Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales
Jonathan Findley Wilkins v Information Commissioner
Acronyms used
DPA
the Data Protection Act 2018
FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber
ICO
Information Commissioner’s Office
Background
1.This Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress made about ICO reference number IC-529358-D7B2.
2.The underlying issue for Mr Wilkins is the way in which his personal data is held/processed by Vegner Group Ltd / HML PM Ltd.
3.On 08 June 2026, Mr Wilkins filed a complaint with the ICO. It appears that he filed initial documents and then, on 19 June 2026 at 12:55pm attempted to file further documents but used an incorrect email address. On several further dates, Mr Wilkins sent additional information to the ICO about his data protection concern and complaint about the above-named group. I have seen emails sent on 19 June 2026 at 12:33pm, 23 June 2026 at 8:50am, 19 June 2026 at 1:03pm, 4 July 2026 at 12:11am, 9 July 2026 at 3:10am, 18 August 2026 at 2:50pm and at 2:56pm, 20 August 2026 at 12:57pm, 21 August 2026 at 3:56pm, 22 August 2026 at 9:34am, 9 September 2026 at 2:41pm.
4.On 9 September 2026 at 2:43pm, the ICO sent to Mr Wilkins the outcome of their consideration of his complaint. At 3:14pm that same day, Mr Wilkins sent an email to the ICO titled (formatting as original):
URGENT APPEAL ADDENDUM & RE-SUBMISSIONS OF EVIDENCE – CASE handle: IC-529358-D7B2
5.The ICO’s outcome letter, dated 9 September 2026, set out that the ICO decided not to undertake a more detailed investigation. Mr Wilkins sent a further email to the ICO on 10 September 2026 at 8:14pm. From the ICO’s response document it appears that Mr Wilkins sent further documentation to the ICO and on 06 October 2026, the ICO provided a review outcome, upholding the original decision.
6.By GRC3 dated 23 September 2026, Mr Wilkins sought an Order to Progress. Standard initial directions were issued; those were dated 24 September 2026.
7.Mr Wilkins filed GRC5s with the FtT, seeking various orders. Judge Saward, in case management directions dated 29 September 2026 explained that the GRC did not have jurisdiction to make any of the orders sought by Mr Wilkins.
8.By GRC5 dated 21 October 2026, the ICO applied to the FtT for the application to be struck out, asserting that the FtT does not have jurisdiction (a mandatory strike out) and, if there is jurisdiction there is no reasonable prospect of the application succeeding (a discretionary strike out). Submissions of the same date set out their reason for applying for strike out.
9.The initial directions (dated 24 September 2026) gave Mr Wilkins the opportunity to respond to such application; Mr Wilkins was also sent case management directions dated 28 October 2026 specifying the opportunity to make representation, giving 14 days within which to make representations.
10.Mr Wilkins made representations in an email sent on 28 October 2026 at 14:02 stating his opposition to the strike out. He used the same document to make representations about this application and a separate application (FT/EA/2026/0364/GDPR) which is not in front of me for consideration.
11.The submissions seemed more focussed on a different complaint; albeit that the principles are likely to be similar for opposing strike out. I considered whether to give Mr Wilkins a further opportunity to make representations about this application only; I do not consider this to be proportionate. Mr Wilkins had the opportunity to make representations; he decided to focus application of any principles elsewhere when filing representations for this application. The GRC Rules only require an opportunity to be given. The underlying issue in this application is whether Mr Wilkins has a reasonable prospect of persuading the FtT that it should make an Order to Progress against the ICO in connection with ICO reference IC-529358-D7B2; I consider I can apply that question to the application using the principles outlined in the submissions.
12.I consider that is his full response to that application. I am satisfied that no useful purpose would be served by awaiting the expiry of the full 14-day period because Mr Wilkins has already filed substantive representations opposing the application.
13.Further, I consider that a hearing is not necessary, each party has been given the opportunity to provide written representations and submissions to the FtT.
The Law
14.The key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are Killock and VeaIe v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 ( Killock ), R (Delo) v Information Commissioner ( Delo ) in the High Court ( [2023] 1 WLR 1327 ) and Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) and Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) ( Smith ).
15.In Killock , the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances in which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section 165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an appropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The Upper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast a critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to achieve a different complaint outcome.”
16.In
Killock
, the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in terms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed the view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any particular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal indicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources effectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special position. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in Killock
.
17.In R (Delo) v Information Commissioner
[2023] EWCA Civ 1141
, in the Court of Appeal, Warby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant legislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a complaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that, having done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80).
18.In Delo , Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits would clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader connotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in Killock that the word “outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also agreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in Delo in the High Court that outcome would properly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint, having informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with UK GDPR.
19.Therefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the merits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision in Smith confirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the Commissioner has issued a complaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application. But, as Judge Stout also explained in Smith at [60], in a case where the Commissioner has carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a section 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons.
