021.The reviewing officer concluded that the outcome was correct and that the IC would not be taking any further action. The reviewing officer advised the Applicant of his rights to take court action and complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO).
8.The IC provided a written update
The Application
9.The Applicant applied to the Tribunal through his representative by way of form GRC3 dated 2 August 2026. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows:
“ The Applicant respectfully requests that the Tribunal make an order requiring the Information Commissioner to:
• provide information regarding the progress of the complaint submitted on 28 January 2026;
• confirm whether the complaint has been allocated to a case officer
• confirm what steps, if any, have been taken in response to the complaint; and
• take such further steps as the Tribunal considers appropriate under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 .
The Applicant does not ask the Tribunal to determine the merits of the underlying complaint concerning The Football Association”.
10.In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated:
“On 28 January 2026, the Information Commissioner's Office ("ICO") acknowledged receipt of my complaint concerning the handling of a Subject Access Request made by Mr Alan Hudson to The Football Association.
In its acknowledgement, the ICO advised that if it failed to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or failed to provide information about the progress or outcome of the complaint within three months, it may be possible to apply to the First-tier Tribunal.
More than six months have now elapsed since the complaint was received by the ICO. During that period the only responses received following my requests for updates have been automated acknowledgements confirming receipt of my correspondence. I have written to the ICO on two occasions requesting an update. On both occasions, I received only an automated acknowledgement confirming receipt of my correspondence. No case officer has contacted me, no indication has been given as to whether the complaint has been allocated, and no information has been provided regarding any steps taken in relation to the complaint.
This application is not made to ask the Tribunal to determine the underlying complaint against The Football Association. Rather, I respectfully request that the Tribunal considers whether the Information Commissioner has complied with its obligations under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 by providing appropriate information regarding the progress of the complaint and taking appropriate steps in response to it.
I therefore ask the Tribunal to make such order as it considers appropriate.”
The strike-out application
11.The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 2 September 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).
12.The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 24 to 28. In summary, these were as follows:
a.
The IC accepts that there was a delay in initially communicating with the Applicant in relation to their complaint. However, the IC has since provided the Applicant with an outcome on the complaint in correspondence dated 27 August 2026. Accordingly, even where the IC, as asserted by the Applicant in section 5 of the Notice of Application that the IC, has failed to deal with the complaint within the six month period, following the receipt of the complaint, in breach of sections 166(1)
(b) and (c) of the DPA18, the provision of the outcome, albeit late, means that the Tribunal is unable to exercise its powers under
section 166(2)
of the DPA18. This is because, that even if the Tribunal finds that there has been a breach of the relevant provisions of the DPA18, there are no further steps that can be ordered by reason of the outcome having been provided (see
Bishop v Information Commissioner
[2026] UKFTT 402 (GRC) at [58]-[61]).
b.
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has now taken steps to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section of the 166(2) of the DPA18.
c.
Finally, as stated above, given that the Applicant no longer has a remedy under section 166 of the DPA18, he could apply for a compliance order under section 167 of the DPA18 if he considers that the FA has not fully complied in its response to his SAR, and not section 94(11) of the DPA18 as stated in the outcome dated 27 August 2026 (see X v Transcription Agency LLP and Another [ 2023] EWHC 1092 (KB) at [107]-[108]).
d.
In light of the above, the present proceedings have no realistic prospect of success, given that they are fanciful and bound to fail, and that by striking out the present application, this therefore saves expense, achieves expedition, and the avoidance of expending unnecessary resources of the Tribunal on an application that has little merit, commensurate with the overriding objective under rule 2(1) of the Tribunal Rules (see Swain v Hillman
[1999] EWCA Civ 3053 at [7] and [14]).
13.The Applicant provided a Reply to the Response dated 4 September 2026, which deals with the strike-out application as well as the substantive response, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows:
a.
The Applicant acknowledged that circumstances have materially changed since his Application was lodged on 2 August 2026, because the IC subsequently issued an outcome on 27 August 2026. However, he argues that the subsequent issue of an outcome does not, of itself, establish that there is no reasonable prospect of any further appropriate procedural step being identified under section 166 .
b.
The process of the FA reviewing its handling of the Applicant’s DSAR following the IC’s request of them remains outstanding.
c.
