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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: задержка рассмотрения жалобы в рамках Закона о защите данных 2018 года
Anzhela Nikolenko v The Information Commissioner
Introduction
1.On 18 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”). It concerned a complaint made to the Information Commissioner on 8 November 2025 about the publication by The Sun of personal information and images relating to a child and family members, and the refusal by News Group Newspapers Ltd (“NGN”) of a request for erasure.
2.The Commissioner filed a response to the present application dated 16 September 2026. The Commissioner invited the Applicant to withdraw because an update had been provided and, in the alternative, applied for strike out under rule 8(3)(c).
3.The Applicant opposed strike out in a reply dated 25 September 2026. She submitted that the update was not an outcome or adequate progress, that the requested authority had been supplied on 13 September 2026, and that an order remained necessary.
4.Also on 25 September 2026 the Commissioner wrote substantively to the Applicant. The Tribunal has considered that later letter with the application, response and reply. The strike out application can fairly be decided without a hearing.
Legal Framework
5.Under Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.
6.Under Rule 8(3)(c) of the Rules, the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.
7.Section 165 DPA sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the Commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:
166 Orders to progress complaints
(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner (a)
fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)
fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or (c)
if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.
(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner (a)
to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or (b)
to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.
8.The Tribunal can only make an order as prescribed by section 166(2) , it does not have the power to make an order beyond the scope of s166(2) , and even then, only if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Some key decisions are:
a.
Scranage v Information Commissioner [2020] UKUT 196 (AAC) , paragraph 6
- "In my experience – both in the present appeal and in many other cases – there is a widespread misunderstanding about the reach of section 166 . Contrary to many data subjects’ expectations, it does not provide a right of appeal against the substantive outcome of the Information Commissioner’s investigation on its merits. Thus, section 166(1) , which sets out the circumstances in which an application can be made to the Tribunal is procedural rather than substantive in its focus." (emphasis in original).
b.
Killock v Information Commissioner
[2022] 1 WLR 2241
, Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 - "…
It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under
section 166
, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory
Notes to the Act which regard the
section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in
section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals
."
9.The Tribunal’s task in this application is to decide whether there remains any procedural failure within section 166 for which the Tribunal could grant the statutory remedy.
Background
10.On 8 November 2025, the Applicant complained to the Commissioner about a number of articles published by The Sun. News Group Newspapers Ltd (“NGN”) is the organisation responsible for the publication. The Applicant said that the articles contained identifiable personal information and photographs concerning her and her minor grandson, and that NGN had refused a request for erasure of personal data contained in the articles.
11.The Applicant asked the Commissioner to assess the lawfulness, fairness and necessity of the processing and to consider appropriate remedial action. Her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. The Applicant was acting in a representative capacity in relation to the child’s data.
12.The Commissioner acknowledged receipt on 8 November 2025. The acknowledgement explained that, because of the volume of complaints, it was taking approximately 29 weeks to assign new complaints. It also indicated that a case officer would assess the complaint, request further information if required and provide an outcome.
13.The Applicant waited beyond the estimated 29-week period. By the end of May 2026 she had received no complaint reference, confirmation of allocation, request for further information, substantive progress update or outcome. She continued to receive no substantive response during June and July 2026.
14.On 18 August 2026, more than nine months after the complaint, the Applicant made the present application. She stated expressly that she was not asking the Tribunal to determine the merits of the complaint, order removal of the articles or award compensation. She sought an order requiring the Commissioner, within 28 days or such other period as the Tribunal directed, to take appropriate steps to respond, provide the complaint reference and confirm assignment, report the progress made and the steps taken, and provide an outcome or a defined timetable.
15.After the application was lodged, the Commissioner wrote to the Applicant on 8 September 2026. The Commissioner supplied case reference IC-445412-J5Q5. The Commissioner asked the Applicant to provide evidence that she was the child’s legal guardian and copies of any further correspondence between her and NGN since the complaint had been submitted.
16.On 13 September 2026 the child’s mother emailed the Commissioner from her own email address. She provided a written authority appointing the Applicant to act as her representative for the purposes of case IC-445412-J5Q5. The authority permitted the Applicant to correspond with the Commissioner, submit evidence and representations, receive correspondence, requests and the outcome, provide relevant documents, and communicate with NGN where necessary for the complaint.
