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PAYONE/GMBH v MR JERRY KOFI LOGO

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Mr Justice Cavanagh:

1.I delivered this judgment orally at the end of today’s hearing.

2.This is the Claimant’s (Payone’s) application for a General Civil Restraint Order (“GCRO”) against the Defendant (Mr Logo), or, in the alternative, an Extended Civil Restraint Order (“ECRO”). Payone also seeks an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the court to restrain Mr Logo from the making of any application or the issuing of any claim in the Employment Tribunal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

3.Payone’s application is dated 31 July 2026. It is supported by the second witness statement of Amanda Jane Voss dated 31 July 2026, the first witness statement of Ewen Houghton Bright, dated 31 July 2026, and the exhibits thereto. The hearing bundle for today’s hearing runs to 1100 pages.

4.Payone has been represented before me today by Mr Philip Judd. I am grateful to Mr Judd for his helpful and measured submissions.

5.The first thing I must deal with is Mr Logo’s renewed application to adjourn today’s hearing.

6.The parties were notified of today’s hearing on 19 August 2026.

7.Mr Logo, who is a litigant in person, applied to adjourn the hearing on health grounds. The application came before me on 16 October 2026, because I happened to be the judge dealing with urgent applications that week. I refused the application and gave written reasons which accompanied my order of that date.

8.Last Friday, 30 October 2026, Mr Logo applied again to adjourn today’s hearing. Again, he relied on health grounds and particularly on updates in relation to his health that had been provided since my order dated 16 October 2026. He made clear that he wished for the application to be dealt with on the papers and that, if I refused the adjournment, he would not be attending today’s hearing, either in person or remotely (I should add that provision had been made for him to appear remotely today and I had also said that, if he attended remotely or in person, he would be offered reasonable adjustments along the lines that had been recommended by his medical advisers.)

9.I adjourned the decision on the application to adjourn to this morning. This was to give Payone’s legal advisers an opportunity to make oral submissions to me about whether or not there should be an adjournment. I took the view that this would be fairer to them than to expect them to respond in writing only, especially as they did not receive my order until Monday 2 November 2026. I realised that this meant that they would be put to the expense of attending today’s hearing even if it was ultimately adjourned, but most of that expense had already been incurred. Mr Logo is not prejudiced by this course of action, because he indicated a willingness for his submissions to be dealt with on the papers. He filed a lengthy and detailed witness statement in support of his application to adjourn, and a bundle of some 93 pages.

10.In paragraphs 64 and 65 of his witness statement dated 30 October 2026, Mr Logo offered some undertakings, to apply if an adjournment was granted. These are:

“64.

Should the Court adjourn the CRO hearing, I am willing, without admission of wrongdoing, to give a voluntary undertaking on terms approved by the Court that, until the CRO application is determined or further order, I will not, without the Court's permission:

(a)

Commence new civil proceedings against Payone GmbH in the civil courts of England and Wales; or (b)

Make any new application against Payone GmbH in existing civil proceedings before those courts, except as expressly permitted by paragraph 65 below.

65.For the avoidance of doubt, the proposed undertaking would not prevent or require prior permission for:

(a)

Seeking permission to appeal, bringing an appeal or taking steps reasonably necessary to preserve or pursue appellate rights arising from proceedings or decisions already in existence;

(b)

Applying for reasonable adjustments, adjournments or other procedural relief necessitated by my disability, illness or any medical incapacity, including the submission of further medical evidence;

(c)

Complying with court orders or directions, responding to applications made against me, filing evidence or submissions in response, or taking procedural steps expressly required or directed by a court; or (d)

Applying to vary, clarify or discharge the undertaking itself.”

11.These proposed undertakings fall considerably short of a GCRO, which would apply to any proceedings in the civil courts that are brought by Mr Logo against any party, not just those related to the proceedings already on foot. They also fall short of an ECRO, because they apply only to claims against Payone itself, and not to proceedings against related companies or legal advisers, notwithstanding that Mr Logo has commenced proceedings against both of those. Also, the proviso in paragraph 65 (a) carves out a substantial exception from the protection offered by an ECRO. Still further, the proposed undertaking would not provide the protection which Payone seeks from the part of the order sought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. This would apply to proceedings in the Employment Tribunal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The proposed undertakings do not apply to ET or EAT proceedings.

12.Payone notified the Court, by means of an email from their solicitors dated 2 November 2026, that they do not accept the proposed undertakings.

13.Before I go on to deal with the adjournment application, I should refer to one other matter. This is that the statement of Ms Voss, a Partner of Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe (UK) LLP (Orrick), Payone’s solicitors, refers to a number of strands of litigation against Payone and those associated with it, in one way or another, that have been brought by Mr Logo. One of these strands, dealt with at paragraphs 107-112 of Ms Voss’s witness statement, concerns proceedings that were brought by Mr Logo against 11KBW Limited, the service company for 11KBW, the set of barristers’ chambers to which one of Payone’s barristers, Mr Leo Davidson, belongs. The witness statement of Mr Houghton, a partner of DWF, the firm acting for 11KBW Limited, also deals with these proceedings.

