Craig Aynsley v The Information Commissioner & Anor

1.This is an appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) dated 17 September 2025, reference IC-372434-Y0Z4 (the “Decision Notice”).

2.The hearing was conducted via CVP on Friday 14 August 2026. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to conduct the hearing in this manner. The Appellant represented himself. The First Respondent did not attend. The Second Respondent was represented by Mr Steven Linsdell-Bell.

Factual background

3.The appeal relates to the application of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“the EIR”). It concerns information requested from the Second Respondent, North Tyneside Council (“the Council”) relating to the construction of a fence in Backworth, Newcastle Upon Tyne.

The request and response

4.The Appellant made the request which is the subject of this appeal on 19 December 2024 in writing as follows:

“In June & July 2024 I received information from North Tyneside Council through a Freedom of Information request relating to a contribution of 50% towards the cost of the installation of the fencing to the west of the Backworth Park Primary School site, east of Hotspur North and Willow Grove.

FOI-3538 & FOI-3634.

The value of this contribution from North Tyneside Council was £4,411.

This relates to the original fencing installation, arranged by Story homes prior to the commencement of the school development.

Under the Freedom of Information act could I request copies of all documents, emails, specifications and drawings relating to this fence that was paid for by North Tyneside Council”.

5.The Council initially acknowledged the request on 20 December 2024. The Council responded to the request on 02 January 2025 and refused the request, relying on regulation 12(4)(b) EIR, namely that the request for information was manifestly unreasonable. The Council stated that:

“The reason for this [ie. the refusal] is the Authority considers all information relating to this matter has already been disclosed to you under Environmental Information Regulations, the Freedom of Information Act and through the Authority’s normal course of action, in addition to what is available to view online via the planning public access pages.

Although the Authority has provided you with the information you require, you continue to contact staff members directly requesting the same information.

The Authority considers your request does not appear to have a value or serious purpose in terms of there being an objective public interest in the information sought; instead, this information only serves your private interests.

Under Environmental Information Regulations we need to apply the public interest test. We need to demonstrate how we meet our obligations, but at the same time we need to balance transparency with risk.

The Authority considers these requests demonstrate an unreasonable persistence and inappropriate use of the public authority’s resources.

The Authority acknowledges there is a public interest in disclosing the requested information as it would demonstrate the Authority is working in an open and transparent manner. However, the information requested has already been disclosed in response to previous requests for information.

The Authority does not consider it to be in the public interest to expose staff to a disproportionate burden, unjustified level of distress or disruption. Allowing such things to take place has a negative impact on the work undertaken by staff, which would not be in the public interest.

On balance of the public interest test, we believe that public interest lies in upholding the exemption and not releasing the information”.

6.The Appellant requested an internal review of the decision to withhold the requested information on 21 February 2025, stating as follows:

“I disagree with the outcome of the public interest test because public funds were used to construct a fence of an acoustic BD-69 specification with drainage which was never constructed as per the submitted drawing submitted and shown on the North Tyneside Council Planning Portal.

I have also not been provided with all of the documents, emails, specifications and drawings relating to this fence that was paid for by North Tyneside Council.

Backworth Park Primary School have not built their own boundary fence as per all of the architect’s drawings and discharged planning conditions and are instead using the property’s fence to meet their planning conditions”.

7.The Council provided the outcome of its internal review on 04 March 2025, in which it upheld the original response that the Council had been entitled to refuse the request under Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR. The Council stated that

“a thorough search of all records held has been completed”

and that

“the Authority considers that all information held in relation to this matter has already been disclosed to you under the Environmental Information Regulations, the Freedom of Information Act and through the Authority’s normal course of action, in addition to what is available to view online via the planning public access pages”.

The Council also informed the Appellant that they would consider refusing any further requests about Backworth Park Primary School under Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR.

The complaint to the Commissioner

8.The Appellant lodged a complaint with the Commissioner on 13 March 2025. He stated that the Council’s assertion that all information held in relation to his request had already been disclosed to him was “untrue as all the information has not been provided to me as I have only been provided with the amount spent, date and to whom”. The Appellant further stated as follows:

“I have not been provided with any of the emails or documents relating to this payment or what the payment was specifically for or that the item has been constructed as public money was spent.