17.The authority made clear that it was limited to the Commissioner’s complaint process. It did not confer parental responsibility, guardianship or custody. The child’s mother authorised the Commissioner to communicate with the Applicant and to disclose personal data reasonably necessary for the Applicant to act as representative. Supporting identity and court documentation was also provided.
18.The Applicant explained that she had not had further direct correspondence with NGN after submitting the complaint. She said that there had been separate correspondence through the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which she could provide if required. She also clarified that she had never claimed to be the child’s legal guardian and that she relied on the mother’s express authority to act.
19.The Commissioner’s response to the application was dated 16 September 2026 and served on 18 September 2026. The Commissioner accepted that there had been delay in initially communicating with the Applicant and apologised. The Commissioner relied on the letter of 8 September 2026 as an update on progress and submitted that the application should be withdrawn or struck out.
20.In her reply dated 25 September 2026, the Applicant pointed out that the Commissioner’s response did not mention the authority sent on 13 September 2026. She maintained that the 8 September letter was a request for information rather than a substantive account of progress, steps taken, an outcome or a defined timetable. She opposed strike out and asked for confirmation that the authority and her explanation had been considered.
21.Later on 25 September 2026 the Commissioner wrote substantively to the Applicant. The Commissioner acknowledged receipt of the mother’s authority and accepted that the Applicant could act on the child’s behalf. The Commissioner identified the complaint as concerning information and images of the child and family published by The Sun and NGN’s refusal of the erasure request.
22.The Commissioner stated that, on the information provided, NGN did not appear to have appropriately addressed the erasure request. The Commissioner had written to NGN, provided guidance and advised NGN to review its handling and respond to the Applicant in detail within 14 days. The Commissioner also explained that data protection law contains a broad, though not absolute, journalism exemption, and that the right to erasure is likely to apply only in exceptional circumstances.
23.The Commissioner told the Applicant that, once she had received NGN’s response, she could provide a copy to the Commissioner for further consideration if she remained dissatisfied.
Parties’ submissions
24.The Commissioner submits that the statutory purpose of section 166 is to remedy a failure to take appropriate steps or provide information about progress or outcome. It is not a mechanism for supervising every stage of an investigation or directing the substantive result.
25.The Commissioner accepts the initial delay and apologises for it. The Commissioner nevertheless submits that the letter of 8 September 2026 provided an update by opening active correspondence, supplying the complaint reference and requesting information necessary to establish the Applicant’s authority and to understand any developments between the Applicant and NGN.
26.The Commissioner relies additionally on the letter of 25 September 2026. By then the representative authority had been accepted, the complaint had been identified, NGN had been contacted, guidance had been supplied and NGN had been given 14 days to provide a detailed response. The Commissioner submits that those steps and the information given to the Applicant remove any basis for an order under section 166 .
27.The Applicant submits that the application was properly made after the Commissioner failed for more than nine months to provide the updates required by section 166 . She says that the fact that the Commissioner acted only after proceedings were commenced does not show that the original application lacked merit.
28.The Applicant distinguishes a complaint reference and a request for documents from meaningful progress. She submits that the letter of 8 September 2026 did not say that the complaint had been assigned, identify any substantive step already taken, give an outcome or provide a timetable for determination. She also relies on the omission from the Commissioner’s response of any reference to the authority supplied on 13 September 2026.
29.The Applicant says that she has now provided all the information requested. She relies on the mother’s written authority and her clarification that there had been no further direct correspondence with NGN. She maintains that an order remained necessary to ensure that the Commissioner considered that material and progressed the complaint to an outcome within a defined period.
30.In light of the later letter of 25 September 2026, the Applicant has received confirmation that the authority was accepted and that substantive action was taken. The remaining issue is therefore whether section 166 permits or requires the Tribunal to make an order while the Commissioner awaits NGN’s response and has indicated a route to further consideration.
Conclusions
31.The Tribunal accepts that the application was properly and reasonably made. When lodged, there had been no meaningful progress information or outcome for more than nine months. The Commissioner accepts delay. This application was not an attempt to challenge the merits of a completed decision.