14.In brief, through this claim, Mr Logo seeks an order under

section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 compelling 11 KBW Limited to disclose the recipient of a fee note related to these matters on the basis that such fee note contained his personal information and the recipient was, therefore, a recipient of his personal information for the purposes of Article 15(1)(c) UK GDPR. The essence of the claim is the Chambers service company mishandled Mr Logo’s data. Mr Logo wishes to argue that this means that Payone is not entitled to any of its legal fees incurred by the UK LLP and he also seeks damages in the sum of £875 plus interest, pursuant to Art 82 of the GDPR. The claim includes a personal injury claim.

15.I mention this, because, before my appointment to the High Court Bench in October 2019, I was Joint Head of Chambers at 11KBW and, in that capacity, I was a director of 11KBW Limited. I ceased all connection with 11KBW and 11KBW Limited upon my appointment to the Bench, save to the extent that I occasionally attend social events connected with Chambers, such as Silk parties. I do not have any financial or any other interest in 11KBW or 11KBW Limited.

16.The claims against 11KBW Limited are still proceeding.

17.Ms Voss’s statement also states that Mr Logo has made a Data Subject Access Request (DSAR) in relation to Mr Davidson.

18.The fact that Mr Logo had made claims against 11KBW Limited only came to my attention yesterday, 2 November 2026, when I started to read into the papers for today’s hearing. I was not aware that Mr Logo had made claims against 11KBW Limited when I considered his adjournment applications on 16 October and 30 October 2026.

19.Whilst my previous connection with 11KBW is readily discoverable through internet searches, there is nothing to suggest that Mr Logo wass aware of it, and therefore he has not had any reasonable opportunity to make submissions about whether I should recuse myself from dealing with this application on the ground of the appearance of bias. I have not been in a position to disclose it to him much in advance of this hearing, because I was not aware of the connection until Monday 2 November, and Payone and its legal advisers were not aware of any need to disclose the connection, because they would not have known until Monday 2 November at the earliest that this hearing was allocated to me.

20.At around lunchtime on Monday 2 November, I caused the following message from the Court Office to be sent to Payone’s solicitors and to Mr Logo:

“Mr Justice Cavanagh has asked that the parties be notified of the following: The application for a CRO, listed for 3 November 2026, has been allocated to him. The judge started reading into the substantive application this morning. He notes that one of the strands of litigation referred to in Ms Voss’s second witness statement dated 31 July 2026, and Mr Bright’s First Witness Statement dated 31 July 2026, is a claim by Mr Logo against 11KBW Limited. Until his appointment to the High Court Bench on 1 October 2019, Mr Justice Cavanagh was Joint Head of Chambers at 11KBW, and, ex officio, was a director of 11KBW Limited. He resigned that directorship before he became a High Court Judge and now has no financial or other interest in 11KBW or 11KBW Limited. The judge considered it appropriate to disclose this to the parties. At the hearing tomorrow, he will invite submissions on, and will consider (1) whether or not this is a reason for adjournment in order to give Mr Logo the opportunity to make submissions about appearance of bias, if he thinks fit; and (2) whether or not this is a reason why the judge should recuse himself from dealing with the CRO application.”

21.I did not consider it feasible or fair to expect Mr Logo or Payone to respond in writing to this information in advance of the hearing on 3 November 2026. I should add that, given that this issue arose at the eleventh hour, it would not have been feasible to replace me with another judge for the hearing on 3 November 2026.

22.Orrick replied to say that they would be in a position to make submissions on the appearance of bias issue this morning. Mr Logo responded at about 5pm on 2 November, reiterating that he felt too unwell to attend and saying, “I have only just seen the judge's disclosure below about 11KBW. I represent myself and need time to understand what it means and try to get some pro bono help. I am too unwell to research the issue or make informed submissions about it before tomorrow's hearing.”

23.In the circumstances, there are two related issues that I must consider at the outset. These are:

(1)Should today’s hearing be adjourned because of Mr Logo’s stated health difficulties?; and/or

(2)Should the hearing be adjourned because Mr Logo has not been made aware of and so has not had an opportunity to make representations about the potential appearance of bias arising from my previous relationship with 11KBW Limited?

24.I will deal with these issues in turn.

Should today’s hearing be adjourned because of Mr Logo’s stated health difficulties?

25.CPR 3.1(b) permits a judge, in his or her discretion, to adjourn a hearing. CPR 1.2(a) provides that the Court should take account of the overriding objective when exercising any power given to it by the Rules.

26.CPR 1.1(1) states that the overriding objective is to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. CPR 1.2 states that this includes, so far as practicable:

(a)

ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence;

(b)

saving expense;

(c)

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – (i)

to the amount of money involved;

(ii)

to the importance of the case;

(iii)

to the complexity of the issues; and (iv)

to the financial position of each party;

(d)

ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly;

(e)

allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases;

(f)

promoting or using alternative dispute resolution; and (g)

enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.

