Пульс · Документы · Великобритания · Суды Англии и Уэльса
Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: возмещение судебных расходов при гражданском неповиновении
Gillian McGivern v MBR Acres Limited & Ors
Lord Justice Jeremy Baker:
Introduction
1.This case concerns the extent to which, if at all, a successful legally aided party in civil contempt proceedings may recover costs from a privately funded party, beyond those set out in schedule 4 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.
2.The issue arose following an application in the High Court for committal for contempt of court, which was dismissed as being “ totally without merit ” and costs in favour of the successful legally aided party were awarded on an indemnity basis.
3.Subsequently, both at first instance in the Senior Courts Costs Office and on appeal to the High Court, the successful party’s costs were limited to those set out in schedule 4, and the matter now comes before this court by way of a second appeal.
4.In order to understand the context in which this issue arises it is necessary to have regard to Blake J’s determination in King’s Lynn and West Norfolk Borough Council v Bunning [2013] EWHC 3390 (QB) , (“ Bunning ”), that whereas before the introduction of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 ,
“…proceedings for committal for breach of an order of the court would have been regarded as quasi-criminal in nature but a form of civil procedure for the purposes of legal aid…”, such proceedings are now “ criminal proceedings ” for the purposes of legal aid.
Background
5.The appellant, Gillian McGivern, is a solicitor who represented a number of individuals against whom the respondent, MBR Acres Limited, obtained a High Court injunction preventing them and “ persons unknown ” from entering or remaining in a marked area of land occupied by the respondent.
6.On 4 July 2022, the respondent issued an application for committal for contempt of court against the appellant, alleging that, in breach of the injunction, the appellant had visited the area outside the respondent’s premises.
7.The appellant, who had the benefit of a legal aid certificate which had been granted under section 16 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 , instructed Scott-Moncrieff & Associates Limited (“the solicitors”) to represent her in the contempt proceedings.
8.The appellant had entered into a Conditional Fee Agreement (“CFA”) with the solicitors whereby they had agreed that,
“Should costs be ordered to be paid by the other side, I would seek to recover these at the inter-parties’ rate that I charge for civil litigation, which is £400 per hour. The only limitation to this is that I will not seek to recover against you more than is paid by the other side.”
9.The committal application was heard by Nicklin J who handed down a judgment on 2 August 2022, [2022] EWHC 2017 (QB) , in which he dismissed the application and, having certified the application as being “ totally without merit ”, he ordered the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs on an indemnity basis.
10.The Legal Aid Agency had assessed the appellant’s costs at £28,556.58, which reflected an enhanced sum beyond that which would have been available based on the fees set out in schedule 4 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.
11.However, the appellant relied upon a Bill of Costs in which she claimed a total of £120,292.21, which was based upon an hourly billing rate by the solicitors of £400 per hour.
12.The respondent disputed its liability to pay the sum set out in the Bill of Costs on a number of bases, including that:
i.
the fees which the solicitors were entitled to recover were limited to those which were based on the rates which were set out in schedule 4 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, rather than the inter-parties’ rate provided for in the CFA or as assessed by the Legal Aid Agency.
ii.
the indemnity principle applied such that the costs which the respondent was liable to pay to the appellant were limited to those which were based on the rates set out in schedule 4.
13.The determination of the preliminary issues relating to the assessment of costs came for hearing before Costs Judge Whalan, (“the costs judge”) who handed down a judgment on 18 July 2024, [2024] EWHC 1869 (SCCO) , in which he upheld the respondent’s submissions, and determined that the costs which the appellant was entitled to recover from the respondent were limited to those based upon the rates set out in schedule 4.
14.On this basis, at a further hearing before the costs judge on 20 November 2024, he assessed the appellant’s costs payable by the respondent at £20,673.34. However, as the respondent had made a Calderbank offer to settle the costs claim for £21,000.00 on 12 August 2022 and a Part 36 offer of £33,000.00 on 5 September 2023, the costs judge ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the assessment proceedings in the sum of £53,044.65.
15.On 31 March 2025, Sir Stephen Stewart, sitting as a High Court Judge, granted the appellant permission to appeal against the order of the costs judge.
16.The appeal was heard before Sweeting J who, in a judgment handed down on 4 August 2025, [2025] EWHC 2070 (KB), dismissed the appeal.
17.By way of an Appellant’s notice dated 9 September 2025, the appellant sought a second appeal to this court; permission for which was granted by Coulson LJ on 18 November 2025.
18.In order to understand the reasons for the decisions and the submissions on appeal, it is necessary to set out the statutory framework in which legal aid has been and is currently provided in civil and criminal proceedings.
Statutory regime and its interpretation
19.The Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 , (“LAA Act 1949”), provided arrangements to make legal aid and advice in England and Wales more readily available for persons of small or moderate means in proceedings other than criminal proceedings, in respect of which free legal aid was already provided for by other enactments.
20.The LAA Act 1949, provided for the establishment of a legal aid fund to be administered by the Law Society, (section 9), from which the payment of legal fees on behalf of assisted parties would be paid.
21.Under the LAA Act 1949, the grant of civil legal aid was subject to a reasonable prospects of success test (section 1(6)) and a means test (section 2). Moreover, although payment of the assisted party’s legal fees was to be paid out of the legal aid fund (section 6(5)), the legally assisted party was liable to make a contribution to the legal aid fund (section 2(2)(c)), any legal costs recovered by the assisted party were to be paid to the legal aid fund (section 2(2)(d)) and any net liability of the legal aid fund in relation to the assisted person’s legal fees would comprise a first charge on any property recovered in the proceedings by the assisted person (section 3(4)).
22.Although the sums payable out of the legal aid fund in respect of legal fees were limited to those set out in the Third Schedule to the Act ( section 6(6) ), some of which were limited to 85% of the fees which would otherwise be awarded on taxation, section 6(9) (a) of the LAA Act 1949 provided that,
“sub sections (6 ) and (7) of this section shall not affect the sums recoverable by virtue of an order for costs made in favour of a person who has received legal aid or an agreement for costs so made which provides for taxation…”.
23.Moreover, section 1(7) of the LAA Act 1949 provided that,
“Save as expressly provided by this Part of this Act or by regulations made thereunder, – (a)
the fact that the services of counsel or a solicitor are given by way of legal aid shall not affect the relationship between or rights of counsel, solicitor and client or any privilege arising out of such a relationship; and (b)
the rights conferred by this Part of this Act on a person receiving legal aid shall not affect the rights and liabilities of other parties to the proceedings or the principles on which the discretion of any court or tribunal is normally exercised.”.
24.However, section 2(2)(b) provided that where a person receives legal aid in connection with any proceedings,
“his solicitor and counsel shall not take any payment in respect of the legal aid except such payment as is directed by this Part of this Act to be made out of the legal aid fund.”.
25.These statutory provisions were considered by Hilbery J in Daley v Diggers Ltd [1951] 1 KB 661 , (“ Daley ”), in which an unsuccessful defendant disputed its liability to pay the costs of a successful legally assisted plaintiff on the basis that as costs are awarded to a successful party as being “ as or in the character of an indemnity ”, and the legally assisted party had no personal liability for costs under the LAA Act 1949, there should either be no award for costs in favour of the plaintiff or they should be limited to the sums set out in the Third Schedule to the Act .
26.In the course of his judgment Hilbery J accepted that,
“As a matter of principle, and apart from statute, this contention would seem well founded. As an assisted person the plaintiff has not been under any personal liability for his costs incurred in establishing his claim against the defendants, and, the court being apprised of the fact, he can have no claim to an award of costs, since such an award would issue on the basis of its being an indemnity to him against a liability which in fact has never been for him an existent liability.”
27.Therefore, Hilbery J considered that it was necessary to examine the express provisions of the LAA Act 1949. Dealing first of all with section 1(7)(b), he observed that,
“The fact therefore that the plaintiff is receiving the legal aid conferred by that part of the Act , in the first place, is not to affect the liability of the other parties to the proceedings, i.e., the liability of a defendant, or in the second place the principles on which the discretion of the court is exercised. Costs are in the discretion of the court and become a liability of a party to the suit only after the court in the excise of its discretion has awarded them. The second part of the sub-section does therefore directly apply to the question of costs to be awarded, either to or against an assisted person. If the discretion to award them should normally be exercised in a particular case so as to make the defendant liable for them, then they become a liability of a party to the proceedings other than the assisted person, and the first part of the sub-section comes into operation.
Since the second part of the sub-section, after the disjunctive, expressly provides that the principles on which the discretion of the court is to be exercised, that is to say in matters of discretion, are not to be affected by the fact that a party is a legally assisted person, the intention of the section would seem to be that when it comes to the exercise of the discretion over costs the court should not allow itself to be affected by the fact that the plaintiff is an assisted person.”
28.Hilbery J considered that this construction was in harmony with other provisions of the Act , including section 6(9) which envisaged an order for costs being made in favour of a person who has received legal aid. Moreover, that,
“ Section 6 , sub-s. 9, expressly referring as it does to sub-s. 7(b) and to s. 6 , sub- ss. 6 and 7, is in terms saying that although in litigation in the Supreme Court a solicitor for an assisted person will only have a right to 85 per cent. of his profit costs and his counsel will only have a right to 85 per cent. of his fees, none the less the court is to disregard this fact when exercising its discretion to award costs to the successful assisted-person- litigant and exercise that discretion on ordinary principles.”
29.In the event, Hilbery J awarded the successful plaintiff his full taxed costs having concluded that,
“These provisions of the Act to which I have called attention lend support to the construction which I have put upon s. 1, sub-s. 7(b), namely, that in considering whether in the exercise of its discretion the court should award costs to the successful person, the court should altogether disregard the fact that the successful plaintiff is an assisted person under the Act .
The alternative contention, that the costs to be awarded to the plaintiff as an assisted litigant should be limited to the 85 per cent. of the solicitors profit costs and 85 per cent. of the fees of counsel for which alone the legal aid fund has undertaken liability, in my opinion is covered by what I have already decided is the proper construction of s. 1, sub-s. 7(b).”
30.Although, Daley was not referred to in the subsequent case of Starkey v Railway Executive
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1951] 2 All ER 902 , (“ Starkey ”), this court allowed an appeal by a successful legally assisted plaintiff against the decision of the trial judge to limit the recovery of costs against the unsuccessful defendant to the plaintiff’s contribution to the legal aid fund which was nil.
31.In his judgment, Cohen LJ referred to section 1(7)(b) of the LAA Act 1949 and stated that,
“It seems to me that that sub-section is conclusive of the matter. It provides, in effect, that, in considering the costs to be awarded against a person unassisted by legal aid, the court must exercise its discretion without regard to the fact that the successful plaintiff is a legally assisted person.”
32.In a concurring judgment, Singleton LJ pointed out that,
“The plaintiff was an assisted person. She had not been called on to provide anything towards the costs of the litigation, from which I take it that she was virtually a person without means. She succeeded in her action and obtained damages. In the ordinary way a litigant who succeeds in those circumstances would recover her costs, and an application was made for her costs. Stable J., did not grant them. If the position is left that way, the costs of the successful plaintiff will fall to be borne by the legal aid fund set up by s.9 of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949
– in other words, by the taxpayer. Why should the wrong-doer profit by the fact that the plaintiff is an assisted person? If a successful plaintiff is to be deprived of costs because he or she is an assisted person, the wrong-doer gets a benefit from the Act at the expense of the State. I do not believe that that is in accordance with the intention of Parliament. Stable J., would seem to have thought that a fully assisted person should recover no costs from a defendant. I see no ground for that. If the judge is to be read as saying that assisted persons under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, are not to have any costs if they succeed, then I think it is not a proper exercise of the discretion granted to the judge either under R.S.C., Ord. 65, r. 1, or under s. 31(1)(h) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925. The judge ought to have granted the plaintiff costs in the usual way. That, I think, follows from s. 1(7)(b) of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949…”
33.Neither of these cases appear to have been referred to in Blatcher v Heaysman
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1960] 1 WLR 663 , (“ Blatcher ”), in which this court again allowed an appeal against the decision of Stable J who had refused to order two legally aided defendants to pay any costs to the successful legally aided plaintiffs arising out of an action for damages for misrepresentation.
34.In the course of his judgment, Lord Evershed MR, observed that,
“The effect of the failure to make any order as to costs was merely to benefit the defendants, one of whom, as I have already said, he found to be deliberately dishonest. So, while I certainly respect the view that the learned judge took of the working of the scheme, I am bound to say that I cannot agree that his decision does justice to the scope and purposes of the Act , and, in any case, it seems to be impossible to say that the learned judge properly exercised his discretion by confining himself to the views which he expressed.
By s. 1(7) (b) of the Act of 1949 it is expressly provided that
“the rights conferred by this Part of this Act on a person receiving legal aid shall not affect the rights or liabilities of other parties to the proceedings or the principles on which the discretion of any court….is normally exercised.”