No information is held on the planning portal regarding this payment or even regarding the discussion that took place”.

9.The Appellant also disagreed with the Council’s conclusion that they were correct to rely on Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR, stating that public funds had been paid to Story Homes for a fence of a certain specification and yet that fence had never been constructed and there had been a fraudulent misuse of public funds.

The Commissioner’s investigation

10.The Commissioner accepted the complaint for formal consideration on 25 March 2025.

11.On the same date, the Appellant emailed the Commissioner to provide further information to explain the basis for his request. In summary, he detailed the following:

i.

When he purchased his home in 2020, there was a single fence to the rear of the property;

ii.

The Appellant was informed by the developer of the land that another fence would be constructed to the rear of the existing fence, leaving a strip of land in between the fences for access and maintenance;

iii.

On purchasing the property, the Appellant had conducted property searches on the Council’s Planning Portal which recorded the discharge of three planning conditions (namely planning condition numbers 33, 35 and 46) on the basis of proposed mitigation measures that consisted of the construction of a minimum 2.4 metre-high acoustic fence along the west boundary of the school that was located to the rear of the Appellant’s house;

iv.

The Council had “misrepresented discharged Planning Conditions and provided Property Search North East my property searches provider with inaccurate false and fraudulent information due to adverse entry’s within the Local Authority Planning Portal” ;

v.

The Council had subsequently indicated to the Appellant that the 2.4 metre-high fence was not going to be built. The Council had also informed the Appellant that the maintenance of the existing fence was his responsibility, and that he must seek permission from the Council to carry out any maintenance work;

vi.

The Appellant had later discovered that, in 2016, an agreement had been reached between the developer (Story Homes), the land owner and the Council that the second fence would not be built and that, instead, the fence at the rear of his property would be replaced with a higher specification fence. The Council agreed to pay half of the cost of the new fence, and paid £4,411 to the developer from public funds. No documents relating to this agreement were available on the Council’s Planning Portal. Again, the fence and drainage was never constructed as per the specification;

vii.

The Council subsequently paid an additional £4,944 from public funds to Story Homes in 2024 to implement drainage to the rear of the fence which was, in the Appellant’s view, an unjustified expenditure as the Council had already paid the developer to construct the fence and drainage in 2016 but they had not done so;

viii.

The Appellant concluded by stating that “I would be most grateful if you could investigate this as North Tyneside Council have discharged Planning Conditions and paid Story Homes £4411.00 for a fence with drainage that was never constructed and further wasted £4944.00 for drainage to actually be implemented which is a complete miss use of public funds. Currently the fence which Backworth Park Primary School are using to secure their boundary and meet noise mitigation is about to collapse and should it collapse then there will be no noise mitigation and no secure boundary and Backworth Park Primary School will be in breach of Planning Conditions 33, 35 & 46”.

12.On 02 September 2025, the Commissioner contacted the Council about the Appellant’s complaint, asking the Council to explain why they relied on Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR to refuse the request. In particular, the Council was asked to provide details of the detrimental impact of complying with the request, why the impact of complying with the request would be unjustified or disproportionate in relation to the request itself and its inherent value or purpose, and whether there was any relevant wider context and history to the request.

13.The Council provided a response to the Commissioner on 16 September 2025, stating the following in summary:

i.

Between 23 March 2024 and 28 January 2025, the Council’s Information Governance Team had responded to ten requests submitted by the Appellant pursuant to either the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“the FOIA”) or the EIR. The Council stated that “most of these requests specifically related to the boundary fence situated between Mr Aynsley’s property and the Backworth Park Primary School” ;

ii.

The Appellant had also been “persistently seeking” information from multiple departments within the Council since July 2023, including from Legal Services, Environmental Health, Planning, Corporate Complaints, and the Office of the Chief Executive. The Council provided an annex which set out a series of emails from September 2023 to March 2024, and stated that the enquiries all related to the same underlying issue with the fence;

iii.