27.Very helpful guidance has been given on the principles to be followed when considering whether or not to adjourn a hearing because of the ill-health of a litigant in person by Warby J in Decker v Hopcraft

[2015] EWHC 1170 (QB) , at paragraphs 21-30. Warby J said:

“The decision whether to adjourn a hearing, and the decision whether to proceed with a hearing in the absence of a party, are both case management decisions. The court is required to exercise a discretion, in accordance with the overriding objective, in the light of the particular circumstances of the individual case. The authorities provide valuable guidance, however.”

28.The principles to be derived from the authorities are, in summary, as follows:

(1)A court faced with an application to adjourn on medical grounds made for the first time by a litigant in person should be hesitant to refuse the application;

(2)However, this is subject to qualifications;

(3)The decision is always one for the Court to make, not one that can be forced on it. A party cannot compel the Court to adjourn by refusing to attend;

(4)The Court must scrutinise carefully the evidence relied on in support of the application. No judge is bound to accept expert evidence;

(5)The Court can take account of a litigant’s ability to communicate coherently with the Court;

(6)There may be reasonable accommodations that can be made by the Court to enable the litigant to participate;

(7)Importantly, the question of whether effective participation is possible depends not only on the medical condition of the applicant for an adjournment but also, and perhaps critically, on the nature of the hearing: the nature of the issues before the court, and what role the party concerned is called on to undertake. If the issues are straightforward and their merits have already been debated in correspondence, or on previous occasions, or both there may be little more that can usefully be said; and

(8)Sometimes, it may appear to the court at the outset or after hearing some at least of the rival arguments that in truth the matter before it is one on which one or other side is bound to succeed. The closer the case appears to one or other of these extremes the less likely it is that proceeding will represent an injustice to the litigant.

29.I have taken these principles into account in coming to my decision about whether to adjourn today’s hearing.

30.I will begin with the medical evidence.

31.I will not repeat in full the summary of the medical position that I gave on 16 October 2026, or repeat in full the reasons that I gave on that date for refusing the adjournment that was sought by Mr Logo. In my order dated 16 October 2026, I summarised the evidence that was available as at that date. For the reasons given alongside the order that I made on that date, I was not persuaded that the evidence, as it then stood, established that Mr Logo was not fit to participate in today’s hearing, with appropriate adjustments along the lines suggested in the medical evidence. It was significant that in a letter dated 13 September 2026, Dr Chappandra, the consultant psychiatrist on whose evidence Mr Logo relied, had said:

“My opinion at 7.9 is that [Mr Logo] cannot presently participate effectively in a prolonged or demanding contested hearing. I accept that a different view could reasonably be taken on whether the adjustments listed at 7.13 would enable participation in a shorter or less demanding hearing.”

32.I did not close the door to an adjournment in my order of 16 October 2026 but said that the application could be renewed at today’s hearing. This course of action had been suggested by Orrick, on behalf of Payone, in a letter dated 9 October 2026.

33.Nothing has been said since that has persuaded me that, in light of the evidence as it stood on 16 October, an adjournment of today’s hearing should be granted. The real issue is whether the new material that has come to light since 16 October 2026 changes matters.

34.The general thrust of the medical reasons given by Mr Logo in his statement dated 30 October 2026 for the adjournment of the hearing remains broadly the same as the reasons I considered on 16 October 2026. Mr Logo said, at paragraph 9 of his statement,

“The combined effects of my medical conditions, disturbed sleep and medication interfere with my concentration, memory, ability to process information, mental stamina and capacity to participate effectively in contested proceedings.”

35.However, the emphasis in the medical evidence that was placed before me on 16 October 2026, and, in particular, the medical report and correspondence from Dr Chandrappa, was in relation to Mr Logo’s mental health. As I have said, Dr Chandrappa is a consultant psychiatrist. The emphasis in Mr Logo’s new witness statement, dated 30 October 2026, is on the debilitating effects of headaches and migraines, which, he said, have deteriorated significantly in recent months. Mr Logo said that he also suffers from serious and painful spinal conditions, including lumbar spinal stenosis and, more recently, substantially worsening cervical pain and associated neurological symptoms. It is fair to say, however, that Dr Chandrappa had mentioned headaches and migraines in his original report. These problems have not only recently been raised for the first time.

36.The principal reasons why I was not persuaded as at 16 October 2026 that Mr Logo was medically unfit to participate was because Dr Chappandra’s opinion appeared to be that Mr Logo was unfit to participate in a lengthy court hearing, which this is not, and, as HHJ Tindal pointed out, Dr Chappandra did not appear to be aware that Mr Logo was the claimant or applicant in most of the court proceedings. In other words, Dr Chappandra did not appear to be aware that Mr Logo was embroiled in multiple proceedings as a result of his own choices. Also, Dr Chappandra proposed some adjustments which could be made, and which I was willing to make, which would enable Mr Logo to participate in a relatively short hearing.

37.The fresh evidence which has recently been provided consists primarily of evidence given by Mr Logo himself in his witness statement dated 30 October 2026, supplemented by a new report from Dr Chappandra which was sent to the Court by email at 5pm last night.