That imposes on the court the duty of considering the question who is to pay costs in accordance with the principles on which such discretion is normally exercised. If that be the right premise, it seems to me unanswerable, I confess, that, prima facie, the defendants ought to have been ordered to pay the costs of the action. If no parties had been legally aided, the defendants would manifestly have been ordered to pay the costs. Therefore, I think that, subject to the limitation which the next subsection imposes, the inescapable result here is that the defendants, one of whom, as I repeat, was held to have deceived the plaintiffs, should pay the costs. By s. 2(2) it is provided:
“Where a person receives legal aid in connection with any proceedings…
(e)
his liability by virtue of an order for costs made against him with respect to the proceedings shall not exceed the amount (if any) which is a reasonable one for him to pay having regard to all the circumstances, including the means of all the parties and the conduct in connection with the dispute.”
As regards the last few words, “and their conduct in connection with the dispute”, there is, plainly, no ground for altering what would be the normal incidence of costs. I must, therefore, look and see what, on the evidence before us, it is reasonable for the two defendants in this case to pay having regard to all the circumstances, including the means of everyone concerned.”
35.In the event, the court ordered the unsuccessful legally aided defendants to pay the costs of the successful legally aided plaintiffs, limited to the contributions which they had been required to make to the legal aid fund.
36.The effect of the Legal Aid Act 1960 was largely confined to expanding the range of those eligible for legal aid under the LAA Act 1949, so that persons with incomes significantly greater than those previously eligible would be entitled to legal aid.
37.However, the Legal Aid Act 1974 was a consolidating statute which, inter alia, repealed the LAA Act 1949 and provided for the granting of legal aid in both civil and criminal cases, under Parts 1 and 2 respectively. In relation to legal aid for civil proceedings, section 2(5) replicated section 1(7) of the LAA Act 1949, and sections 10(4)(a) and 8(1)(b) contained similar provisions to sections 6(9) (a) and 2(2)(b) of the LAA Act 1949.
38.The Legal Aid Act 1988 ( “LA Act 1988 ”) was intended to make new provision for the administration of, and to revise the law relating to, legal aid, advice and assistance. The Act established the Legal Aid Board to administer the new scheme (section 3). It was required to maintain a fund from which payments for, inter alia , legal aid would be made, and into which any contributions by the legally assisted person were required to be made, together with any costs ordered in favour of the legally assisted person ( section 6 ).
39.In relation to civil legal aid, section 15(6) prohibited an assisted person being required to make any payment in respect of his representation beyond any contribution he was required to make towards his legal representation under section 16(1) .
40.Section 16(5) required any costs recovered by an assisted person to be paid to the Board, and section 16(6) provided for any sum paid by the Board in respect those proceedings which were not covered either by such contributions or costs recovered in the proceedings to be a first charge upon any property recovered or preserved in those proceedings.
41.Furthermore, section 31 of the LA Act 1988 contained similar provisions to those in the repealed sections 1(7) (b), 6(9) and 2(2)(b) of the LAA Act 1949, and provided as follows:
“ 31 Act not generally to affect position of legal representatives or other parties
(1)Except as expressly provided by this Act or regulations under it— (a)
the fact that the services of counsel or a solicitor are given under this Act shall not affect the relationship between or rights of counsel, solicitor and client or any privilege arising out of such relationship; and (b)
the rights conferred by this Act on a person receiving advice, assistance or representation under it shall not affect the rights or liabilities of other parties to the proceedings or the principles on which the discretion of any court or tribunal is normally exercised.
(2)Without prejudice to the generality of sub section (1 )(b) above, for the purpose of determining the costs of a legally assisted person in pursuance of an order for costs or an agreement for costs in his favour (other than an order under Part II of the [ 1985 c. 23 .] Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 ) the services of his solicitor and counsel shall be treated as having been provided otherwise than under this Act and his solicitor shall be treated as having paid counsel’s fees.
(3)A person who provides advice, assistance or representation under this Act shall not take any payment in respect of the advice, assistance or representation except such payment as is made by the Board or authorised by, or by regulations under, this Act .
….”
42.These provisions and related regulations were considered by this court in Willis v Redbridge Health Authority
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1996] 1 WLR 1228 , (“ Willis ”), which concerned an appeal against an order for the payment of costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis against a defendant in favour of a legally assisted plaintiff.
43.In the course of his judgment Beldam LJ rejected the submission that regulation 107 of the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, which provided for the assessment of the legally assisted person’s costs to be taxed on the standard basis, prevented the court making an order for indemnity costs. Nevertheless, he went on to hold that the effect of the LA Act 1988 and the regulations, including regulation 64 which prohibited an assisted person’s legal representatives from receiving any payments beyond those made out of the fund, meant that it was not a correct use of the court’s discretion to direct a defendant to pay costs on an indemnity basis to a plaintiff who has been legally aided throughout the proceedings.
44.Beldam LJ explained the effect of the LA Act 1988 and the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989 which were made under section 34, as follows:
“I now summarise my understanding of the effect of the Legal Aid Act 1988 and the regulations I have quoted. (1) An assisted party’s representatives can only recover payment for work done under a legal aid certificate from the board by payments out of the fund. (2) The assisted person can only be required to pay his legal costs to the extent of his assessed contributions and any costs which may be secured as a charge on the property recovered. (3) The board’s liability to pay the legal advisers is limited to the costs taxed on a standard basis. (4) If costs were to be awarded to a legally assisted person taxed on an indemnity basis, they cannot be awarded as an indemnity (that is to say, to reimburse either the assisted party, his legal representatives or the board).”
45.Aldous LJ in a concurring judgment, stated that,
“Under the legal aid system, a solicitor acting for an assisted person receives as payment from the board that amount which is allowed upon taxation on the standard basis. It is that sum that the assisted person is liable to have to repay out of any property that may be recovered from the litigation. Thus his maximum liability for the costs of the litigation – including those which are incidental to it – are the costs taxed upon a standard basis. It follows in my view that an award to an assisted person of costs upon an indemnity basis would mean that he would recover more than his maximum liability. That is not lawful.”
46.In the event, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the order for costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis, and substituted an order for costs on the standard basis.
47.The decision in Willis was, inter alia , based upon the unamended Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989. However, these were subsequently amended by the Civil Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1994, and supplemented by the Legal Aid in Civil Proceedings (Remuneration) Regulations 1994.
48.The Legal Aid in Civil Proceedings (Remuneration) Regulations 1994 provided for fixed fees to be allowable to solicitors on taxation in respect of items of work undertaken for a legally assisted person in civil proceedings (regulation 4(1)), subject to a percentage enhancement in cases where the work undertaken was done with exceptional competence, dispatch or involved exceptional complexity (regulation 5).
49.This alteration from the previous standard basis of taxation was reflected in amendments made to the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989. In particular, regulations 107A and 107B were inserted after regulation 107, and a new regulation 92 was substituted for the previous one.
50.Regulation 107A(2), provided for taxation of the assisted person’s costs on a standard basis, subject to the new costs regime in the Legal Aid in Civil Proceedings (Remuneration) Regulations 1994.
51.The new regulation 92(1), provided that,
“Retention and payment out of moneys by the Board
“92.
—(1) The costs payable by the Board in respect of any work done under a certificate, after deduction of any sums paid under regulations 100 or 101 (payments on account), shall be—”
(a)
the legal aid only costs;
(b)
any other costs determined under regulation 107A(2);
(c)
where inter partes costs paid in favour of the assisted person are received by the Board, a sum equal to the amount by which the costs received exceed the costs referred to in sub-paragraph (b) above;
(d)
where all the inter partes costs as agreed or determined in accordance with any direction or order given or made in the proceedings in favour of the assisted person are received by the Board together with interest, a sum equal to the balance of interest after deduction of interest on the costs to which sub-paragraph (b) refers.
……”
52.Regulation 107B provided that,
“Recovery of costs
107B.—(1) Where an agreement or order provides for costs to be paid by any other party (in this regulation referred to as “the paying party”) in favour of the assisted person, the assisted person’s solicitor may recover a sum in respect of costs from the paying party subject to the provisions of this regulation and regulation 91(2B).”
(2)The costs which the assisted person’s solicitor may recover by virtue of this regulation shall not exceed the total of the sums referred to in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of regulation 92(1).
(3)The assisted person’s legal representatives shall not be prevented from recovering from the paying party the sums in respect of costs to which this regulation refers by (a)
any rule of law which limits the costs recoverable by a party to proceedings to the amount which he is liable to pay his legal representatives; or (b)
regulation 64 (restriction on payment otherwise than from the fund).
(4)Subject to reimbursement of the Board in respect of costs to which regulation 92(1)(b) refers and any interest thereon, any costs recovered from the paying party by virtue of this Regulation shall belong to the solicitor.”.
53.The effect of these new and amended regulations were considered by this court in Brawley v Marczynski
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[2003] 1 WLR 813 (“ Brawley ”), which concerned an appeal against an order for the payment of costs, arising in civil proceedings, against a privately funded defendant in favour of a legally assisted plaintiff, which had been ordered to be paid on an indemnity basis under CPR Pt 44.
54.The defendant submitted that as the plaintiff was legally aided, the award of costs should not be taxed on an indemnity basis, and relied upon the previous decision of this court in Willis
. Notwithstanding what this court had held in Willis
, those instructed on behalf of the plaintiff, supported by counsel on behalf of the Legal Services Commission (which had replaced the Legal Aid Board under the Access to Justice Act 1999
), submitted that the effect of
section 31 of the Legal Aid Act 1988 enabled indemnity costs to be awarded in favour of a legally assisted party, because the rights conferred by the Act were expressed not to affect the rights or liabilities of other parties to the proceedings or the principle on which the discretion of the court is normally exercised.
55.In his judgment, Longmore LJ, with whom both Tuckey and Aldous LJJ agreed, dealt with this submission as follows:
“17…….. Carried to its logical conclusion this submission would mean that Willis was wrongly decided but we cannot so hold since
section 31 was drawn to the attention of the court and actually set out in the judgment. The court must in Willis have decided that if an application for indemnity costs is made in a legally aided case, the court must be informed (if it does not already know) that the applicant for the order is a legally aided litigant. If there is then a danger that the indemnity principle may be infringed, an order could not (under the Regulations then in force) be made. The court presumably considered that it cannot have been Parliament's intention to allow
section 31 to override what was then thought to be the salutory principle that no litigant should make a profit out of an order requiring a defeated party to pay costs any more than it intended
section 31 to be a charter for forum-shopping by defendants trying to have cases decided in jurisdictions where there was no legal aid; see Connelly v RTZ Corpn plc
[1998] AC 854
.”
56.However, Longmore LJ noted that the regulations had changed since Willis had been decided, and observed that,
“4.
We have now had the benefit of a detailed skeleton argument from Mr Jeremy Morgan of counsel for the Legal Services Commission. He has explained that the Civil Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 introduced Regulation 107B into the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, which were the regulations the subject of consideration in Willis v Redbridge. The effect of this new Regulation 107B is to disapply both the indemnity principle and also the rule that a lawyer for a legally-aided party can only be paid out of the Legal Aid Fund. The reason for this was that the 1994 Regulations for the first time introduced the concept of a prescribed fee (lower than the fees recoverable previously, which were normally those that were allowable on an inter partes standard basis taxation). The new regulations also permitted, however, an uplift provided that costs were actually recoverable from the legally-aided litigant's opponent. This was thus an early example of a success fee, a concept with which, since the Access to Justice Act 1999 , both the profession and the courts are now becoming familiar. Mr Morgan further confirmed our initial impression that the effect of the new regulations was that it was not the claimant but his solicitor who was entitled and, indeed, could sue for the uplift in costs over and above the prescribed basis.”
57.In these circumstances, counsel on behalf of the defendant accepted that there was no legal impediment to an award of indemnity costs based on Willis , due to the wording of the legal aid regulations, but submitted that the judge had nevertheless wrongly exercised his discretion to award indemnity costs on the basis, inter alia, that the rationale for awarding indemnity costs was that the actual litigant should not be out of pocket or should be less out of pocket than he would be if an order was made on a standard basis, and that this had no application in legal aid cases because the litigant himself does not have to pay anything by way of costs or at least only has to make a contribution based on his means.
58.This submission was dealt with by Longmore LJ, between [11] – [16], as follows,
“11.
For his proposition that the rationale for awarding indemnity costs was that the actual litigant should, in an appropriate case, not be out of pocket or, at least, less out of pocket than if costs were awarded on a standard basis, Mr Shipley relied on Petrotrade v Texaco [2002] 1 WLR 947 paras. 63−4 (where Lord Woolf MR observed that the power to award indemnity costs is a means of achieving a fairer result for a claimant) and McPhilemy v Times Newspapers [2002] 1 WLR 934 para. 20 where Chadwick LJ explained the unfairness of an award of standard costs as follows:−
". . . an award of costs on a standard basis will, almost invariably, lead to the successful claimant recovering less than the costs which he has to pay to his solicitor. So, although he has been successful, he is out of pocket. Costs on an indemnity basis should avoid that element of unfairness.
