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MUHAMMED SHAFI THAILAKANDI v INFORMATION COMMISSION

court decision 2026-11-09 13 822 characters Personal data
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Introduction

1.These proceedings concern an application made by the Applicant, Muhammed Shafi Thailakandi, under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the DPA”), arising from a complaint about the handling by Chenai Holistic Home Care Agency Ltd (“the organisation”) of a subject access request.

2.The Applicant complained to the Information Commissioner on or about 12 March 2026. Nothing turns on whether the complaint was received on 12 or 13 March 2026.

3.On 11 September 2026, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for an order requiring an update on the complaint, confirmation of the steps being taken and an outcome or substantive response within a period specified by the Tribunal.

4.The Applicant also sought an order requiring the organisation to comply with his subject access request and disclose outstanding information. The Tribunal has no power under section 166 to make an order against the organisation or determine the merits of the underlying subject access request. I therefore consider only that part of the application concerning the handling and progress of the complaint.

5.On 12 October 2026, the Commission filed its Response and applied for the proceedings to be struck out under rule 8(3)(c). It accepted that there had been a delay but submitted that a case officer had since been assigned and progress information provided.

6.The relevant functions of the Information Commissioner transferred to the Information Commission on 30 September 2026. I therefore refer to the Respondent as “the Commission”.

7.On 15 October 2026, Judge Harris gave the Applicant an opportunity to make representations under rule 8(4). The Applicant responded on 30 October 2026, opposing strike-out and asking the Tribunal alternatively to require a further progress update.

8.Although the Applicant requested a hearing and indicated a preference for it to be conducted by video, the relevant correspondence and chronology are not materially disputed. The issue is whether the Commission’s subsequent steps mean that there is no longer a realistic basis for an order under section 166 . The Applicant has had a full opportunity to address that issue in writing. No oral evidence, assessment of credibility or determination of materially disputed facts is required. Having regard to the overriding objective, I am satisfied that it is fair and just to determine the strike-out application on the papers.

Legal framework

9.Section 165 of the DPA permits a data subject to make a complaint where the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to them, there has been an infringement of the UK GDPR or Parts 3 or 4 of the DPA.

10.Section 166 is headed “Orders to progress complaints”. So far as relevant, it provides:

‘166 Orders to progress complaints

(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner:

(a)

fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)

fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c)

if the Commissioner’s consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.

(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner:

(a)

to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b)

to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order’.

11.The Tribunal may make an order under section 166(2) only where a procedural failure identified in section 166(1) is established. Its jurisdiction concerns the steps taken to respond to a complaint and the provision of information about its progress or outcome. It does not extend to determining the merits of the underlying complaint.

12.That limited jurisdiction is confirmed by Scranage v Information Commissioner

[2020] UKUT 196 (AAC) and Killock v Information Commissioner

[2022] 1 WLR 2241 . The Tribunal cannot determine whether the organisation infringed the Applicant’s data protection rights or require the organisation to disclose particular information.

13.Under rule 8(3)(c) of the Procedure Rules, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings where it considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or the relevant part of it, succeeding. The question is whether the Applicant has a realistic, rather than fanciful prospect of obtaining an order under section 166 . The Tribunal must not determine materially disputed facts or conduct a mini-trial.

14.In the present case, the relevant communications and steps are not disputed. The issue is whether, taking the Applicant’s case at its highest, there remains any realistic basis for an order under section 166 .

Factual background

15.In February 2026, the Applicant made a subject access request to the organisation. Although the organisation provided some documents and recordings, the Applicant maintained that the response was incomplete, particularly in relation to telephone recordings, a Teams recording or transcript, personnel records and rota information. The organisation subsequently stated that some of the requested material was not held and declined to provide other material in the terms sought.

16.The Applicant complained to the Information Commissioner on or about 12 March 2026. The complaint was acknowledged but no substantive progress update was provided before the Applicant applied to the Tribunal on 11 September 2026, approximately six months later.

17.On 12 October 2026, the Commission informed the Applicant that a case officer had been assigned, that the information he had supplied was being reviewed, and that a further update would be provided by 14 October 2026.

18.On 14 October 2026, the Commission explained that it had contacted the organisation to establish an appropriate point of contact and had considered a call detail record supplied by the Applicant. It sought his instructions about sharing that document. After the Applicant withheld consent but supplied disciplinary minutes which he agreed could be shared, the Commission confirmed on 20 October 2026 that it would act in accordance with his instructions and contact him again once it had received further information from the organisation.

The parties’ positions

19.The Commission accepts and apologises for the initial delay. It submits, however, that it has now taken appropriate steps to progress the complaint and provided information about that progress. It therefore contends that no continuing failure is capable of remedy under section 166 and that the application has no reasonable prospect of success.