38.In his witness statement dated 30 October, Mr Logo said that in the period from 12-22 October, he has suffered severe cervical symptoms, leading to an MRI investigation. He said that he has always suffered from severe headaches, but they had become a daily occurrence by September 2026. Mr Logo said that he had suffered a sudden deterioration in neck pain around 12 October 2026. At paragraph 20 of his statement, he said:

“Attempting to straighten my head or look forward caused intense, sharp pain accompanied by severe muscle spasms across my neck and upper back. My neck became extremely stiff and effectively locked in a tilted position, with any attempt to straighten it causing further agonising pain. I struggled to find a comfortable position, whether sitting, standing or lying down, as even slight movements could trigger further spasms. The pain spread from the base of my neck into the back of my head, while my daily migraines worsened considerably, often causing pain behind my eyes.”

39.Mr Logo said that his pain led him to call NHS 111 on 9 August, 12 September and 15 October 2026, and that on 19 October (so after my 16 October order) he had attended Accident and Emergency at the Worcestershire Royal Hospital. His symptoms persisted despite treatment and he had to seek emergency medical assistance again on 22 October 2026.

40.Mr Logo said that he underwent a cervical MRI scan on 17 October 2026.

41.At paragraph 35, Mr Logo said:

“My concern is that the severe daytime pain associated with my cervical condition and nerve compression, alongside my migraines and cognitive problems, would make it extremely difficult to concentrate, follow the arguments and express myself clearly, without becoming confused or losing my train of thought.”

42.At paragraph 51, Mr Logo said:

“My current medication includes lorazepam, quetiapine, escitalopram, topiramate, sumatriptan and codeine phosphate for my longstanding lumbar spinal condition.

Following my emergency hospital attendances in October 2026, nefopam was discontinued after I experienced dizziness, confusion and problems with coordination. I was subsequently prescribed pregabalin, which I have found further aggravates my mental cloudiness and difficulty concentrating.”

43.Mr Logo said that he suffers daily migraines which persist for much of the day, and, at paragraph 53 he said, “the cumulative effects of pain, medication and lack of sleep leave me exhausted and frequently unable to think clearly. I experience significant brain fog, poor concentration and memory difficulties.” He said that he is no longer able to work at his desk for long periods. Reading and writing aggravate his symptoms. At paragraph 55, Mr Logo said, “Even a relatively short hearing would require a level of sustained concentration and responsiveness that I cannot presently manage.”

44.Mr Logo said that he has a neurology appointment scheduled for 4 November 2026 and his GP, Dr Crookall, has recommended reassessment of his neurological condition in March 2027.

45.All of this evidence comes from Mr Logo himself. He has an obvious interest in exaggerating his symptoms, as there is nothing for him to gain from today’s hearing going ahead, and he knows that the evidence that he provided in advance of the 16 October hearing had not been sufficient to persuade me to adjourn. A degree of scepticism might arise from the shift of emphasis from psychiatric symptoms to headaches and physical pain. There is some corroboration from elsewhere, but it is limited. Dr Crookall provided a letter dated 29 September 2026, and amended on 7 October, in which he referred to Mr Logo having a long history of headaches which have become more frequent. Dr Crookall referred to the medication that has been prescribed for Mr Logo and said that the medical problem and the headaches influence Mr Logo’s ability to concentrate and to process information.

46.An addendum to this letter dated 22 October 2026 says:

“I believe that the 6th March 2027 would seem a sensible point for reassessment of his condition.

The MRI scan would explain the neck pain and pins and needles in the arms as there is compression of one of the nerve roots. This may exacerbate his headaches and neck pain. He can discuss this further at his pending appointment.”

47.The GP’s letter did not enclose the MRI scan results themselves, or any report from a specialist, but this short addendum corroborates that Mr Logo has had an MRI scan and that this showed compression of one of the nerve roots.

48.Much greater clarity was provided by the further report from Dr Chappandra, dated 31 October 2026, which was provided by Mr Logo himself last night. Though it has not formally been appended to a witness statement, it is plainly a genuine document, and it contains the appropriate expert’s declaration. I have taken the view that it is in the interests of justice that I read and take it into account.

49.Dr Chappandra examined Mr Logo remotely on 15 October 2026. The results of this examination were not available when I gave my ruling on 16 October 2026. Dr Chappandra has also considered the evidence now relied upon by Mr Logo, including the MRI scan. The report states that Mr Logo commented on a first draft of this report and some amendments were made to it by Dr Chappandra, though his opinions are his own and remain unchanged.

50.Dr Chappandra made the point that the history of symptoms are Mr Logo’s own account. Dr Chappandra said of his examination of Mr Logo on 15 October 2026:

“On mental state examination on 15 October 2026, Mr Logo was cooperative, with good rapport. Speech was normal in rate, volume, tone and coherent and there was no thought disorder. Mood was low and he presented as anxious. He reported subjective confusion, disorientation to the day and word-finding difficulty. Cognitive functions were grossly intact. Insight was good, and he had capacity to consent to treatment.”