The Council stated that the same issue has been escalated to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman by the Appellant and enclosed a copy of the final decision which had been issued in January 2025. The Ombudsman’s final decision was that no fault was found about the Council failing to ensure compliance with planning conditions or failing to take enforcement action in relation to the fence, although it had failed to follow the proper procedure when dealing with the Appellant’s complaint;

iv.

When referring to the previous requests, the Council stated that “The volume, frequency, and overlapping nature of these requests have required a disproportionate amount of officer time and resources. This sustained level of engagement is significantly interfering with the Authority’s ability to carry out its core functions and statutory responsibilities” ;

v.

The Council indicated that, on 28 June 2024, it had issued a formal warning letter to the Appellant advising that, due to the volume and repetitive nature of his correspondence regarding the fence, as well as other matters concerning the school, any future requests may be considered to be manifestly unreasonable under the EIR. Notwithstanding that warning, they had received a further request from the Appellant in December 2024. The Council stated that “The continued submission of requests on the same subject, despite comprehensive disclosures and clear communication, demonstrates a pattern of behaviour that places an unreasonable burden on the Authority’s resources” .

14.In addressing the public interest test, the Council responded as follows:

“The Authority acknowledges that, in principle, the disclosure of environmental information serves the public interest by promoting transparency, accountability, and public trust in decision-making processes and can help demonstrate that the Authority is acting fairly and lawfully. In this case, the requested information has already been previously disclosed through various avenues.

While we remain committed to transparency, the Authority must also consider the impact of repeated requests on its staff and resources. Responding to these requests has required a disproportionate allocation of officer time across several departments.

In this case, the concerns raised do not serve a broader public interest and appear to be of personal significance to the requester alone. Outside of Mr Aynsley, there is little to no indication of wider public interest in the matter of the fence between the school and neighbouring residential properties.

Balancing the public interest in transparency against the adverse impact on staff and service delivery, the Authority has concluded that the request is manifestly unreasonable under Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR. We believe that maintaining this exception is justified and proportionate in the circumstances”.

Decision notice

15.The Decision Notice was issued on 17 September 2025. The Commissioner’s decision was that the request was vexatious and therefore the Council was entitled to rely on Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR to refuse it. The Council were not required to take any further steps.

16.In summary, the background and reasons for the Commissioner’s decision were:

a.

The requested information related to decisions taken concerning the building of a fence. The Commissioner considered that the information was therefore likely to fall within the definition of “environmental information” in Regulation 2 of the EIR and so he assessed the case under those regulations;

b.

The Commissioner referred to his guidance on the application of Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR, noting that the Council’s position was that the request submitted by the Appellant, when taken in the context of previous requests and as a whole, was vexatious and that responding to it would impose a significant burden;

c.

The Commissioner noted that Regulation 12(2) of the EIR creates a presumption towards the disclosure of requested information which must be taken into account in any public interest test which is required, and also noted that engaging Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR was a high hurdle;

d.

The Commissioner referred to the leading case on the interpretation of section 14 of the FOIA, namely

Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield

[2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)

, which can also provide assistance in relation to the approach to be taken to Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR. The Commissioner confirmed that Dransfield established that the key question for a public authority to ask itself was whether the request was likely to cause a disproportionate or unjustified level of disruption, irritation or distress. The Commissioner highlighted the four themes that were considered in Dransfield

, namely the burden on the public authority and its staff, the motive of the requester, the value or serious purpose of the request, and any harassment or distress of or to any staff;

e.

In considering the burden on the public authority and its staff, the Commissioner concluded that “although the complainant’s requests were not intended to harass the council, the overall impact of the requests, when seen in context, would create a significant burden upon it. The Commissioner is satisfied that the volume of requests and parallel enquiries to other council departments create a difficult set of circumstances within which to work to respond to requests accurately and within the appropriate time limits. This would have placed council staff under a significant degree of stress and pressure”. The Commissioner noted that, between April and June of 2024, the Appellant submitted seven requests for information relating to the fence;

f.