20.The first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a procedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether the Commissioner has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application to the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages against the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision (see further [74] of Killock ).
21.The second reason is because the Commissioner has a wide discretion under section
165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the scope for the FTT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is limited.
EW
, decided alongside
Killock
, was an exceptional case where the Commissioner, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at
all. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Delo
, the Commissioner is not required to determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further
([64]), the Commissioner is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78])
and has a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent” ([80]).
Consideration
22.Mr Wilkins’ representations set out different themes:
a.
This is a pure public law appeal under Section 165 of the DPA.
i.
I consider this is a statutory application under section 166 for an Order to Progress a complaint. It is limited in scope by the authorities already set out in this decision.
b.
The ICO made a material error of fact and law and failed in its statutory duties to investigate.
i.
From the documentation I have seen, the ICO made an informed decision not to investigate the complaint. That is its right as the expert regulator who has been charged with regulating personal data matters and is, therefore, in the position of being able to determine where it should target its resources.
c.
Dismissal due to a contamination breach (Mr Wilkins’ part 2), Financial Ombudsman Determination (Mr Wilkins’ part 3), a wider interest (Mr Wilkins’ part 4).
i.
Mr Wilkins does not appear to have applied any of these themes to the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2.
d.
Mr Wilkins’ part 5 refers to a review decision on 22 October 2026 and a different data processor/controller, it seems this argument does not apply to the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2.
23.The remedies sought by Mr Wilkins (part 7) are:
a.
To dismiss the application to strike out. This decision does dismiss part of the application by the ICO (see above).
b.
Overturn and set aside “the ICO’s rogue closures dated 20 October 2026 and the Stage 2 Review Decision dated 22 October 2026” – this remedy does not appear to refer to the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2 as its review decision was dated 6 October 2026.
c.
Issue a “binding supervisory order compelling the [ICO] to immediately reopen Master Case IC-524495-Q0S3” – such would be improper in this decision which is about the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2.
d.
Require and/or compel the ICO to do certain things regarding Link Financial Outsourcing Limited – such would be improper in this decision which is about the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2.
24.Turning back to the application which is before me and which concerns the complaint which was, by the ICO, given reference number IC-529358-D7B2. I am satisfied that the FtT has jurisdiction to consider the application.
25.Having cast a critical eye over the decision of the expert regulator not to make further investigation, I find that there is no reasonable prospect that the FtT would make an Order to Progress under section 166 of the DPA. Therefore, the application is struck out pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) of the GRC Rules.
Signed: Judge Worth
Date: 06 November 2026
Details
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Body | Courts of England and Wales |
| Type | court decision |
| Language | en |
| Document date | 2026-11-06 |
| Size | 12 355 знаков |
| Versions | 1 |
| First seen | 2026-11-10 |
| Last checked | 2026-11-16 05:28 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] UKFTT 01525 (GRC) |
| court | United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
Topics
Why this document is in the base
Selection matched on the following, total weight 9.
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…acronyms used dpa the data protection act 2018 ftt the first-tier tribunal general regulatory chamber ico information commiss…
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personal data
текст
Personal data
…e number ic-529358-d7b2. 2. the underlying issue for mr wilkins is the way in which his personal data is held/processed by vegner group ltd / hml pm ltd. 3. on 08 june 2026, mr wilkins file…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…ss. on several further dates, mr wilkins sent additional information to the ico about his data protection concern and complaint about the above-named group. i have seen emails sent on 19 june 202…
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gdpr
текст
Personal data
…o make representations about this application and a separate application (ft/ea/2026/0364/gdpr) which is not in front of me for consideration. 11. the submissions seemed more focusse…
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gdpr
текст
Personal data
…formed mr delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with uk gdpr. 19. therefore, the ftt on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with…
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personal data
текст
Personal data
…complaint. that is its right as the expert regulator who has been charged with regulating personal data matters and is, therefore, in the position of being able to determine where it should tar…
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Information Commissioner
орган
Personal data
…Jonathan Findley Wilkins v Information Commissioner Acronyms used DPA the Data Protection Act 2018 FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regu…
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ICO
орган
Personal data
…DPA the Data Protection Act 2018 FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber ICO Information Commissioner’s Office Background 1. This Tribunal is concerned with an app…
Found by query: «personal data» (caselaw_uk)
Summary
Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина Джонатана Уилкинса на отказ органа защиты данных Великобритании (ICO) провести дополнительное расследование по его жалобе относительно обработки персональных данных компанией Vegner Group Ltd / HML PM Ltd. Суд пришёл к выводу, что ICO правомерно принял решение не проводить дальнейшее расследование, поскольку имеет право самостоятельно определять приоритеты своей деятельности и эффективно распределять ресурсы. Суд отклонил просьбу заявителя об отмене или пересмотре решений ICO и постановил отказать в выдаче приказа о проведении дополнительного расследования.