51.Dr Chappandra provided much more information about the results of the MRI scan that Mr Logo underwent than Dr Crookall had done. He said that this was a private scan arranged by Mr Logo. There were multilevel degenerative changes with nerve root compression, but the radiologist recorded no critical findings. Cord signal is grossly normal, there is no central canal stenosis, cord compression, fracture or collapse. No treatment apart from clinical review was advised.

52.Dr Chappandra provided more detail than had previously been available about Mr Logo’s same day emergency care visit on 19 October. Mr Logo had self-referred with neck pain worsening over a week, with migraine at the back of the head. “No true photophobia” was recorded, although dark glasses help his migraines. On examination there was no cervical spine tenderness. He reported being unable to flex or rotate his neck because of pain, and “no other new neurology” was found. Observations were stable and inflammatory markers were normal. The impression was neck pain secondary to cervical degeneration. Nefopam was prescribed and a reduction in codeine was to be considered.

53.Dr Chappandra said that Mr Logo attended emergency care again on 22 October 2026. He requested a prescription because of ongoing neck pain and said he was not tolerating nefopam because it made him dizzy. Pregabalin was prescribed. No investigations or treatment were indicated and Mr Logo was discharged home.

54.Dr Chappandra emphasised that his opinion is confined to the psychiatric aspects, including the psychiatric and functional aspects of pain, sleep disturbance and medication. These are the most important features when considering the application to adjourn, in my view, because Mr Logo has not said that he has mobility issues that would prevent him from attending court and, in any event, he was given the option of attending remotely.

55.Dr Chappandra said that from a psychiatric perspective, the findings are consistent with neck pain, which adds to Mr Logo’s sleep disturbance, anxiety and low mood and limits prolonged sitting. The MRI cervical spine showed no critical findings and the hospital found no new neurological deficit. Mr Logo’s neck pain does not rest on his own account, and there is independent medical evidence capable of explaining it.

56.At paragraph 5.5 of his report, Dr Chappandra said:

“Taking his conditions together, in my opinion the combined effect of his anxiety and depression, panic attacks, severe insomnia, neck and back pain, headaches and medication is likely to impair his concentration, working memory, speed of processing and stamina, and these effects add to one another (paragraphs 7.3 and 7.6 of the report). His pain, and its effects on his sleep, concentration and stamina, are present whatever the format of a hearing, and whether he attends in person or remotely. How far they impair his participation depends on the length and demands of the hearing and on the adjustments in place.”

57.At paragraph 5.10 of his report, Dr Chappandra said:

“In my opinion the evidence shows no improvement since September 2026 and some reported deterioration. There is no objective evidence of a material change in his cognitive function.”

58.Dr Chappandra addressed Mr Logo’s ability to take part in today’s hearing at paragraphs 5.14 to 5.16 of his report of 31 October 2026. He said:

“5.14

This is a shorter hearing of about five hours, which I understand will consist of legal argument rather than oral evidence, and Mr Logo may attend remotely. My opinion in my addendum of 13 September 2026 is unchanged: a different view could reasonably be taken on whether the adjustments at paragraph 7.13 of the report would enable participation in a shorter or less demanding hearing.

5.15In my opinion Mr Logo’s ability to participate in that hearing would be impaired, particularly in sustained attention, rapid comprehension and responding to submissions in real time. The adjustments would be essential. An early start would increase the difficulty, given migraine and possible morning sedation.

5.16I am of the clinical opinion regarding the hearing on 3 November 2026 that Mr Logo’s ability to take part effectively would be impaired, and that the adjustments I have recommended would be essential. This opinion is separate from my recommendation at paragraph 5.18 that the Court consider those adjustments if the court is minded to proceed. My acknowledgement that a different view could reasonably be taken does not mean that I consider him fit for that hearing: it recognises that whether he can participate effectively with those adjustments is ultimately and respectfully a matter for the Court.”

59.At paragraph 5.18, Dr Chappandra proposed a number of adjustments for the hearing of 3 November 2026, to accommodate Mr Logo’s health problems. These adjustments would readily be achievable.

60.In light of the medical evidence available to me, and taking into account the principles set out by Warby J in the Decker case, I have decided that Mr Logo’s health issues are not a good reason to adjourn consideration of Payone’s application for a CRO. This is for the following reasons.

61.First, I acknowledge that the Court should think carefully before refusing an adjournment application by a litigant in person on health grounds. On the other hand, assertions of ill-health are not a trump card and cannot be deployed so as automatically to procure an adjournment. The interests of Payone must be borne in mind. They have expended a considerable sum in legal costs to be here and as Ms Voss’s statement and Mr Judd’s skeleton argument make clear, Payone consider that they have a real need for a CRO and that the matter is urgent.