32.The issue is whether there is now a continuing failure for which an effective order can be made. Section 166 is not punitive and does not provide a declaration or sanction for past delay which has since been remedied.
33.The communication of 8 September 2026 supplied the reference and sought information necessary to progress the complaint. Standing alone, it may not have resolved every aspect, particularly because the requested authority had been supplied but not acknowledged in the response.
34.The position materially changed on 25 September 2026. The Commissioner accepted the authority, identified the complaint, formed a provisional view about NGN’s handling, contacted NGN with guidance, required a detailed response within 14 days and explained the route to further consideration.
35.That letter may not be a final outcome closing the complaint. Section 166 does not require a concluded outcome in every case. It expressly permits compliance by taking appropriate steps and providing information about progress. The letter gives substantive information about the assessment, action and next steps, and supplies a defined timetable.
36.The principal relief sought has therefore been provided. The complaint has a reference, authority has been accepted, the complaint is being substantively handled, NGN has been contacted, a 14-day period has been specified and the route to further consideration identified.
37.There is no basis for ordering an immediate final outcome while that process is current. Such an order would intrude upon the Commissioner’s conduct of an active complaint. Section 166 also creates no right to a named case officer or a particular internal allocation arrangement.
38.The concern about earlier delay is legitimate, but historic delay cannot sustain proceedings once appropriate steps and meaningful progress information have been provided. Any future failure would fall to be considered on the facts then prevailing.
39.The Tribunal does not determine the merits of the erasure request, the journalism exemption, the lawfulness of publication or the adequacy of a future response from NGN.
40.There is no present procedural failure for which an effective section 166 order can be made. Accordingly, the application has no reasonable prospect of succeeding and is struck out under rule 8(3)(c).
Signed: Judge Peri Mornington Date: 6 October 2026
Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 08.10.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.
Реквизиты
| Страна | Великобритания |
| Орган | Суды Англии и Уэльса |
| Вид | судебное решение |
| Язык | en |
| Дата документа | 2026-10-07 |
| Объём | 15 861 знаков |
| Редакций | 1 |
| Впервые увидели | 2026-10-08 |
| Проверен | 2026-11-16 05:35 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] UKFTT 01387 (GRC) |
| court | United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
Темы
Почему документ в базе
Отбор сработал на этих совпадениях, суммарный вес 11.
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data protection
текст
Персональные данные
…duction 1. on 18 august 2026 the applicant made an application under section 166 of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”). it concerned a complaint made to the information commissioner on 8…
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data protection
текст
Персональные данные
…ata subjects to complain to the commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. under section 166 dpa a data subject can make an application to this tribuna…
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gdpr
текст
Персональные данные
…s where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or article 77 of the uk gdpr, the commissioner - (a) fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…concerning her and her minor grandson, and that ngn had refused a request for erasure of personal data contained in the articles. 11. the applicant asked the commissioner to assess the lawfu…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…d to consider appropriate remedial action. her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. the applicant was acting in a representative cap…
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personal data
текст
Персональные данные
…opriate remedial action. her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. the applicant was acting in a representative capacity in relation…
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Information Commissioner
орган
Персональные данные
…Anzhela Nikolenko v The Information Commissioner Introduction 1. On 18 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under section 166 o…
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GDPR
акт
Персональные данные
…s where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - (a) fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (…
Найден по запросу: «personal data» (caselaw_uk)
Аннотация
Суд рассмотрел жалобу заявительницы на нарушение сроков рассмотрения жалобы органом по защите данных. Заявительница утверждала, что после подачи жалобы прошло более девяти месяцев, но она получила лишь частичную информацию о ходе рассмотрения. Суд установил, что хотя ранее имела место значительная задержка, текущие действия органа по защите данных свидетельствуют о принятии мер и предоставлении информации о ходе рассмотрения жалобы. Суд счёл, что жалоба больше не содержит оснований для продолжения разбирательства в соответствии с разделом 166 Закона о защите данных 2018 года, и прекратил дело.
Редакции документа
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| Редакция 1 открыта | 2026-10-08 03:23 | xml | 15 861 зн. | txt |