Although in a sense one can say that one of the reasons for awarding costs is to avoid the inherent unfairness of an order for costs on a standard basis, that is not the rationale of indemnity costs as such. If it were, indemnity costs would be awarded more often than they are.
12.In fact the rationale for an award of indemnity costs is rather different. Since the introduction of the C.P.R., indemnity costs have been described as both compensatory and penal; but these concepts are not antitheses. All costs awards are intended to be compensatory in the sense that the litigant is compensated for the liability he has incurred to his own lawyers. The "indemnity principle" ensures that an award of costs (whether on a standard or an indemnity basis) does not enable the litigant to profit from any costs order. But an order for indemnity costs is often intended to operate penally on the losing party in the sense that the court disapproves of that party's conduct in relation to the litigation. That is what Laddie J intended in the present case.
13.Recent authority has shown that it may also be appropriate to make an award of indemnity costs where there is little or no stigma to be attached to the manner in which the losing party has conducted the litigation, see eg Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury Hammer 12 June 2002, [2002] EWCA Civ 879 para. 31 and Lord Woolf CJ's re−emphasis in para. 32 of: "the point . . . that, before an indemnity order can be made, there must be some conduct or some circumstance which takes the case out of the norm." He gives the example of a test case which benefits other litigants. Indemnity costs may, specifically, be also awarded where a claimant makes a Part 36 offer which the defendant should, but does not, accept, see CPR 36.21 and McPhilemy. But despite these examples indemnity costs are, more usually, awarded when, as here, the judge disapproves of a party's conduct in the litigation.
14.The important thing in non−assisted litigation, however, is that whatever the circumstances may be in which indemnity costs are awarded, such award must not offend the indemnity principle that a litigant cannot recover more by way of costs than the costs for which he is liable. Since his liability to his own solicitor cannot, apart from some special agreement, be greater (or, indeed, less) than a sum assessed on an indemnity basis, the indemnity principle will not be infringed.
15.If (as I believe to be the case) there are many different reasons why a judge makes an award of indemnity costs, it is impossible to say that the rationale of an award of indemnity costs is that the successful party should not be out of pocket. It may be the desired consequence but it is not the rationale; in the present case, the rationale is that the unsuccessful party has misconducted himself in the course of the litigation for the purposes of Part 44 of C.P.R., and in other cases that he has eg failed to beat a claimant's offer to settle pursuant to Part 36 or (to take Lord Woolf MR's example) has conducted a test case for the benefit of other litigants as well as himself.
16.From this it can be seen that it is not a principled objection to an award of indemnity costs for the losing party to say that a legally aided litigant will not himself recover the difference between a standard costs and an indemnity costs order and that, therefore, an indemnity costs order cannot be made in favour of a legally aided litigant. There may be practical objections but that is a different matter. ”
59.In so far as other submissions raised on behalf of the defendant, as to the practical effect of making an award of costs taxed on an indemnity basis in favour of a legally assisted party, Longmore LJ observed that,
“18.
Mr Shipley's other arguments can be considered under this head but it is first worth observing that, now that Parliament has permitted the indemnity principle to be infringed in legal aid cases, it would be odd that the weapon of indemnity costs should be withdrawn from the litigant's armoury. The rationale for making an order (whether one takes, by way of example, test cases, Part 36 offers or cases where a party has acted unreasonably in the litigation) is equally strong, where a party is legally aided as where he is not. One view might be that it is even more undesirable that litigation taking place at public expense should be conducted unreasonably than when it is taking place at the expense of the parties.
19.For these reasons I do not think that the fact that the case for a claimant has been conducted with the benefit of legal aid so that any order for indemnity costs will benefit the claimant's lawyers not the claimant should encourage the court to consider whether the lawyers deserve any increase in their usual or prescribed fee. Usually, if the defendant has been unreasonable, the claimant's lawyers will, in fact, deserve some extra remuneration even if only to compensate for the exasperation of acting against an unreasonable opponent. To look at the matter in detail would be counter−productive, and unnecessarily expensive; it would probably require also an undesirable investigation into privileged matters.
20.As for the teasing conundrums as to conflict of interest posed by Mr Shipley (with some assistance from the court), they will, in my view, have to be worked out in practice. As Mr Morgan helpfully pointed out, much more awkward problems with regard to offers of settlement than the ones posed are liable to arise daily as part of the ordinary course of conducting litigation pursuant to conditional fee agreements ("CFAs"). To make some special provision with regard to the award of indemnity costs when the receiving party is legally aided would be straining at a gnat at a time when both the profession and the court have to swallow the camel of CFAs. Since applications for indemnity costs are moreover usually made at the same time as, and are dependent on, applications for ordinary costs, conflict problems are not likely to loom large in any practical sense.
21.For these reasons I consider there is no impediment to an award of indemnity costs in the present case. Apart from the legal aid aspects of the present case, the decision to award indemnity costs was well within the judge’s discretion and I would dismiss this appeal.”
60.The Legal Aid Act 1988 was repealed by the Access to Justice Act 1999 which established the Legal Services Commission which was responsible for establishing and maintaining the Community Legal Service in respect of the provision of civil legal aid, and the Criminal Defence Service in respect of the provision of criminal legal aid.
61.The successor provisions to section 31 of the Legal Aid Act 1988 , were to be found in section 22 which provided as follows:
“22 Position of service providers and other parties etc
(1)Except as expressly provided by regulations, the fact that services provided for an individual are or could be funded by the Commission as part of the Community Legal Service or Criminal Defence Service shall not affect— (a)
the relationship between that individual and the person by whom they are provided or any privilege arising out of that relationship, or (b)
any right which that individual may have to be indemnified in respect of expenses incurred by him by any other person.
(2)A person who provides services funded by the Commission as part of the Community Legal Service or Criminal Defence Service shall not take any payment in respect of the services apart from— (a)
that made by way of that funding, and (b)
any authorised by the Commission to be taken.
……
(4)Except as expressly provided by regulations, any rights conferred by or by virtue of this Part on an individual for whom services are funded by the Commission as part of the Community Legal Service or Criminal Defence Service in relation to any proceedings shall not affect— (a)
the rights or liabilities of other parties to the proceedings, or (b)
the principles on which the discretion of any court or tribunal is normally exercised.
………”
62.In turn the Access to Justice Act 1999 was replaced by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 , (“ LASPO 2012 ”), Part 1 of which introduced a new statutory regime for the provision of legal aid, including the abolition of the Legal Services Commission and the establishment of the Legal Aid Agency.
63.Section 1 places a duty upon the Lord Chancellor to secure the availability of legal aid in civil and criminal proceedings, and section 2 provides that,
“2 Arrangements
(1)The Lord Chancellor may make such arrangements as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate for the purposes of carrying out the Lord Chancellor's functions under this Part.
(2)The Lord Chancellor may, in particular, make arrangements by—
(…)
(c)
establishing and maintaining a body to provide services or facilitate the provision of services.
(3)The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision about the payment of remuneration by the Lord Chancellor to persons who provide services under arrangements made for the purposes of this Part.
(4)If the Lord Chancellor makes arrangements for the purposes of this Part that provide for a court, tribunal or other person to assess remuneration payable by the Lord Chancellor, the court, tribunal or person must assess the remuneration in accordance with the arrangements and, if relevant, with regulations under subsection (3).
……..”
64.The provision of legal aid in civil proceedings is dealt with under sections 8 – 12, whilst the provision of legal aid in criminal proceedings is dealt with by sections 13 – 20.
65.Section 15 and 16 requires advice and representation, respectively, to be provided in relation to criminal proceedings, which are defined by section 14.
66.The relevant part of section 14 provides that,
“14 Criminal proceedings
In this Part “criminal proceedings" means – ……
(h)
such other proceedings, before any court, tribunal or other person, as may be prescribed.”
67.Section 16 provides that,
“16 Representation for criminal proceedings
(1)Representation for the purposes of criminal proceedings is to be available under this Part to an individual if— (a)
the individual is a specified individual in relation to the proceedings, and (b)
the relevant authority has determined (provisionally or otherwise) that the individual qualifies for such representation in accordance with this Part (and has not withdrawn the determination).
(…)
(5)In this section—
“the relevant authority”, in relation to a specified individual and criminal proceedings, means the person who is authorised by or under section 18, 19 or 20 to determine (provisionally or otherwise) whether the individual qualifies under this Part for representation for the purposes of the proceedings;
“specified individual” means— (a)
in relation to criminal proceedings mentioned in any of paragraphs (a) to (g) of section 14, an individual mentioned in that paragraph in relation to those proceedings, and (b)
in relation to criminal proceedings prescribed by regulations under section 14(h), a description of individual specified in the regulations in relation to those proceedings.”
68.Section 23 limits the extent to which, if at all, an individual to whom legal aid is provided may be required to make a payment in connection with the provision of legal services.
“23 Payment for services
(1)An individual to whom services are made available under this Part is not to be required to make a payment in connection with the provision of the services, except where regulations provide otherwise.
(2)The regulations may, in particular, provide that in prescribed circumstances an individual must do one or more of the following— (a)
pay the cost of the services;
(b)
pay a contribution in respect of the cost of the services of a prescribed amount;
(c)
pay a prescribed amount in respect of administration costs.
(3)The regulations may, in particular, provide that where— (a)
civil legal services are provided to an individual under this Part in relation to a dispute, and (b)
prescribed conditions are met, the individual must pay a prescribed amount which may exceed the cost of the civil legal services provided.
(4)The regulations may, in particular, make provision about the determination of the cost of services for the purposes of the regulations.
…….”
69.Section 28 sets out the extent to which, if at all, the provision of legal aid affects the position of the individual to whom the legal aid has been provided, the position of the person who provides any legal services to that individual and the relationship between them.
“ 28 Position of providers of services
(1)The fact that services provided for an individual are or could be provided under arrangements made for the purposes of this Part does not affect— (a)
the relationship between the individual and the person by whom the services are provided, (b)
any privilege arising out of that relationship, or (c)
any right which the individual may have to be indemnified by another person in respect of expenses incurred by the individual, except to the extent that regulations provide otherwise.
(2)A person who provides services under arrangements made for the purposes of this Part must not take any payment in respect of the services apart from— (a)
payment made in accordance with the arrangements, and (b)
payment authorised by the Lord Chancellor to be taken.
……”
70.Moreover, section 30 sets out the extent to which, if at all, the provision of legal aid affects the rights and liabilities of other parties to the proceedings.
“30 Position of other parties, courts and tribunals
(1)Except as expressly provided by regulations, any rights conferred by or under this Part on an individual for whom services are provided under this Part for the purposes of proceedings do not affect— (a)
the rights or liabilities of other parties to the proceedings, or (b)
the principles on which the discretion of a court or tribunal is normally exercised.
…….”
71.Following the introduction of LASPO 2012 , the Lord Chancellor established the Legal Aid Agency (“LAA”), as the body which facilitates the provision of services under Part 1, and has made various regulations, including:
i.
the Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, (“the General Regulations 2013”);
ii.
the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, (“the Remuneration Regulations 2013”);
iii.
the Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs) Regulations 2013, (“the Recovery of Defence Costs Regulations 2013”);
iv.
the Criminal Legal Aid (Standard Crime Contract) (Amendment) Regulations 2017, (“the Standard Crime Contract Amendment Regulations 2017”), and;
v.
the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013.
72.Regulation 9 of the General Regulations 2013, sets out a list of proceedings which are criminal proceedings for the purposes of section 14 (h) of LASPO 2012 , which includes,
“9…….
(…)
(v)
any other proceedings that involve the determination of a criminal charge for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
73.It was because of this provision that, following Hammerton v Hammerton
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[2007] 2 FLR 1133 in which Moses LJ held that committal proceedings for breach of an injunction involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Blake J held in Bunning that an individual who is faced with committal proceedings for breach of an injunction is a “ specified individual ” under section 16(6) (b) of LASPO 2012 , and is therefore entitled to legal aid for their representation in such proceedings under section 16(1) .
74.Although in The All England Lawn Tennis Club (Championships) Ltd v McKay
[2019] EWHC 3065 (QB) , Chamberlain J considered that one aspect of Blake J’s judgment had been wrongly decided, namely the identification of the “relevant authority” responsible for determining eligibility for the purposes of section 16 of LASPO 2012 , he accepted that such proceedings are “criminal proceedings” for the purpose of section 14 (h) of LASPO 2012 by regulation 9(v) of the General Regulations 2013; a matter which was “ common ground ” between the parties in Turk v The Legal Aid Agency [2026] EWCA Civ 469 , (“ Turk ”).
75.The Remuneration Regulations 2013 make provisions for the funding and remuneration of advice, assistance and representation made available under sections 13 , 15 and 16 of LASPO 2012 .
76.Regulation 3 sets out the regulations which apply to proceedings in particular courts, and provides that,
“3…..
(2)Regulation 8 and Schedule 4 apply to proceedings in magistrates' courts, to proceedings in the county court, to proceedings in the family court, to proceedings in the Crown Court and to proceedings in the High Court.