62.Second, I have carefully scrutinised the medical and other evidence. The most helpful evidence, by far, is Dr Chappandra’s helpful report of 31 October 2026. This report is very far from saying that Mr Logo would be unable to participate in today’s hearing on health grounds. Rather, it is clear, in my view, that Mr Logo would be able to participate if reasonable adjustments were made. I had made clear in my ruling of 16 October that the reasonable adjustments advised in Dr Chappandra’s earlier report, which continue to reflect his advice, would be made available to Mr Logo if he chose to participate. I have also made clear that he could attend remotely. On the evidence, I am satisfied, that, with assistance from reasonable adjustments, Mr Logo would have been able fairly to participate in today’s hearing.

63.Third, it is significant that, notwithstanding his headaches and the impact of medication, Mr Logo was able to draft a thorough, clear, and articulate witness statement dated 30 October, and to prepare a logical and chronological exhibit to it. He drafted complication and sophisticated draft undertakings. Mr Logo anticipated this point, saying that he had prepared the witness statement over 12 days, working in stages as his health had permitted. He said that had he not been able to spread the preparation of his statement over many days, stopping and resting whenever necessary, he would not have been able to complete it. Nevertheless, this shows that Mr Logo is clear-thinking and there is no reason, in my view, why he could not have prepared submissions in response to the CRO application, if he had wanted to do so. I also note that he was able to consider Dr Chappandra’s most recent report and to propose amendments to it.

64.This reinforces my view that Mr Logo is able to participate in this hearing, with appropriate adjustments, or at the very least was in a position to make written submissions for consideration by the Court on the CRO issue.

65.Fourth, it is important and instructive to identify the issues that the court would have to consider at a substantive hearing today, those being matters on which Mr Logo might make written and oral submissions. I leave aside the question whether, in light of my previous connection with 11KBW Limited, I should recuse myself (if Mr Logo chooses to take the point). I will deal with this separately, later in this ruling.

66.The issues are:

(1)Whether, in light of the evidence, the Court should make a civil restraint order at all;

(2)If so, whether it should be a GCRO, or an ECRO, and whether the court should also make an order under its inherent jurisdiction which would apply to actions and applications in the ET and EAT; and

(3)Whether Payone should be awarded its costs of the application.

67.It is important to note that, so far as the underlying facts relevant to the applications for the CROs are concerned, there is effectively no scope for any challenge to them by Mr Logo. They are matters of public record about events and rulings in the various proceedings in which he has been involved. This is not, therefore, a case in which, if he does not participate in today’s hearing, Mr Logo will be deprived of the opportunity to dispute or challenge the evidence that is relied upon by Payone.

68.As for whether a CRO should be made, and, if so, what type, I bear in mind that Mr Logo has not said anything about this. However, this is, in my view, one of those matters referred to by Warby J in Decker in which it appears to the court at the outset that this is a matter on which Payone is bound to succeed. It is clear from the evidence of Ms Voss, which it would not be realistic or feasible for Mr Logo to dispute, that he has been the subject of a large number of “totally without merit” rulings, substantially in excess of the minimum of three that is required before a CRO can be imposed. There is a considerable body of other irrefutable evidence about the unreasonable way in which Mr Logo has pursued litigation, and has persisted vigorously in arguments that had become hopeless, and tried through various inappropriate means to revive points that he had already lost, all of which would support a CRO. In my judgment, it is also clear, in light of the undisputable evidence before the Court, that the only suitable type of CRO in the circumstances of this case would be a GCRO, accompanied by a further CRO under the inherent jurisdiction of the court (See

Law Society v Otobo

[2001] EWHC 2264 (Ch) at paragraphs 42-47 and 53). This is an application in respect of which the issue is straightforward.

69.Fifth, I note that HHJ Tindal chose at the last minute to revise his decision and adjourn the hearing that was listed before him on 26 and 27 October 2026. The judge made clear that his decision does not bind me. In fact, the evidence and considerations before me are different. The evidence is different because HHJ Tindal did not have the benefit of Dr Chappandra’s most recent report. The considerations are different because the hearing before HHJ Tindal is a 2-day hearing and, for all I know, it may well involve greater complexity and less straightforward issues than the issues before me.

70.Finally, there has been no suggestion by Mr Logo that my prior connection with 11KBW Limited is a reason why I should not consider his application to adjourn today’s hearing. The issue of appearance of bias arises, if at all, in relation to the substantive question of whether a CRO should be granted.

71.For these reasons, I would not adjourn today’s hearing because of Mr Logo’s health issues and his absence from the hearing.

Should the hearing be adjourned because of the appearance of bias question?

72.The other point that arises is whether I should adjourn because it would be unfair and inconsistent with the overriding objective to proceed without giving Mr Logo an opportunity to take advice and, if so advised, to make submissions that I should recuse myself because my previous position as Joint Head of Chambers at 11KBW, and as a former director of 11KBW Limited, gives rise to a potential appearance of bias.

73.If I were to adjourn for this reason, the matter would resolve itself, because it would make sense for me to direct that the CRO application come back before another judge who had no prior connection with 11KBW or 11KBW Limited.