The IC’s position was still being clarified at the point of making the strike-out application.
d.
It is at least reasonably arguable that an appropriate procedural step remains available, namely for the IC
• to obtain or consider the further response which he has himself required the FA to produce; and • thereafter inform the Applicant whether the action required by the IC has been completed and whether any further procedural action on the complaint is considered necessary.
e.
He states, “The issue is confined to whether the Commissioner can properly regard his handling of the complaint as procedurally complete while the corrective action which he himself required remains outstanding and while he does not intend to consider its result ”.
f.
the IC’s own outcome generated a further step in the complaint-handling process: the requirement that the FA review its handling of the DSAR and issue an additional response within one month. The Tribunal should therefore determine objectively whether any procedural step remains.
14.On 18 September 2026, I directed both parties to update the Tribunal, as at that stage no review outcome had been provided.
15.The Applicant wrote to the Tribunal on the same day with a copy of the review response from the IC (see paragraph 8 above). The Applicant in their covering email made the following additional points:
a.
The FA’s further response remains outstanding.
b.
The IC did not communicate to the Applicant on 27 August 2026 that the FA had one month within which to respond to him.
c.
The underlying characteristics of the archive do not appear to have been established before the IC accepted the FA’s conclusion that the relevant material was unstructured and outside the scope of the right of access.
d.
The 2021 search relied upon by the IC was qualified by the person who conducted it.
e.
The identified historic search lead concerned a number of different FA committees.
f.
The FA has repeatedly said it cannot locate documentary evidence.
g.
The IC has not identified any step within the present complaint by which he will obtain, consider or assess whether the further action he required from the FA has actually resolved the matters which caused him to intervene.
h.
The Applicant maintains that his Application cannot properly be characterised as having no reasonable prospect of identifying any further appropriate procedural step.
i.
He invites the Tribunal to defer consideration of the strike-out application until the FA has responded to the Applicant.
16.The IC wrote to the Tribunal with an update on 1 October 2026 upholding its position. It confirmed that the IC did express a view that it was unable to determine whether there was an infringement based on the material provided but nevertheless asked the FA to undertake certain steps, which is more than sufficient to fulfil the IC’s obligations under the legislation.
17.The Applicant wrote to the Tribunal with an update on 5 October 2026, which was not uploaded onto the Tribunal’s case file until the following day. This stated that the FA had provided the additional response required following the IC’s intervention on 29 September 2026 and attached a copy of this response, which stated that the FA’s position was unchanged. The Applicant stated that the FA’s response “continues to rely upon the enquiries and searches undertaken in 2021 and 2025 and does not identify any materially new search undertaken following the Commission’s intervention of 27 August 2026. It also leaves unchanged the FA’s position concerning the historic archive and its characterisation of those records as unstructured .”
18.The Applicant contended that the outstanding procedural step for the IC is “ now that the FA’s response has been received and is being served upon it with this update, to consider the result of the action which it itself required before treating its handling of this complaint as finally complete .” He asked the Tribunal to refuse the strike-out application because “.” there remains an identifiable procedural step which prevents the application from properly being characterised as having no reasonable prospect of success” .
19.The Applicant therefore invited the Tribunal to consider whether it is appropriate to require the IC to inform the Applicant, having considered the FA’s response dated 29 September 2026, whether the action which the IC required from the FA on 27 August was completed.
Legal framework
20.Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:
“Orders to progress complaints
(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner a.
fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b.
fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c.
if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.
(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner d.
to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e.
to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”
21.The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.
22.Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that:
“(4)
If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.
(5)The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”
23.In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner
[2022] 1 WLR 2241
, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - "
…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under
section 166
, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the
section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in
section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals."
24.Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner
[2023] 1 WLR 1327
, paragraph 57 - "
The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...
”.
25.Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141
) – “
For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint
.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).
26.The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner
(UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both
Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of
section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “
The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of
section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under
section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.”
(paragraph 33).
27.The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner
[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)
, noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because
section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner,
section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I n considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick
“when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”
28.Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “
However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”
Discussion and conclusions
29.I have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing, noting the Applicant’s preference that it be decided without a hearing.