(3)Regulations 16 and 31 and Schedule 5 apply to proceedings in magistrates’ courts, to proceedings in the county court, to proceedings in the family court, to proceedings in the Crown Court, to proceedings in the High Court and to proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
(…)
(5A)Regulation 9 applies to proceedings in magistrates’ courts, to proceedings in the Crown Court and to proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
….”
77.It is to be noted that regulation 3(5A) was inserted into Regulation 3 of the Remuneration Regulations 2013, by regulation 3(1) of the Standard Crime Contract Amendment Regulations 2017.
78.Regulation 8, which by virtue of regulation 3(2) applies to proceedings in the High Court, provides that,
“8.
—(1) This regulation applies to— ……
(a)
representation pursuant to a section 16 determination in proceedings prescribed as criminal proceedings under section 14 (h) of the Act ;
……
(1)Claims for fees in cases to which this regulation applies must— (a)
be made and determined in accordance with the 2017 Standard Crime Contract; and (b)
be paid in accordance with the rates set out in Schedule 4.
(3)In this regulation and in Schedule 4, “2017 Standard Crime Contract” means the contract so named between the Lord Chancellor and a person with whom the Lord Chancellor has made an arrangement under section 2(1) of the Act for the provision of advice, assistance and representation made available under sections 13 , 15 and 16 of the Act .”
79.Whereas regulation 9, which by virtue of regulation 3(5A) does not extend to proceedings in the High Court, provides that,
“9.
Where representation is provided in respect of any proceedings, the representative, whether acting pursuant to a section 16 determination or otherwise, must not receive or be a party to the making of any payment for work done in connection with those proceedings, except such payments as may be made— (a)
by the Lord Chancellor; or (b)
in respect of any expenses or fees incurred in— (i)
preparing, obtaining or considering any report, opinion or further evidence, whether provided by an expert witness or otherwise; or (ii)
obtaining any transcripts or recordings, …….”
80.The Recovery of Defence Costs Regulations 2013 make provision for the court to make a determination under section 23 of LASPO 2012 that an individual is required to make a payment in respect of the cost of their representation.
81.Regulation 5 provides that,
“5.
—(1) Subject to regulations 7 to 11, at the conclusion of any relevant proceedings involving a represented individual, the relevant court must make a determination that the represented individual is required to pay— (a)
the cost of that individual’s representation in such proceedings; or (b)
such proportion of the cost of that individual’s representation in the proceedings as the relevant court considers reasonable, having regard in particular to the financial resources of that individual.
(2)The maximum amount payable in respect of a determination made under these Regulations is the full cost of the represented individual’s representation in the proceedings before the relevant court .”
82.In so far as legal aid in civil proceedings are concerned, regulation 21 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013 provides that,
“21.
—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) to (4), the amount of costs to be paid under a legally aided party’s costs order or costs agreement must be determined as if that party were not legally aided.
(2)Paragraph (3) applies only to the extent that the Lord Chancellor has authorised the provider under section 28(2) (b) of the Act to take payment for the civil legal services provided in the relevant proceedings other than payment made in accordance with the arrangements.
(3)Where this paragraph applies, the amount of costs to be paid under a legally aided party’s costs order or costs agreement is not limited, by any rule of law which limits the costs recoverable by a party to proceedings to the amount the party is liable to pay their representatives, to the amount payable to the provider in accordance with the arrangements.
……”.
83.In 2017, the LAA issued a Standard Crime Contract, (“the 2017 contract”) together with written specifications, (“the 2017 specifications”), which governed the relationship between the LAA and solicitors who provided legal services under Part 1 of LASPO 2012 . Although they have since been superseded by a new contract and specifications issued in 2025, version 3 of the 2017 contract and version 10 of the specifications were effective at the material time, namely between 1 November 2021 – 30 September 2022.
84.Paragraph 7.18 of the 2017 contract provided that,
“7.18
Except where this Contract or Legal Aid Legislation so provides, you must not claim or seek to claim any payment from any Client or Former Client for any Contract Work or for any work that was performed in your or your Client’s or Former Client’s reasonable belief that it was Contract Work.”
85.Paragraph 12.4 explained the purpose of the specifications, namely,
“12.4
The Specification contains rules governing the day to day performance of Contract Work including, but not limited to:
(a)
the Contract Work that you are authorised to perform;
(b)
provisions relating to remuneration for Contract Work, Assessment, including information on how Assessments are carried out;
……”
86.Paragraph 1.3 set out the classes of work to which the specification applied, which included the legal representation of those involved in criminal proceedings in the High Court.
87.Paragraph 5 set out the basis upon which solicitors would be remunerated by the LAA for the provision of their legal services, which under paragraph 5.1 stipulated that the fees for such work were those set out in the Remuneration Regulations 2013.
88.The basis upon which claims for fees would be assessed by the LAA was set out in paragraph 8. In so far as inter partes costs were concerned, paragraph 8.10 stated that,
“8.10
In accordance with section 28(2) of the Act , where an agreement or order provides for costs to be paid by any other party in favour of a Client for whom you have been providing Representation in the High Court, county court, Crown Court or magistrates’ court under this Contract then you may retain the element of any costs recovered under that agreement or order which exceeds the amount paid or payable to you by us in relation to the relevant dispute or proceedings under the terms of this Contract.”
89.Moreover, paragraphs 8.41 – 8.44 provided that,
“8.41
Subject to Paragraph 8.43 below, you must not charge a fee to the Client or any person for the services provided under this Specification or seek reimbursement from the Client or any other person for any Disbursements incurred as part of the provision of such services. This Paragraph does not apply to services you provide which cannot be paid under this Contract or the Act , but which are in connection with a Matter or Case.
8.42Where you have been carrying out Contract Work on behalf of a Client, you may not accept instructions to act privately in the same matter from that Client unless the Client has been first advised by you in writing of the consequences of ceasing to be in receipt of services and as to the further services which may be available under criminal Legal Aid, whether from you or another Provider, (including the possibility of an extension of the limit for Advice and Assistance or Advocacy Assistance, an application for Representation or the availability of Advocacy Assistance or the Duty Solicitor and has nevertheless elected to instruct you privately.
8.43Where an application for prior authority for costs to be incurred under a determination has been refused and the Client has expressly authorised you to:
(a)
prepare, obtain or consider any report, opinion or further evidence, whether provided by an expert witness or otherwise; or (b)
obtain or prepare any transcripts or recordings of any criminal investigation or proceedings, including police questioning; or (c)
instruct Counsel other than where an individual is entitled to Counsel (as may be determined by the court) in accordance with regulation 16 and 17 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Determinations by a Court and Choice of Representative) Regulations 2013, then Paragraph 8.41 will not apply to payment by the Client on a private basis for that work.
8.44You must not charge the Client for the provision of Contract Work or seek payment of Disbursements incurred from the Client unless an exception under this Contract applies. All payments for Contract Work must come through us. You cannot be retained to act for the Client in the same Matter or Case under this Contract and on a privately paying basis at the same time. Where a Client elects to instruct you privately in relation to a Matter or Case in which you have been providing Contract Work, a copy of the letter dealing with the requirements of Paragraphs 8.41 to 8.44 must be kept on the file.”
Hearing before the costs judge
90.Before the costs judge, it was submitted on behalf of the appellant that in order to give effect to Nicklin J’s order that the appellant was entitled to costs against the respondent to be assessed on an indemnity basis, the appellant was entitled to recover costs against the respondent based on the rates set out in the CFA.
91.The appellant’s primary position was that this could be effected by her revoking the legal aid certificate, and relying upon the terms of the CFA, which provided for costs to be based on the inter-parties’ rate which the solicitors charge for civil litigation, which is £400 per hour.
92.In the alternative, it was submitted that the introduction of LASPO 2012 was not intended to make any changes to the long-standing practice of the court in respect to the costs implications of losing in a committal matter, which are the same as a general civil matter, and that sections 28 and 30 of LASPO 2012, which indicated the existence of a wide discretion, including a provision that the existence of a legal aid certificate does not affect the normal solicitor/client relationship, were to be interpreted as allowing for the recovery of costs beyond those provided for in schedule 4, including costs based on the rates set out in the CFA.
93.On behalf of the respondent, it was submitted that the costs which the appellant was entitled to recover from the respondent were those based upon the rates set out in schedule 4.
94.It was pointed out that the indemnity principle was a fundamental rule of law applicable to the recovery of costs between parties, and that a party cannot recover more in costs from an opponent than they are liable to pay their own legal representatives.
95.It was submitted that the principle applies to the recovery of costs in all proceedings, including those where at least one of the parties is in receipt of legal aid.
96.It was pointed out that as section 28(2) of LASPO 2012 prohibits solicitors from taking any payments for services provided under Part 1, except where expressly permitted by arrangements, the application of the indemnity principle would normally prevent the recovery of any costs by a legally aided individual, as the individual would have no liability to make any payment in connection with the provision of legal advice and representation.
97.It was submitted that although express provision has been made by regulation 21 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013 to enable those in receipt of civil legal aid to recover costs beyond those based on rates to which solicitors are entitled to be paid by the LAA, no equivalent provision has been made in relation to those in receipt of criminal legal aid.
98.It was submitted that in view of the prohibition in section 28(2) , the term in the CFA which provided for the solicitor being able to recover costs at inter-parties’ rates was unlawful and unenforceable. Moreover, it would be contrary to public policy to enable a legally aided party to retrospectively revoke their legal aid certificate to enable recovery of costs on a basis beyond that provided for under schedule 4.
99.In the course of his judgment, the costs judge noted that Bunning had been followed by Garnham J. in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan & others
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[2018] EWHC 2581 (QB) and Costs Judge Leonard in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan & others [2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), and determined that for the purposes of Part 1 of LASPO 2012 , the present proceedings are to be treated as criminal proceedings.
100.He noted that it appeared to be common ground between the parties that the indemnity principle applied to the recovery of costs in all proceedings, including those in which at least one of the parties is, as in the present case, legally aided.
101.The costs judge noted the prohibition in section 28(2) of LASPO 2012 , against a solicitor taking payments for their services, other than payments made in accordance with arrangements made under Part 1 and authorised by the Lord Chancellor, and considered that this did not have the effect of disapplying the indemnity principle.
102.Moreover, unlike the position of an individual in receipt of civil legal aid, where express provision has been made for recovery of costs beyond those based on rates to which solicitors are entitled to be paid by the LAA, no equivalent provision has been made in relation to those in receipt of criminal legal aid.
103.In those circumstances, the costs judge determined that as under regulation 8(2) of the Remuneration Regulations 2013, the costs which the appellant was entitled to recover from the respondent were limited to those based upon the rates set out in schedule 4, the application of the indemnity principle was such as to limit the costs recoverable by the appellant from the respondent to those based upon these rates.
104.The costs judge went on to observe, that in view of the prohibition in section 28(2) of LASPO 2012 , “…it is difficult to avoid the conclusion advanced by Mr Mallalieu, namely that in providing for, inter alia, an enhanced solicitors’ hourly rate, it expressly intended to provide for topping up, contrary to s.28 of LASPO.” Moreover, the costs judge observed that although he was not persuaded by the appellant’s primary position that she could in effect avoid these consequences by revoking the legal aid certificate, he noted that the appellant had not in fact done so.
105.In reaching these conclusions, the costs judge followed the reasoning of Costs Judge Leonard in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan & others [2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), which he considered was correctly determined.
Sweeting J’s judgment on appeal
106.Before Sweeting J it was common ground between the parties that not only did the indemnity principle apply to the present proceedings, but that for the purposes of Part 1 of LASPO 2012 , the type of legal aid available to the appellant was criminal legal aid.
107.The judge accepted that the “ key difference ” between civil and criminal legal aid in relation to inter partes costs recovery, was that whereas Regulation 21 of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013, “... in conjunction with section 28(2) of LASPO and the Civil Specification, explicitly overrides the indemnity principle in civil legal aid cases, permitting the recovery as if the party were not legally aided ”, there is no equivalent disapplication of the indemnity principle in criminal legal aid.
108.The judge rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellant that as Regulation 9 of the Remuneration Regulations 2013 does not apply to proceedings in the High Court, there is no prohibition on recovery from other sources in High Court committal proceedings. He observed that he preferred the respondent’s submissions on this point, namely that,
“Regulation 9 serves as an example of a situation where the statutory regime expressly allows for certain payments outside the standard LAA funding; the fact that it is limited to other courts (rather than including the High Court) reinforces the argument that such express legislative provision is required for any deviation from the general rule. Its limited scope does not create a general disapplication of the indemnity principle in the High Court.”
109.The judge also rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellant that the effect of paragraph 8.10 of the 2017 specifications, which authorises a solicitor to retain costs recovered from other parties that exceed the amount paid by the LAA, is to disapply the indemnity principle. He observed that,
“The indemnity principle is a rule of law, and its disapplication requires primary or secondary legislation, not merely a contractual term between the LAA and the provider. Paragraph 8.10 operates within the confines of the indemnity principle, allowing the provider to retain costs if they are recoverable under the principle, but not to create a liability where none exists on the part of the client.”