74.The test for appearance of bias is whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude there is a real possibility of bias. ( Porter v Magill

[2002] 2 AC 357

). If such an appearance of bias exists, the judge has no discretion: he must recuse himself:

AWG Group v Morrison

[2006] EWCA Civ 6

;

[2006] 1 WLR 1163

, at paragraph 6. It follows, in my judgment, that the fact that the arguments in favour of the CRO appear to be strong is not a reason to refrain from recusing myself, if grounds for doing so otherwise exist. Unlike the question of adjournment in the absence of a litigant in person, the fact that the issue before the court appears straightforward is not a relevant consideration when a judge considers whether to recuse himself or herself.

75.Guidance on the circumstances in which the appearance of bias may arise has been given by the Court of Appeal in Locabail v Bayfield Properties

[2000] QB 451 , see especially paragraph 22. There must be substantial evidence of a real possibility of apparent bias, but “…if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal” ( Locabail , paragraph 25).

76.It is clear that, where an issue of appearance of bias arises, it is important that the judge discloses it, and that the parties have an opportunity to make submissions about it. This was made clear by the House of Lords in Davidson v Scottish Ministers

[2004] UKHL 34 . At paragraph 19 of his speech, Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:

“It is very important that proper disclosure should be made in such cases, first, because it gives the parties an opportunity to object and, secondly, because the judge shows, by disclosure, that he or she has nothing to hide and is fully conscious of the factors which might be apprehended to influence his or her judgment. When such disclosure is made, it is unusual for an objection to be taken…”

77.In the more recent case of Halliburton Co v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd

[2020] UKSC 48 ; [2021] A.C. 1083 , the Supreme Court once again emphasised the importance of disclosure when an issue of the potential appearance of bias arises.

78.Mr Logo was not made aware of, or given an opportunity to make submissions upon, the “appearance of bias” issue at a stage that would have given him an opportunity to make submissions about it today. This is absolutely not the fault of Payone or their legal representatives. As I have said, this matter did not crop up until the day before this hearing, and there was nothing that would have alerted anyone to it before that day. I only discovered that I would be the judge dealing with this case on the late afternoon of Friday 30 October 2026, when I came out of court after giving judgment in another matter. I dealt with the immediate matter before me that afternoon, which was the renewed application to adjourn on health grounds, but I did not read into the papers relating to the CRO application until Monday 2 November 2026. I informed the parties about the issue as soon as it came to light. This triggered the email from Mr Logo yesterday evening, in which he said that “I need time to understand what it means and try to get some pro bono help.”

79.I do not think that the simple answer to this issue is that Mr Logo had already reached a settled decision not to attend today’s hearing before the issue arose, and so he has not, in reality, missed out on an opportunity to make representations on the appearance of bias point. Mr Logo has, from time to time, had legal representation. I do not know if this was on a pro bono basis or not. In any event, Mr Logo has not had the opportunity properly to consider whether, notwithstanding his stated inability to participate in the hearing, he might be able to say something on the appearance of bias point, or to instruct counsel to do so. Mr Logo has not waived or forfeited his right to make submissions on the appearance of bias issue.

80.In light of this, in my judgment, the central question is not whether I take the view that the “appearance of bias” test is satisfied in all the circumstances that have arisen. The question, rather, is whether it is arguable that there is an appearance of bias. If it is, then I must adjourn. This is because, if there is an arguable question of recusal because of the appearance of bias, Mr Logo must be given a reasonable opportunity to make submissions before the decision is taken. If there is no arguable issue of appearance of bias, then no problem arises, and Mr Logo suffers no injustice.

81.I have not found it easy to decide whether it is even arguable that an appearance of bias arises. The matter is close to the borderline. Mr Judd in his very helpful submissions, reminded me of the de minimis principle, as identified in Locabail at paragraph 10, and emphasised that my connection with 11KBW is historic and that, unlike the well-known

Pinochet case, there is no issue about the connection with the company showing sympathy with a particular social or political position that is ongoing. However, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot say that it is not even arguable that a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there is a real possibility of bias. As I have said, I ceased to be a director of 11KBW Limited in 2019, and even before then, my directorship was ex officio as Joint Head of Chambers. I have no financial or other interest in 11KBW Limited. It is well established that it cannot conceivably be a ground for recusal that a judge was formerly in Chambers with counsel for one or other party. However, the issue here is different. My former Chambers’ service company is an interested party in the proceedings. My connection is, therefore, with an interested party, not with a party’s representative. I was a member of those Chambers for many years, and I was a member of its management committee or senior leadership for most of that time. I was a director of the service company for a considerable number of years. I cannot now recall how many, but my best estimate is at least 10 years. If the CRO is granted, then this will at least potentially have an impact upon the litigation between Mr Logo and 11KBW Limited, and there may be significant financial consequences, such as the saving of legal costs. Put bluntly, 11KBW Limited is a potential beneficiary of the CRO, in the sense that it would be protected from being the target of a new claim or an application in an existing claim. It is true that it is not the most serious litigation, but the essence of a CRO application is to protect a party from vexatious litigation, which may include onerous litigation where the actual matter at issue is slight. I bear in mind that the Court of Appeal said in Locabail that if any doubt exists, it should be resolved in favour of recusal.