Regarding the motive of the requester, the Commissioner concluded that there was value in allowing oversight of the Council’s actions in relation to whether they had implemented planning conditions and any associated risk to public safety;

g.

The Commissioner also concluded that there was a public value to the Council being transparent about its actions as a planning authority, particularly where there were concerns about public safety;

h.

Whilst the Commissioner recognised that the Council was not submitting that any of the Appellant’s requests had been abusive or threatening in any way, he did note the burden that would be placed on staff through the continuation of requests from the Appellant and the general burden of responding to numerous requests for information received within a short period of time. He referred in particular to the Appellant sending thirty-three emails to other council departments between September 2023 and March 2024;

i.

The Commissioner noted that, in relation to the wider context, he had not been provided with evidence that demonstrated that concerns about the fence extended beyond the Appellant’s own concerns linked to his property, albeit he recognised that the Council’s obligations as a planning authority and safety concerns have a broader value;

j.

The Commissioner took the view that responding to the request was unlikely to lead to the Appellant being satisfied, and that it was extremely likely that further requests would be made. In support of this view, he noted that the Appellant had continued to pursue their request and complaint after the Ombudsman had issued its conclusions in relation to the substantive matter;

k.

In his conclusion on whether the exception was engaged, the Commissioner held that, whilst he acknowledged the public value behind the requests, he had “also considered this relative to the length of time over which requests / enquiries have been made, and the amount of time the council has already spent addressing the complainant’s requests and queries. The Commissioner’s view is that responding to the request would cause the council significant disruption to the extent that his would negatively impact on its ability to carry out its other statutory duties”. The Commissioner therefore concluded that Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR was engaged by the Appellant’s requests;

l.

In considering the public interest test, the Commissioner acknowledged that an interrogation of the Council’s handling of the issue relating to the fence might be of broader public interest. Whilst he recognised that the Appellant had an interest in pursuing the matter, he determined that it was not reasonable to continue to make requests for information where no possible response will result in any changes to the substantive matter, and that more appropriate remedies were available to the Appellant rather than via requests for information;

m.

The Commissioner held that the public interest rested with the exception being maintained, stating that, “whilst the Commissioner accepts that the complainant’s requests reflect a valid concern, he does not consider that this concern reflects a broader public interest in this specific matter. He considers that any public interest has already been met by previous disclosure of information by the council. It is not, therefore in the public interest for the council to respond to this request as doing so would create a manifestly unreasonable burden which would detract it from carrying out its other statutory functions” ;

n.

Whilst recognising that there is a presumption in favour of disclosure, the Commissioner considered that the request in the context of previous requests would place a grossly oppressive burden upon the Council and damage its ability to deliver other services, and so he did not consider that there was an equal or greater public interest in compliance with the request.

Grounds of appeal

17.The Appellant appealed on 13 October 2025.

18.The Grounds of Appeal were, in essence, that:

a.

The Council had failed to inform the Commissioner that they had provided factually incorrect and fraudulent information to the Appellant’s solicitor when he was purchasing the property;

b.

The Council had been deliberately obstructive throughout the process, and had informed him to submit further FOI requests if he was seeking more information;

c.

The Appellant stated that he had only contacted the Council on six occasions regarding information about the fence and that “even then it is because the local authority blatantly withheld the full facts and dates” ;

d.

The Appellant stated that the six formal requests that he had made for information relating to the fence had been made on 09 April 2024, 19 th April 2024, 24 th May 2024, 11 th June 2024, 20 th June 2024 and then on 19 th December 2024.

The response of the Council

19.The Council issued a response on 11 November 2025.

20.The response stated as follows:

“Please see documentation as supplied by ICO. This includes North Tyneside Council’s documentation and grounds, supporting documents and chronology for opposing the appeal”.

The response of the Commissioner

21.The Commissioner’s response, dated 12 November 2025, maintained that the Decision Notice was correct. The Commissioner submitted that, in all of the circumstances of the case, the request was manifestly unreasonable and that the public interest in the maintenance of the exception in Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the withheld information.