110.The judge noted that the LAA had assessed the appellant’s costs at a figure which reflected an enhanced sum, beyond that which would have been available based on the fees set out in schedule 4. However, the judge rejected a submission that this enabled these fees to be recovered from the respondent. In reaching this conclusion, the judge explained that,
“I accept the Respondent’s submission, supported by Costs Judge Leonard’s detailed reasoning in Khan, that the Regulations (specifically Schedule 4) do not provide for the enhancement of rates in High Court proceedings for cases falling under section 14 (h) of LASPO. The provisions for enhancement elsewhere in the Regulations (e.g. Schedule 2, Regulation 29) are explicitly limited to Crown Court proceedings.
44.Costs Judge Leonard expressly found that the LAA ‘has no discretion to enhance the rates and fees set by paragraph 7(b) of Schedule 4,’ and that any purported contractual agreement to do so would be a matter between the solicitors and the LAA, having no bearing on the amount recoverable from the paying party. I agree with this conclusion.”
111.The judge described the submission, made on behalf of the appellant, that the appellant could revoke the legal aid certificate and rely upon the terms of the CFA in order to effect the recovery of costs from the respondent on the basis of the inter partes rate set out in the CFA, as “ untenable .”
112.He explained that,
“46.
The principle established in Radford v Frade [2018] EWCA Civ 119 , following Kellar v Williams [2004] UKPC 30 , is clear; a retrospective variation of a receiving party’s costs liability after a costs order has been made cannot be effective to increase the liability of the paying party. The liability crystallises when the order is made.
47.Furthermore, such an attempt would appear to breach the statutory prohibition on topping up and would be contrary to public policy, as it would expose the legally aided clients to the risk of being pursued privately for fees that the statutory scheme intended to prevent. The argument is, as the Respondent described it, ‘unprecedented and remarkable.’”
113.The judge noted the observations made both by the Supreme Court in In re appeals by Governing Body of JFS and others
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[2009] UKSC 1 (“ JFS ”) and Irwin LJ in Bunning , as to the importance of solicitors undertaking publicly funded work being able to recover remuneration at inter partes rates in successful cases, but agreed with the respondent that,
“While those cases illustrate a broader policy imperative, they do not, in my judgment, provide any binding legal principle that overrides the specific statutory provisions and their interpretation concerning the indemnity principle in criminal legal aid. The function of the courts is to give effect to the words Parliament has used in a statute not to rewrite them based on perceived absurdity or policy arguments that are the province of the legislature.”
114.The judge went on to observe that, in any event,
“The Respondents offered a plausible policy rationale for the distinction between civil and criminal legal aid funding between the parties’ costs: the majority of criminal prosecutions are state-funded, and a general disapplication of the indemnity principle would mean the Government would fund a defence at low rates only to then pay higher commercial rates if it lost the case. While this case involves a private party, the legal aid regulations are framed for the broader criminal justice system. Whether this leads to an ‘unjust outcome' in particular cases, is a policy matter that, if deemed problematic, should be addressed elsewhere.”
115.In the event, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
Submissions on the second appeal
116.Under their first ground of appeal, Ashley Underwood KC and Adam Tear submit that the appellant is entitled to recover costs as against the respondent on the basis of the CFA entered into between the solicitors and the appellant which provided for the recovery of costs at the inter-parties’ rate of £400 per hour, either because the effect of section 30(1) of LASPO is to disapply the indemnity principle or, alternatively, if the indemnity principle applies, the CFA created a formal legal liability on the appellant to pay her solicitors’ costs on that basis against which she is entitled to be indemnified by the respondent.
117.It is pointed out that section 1(7) (b) of the LAA Act 1949 was the statutory predecessor of section 30(1) of LASPO and that in Daley the High Court considered that section 1(7) (b) effectively disapplied the indemnity principle in legal aid cases, so as to enable the recovery of costs by a successful legally assisted party to be taxed on an indemnity basis. Moreover, it is submitted that the same statutory provision was relied upon to similar effect in both Starkey and Blatcher .
118.It is pointed out that none of these authorities were cited in Willis , which it is submitted was a decision reached per incuriam and is therefore not binding upon the court in this case. Likewise, in Brawley , none of the earlier cases, except Willis were cited to the court.
119.It is submitted that the effect of section 30(1) of LASPO is that when it comes to the respondent’s liability to pay costs to the appellant, the court should ignore the fact that the appellant is a legally assisted party, and order costs to be paid on an indemnity basis.
120.In any event, it is submitted that as the CFA, known as “CFA lite”, created a liability on the appellant to pay her solicitors at the inter-parties’ rate of £400 per hour, there is no need to disapply the indemnity principle.
121.It is pointed out that to adopt any other approach would be contrary to the observations made by both Irwin LJ in Bunning and the Supreme Court in JFS , as to the importance of solicitors undertaking publicly funded work being able to recover remuneration at inter parties rates in successful cases. Moreover, it would prevent the courts being able to sanction by way of costs a party who, as in the present case, makes a without-merit application, and prevent the Legal Aid Agency recovering the enhanced sum to which it had assessed the solicitor as being entitled.
122.Under their second ground of appeal it is submitted in the alternative that the effect of
section 28(2)
of LASPO enables the appellant to recover costs as against the respondent on the basis of the enhanced sum of £28,556.58 as assessed by the Legal Aid Agency. It is pointed out that the enhanced sum which the Legal Aid Agency assessed the solicitors were entitled to recover, was provided for under the terms of the standard criminal contract which was an arrangement made by the Lord Chancellor in accordance with
section 2 of LASPO. It is submitted that as such, the effect of
section 28(2)
of LASPO was to enable the recovery of that sum, rather than the lower sum based upon the fees set out in schedule 4 to the Remuneration Regulations 2013. In this regard it is submitted that the decisions in Daley and the following cases were reached despite
section 2(2)
(b) of the LAA Act 1949, which it is submitted was the statutory predecessor of
section 28(2)
of LASPO. Moreover, it is submitted that the effect of regulation 8 of the Remuneration Regulations 2013 is to provide statutory force to the standard crime contract.
123.On behalf of the Law Society, as intervener, Rupert Cohen acknowledges that the indemnity principle does not fit well within proceedings which are at least in part funded by legal aid, because of the role of the Legal Aid Agency, and the provisions of section 23(1) and 28(2) of LASPO.
124.It is submitted that the decision in Willis was per incuriam , in that the application of the indemnity principle was assumed to apply and that the previous decisions of Daley and following were not mentioned.
125.Furthermore, the decision dealt with the provision of civil legal aid where the statutory charge applied, whilst the present case is concerned with the provision of criminal legal aid where no statutory charge applies, such that, save in cases where a recovery of defence costs order is made, the legally aided party is not liable to the Legal Aid Agency in respect of the sum paid out to the legal representatives.
126.On behalf of the respondent, Roger Mallalieu KC, submits that the indemnity principle is one of general application and has its origins in Harold v Smith [1860] 5 H&N 381.
127.It is submitted that the effect of section 30(1) is not to disapply the indemnity principle, rather that is disapplied in civil proceedings by regulation 21(3) of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013, as held by the court in Brawley in relation to the predecessor regulation 107(b) of the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, as amended.
128.However, in criminal proceedings there is no such equivalent disapplication of the indemnity principle, beyond that which Willis envisaged in relation to civil proceedings, which in that case permitted the recovery of costs on the standard basis. It is submitted that neither of these cases was per incuriam , and represented the correct interpretation of the predecessor legislation to LASPO and its regulations.
129.Furthermore, to the extent to which the CFA created a liability on the part of the appellant to pay her solicitors at the inter-parties’ rate of £400 per hour, this is unlawful as it is contrary to the prohibition in section 28(2) of LASPO against solicitors taking payments in respect of their services beyond those provided for under arrangements made for the purposes of the provision of legal aid.
130.In so far as the extent of the respondent’s liability for the appellant’s costs are concerned, it is submitted that this is limited to those set out in schedule 4 to the Remuneration Regulations 2013. Whilst it is accepted that the Lord Chancellor has made arrangements, which include the standard criminal contract, regulation 8(2)(b) of the Remuneration Regulations 2013 provides that the payment of fees must be paid in accordance with schedule 4.
Discussion
131.As Blake J pointed out in Bunning
, prior to the introduction of LASPO 2012 the current proceedings for committal for breach of an order of the court, despite being criminal in nature, would have been regarded as civil proceedings for the purposes of legal aid. In those circumstances, there is no doubt that, as this court held in Brawley
, regulation 107B of the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989, as amended, would have had the effect of disapplying the indemnity principle and enabled costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis in favour of a successful legally aided party. Indeed had it not been for
section 16(6)
(b) of LASPO 2012
, this would have remained the position by reason of the application of regulation 21(3) of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013, being the successor regulation to regulation 107B.
132.However, just as regulation 107B only applied to civil proceedings, so too does regulation 21(3) of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013, and there is no equivalent regulation relating to the provision of criminal legal aid under LASPO 2012 . In these circumstances, the appellant seeks to persuade the court that the effect of section 30(1) of LASPO 2012 is to similar effect and that when it comes to the respondent’s liability to pay costs to the appellant, the court should ignore the fact that the appellant is legally aided, and order costs to be paid on an indemnity basis.
133.I accept that this was the way in which Hilbery J in Daley appears to have interpreted the predecessor statutory provision to section 30(1) of LASPO, namely
section 1(7)
(b) of the LAA Act 1949, albeit his observation that the plaintiff did not have any personal liability for his costs would appear to have overlooked the provisions of
section 2(2)
(c) and section 3(4) of the LAA Act 1949, which provided both for a contribution by the plaintiff to the legal aid fund in respect of his costs, and a first charge on any property recovered by him in the proceedings in respect of any net liability of the legal aid fund in relation to his legal fees.
134.Moreover, I accept that in Starkey
,
section 1(7)
(b) of the LAA Act 1949 was interpreted by this court so as to enable costs to be awarded in favour of a successful legally aided party. However, the court in that case does not appear to have given any express consideration to the application of the indemnity principle, and appears to have focused its attention upon the public interest in supporting the legal aid fund. Indeed, this may well have been due to the fact that the unsuccessful defendant did not seek to support the judgment of the lower court, which had declined to award the plaintiff the full costs of the action.
135.In contrast, when this court in Willis came to consider the successor statutory provisions to those in the LAA Act 1949, namely section 31 of the LA Act 1988, it is apparent that the court gave detailed consideration to the indemnity principle, and concluded that notwithstanding those provisions, the court was not enabled to order the payment of costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis against a defendant in favour of a legally aided plaintiff (see Kadhim v The Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[2001] QB 955 ).
136.In my view, just as the court in Brawley considered that it could not hold that Willis was wrongly decided, nor too do I consider that it is open to this court to do so. Moreover, given the lack of express consideration to the application of the indemnity by the court in Starkey , nor am I of the view that the decision in that case can be properly considered to be per incuriam , (see Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1944] KB 718 ).
137.I do not consider that the fact that Willis was dealing with civil legal aid rather than criminal legal aid assists the appellant, in that although the provisions relating to criminal legal aid, unlike for civil legal aid, do not include a charge on any recovered property, they do provide for recovery of defence costs order, the effect of which was explained by this court in Turk .
138.In those circumstances, I consider that this court is bound to follow the decision in Willis , to the effect that what is now section 30(1) of LASPO 2012 , does not of itself permit indemnity costs to be awarded in favour of a successful legally aided party.
139.Were it to have been otherwise, I can well appreciate the force in the submission made on behalf of the appellant in this case as to the construction of section 30(1) itself, given that the indemnity principle could be said to be one of the principles on which the discretion of the court is normally exercised.
140.As I do not consider that section 30(1) of LASPO 2012 has the effect contended for of disapplying the indemnity principle, this aspect of the appellant’s submissions in relation to the first ground of appeal fails.
141.However, I consider that for the reasons given by Sir Nicholas Underhill the second aspect of the first ground should succeed, as the CFA did create a legal liability on the part of the appellant to pay her solicitors at the inter partes rate of £400 per hour, against which she is entitled to be indemnified by the respondent, and that this arrangement is not rendered unlawful by any of the provisions of Part 1 of LASPO 2012 .
Conclusion
142.Accordingly, I would allow the appeal on the first ground, and the second ground does not arise.
Sir Nicholas Underhill:
INTRODUCTION
143.I am grateful to Jeremy Baker LJ for setting out the background to this appeal so comprehensively. That enables me to proceed directly to the issues. I must say that I have not found them particularly easy, at least partly because of the peculiarly complicated cat’s cradle presented by the relevant legislation and its history.
144.As I explain more fully below, two distinct arguments were advanced before us in support of the appeal on ground 1. I agree with Jeremy Baker LJ that the first argument must be rejected, but I believe that the second is well-founded. Because of the difficulty that I have found in disentangling the issues, I will state my reasons on the first argument as well as the second. In view of my conclusion ground 2 does not arise and I express no view about it.