82.On the other hand, the fact that a DSAR was submitted in relation to a barrister who is a former colleague of mine in my old Chambers could not, in my judgment, conceivably give rise to a potential bias issue.

83.The key point, in my judgment, therefore, is that a live issue exists as regards whether I should recuse myself or not. My provisional views relating to the strength of the appearance of bias argument are not the point. What matters is that, whatever my own view about whether this gives rise to an appearance of bias, I am satisfied that this is a connection which I should disclose and that the point is arguable. Given the timing of the disclosure, Mr Logo has not had the opportunity to consider or make submissions on the matter. This is through no fault of his own. It is because the disclosure of my connection took place at a point at which it was not feasible for him to do so at or in advance of today’s hearing. If I were to deal with the appearance of bias point today, he would, in practice, be no better off than if I had not disclosed the connection at all.

84.In my judgment, therefore, with considerable reluctance, the application for a CRO against Mr Logo will have to be adjourned.

85.I have taken account of the inconvenience and additional costs that will be incurred by Payone by reason of the adjournment. It is the result of a problem that no-one could have anticipated and it is not of Payone’s making. As Mr Judd emphasised, Payone has been bombarded with applications to adjourn in various strands of the litigation, whenever Mr Logo has nothing to gain from a particular hearing. Moreover, this is against the background that, on the face of it, the grounds for granting a CRO appear very strong. This is most unfortunate, but it cannot override the duty of fairness and the obligation to disclose a matter which may give rise to a potential appearance of bias.

86.Mr Judd suggested that the court could make a short time-limited order for a CRO, but that would not, in my view, solve the problem. I would still have to deal with the application for the CRO on its merits.

87.The hearing will be listed for the first available date, taking account of availability of Payone’s chosen counsel. I hope that the hearing can be relisted within a short time, though that will depend on the state of the lists. There is no need to delay the adjourned hearing because, as I have said, there is, in my judgment, no medical reason to delay the hearing of this matter. It is for this reason that I have considered the health issues in detail, even though they are not, as it turns out, determinative of whether an adjournment is granted or not. There is no question of adjourning the hearing until March or April 2027. Unless the medical position changes significantly, and there is clear proof of such a change, the adjourned hearing will proceed even if Mr Logo does not consider himself able to participate by way of oral representations.

88.I will direct that the hearing should not be before me or, out of an abundance of caution, before any other judge who is a former member of 11KBW Chambers, as this will mean that the appearance of bias issue falls away.

89.The adjournment will inevitably increase Payone’s costs, though the vast majority of the work done in preparation for this hearing has already taken place. I will reserve the costs of today’s hearing to the judge who deals with the application.

90.Even though I will not consider today whether to make a CRO, there are two matters that will afford Payone some protection in the meantime.

91.First, the order will record the undertakings offered by Mr Logo in his witness statement dated 30 October 2026 and so Mr Logo will be bound by them pending the adjourned hearing. Breach of the undertakings will be likely to amount to a contempt of court. There is no appearance of bias issue in relation to the undertakings, as Mr Logo offered them voluntarily. There is no scope for varying the undertakings, as Mr Logo is not here to discuss or consent to any such variations.

92.Second, I appreciate that these undertakings are, perhaps understandably, not acceptable to Payone, but if Mr Logo is as unwell as he says he is he should be in no fit state to issue proceedings or make applications and so Payone should not be disadvantaged by the adjournment, in this respect. They will have liberty to apply, so if it turns out that Mr Logo is active again in relation to any aspect of the litigation, they will have the opportunity to apply to the court as a matter of urgency, and the court may well take a dim view of Mr Logo’s conduct if he is active in the litigation again, despite what he says about his health.

93.There are two other matters. First, Mr Logo has applied for an oral hearing to appeal detailed assessment proceedings, which were previously listed on 28 July 2026, and were adjourned by Fordham J because Mr Logo had a kidney problem at the time of the hearing which required hospitalisation. Second, Mr Logo has applied to transfer the proceedings to Birmingham. These can be dealt with at the adjourned hearing.

94.I will arrange for a written version of this judgment to be issued so that the position is clear to Mr Logo.

95.In summary, therefore, I have decided that:

(1)The application for a CRO is adjourned;

(2)The interim undertakings offered by Mr Logo should be incorporated in my order;

(3)The hearing of the application is to be relisted on the first available date with a time estimate of half a day;

(4)Listing should take account of the availability of Payone’s counsel;

(5)The judge for the hearing should not be Cavanagh J or any other High Court Judge who was a former member of 11KBW Chambers;

(6)The parties have liberty to apply to vary these directions on 48 hours’ notice to the other party;

(7)Costs are reserved to the judge who deals with the adjourned application for a CRO; and

(8)The application to renew the application for permission to appeal the detailed assessment proceedings and the application to transfer the proceedings to Birmingham will be dealt with at the adjourned hearing.

1.This has been a hearing to deal with a number of applications for directions that relate to a contempt hearing that is currently listed to take place next week, in a window starting on Wednesday 4 November 2026, with a time estimate of 3 days. This means that there are only two working days before the hearing is due to commence.