20.The Applicant relies on the length of the initial delay and submits that the Tribunal should not strike out the proceedings solely because the Commission acted after the application was made. Although he accepts that the complaint is now being progressed, he says that the Commission has not provided sufficient clarity about the next steps or the expected timeframe.

21.The Applicant accepts that the Tribunal cannot determine the underlying subject access dispute. He asks the Tribunal to refuse strike-out or, alternatively, to require the Commission to provide a further written progress update within a specified period or to obtain further clarification before determining the application.

Discussion and Conclusion

22.I begin by acknowledging the force of the Applicant’s concern about the initial delay. By the time the Applicant applied to the Tribunal, approximately six months had elapsed without a substantive progress update. The Commission accepts that delay and has apologised for it. The Applicant was reasonably entitled to be concerned and to seek a procedural remedy. Nothing in this decision should be understood as concluding that the initial delay was satisfactory.

23.However, the question under rule 8(3)(c) is whether, in light of the position at the date of determination, the Applicant retains a realistic prospect of obtaining an order under section 166 . Even if there had been an earlier failure falling within section 166(1) , that would not necessarily justify an order where the position has since changed and there is no current failure capable of remedy under section 166(2) .

24.I have considered carefully the Applicant’s submission that the Commission’s actions after the proceedings commenced do not, without more, justify striking out the application. Those actions do not retrospectively erase the preceding delay. It is nevertheless necessary to assess the circumstances as they stand at the date of determination.

Section 166 is directed towards securing an appropriate procedural response and information concerning the progress or outcome of a complaint. The purpose of an order under

section 166(2)

is remedial. Where sufficient progress information has subsequently been provided and appropriate steps are being taken, the Tribunal is not required to make an order solely to record or declare that there was a failure at an earlier stage.

25.The evidence establishes that:

a.

a case officer has been assigned to the complaint;

b.

the information supplied by the Applicant is being reviewed;

c.

the Commission contacted the organisation to establish an appropriate point of contact so that the relevant issues could be raised;

d.

the Commission considered the further evidence supplied by the Applicant, sought his instructions concerning its disclosure and acted in accordance with those instructions; and e.

the Commission informed the Applicant that it would contact him again once further information had been received from the organisation.

26.Those are identifiable steps directed towards progressing the complaint. The complaint is under active consideration and is no longer characterised by inactivity or silence.

27.I acknowledge that the Commission has not provided a date by which it expects to conclude its consideration of the complaint. However, section 166 does not require the Commission to provide a complete timetable or specify when information will be received from a third party. The absence of a fixed completion date does not, without more, establish a failure to take appropriate steps.

28.The Applicant received progress information on 12, 14 and 20 October 2026. On the evidence before the Tribunal, the Commission has recently provided information about the progress of the complaint and the steps being taken. There is therefore no present evidential basis for finding a current or continuing failure of the kind described in section 166(1) (a), (b) or(c).

29.The complaint has not yet reached an outcome. However, section 166 does not require an immediate outcome where the complaint remains under consideration. The evidence does not establish a present failure to take appropriate steps or provide information about the complaint’s progress.

30.It is possible that further delay may occur. However, the Tribunal cannot proceed on the assumption that a future procedural failure will arise. The possibility of a later failure does not establish a present failure.

31.I have considered the Applicant’s request for an order requiring a further progress update. Section 166(2) (b) permits the Tribunal to make such an order where a failure under section 166(1) has been established. In the present case, however, recent progress information has been provided and the evidence does not establish a current or continuing failure. An order specifying a further reporting date would regulate the Commission’s future handling of the complaint rather than remedy an existing statutory failure. I therefore do not consider such an order necessary or justified.

32.Nor is further clarification required before the strike-out application can be determined. The relevant correspondence is before the Tribunal, its contents are not disputed, and the Applicant acknowledges the steps now taken. Further directions would prolong the proceedings without identifying a realistic basis for an order under section 166 .

33.The Applicant’s original application referred extensively to his underlying dispute with the organisation and alleged that the organisation had not provided the documents to which he was entitled. I make no findings about those matters. The Tribunal cannot use

section 166 to make an order directly against the organisation, require it to disclose particular information, or determine whether it infringed the Applicant’s data protection rights. The issue in these proceedings is confined to whether there is a procedural failure by the Commission capable of remedy through an order under

section 166

.

34.Taking the Applicant’s case at its highest, there was a significant initial delay. However, the Commission has since taken identifiable steps to progress the complaint and has provided the Applicant with information about its progress and the next stage. Although the Applicant understandably seeks a more precise timetable and further written confirmation, the evidence does not establish a current or continuing failure under section 166(1) capable of remedy by an order under section 166(2) .

35.I am therefore satisfied that there is no realistic prospect of the Tribunal making an order under section 166(2) . The Applicant’s case has no reasonable prospect of succeeding and the proceedings are struck out under rule 8(3)(c).

Signed: Date:

Judge Kiai 6 November 2026