145.Ground 1 reads:
“The learned judge wrongly construed the statutory regime as limiting the Appellant’s recovery against the Respondent under an indemnity costs order to an amount less than the Legal Aid Agency had assessed as payable to her solicitor.”
The words “less than” are misleading. Under this ground the Appellant’s case is that the Judge was wrong to limit her recovery to legal aid rates.
146.I should start by observing that there are two rules which may potentially prevent a successful legally-aided party from recovering costs from the losing party at rates in excess of legal aid rates (for short, “private client rates”):
(1)The first is the common law rule known as the “indemnity principle”, classically stated by Bramwell B in Harold v Smith (1860) 5 H & N 381, at p. 385, as follows:
“ Costs as between party and party are given by the law as an indemnity to the person entitled to them: they are not imposed as a punishment on the party who pays them, nor given as a bonus to the party who receives them. Therefore, if the extent of the damnification can be found out, the extent to which costs ought to be allowed is also ascertained.”
That means that a party can only recover for costs for which they are themselves legally liable to their lawyers: I examine below the implications of that rule in the context of legal aid.
(2)The second is a statutory rule which has been part of the legal aid legislation from the start prohibiting lawyers working under the legal aid scheme
I use the phrase “the legal aid scheme” as a comprehensive term t o cover the various legal aid arrangements which have been in place since 1949. I will also refer to “lawyers ” to reflect the fact that , al though we are mostly concerned with solicitors , aspects of the scheme will apply also to barristers.
from taking payment for their services from any other source (“the other payments rule”). The rule is now stated in sections 23 (1)
and 28 (2) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012
(“LASPO”). (It previously appeared, though initially in not quite the same terms, in
section 2 (2)
(d) of the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949
;
section 10 (3)
of the Legal Aid Act 1974
;
section 31 (3)
of the Legal Aid Act 1988 (and also regulation 64 of the regulations made under that statute, being the Civil Legal Aid (General) Regulations 1989); and sections 10 (1)
and 22 (2) of the Access to Justice Act 1999
.) The payments which it prohibits are sometimes described as “top-up payments”, but that label can have varying connotations and I prefer not to use it.
The two rules are quite distinct, though as we will see they to some extent interact.
147.The reason why the Appellant was held by Costs Judge Whalan and by Sweeting J (who sat with Senior Costs Judge Rowley as an assessor) to be disentitled to anything except the amount payable by the Legal Aid Agency (“the LAA”) is:
(a)
that payment of anything more would, unless disapplied by statute, infringe the indemnity principle; and (b)
that, although that principle had been disapplied by statute in the case of civil legal aid, there was no equivalent disapplication in the case of criminal legal aid.
That reasoning focuses specifically on the indemnity principle, but as we shall see it will be necessary also to consider the other payments rule.
148.The challenge to the Judge’s reasoning developed in the submissions before us had two strands, though in the oral submissions they sometimes became elided. The first strand, which was primarily argued by Mr Cohen, appearing for the Law Society as intervener, focused on how the indemnity principle applies in the context of the recovery of costs by a legally-aided party. The second strand, which was Mr Underwood’s primary case and did not form part of Mr Cohen’s submissions
I should mention one oddity. Although the Law Society did not appear below, it did supply the Appellant’s solicitors with a skeleton argument (settled, we were told, by Mr Cohen) on the basis that the Appellant’s counsel would adopt it in their submissions before Sweeting J. We were told that that did not in fa ct occur, but the skeleton argument has nevertheless been included in the bundle before us
. In it both strands of the argument were advanced. I mention this only because Mr Underwood in his reply endorsed the formulation of the second strand in that sk e le ton argument (where it was described as “Approach 1”
)
, and I have found it helpful in understanding that aspect of the case.
, focused on the fact that the Appellant had entered into the agreement with her solicitors described by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 5 of his judgment – in the jargon, a “CFA lite”
A CFA lite was defined by Foskett J, in a passage quoted with approval by Lewison LJ in Surrey v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 451 , [2018] 1 WLR 5831 , as “ a CFA by virtue of which the client's liability to pay his lawyers’ costs is limited to the amount of costs recoverable from the other party” (see para. 8) .
: that agreement, he submitted, created a liability against which she was entitled to be indemnified, thus satisfying the indemnity principle and leaving no need for it to be disapplied. I take the two strands in turn.
(1)THE INDEMNITY PRINCIPLE AND COSTS RECOVERY BY LEGALLY-AIDED PARTIES
149.For the purpose of the following analysis it is important to distinguish between two different aspects of the operation of the indemnity principle.
First
, it precludes recovery of costs for which someone other than the successful party is liable (“the different person aspect”).
Second
, it precludes recovery of any greater amount than they are liable for (“the different amount aspect”). (There is a third potential situation, namely where the successful party is on the face of it liable to their solicitors, but the liability is vitiated by illegality: this has some relevance to the second strand of the argument – see para. 174 below.)
150.The question of whether the indemnity principle precludes recovery of costs by a legally-aided party (originally referred to as “an assisted person”) was first considered by Hilbery J in Daley v Diggers Ltd [1951] 1 KB 661 and, shortly afterwards, by this Court in Starkey v Railway Executive
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1951] 2 All ER 902 : the Court in Starkey was apparently unaware of the decision in Daley , which had not been reported at the date when it was argued. In both cases it was contended that the successful legally-aided plaintiff should not be entitled to recover costs against the defendant because their lawyers had been paid by the legal aid fund and they themselves had never been under any liability. Hilbery J stated the point very clearly at the start of his judgment in Daley (p. 662), where, having referred to Harold v Smith , he said:
“As an assisted person under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949 , the plaintiff has not been liable personally for costs, and therefore, it is argued, cannot be granted something in the character of an indemnity against a liability which he has not incurred. As a matter of principle, and apart from statute, this contention would seem well founded. As an assisted person the plaintiff has not been under any personal liability for his costs incurred in establishing his claim against the defendants, and, the court being apprised of the fact, he can have no claim to an award of costs, since such an award would issue on the basis of its being an indemnity to him against a liability which in fact has never been for him an existent liability.”
In short, the argument was that recovery would contravene the different person aspect of the indemnity principle. In Starkey there is no express reference to the indemnity principle, and the objection is not so fully formulated, but it is clear that the point being addressed is the same: see the judgments of Cohen LJ at p. 902H and Singleton LJ at p. 903H.
151.In both Daley and Starkey the defendant’s contention was rejected on the basis that section 1 (7) (b) of the 1949 Act required the court when exercising its costs discretion to ignore the fact that a party was legally aided – a requirement sometimes referred to as “the statutory fiction”. It thus disapplies the indemnity principle at least as regards the different person aspect. The same conclusion was reached by this Court in Blatcher , which Jeremy Baker LJ summarises at paras. 33-35 above.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
152.The proposition established in those cases has never been questioned since.
A rather more recent case in which it was firmly reaffirmed in this Court is R v London Borough of Wandsworth , ex p. Heshmati (unrep. 4.11.97).
Provisions equivalent to section 1 (7) (b) have appeared in all the subsequent legal aid statutes – specifically, in section 2 (5) (b) of the 1974 Act , section 31 (1) (b) of the 1988 Act , section 22 (4) (b) of the 1999 Act , and now section 30 (1) (b) of LASPO. They remain the basis on which the different person aspect of the indemnity principle is disapplied in legal aid cases.
153.There is a distinct question about whether the statutory fiction also requires the disapplication of the different amount aspect of the indemnity principle. It could be argued that the logic of
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
section 1 (7)
(b) and its successors is that the Court should disregard not only the fact that the assisted person’s lawyers have been paid by the legal aid fund but also the fact that they were paid at legal aid rates, with the result that the costs discretion should be exercised on the basis that they had been paid at private client rates, albeit subject to inter partes taxation/assessment, Of course that question would normally only arise if there is a differential between legal aid and private client rates. That was the case under
, when the fund paid only 85% (later raised to 90%) of lawyers’ taxed costs (see para. 22 of Jeremy Baker LJ’s judgment). No such discount was required by (which came into force on 1 April 1989) and the differential accordingly disappeared. But a differential re-emerged when the 1994 Regulations (see paras. 48-53) introduced remuneration by prescribed fees, and it has remained a feature of the system ever since.
154.Despite the differential in the 1949 Act the question whether the indemnity principle precluded an assisted person from recovering costs at more than legal aid rates did not arise in Starkey or in any subsequent case under the 1949 Act . (It was considered in Daley , but it is more convenient to deal with that later – see para. 160 below.) It was first considered by this Court in Willis v Redbridge Health Authority
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
[1996] 1 WLR 1228 . At that point the governing statute was the 1988 Act , under which there was no differential between legal aid and private client rates; but the issue nevertheless arose because an order for indemnity costs had been made in favour of the legally-aided plaintiff. It was held that she could not recover more than standard costs. The determinative reasoning does not leap from the page, but it seems clear that the essential elements are:
(a)
that a successful assisted person can only recover from the paying party the amount that their lawyers were entitled to be paid by the Legal Aid Board; and (b)
that under the regulations as they stood at the material time – specifically regulation 107 of the 1989 Regulations – such payment was limited to costs taxed on the standard basis (see Beldam LJ’s proposition (3) in the passage quoted by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 44 above).
The Court does not refer to the indemnity principle eo nomine, but element (a) in that reasoning is evidently an application of it in its different amount aspect. (Indeed that was expressly acknowledged by Longmore LJ at para. 17 of his judgment in the case of Brawley , which I consider in the following paragraphs.)
155.The effect of Willis was considered, and helpfully elucidated, by this Court in the subsequent case of Brawley v Marczynski (no. 2)
[2002] EWCA Civ 1453
, [2003] 1 WLR 813
. By then the legal aid regime had been radically changed by the 1994 Regulations. The overall effect of those changes, so far as relevant for our purposes, is summarised by Longmore LJ at para. 4 of his judgment (quoted in full by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 56 above) as being twofold. On the one hand, the new regulations “ introduced the concept of a prescribed fee (lower than the fees recoverable previously, which were normally those that were allowable on an inter partes standard basis taxation)”; but, on the other, “they permitted … an uplift provided that costs were actually recoverable from the legally-aided litigant’s opponent” – described by Longmore LJ as “an early example of a success fee”.
156.As a corollary to those changes the 1994 Regulations also introduced a provision regulating the amounts recoverable under a costs order in favour of a legally-aided party. This was done by the insertion of a new regulation 107B into the 1989 Regulations (set out in full by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 52 above). The drafting of the regulation is convoluted, but all that matters for present purposes is that it was intended to permit recovery not only of the amounts paid to the lawyers by the Board but also of the amount of the uplift. The drafter evidently took the view that that required the disapplication of both the rules which I identify at para. 146 above – as Longmore LJ put it at para. 17, “both the indemnity principle and the rule that a lawyer for a legally-aided party can only be paid out of the Legal Aid Fund”. That was effected by paragraph (3) of the new regulation, which reads:
“The assisted person’s legal representatives shall not be prevented from recovering from the paying party the sums in respect of costs to which this regulation refers by (a)
any rule of law which limits the costs recoverable by a party to proceedings to the amount which he is liable to pay his legal representatives; or (b)
regulation 64 (restriction on payment otherwise than from the fund).”
Regulation 64, which is disapplied by subparagraph (b), reads:
“Where a certificate has been issued in connection with any proceedings, the assisted person’s solicitor or counsel shall not receive or be party to the making of any payment for work done in those proceedings during the currency of that certificate (whether within the scope of the certificate or otherwise) except such payments as may be made out of the fund.”
That is a straightforward statement of the other payments rule (which at that stage appeared in section 31 (3) of the 1988 Act ).
157.As regards subparagraph (a) of regulation 107B (3), the disapplication of the indemnity principle was evidently regarded as necessary because recovery of the uplift would involve recovery of more than the lawyers were entitled to recover from the fund. As regards subparagraph (b), receipt by the lawyers of the uplift element in the costs order was evidently regarded as potentially contravening the prohibition on “receiving … any payment for work done in those proceedings except such payments as may be made out of the fund”. (It may or may not be material in that regard that, as Longmore LJ noted in para. 4 of his judgment in Brawley
, the assisted person’s lawyers were entitled to claim the uplift element in their own right.)
158.Although it does not seem that the drafter of regulation 107B (3) specifically had in mind cases where an order for indemnity costs had been made in favour of a legally-aided party, it was held in Brawley that the disapplication of the indemnity principle in subparagraph (a) had the effect of permitting such an order to be made. That conclusion is not in any way inconsistent with the reasoning in Willis
. On the contrary, the court accepted that the indemnity principle had the effect of limiting the assisted person’s recovery to the amount of the Legal Aid Board’s liability, but it relied on the fact that it had been disapplied. That is confirmed in para. 17 of Longmore LJ’s judgment, where (in the context of a different argument) he rejects a submission based on
section 31 (1)
(b) (the then successor to
section 1 (7)
(b) of ) which would have meant that Willis was wrongly decided. He held that the Court in Willis was aware of
section 31 (1)
(b) and had clearly taken the view that it did not allow a successful party to recover more by way of costs than the Board was liable for.