30.In deciding this, I have taken into account the overriding objective, particularly dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; and using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively. While I recognise that the fair determination of this case is very important to the Applicant, I do not consider it a proportionate use of resources to require an oral hearing to determine the issue of jurisdiction. I note also that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing.
31.Turning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 27 August 2026 with a further response after review on 18 September 2026. The response on 27 August 2026 informed the Applicant that the IC had contacted the FA, asked it to provide an additional response to the Applicant’s DSAR and provide copies of any additional personal data to which he was entitled.
32.I find that in the review letter dated 18 September 2026, the IC clearly explained to the Applicant’s representative the IC’s role in the context of this complaint as follows: “
We deal with complaints in accordance with Section 165 of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018, which requires us to respond to complaints including investigating to the extent that we feel is appropriate. It also requires us to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint. However, the ICO does not act on behalf of individuals to resolve matters to their satisfaction. We use the information we gather from complaints to aid in our regulatory process, but this does not necessarily mean that individuals’ specific disputes will be resolved by the ICO. Therefore, while you are welcome to provide further information to the ICO regarding this matter, we are not obligated to take any particular action at the request of the complainant following issuing an opinion of compliance and as confirmed in our outcome dated 27 August 2026, we will not be taking any further action for the reasons that we have given as stated above.”(emphasis added)
33.I am satisfied that, when taken together, the IC’s responses dated 27 August 2026 and 18 September 2026 have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4) in line with its broad discretion. I do not consider that, as contended by the Applicant, it would be an appropriate step for the IC to comment additionally on its position following receipt of further communication from the FA even if the FA’s position had not remained unchanged. The Tribunal cannot order the IC under section 166 to compel provision of a response from the data controller or opine on whether such a response is adequate; that is a matter which can be addressed by the Applicant through civil action against the data controller. The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.
34.It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint.
In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.
35.Although he disputes that it does, it appears to me that the outcome sought by the Applicant is, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision.
In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.
36.Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.
37.The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.
Details
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Body | Courts of England and Wales |
| Type | court decision |
| Language | en |
| Document date | 2026-10-08 |
| Size | 29 771 знаков |
| Versions | 1 |
| First seen | 2026-10-09 |
| Last checked | 2026-11-16 05:35 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] UKFTT 01382 (GRC) |
| court | United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
Topics
Why this document is in the base
Selection matched on the following, total weight 30.
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…these proceedings concern an application (the “application”) under section 166(2) of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”) for an order to progress the applicant’s complaint against the foot…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…ded, he was unable to determine whether the fa had infringed the applicant’s rights under data protection legislation. however, given the concerns raised by the applicant, the case officer had wr…
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personal data
текст
Personal data
…ovide an additional response to the applicant’s dsar and provide copies of any additional personal data to which he was entitled. as a consequence of the above actions, the case officer confirm…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…low it to monitor the fa’s practices. 3. on the same day, the case officer wrote to the data protection team of the fa in the similar terms as they had to the applicant. the case officer reques…
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personal data
текст
Personal data
…of the applicant’s dsar and to ensure that that they provide copies to him of all of the personal data that he is entitled to under data protection legislation. in the event that the fa was un…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…that they provide copies to him of all of the personal data that he is entitled to under data protection legislation. in the event that the fa was unable to comply with all or a part of the requ…
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dsa
текст
Digital platforms and services
…iation (“fa”) regarding its handling of and response to his data subject access request ("dsar”). the complaint was submitted to the information commissioner (now the information commi…
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dsa
текст
Digital platforms and services
…records being both historic and “unstructured”, they did not fall within the ambit of his dsar, which he disputed on the basis that a reasonable search was not conducted by the fa. the…
Found by query: «automated decision» (caselaw_uk)
Summary
Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина Алана Хадсона на Информационный комиссар Великобритании относительно обращения с запросом доступа к персональным данным, поданным Ассоциацией футбола. Комиссар провел расследование, но не принял дальнейших действий после получения информации от Ассоциации футбола. Суд отклонил жалобу заявителя, указав, что комиссия предоставила ответ заявителю и выполнила свои обязательства согласно Закону о защите данных 2018 года. Суд также отметил, что трибунал не обладает полномочиями рассматривать существо жалобы или предписывать комиссию проводить дополнительные расследования.