159.The effect, therefore, of Willis and Brawley is that, although the statutory fiction required by (what was then) section 31 (1) (b) disapplies the different person aspect of the indemnity principle, it does not disapply the different amount aspect. What in effect it does is to treat the Board’s liability to pay the assisted person’s lawyers as a liability of the party themselves, with the result that only the amount of that liability is recoverable. Mr Underwood, while not accepting that Willis was binding on us, described this effect as a form of subrogation, and the label is not inapt.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
160.Mr Cohen, and also Mr Underwood though not as part of his primary case, submitted that the decision in Willis was inconsistent with the decisions in Daley and Starkey
, to which the court had not been referred, and that we were accordingly not bound by it. I cannot agree. I take
Starkey first, since it is a decision of this Court. It is not inconsistent with Willis because there was no issue about the amount of the recovery: as we have seen, applied a 15% discount to the rates payable by the fund, but there was no argument about whether the plaintiff’s recovery from the defendant was limited accordingly. That issue did in fact arise in Daley
, and Hilbery J held that costs were recoverable at the undiscounted rate (see p. 664). That was not binding on the court in Willis since it was only a first-instance decision; but in fact I note that Hilbery J reached his conclusion on the basis of an express provision in (
section 6 (9)
), rather than simply on the basis of the statutory fiction.
There was no equivalent to section 6 (9) in the 1988 Act , which was the applicable statute in Willis , no doubt because the statute did not provide for any discount.
It is likely that that this was well appreciated by most practitioners, and that that is why the point was not taken in Starkey .
161.I should mention one complication because it is relevant both to a point made by Mr Cohen and to an observation made by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 133 of his judgment. Under
, as in subsequent statutes, an assisted person might be required to make a contribution to their costs or to reimburse the fund for the costs which it had paid out of any damages recovered (the relevant provisions are identified by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 21 above). The indemnity principle would not preclude recovery of those sums from the paying party since they represent actual liabilities on the part of the successful party. However, that forms no part of the reasoning in Daley or Starkey
, which depended straightforwardly on the point that the statutory fiction required that the fact that the successful party was legally aided be ignored: that being so, it was irrelevant whether or not they had paid a contribution or whether they had made a recovery against which the charge could be exercised. (Of course, not all persons paid any contribution, and in not every case would the assisted person recover or preserve any asset against which the charge could be exercised.) It is true that in Willis
Aldous LJ does treat the statutory charge as relevant: see the passage quoted by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 45 above. But I do not think that this gives rise to any inconsistency between his reasoning and that in Daley and Starkey
: as explained above, they were addressing different questions and Aldous LJ was deploying the fact of the statutory charge for a different purpose.
162.It follows that in my view we are bound by Willis to hold that, unless the indemnity principle is disapplied, its effect is to prevent a successful legally-aided party from recovering costs in excess of the amount that the LAA is obliged to pay their lawyers.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
163.The question (as regards this strand of the argument) then becomes whether the indemnity principle has indeed been disapplied in the present case. As we have seen, such a disapplication was provided for in the case of civil legal aid by section 107B (3) (a) of the (amended) 1989 Regulations. That disapplication now appears in regulation 21 (3) of the Civil Legal Aid (Costs) Regulations 2013, which is part of the suite of regulations accompanying the coming into force of LASPO. Regulation 21 reads (so far as material):
“(1)
Subject to paragraphs (2) to (4), the amount of costs to be paid under a legally aided party’s costs order or costs agreement must be determined as if that party were not legally aided.
(2)Paragraph (3) applies only to the extent that the Lord Chancellor has authorised the provider under section 28(2) (b) of [LASPO] to take payment for the civil legal services provided in the relevant proceedings other than payment made in accordance with the arrangements.
(3)Where this paragraph applies, the amount of costs to be paid under a legally aided party’s costs order or costs agreement is not limited, by any rule of law which limits the costs recoverable by a party to proceedings to the amount the party is liable to pay their representatives, to the amount payable to the provider in accordance with the arrangements.
(4)…”
Unlike regulation 107B (3), regulation 21 (3) only disapplies the indemnity principle and not the other payments rule. However, section 28 (2) (b) of LASPO, which is referred to in paragraph (2), does provide for such disapplication in certain circumstances: I set it out in full at para. 167 below. Since paragraph (3) only applies where section 28 (2) (b) has operated, the position remains that the two disapplications operate in tandem.
164.It is because of the combination of the disapplication of the indemnity principle and the other payments rule that in civil legal aid cases courts have been able to make costs orders in favour of successful legally-aided parties on the basis of private client rates. They have of course done so for decades, and the making of such orders, even where the other party is a public body, has been encouraged by the higher courts for important reasons of public policy. The most authoritative statement of those reasons is that of Lord Hope at para. 25 of his judgment on a preliminary application in the JFS case
[2009] UKSC 1
, [2009] 1 WLR 2353
. He said:
“ It is one thing for solicitors who do a substantial amount of publicly funded work, and who have to fund the substantial overheads that sustaining a legal practice involves, to take the risk of being paid at lower rates if a publicly funded case turns out to be unsuccessful. It is quite another for them to be unable to recover remuneration at inter partes rates in the event that their case is successful. If that were to become the practice, their businesses would very soon become financially unsustainable. The system of public funding would be gravely disadvantaged in its turn, as it depends upon there being a pool of reputable solicitors who are willing to undertake this work.”
165.However, we are here concerned with criminal legal aid, and it is common ground that the criminal legal aid regulations contain no provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3). This is, as I have said, the basis on which Sweeting J and Costs Judge Whalan, following Costs Judge Leonard in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), held that the Appellant could not recover at more than legal aid rates.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
166.I understood Mr Underwood to submit, though it was not part of his primary case, that notwithstanding the absence of any legislative provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3) the indemnity principle was disapplied in the present case by paragraph 8.10 of the Standard Criminal Contract Specification (“the SCCS”). This reads as follows:
“In accordance with section 28 (2) of the Act , where an agreement or order provides for costs to be paid by any other party in favour of a Client for whom you have been providing Representation in the High Court, county court, Crown Court or magistrates’ court under this Contract then you may retain the element of any costs recovered under that agreement or order which exceeds the amount paid or payable to you by us in relation to the relevant dispute or proceedings under the terms of this Contract.”
I should note that there is a term to substantially the same effect, albeit not quite identically worded, in the Standard Civil Contract Specification (para. 1.40).
167.I need also to set out section 28 (2) of LASPO, which is referred to in the opening words of paragraph 8.10. It reads:
“A person who provides services under arrangements made for the purposes of this Part must not take any payment in respect of the services apart from — (a)
payment made in accordance with the arrangements, and (b)
payment authorised by the Lord Chancellor to be taken.”
The subsection is rather oddly drafted, but in substance it comprises, in subparagraph (a), a prohibition on the taking of payment otherwise than under the legal aid scheme, but subject, by subparagraph (b), to a proviso disapplying the prohibition where such taking is authorised by the Lord Chancellor. That is broadly equivalent to the earlier formulations of the other payments rule, albeit differently structured.
168.I cannot accept Mr Underwood’s submission that paragraph 8.10 of the SCCS disapplies the indemnity principle. As the reference to section 28 (2) makes clear, the purpose of the paragraph is simply to disapply the other payments rule by providing the Lord Chancellor’s authorisation for a solicitor to “take” (i.e. by retaining for themselves) a payment of any costs paid under a court order (or agreement with another party) over and above legal aid rates. It makes no provision about the circumstances in which the Court might make such an order (or the other party make such an agreement), and it says nothing at all about the indemnity principle. It is in any event hard to see how a contract, even of this unusual character, could be effective to disapply a general principle of law.
169.The upshot is that this strand of the Appellant’s argument must fail.
(2)The Relevance of the CFA lite
170.In his reply Mr Underwood complained that the effect of Mr Cohen’s submissions, focusing on the first strand in the challenge to the Judge’s reasoning, had been to distract attention from his primary case based on the existence of the CFA lite. In a nutshell, that case is that the agreement created a liability on the Appellant, in the specified circumstances, to pay her solicitors at private client rates in excess of legal aid rates, and that a costs order requiring the Respondent to indemnify her against that liability
The terminology creates a possibility of confusion here. As it happens, in this case Nicklin J made an order for costs to be assessed on the indemnity basis, but even if he had made an order for costs to be assessed on the standard basis it would have complied with the indemnity principle. The amount assessed under an inter partes costs order will very often not fully indemnify a successful party against their liability to their representatives (even if assessed on the indemnity basis), but what matters is that it is “in the character of an indemnity” as Cozens-Hardy MR put it in Gundry v Sainsbury
[1910] 1 KB 645
, at p. 648.
was, by definition, compliant with the indemnity principle. Accordingly no question of having to disapply the indemnity principle arose. That is quite different from the situation in Willis , where there was no agreement between the plaintiff and her solicitors requiring her to make any payment to them: indeed payment under any such agreement would at that time have been unlawful by virtue of the other payments rule (then contained in regulation 64).
171.Mr Underwood acknowledged that it was necessary to his submission that the payment under the costs order should not contravene the other payments rule. But he submitted that it did not do so because receipt of payment under a costs order had been expressly authorised by paragraph 8.10 of the SCCS and accordingly fell within the proviso in section 28 (2) (b) of LASPO.
172.Mr Mallalieu’s initial response to this strand of the case appears at paras. 90-97 of his skeleton argument. Para. 97 summarises his submission as being that an agreement “intended to provide for ‘topping up’ … would be contrary to public policy, contrary to s.28 , contrary to the express terms of Regulation 9 and would be unlawful”. (“Regulation 9” is a reference to regulation 9 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Criminal Regulations”).)
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
173.Before considering those points it is convenient to address a potential objection to Mr Underwood’s case which Mr Mallalieu did not advance but which I think needs to be considered. That objection is that because it was fundamental to the agreement that the Appellant would never herself be under any obligation to pay anything (“we will not seek to recover against you more than is paid by the other side”) she was subject to no liability against which the paying party could be required to indemnify her. However, there seems to be a consensus that such an objection would be ill-founded. In his skeleton argument Mr Mallalieu not only did not advance it but positively asserted that “the client’s liability [under a CFA lite] … is not destroyed, but very much exists” (see para. 93). I am not in fact sure that the authority which he cited in support of that proposition ( Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd
[2018] UKSC 21 , [2018] 1 WLR 2052 ) is addressed to this point; but nevertheless the effect of the discussion in paras. 18.89-18.92 of Friston on Costs
I owe this reference to Mr Cohen’s unused skeleton argument below (see n. 2 above).
is that the better view is that recovery of sums payable under a CFA lite is not precluded by the indemnity principle. That view is reinforced by a passage in the judgment of Millett LJ in Thai Trading Co v Taylor
[1998] QB 781
. In that case a successful defendant who had entered into a CFA lite avant la letttre claimed costs from the plaintiff. The claim pre-dated the legislation permitting CFAs, and the main issue concerned the lawfulness of the arrangement. However, Millett LJ, who wrote the leading judgment, also referred to the indemnity principle, endorsing (at p. 785 A-B) the observation of the judge below that
“… if the law relating to the recovery of contingent fees be put on one side, the so-called indemnity principle did not avail the plaintiffs. Even if there was an express agreement that [the solicitor] would be paid his profit costs only if [the client] won her case, she would still be entitled to be indemnified against a legal liability which had been incurred in the events which had happened. The fact that she would have incurred no liability in a different event which had not happened would not affect this.”
Thai Trading was (notoriously) not followed by a different division of this Court in Geraghty & Co v Awwad
[ 1999] EWCA Civ 3036, [2001] QB 570 , but the difference did not relate to the application of the indemnity principle.
174.I return to Mr Mallalieu’s argument. Before us he no longer relied on regulation 9 for reasons which I explain at para. 183 below. The remaining points are all different aspects of a fundamental submission that the CFA lite was unlawful because it provided for an unlawful “topping up payment”: if that were the case the Appellant would be under no liability to her lawyers against which she needed to be indemnified by the other party. (To be clear, that is not the same argument as I have reviewed in the previous paragraph: in that case the reason why the indemnity principle would not apply would be that the liability was notional rather than real, whereas here it is that the agreement, though real, is unlawful.)
175.In so far as that submission depends on the proposition that the use of a CFA lite in order to allow a legally-aided party to recover at private client rates is, as Mr Mallalieu says, “contrary to public policy”, I find that hard to accept. Legislation has permitted such recovery in the case of civil legal aid since 1994, and the public policy benefits of such orders have been repeatedly proclaimed: see para. 164 above. I do not see how, in the unusual case where criminal legal aid is granted in civil proceedings, it can be contrary to public policy for the same result to be achieved by a different means if that means is not in itself unlawful. Mr Mallalieu referred in his skeleton argument to a passage in the judgment of Gross J (sitting with Thomas LJ) in the Divisional Court in Merrick v The Law Society
[2007] EWHC 2997 (Admin)
. That was an appeal against a finding by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal that the appellant had taken money on account of costs from his legally-aided client in breach of regulation 64 of the 1989 Regulations. At para. 54 of his judgment, with which Thomas LJ agreed, Gross J said (in the context of the gravity of the breach):
“[The Appellant] … was here in breach of the fundamental rule … that solicitors, acting for legally aided clients, are not entitled to look to that client for payment. That is not a complex matter; it is basic; it is also of the first importance to the reputation of the profession in its handling of legal aid work.”
But that does not advance the argument. Merrick was not concerned with a CFA lite: the appellant had taken actual payments from the client, and that was the vice which the Court condemned.
176.The question thus resolves itself into whether there is any statutory provision which prohibits a client who is in receipt of legal aid and/or their lawyers from entering into a CFA lite with a view to enabling the client to obtain an order for costs against the other party at private client rates if the claim succeeds. The only such provisions relied on by Mr Mallalieu are those which enact the other payments rule, namely sections 23 (1) and 28 (2) of LASPO.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
As we have seen his skeleton argument refers only to section 28 (2) , and it is fair to say that that received more attention at the hearing. But we were also referred to section 23 (1) by both him and Mr Underwood.
I have already set out section 28 (2) (see para. 167 above). Section 23 (1) reads:
“An individual to whom services are made available under this Part is not to be required to make a payment in connection with the provision of the services, except where regulations provide otherwise.”
177.There is obviously a relationship between section 23 (1) and section 28 (2) of LASPO. Section 23 (1) proscribes any requirement on the client to make any payment in connection with the provision of services under the legal aid scheme, whereas what section 28 (2) proscribes is the “taking” by the lawyer of any such payment. They could thus be said to address the same act – payment for the services otherwise than out of the fund – but from different ends.
It is not clear to me why this twofold provision was thought necessary. So far as I have been able to ascertain, u ntil the 1999 Act the other payment rule had been in the form of a single provision: see , e.g. , regulation 6 4 of the 1989 Regulations quoted at para. 156 above.
Mr Underwood described the two provisions as “mirror images” of each other. Likewise in Merrick
Gross J described the predecessor of
section 23 (1)
(
section 10 (1)
of ) as “reinforcing” the predecessor of
section 28
(
section 22 (2)
) – see para. 31 of his judgment; and at para. 35 of his judgment in Surrey v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust
[2018] EWCA Civ 451
, [2018] 1 WLR 5831
, Lewison LJ referred to the two sections as together rendering “topping up” unlawful (I should say that what he was referring to as “topping-up” was a situation where the client themselves had to pay the shortfall between legal aid and private client rates). However, the two provisions are not identically structured and the only safe course is to consider each separately in accordance with its own terms.
178.I start with section
23 (1). The Appellant is clearly a person to whom services had been made available under the legal aid scheme, and it is common ground that there are no regulations disapplying its effect in her case. The only question thus is whether under the CFA lite she is “ required to make a payment in connection with the provision of the services”. The straightforward answer is that she is not required to make any such payment: it is fundamental to the agreement that the payment to the solicitors which it is intended to achieve will only come in the form of a payment of costs from the other party. But it is not quite as simple as that. It could be said that the legal basis on which the costs order would necessarily have been made was that she was under a liability to pay her lawyers at private client rates, otherwise there would be nothing against which she was entitled to be indemnified – see the discussion at para. 173 above; and that accordingly she should be regarded as being “required” to make such a payment, albeit that the requirement would never crystallise into an actual payment.
179.I believe that the straightforward reading is correct. I do not believe that
section 23 (1)
is intended to proscribe a “requirement” to pay which it is agreed will never result in actual payment by the client out of their own funds, as opposed to by the losing party. In my view the natural reading of the statutory language puts the emphasis on the actual making of the payment. The reference to the client being “required” to pay simply connotes that the payment is as a result of a (perceived) obligation. It is not intended to proscribe a prior agreement, or in any event one which will never lead to an actual payment. That reading also reflects the obvious policy behind the provision, which is to prevent clients being required to dip into their own pockets for services which they are receiving under the legal aid scheme. A CFA lite does not contravene that policy because the only pocket from which the payment at private client rates comes is that of the other party. A situation where a legally-aided party can recover costs from a third party at private client rates is entirely in accordance with public policy: see para. 164 above. As for the fact that the client’s entitlement to costs against the third party depends on their being treated as subject to a genuine liability to pay, it does not follow that the same assumption has to be made in the context of
section 23 (1)
.
180.I turn to
section 28 (2)
. I accept that the retention by a solicitor of that part of a costs order which exceeds the amount payable to the LAA constitutes the taking of payment otherwise than under the legal aid scheme. However, I can see no answer to Mr Underwood’s point that that is precisely the form of payment which paragraph 8.10 of the SCCS is designed to, and does, authorise and that it accordingly falls within the terms of the proviso in subparagraph (b). Since that is the (only) form of payment which the CFA lite is intended to achieve I can see no basis on which it can be said to be unlawful. That there is no contravention of
section 28 (2)
reinforces my conclusion as regards
section 23 (1)
: it would be incoherent if the two provisions produced different outcomes.
181.I therefore believe that the CFA lite does not contravene the other payments rule. The result is that the payment at private client rates for which it provides represents a genuine liability against which the Appellant was entitled to be indemnified by the paying party.
182.I have considered whether it is an objection to this construction of sections 23 (1) and 28 (2) of LASPO that it is inconsistent with the basis of both regulation 107B (3) of the (amended) 1989 Regulations and regulation 21 (3) of the 2013 Regulations, both of which proceed on the basis that, in order to permit costs orders in favour of legally-aided parties at more than legal aid rates, it is necessary to disapply both the indemnity principle and the other payments rule. I do not believe that that is the case. It is true that the effect of my reasoning is that the same result can now be achieved by the use of a CFA lite. But CFA lites were not available in 1994, when regulation 107B (3) was made. I do not know whether any thought was given to their availability in 2013, when regulation 107B (3) was replaced by regulation 21 (3). But even if it was, there would have been no point in abandoning the by then well-understood mechanism made available by regulation 107B (3) so that legal aid solicitors would have to require their clients to enter into CFA lites in order to preserve the possibility of recovery under a costs order. It is only because, almost certainly by oversight, no provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3) has been included in the regulations governing criminal legal aid that the CFA lite route has had to be resorted to.
правок: 1
- 2026-10-03 — изменён в редакции 2 · построчный дифф →
183.Finally, if only for completeness, I should return to regulation 9 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Criminal Regulations”). This is headed “Payment from other sources”. It reads:
“Where representation is provided in respect of any proceedings, the representative, whether acting pursuant to a section 16 determination or otherwise, must not receive or be a party to the making of any payment for work done in connection with those proceedings, except such payments as may be made— (a)
by the Lord Chancellor; or (b)
in respect of any expenses or fees incurred in— (i)
preparing, obtaining or considering any report, opinion or further evidence, whether provided by an expert witness or otherwise; or (ii)
obtaining any transcripts or recordings, where an application under regulation 13 for an authority to incur such fees or expenses has been refused by a committee appointed under arrangements made by the Lord Chancellor to deal with, amongst other things, appeals of, or review of, assessment of costs.”
This is thus an articulation of the other payments rule, though in a rather different form from sections 23 (1) and 28 (2) of LASPO. At para. 92 of his skeleton argument Mr Mallalieu submitted that it was the complete answer to this strand of the case, since payment under a court order based on a “top up” CFA lite was not one of the types of payment allowed by subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b). However, as already noted, he did not advance that argument at the hearing. This was because he accepted that the effect of regulation 3 (5A) of the 2013 Criminal Regulations is that regulation 9 does not apply to High Court proceedings. The reason for that exclusion (which was in fact present in a different form in the original Regulations) is obscure, but it was not suggested that it casts any light on the issues which we have to decide.
184.I would accordingly allow the appeal on ground 1 on the basis of the second strand in the Appellant’s challenge. It is a curiosity that this strand is not considered in the judgment of Sweeting J: the CFA lite is barely mentioned. I suspect that, even though it features in Mr Cohen’s unused further skeleton argument below (see n. 2), it was not as prominent in the Appellant’s submissions below as it was before us. However, no objection was made to it being advanced, and we heard submissions from both parties on the essential elements in it. On a related point, I should also say that the careful judgment of Judge Leonard in Khan , which was followed by Judge Whalan in the present case and endorsed by Sweeting J, did not concern a case where the legally-aided party had entered into a CFA lite: it was thus only concerned with the first strand.
For completeness, I should record that in the course of his jud g ment Judge Leonard referred to regulation 9 of the 2013 Criminal Legal Aid Regulations as if they applied to High Court proceedings. Mr Underwood pointed out that this was an error; but it did not vitiate Judge Leonard’s reasoning on the indemnity principle issue
Lord Justice Bean (Vice President, Court of Appeal, Civil Division)
185.I agree that for the reasons given by both Jeremy Baker LJ and Sir Nicholas Underhill the first strand of Ground 1 of Ms McGivern’s appeal – the argument that the indemnity principle has been disapplied by s 30(1)
of LASPO – must be rejected. The decision of this court in Willis
, for all its flaws, is binding on us and cannot be characterised as per incuriam
. However, I too agree with Sir Nicholas Underhill’s conclusion that the alternative argument or second strand of Ground 1, based on the existence of a “CFA-lite” between the Appellant and her solicitors, is well founded for the reasons he gives, and that the appeal should be allowed on that basis.
186.The decisions below were in my view unjust to Ms McGivern’s solicitors and counsel and contrary to public policy. As Lord Hope observed in the JFS costs decision, it is important that lawyers working for legally aided clients should be able to recover at inter partes rates. Ms McGivern was the respondent to an application to commit for contempt of court. An adverse finding, even if it had not resulted in her imprisonment, might have been professionally ruinous. Nicklin J held that the committal application was totally without merit and ordered MBR to pay indemnity costs.
187.Yet, in the present state of the law, if Mr Mallalieu’s arguments were to prevail, Nicklin J would have been spitting into the wind. When the experienced costs judge came to assess what was payable, he held that Ms McGivern’s solicitors could recover only £20,673.34 (including VAT) for their successful defence of the unwarranted contempt charge, a small fraction of what they were claiming. For the reasons given by Sir Nicholas Underhill I agree that the CFA-lite operates to prevent that unsatisfactory outcome.
Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 04.10.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.
Реквизиты
| Страна | Великобритания |
| Орган | Суды Англии и Уэльса |
| Вид | судебное решение |
| Язык | en |
| Дата документа | 2026-09-18 |
| Объём | 130 519 знаков |
| Редакций | 2 |
| Впервые увидели | 2026-10-01 |
| Проверен | 2026-11-16 05:39 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] EWCA Civ 1202 |
| court | The Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division) |
Темы
Почему документ в базе
Отбор сработал на этих совпадениях, суммарный вес 9.
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…which they had been required to make to the legal aid fund. 36. the effect of the legal aid act 1960 was largely confined to expanding the range of those eligible for legal aid under th…
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…r than those previously eligible would be entitled to legal aid. 37. however, the legal aid act 1974 was a consolidating statute which, inter alia, repealed the laa act 1949 and provide…
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…similar provisions to sections 6(9) (a) and 2(2)(b) of the laa act 1949. 38. the legal aid act 1988 ( “la act 1988 ”) was intended to make new provision for the administration of, and…
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…der section 34, as follows: “i now summarise my understanding of the effect of the legal aid act 1988 and the regulations i have quoted. (1) an assisted party’s representatives can only…
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…er the access to justice act 1999 ), submitted that the effect of section 31 of the legal aid act 1988 enabled indemnity costs to be awarded in favour of a legally assisted party, because…
-
ai act
текст
Искусственный интеллект
…was well within the judge’s discretion and i would dismiss this appeal.” 60. the legal aid act 1988 was repealed by the access to justice act 1999 which established the legal services…
Найден по запросу: «payment services» (caselaw_uk)
Аннотация
Суд рассматривает вопрос о возмещении судебных расходов успешно защищавшейся стороной в деле гражданского неповиновения против стороны, финансируемой частным образом. Рассматривается возможность возмещения расходов сверх сумм, установленных расписанием 4 Регламента о вознаграждении за уголовную правовую помощь 2013 года. Суд постановил, что расходы могут быть взысканы исходя из ставки, согласованной сторонами в соглашении о разделе судебных издержек, но ограничены суммой, предусмотренной расписанием 4. Решение изменяет подход судов к рассмотрению подобных споров.
Редакции документа
Отметьте две редакции и нажмите «Сравнить» — покажем построчные отличия.
| выбор | Редакция | Загружена | Формат | Объём | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Редакция 2 открыта | 2026-10-03 01:29 | xml | 130 519 зн. | txt | |
| Редакция 1 | 2026-10-01 01:28 | xml | 130 456 зн. | txt |
Выбрано: 0 из 2
Зафиксированные изменения
| Дата | Редакции | Строк | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-03 | 16178 → 16532 | +66 −42 | Построчное сравнение → |