22.The Commissioner placed reliance on the Court of Appeal decision in Dransfield, in which the Upper Tribunal held that, for all intents and purposes, the term “manifestly unreasonable” has the same meaning as “vexatious” under section 14(1) FOIA.

Legal Framework

23.The relevant provisions of EIR are as follows:

5.Duty to make available environmental information on request

(1)Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request.

(…)

12 Exceptions to the duty to disclose environmental information

(1)Subject to paragraphs (2), (3), and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if – (a)

an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and (b)

in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

(2)A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.

(3)

(…)

(4)For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that – (a)

(…)

(b)

the request for information is manifestly unreasonable;

(c)-(e)…..

(…)

24.The EIR does not provide any assistance as to what is meant by ‘manifestly unreasonable’. The Upper Tribunal gave guidance in Information Commissioner v Devon County Council and Dransfield

[2012] UKUT 440 (AAC)

, upheld and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council; Craven v Information Commissioner and Department for Energy and Climate Change

[2015] EWCA Civ 454

.

The question was posed as to whether the tests under section 14 of the FOIA and Regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR have the same meaning, with the Court of Appeal concluding that, to all intents and purposes, they do.

Given that the two tests are essentially the same, references below to “vexatious” should be read as references to “manifestly unreasonable”.

25.As noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the Court of Appeal in Dransfield , the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one:

“…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious” (para 68).

26.Judge Wikeley’s decision in the Upper Tribunal sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. The ultimate question is,

“is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?”

(para 43). In the context of reviewing the Commissioner’s Guidance, Judge Wikeley highlighted

“the importance of adopting a holistic and broad approach to the determination of whether a request is vexatious or not, emphasising the attributes of manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests”

(para 45). Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal also emphasised that a

“rounded approach”

is required (para 69).

27.The Upper Tribunal set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious (or, for the purposes of this appeal, manifestly unreasonable):

a.

The burden imposed on the public authority by the request.

This may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings between the parties. “…the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor” (para 29);

b.

The motive of the requester.

Although FOIA is motive-blind, the Upper Tribunal observed that “what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority” (para 34);

c.

The value or serious purpose of the request .

Regard should be had to the inherent value of the request, specifically “does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?” (para 38), albeit that a lack of apparent objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own;

d.

Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff . Vexatiousness “may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive” (para 39), although this is not a prerequisite for concluding that a request is vexatious.

28.Overall, the purpose of section 14 (and, by inference, the corresponding provision in regulation 12(4)(b) EIR) is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (Upper Tribunal, para 10).

The role of the Tribunal

29.The Tribunal’s remit is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of his discretion, whether he ought to have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner.

Issues

30.The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law and whether the Information Commissioner was correct in upholding the decision of the Council to rely on regulation 12(4)(b) EIR in refusing the Appellant’s request.

31.The issues for the Tribunal are:

i.

Whether in all the circumstances of the case, the request for information was manifestly unreasonable; and ii.

Whether in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information.

Evidence

32.We read and took account of an open bundle containing 157 pages including indexes. We also read and took account of additional documents submitted by the Appellant and the Second Respondent on 13 August 2026, at the request of the Tribunal, labelled as 033(a)-033(j), 034 and 034(a).

Witnesses

33.The Case Management Questionnaire submitted on behalf of the Second Respondent on 11 November 2025 indicated that they intended to rely on the evidence of three witnesses, namely E.Phillips, P.Abbott, and L.Chruszczewski. Prior to the date of the hearing, the Second Respondent indicated that they were no longer seeking to rely on the evidence of P.Abbott due to the non-availability of the witness.

34.No witness statements were submitted for E.Phillips and L.Chruszczewski. On the day of the hearing, the Second Respondent indicated that it was not seeking to rely on the witnesses in the absence of any statements from them. No application for an adjournment was made.

Oral submissions - Appellant

35.The Appellant outlined the background to his requests, explaining that he had purchased a new-build property in 2020 which backed onto a primary school. At the time of purchase, there was a single fence to the rear of the property, and the Appellant had been informed that another fence, namely a 2.4 metre-high acoustic fence, would be constructed to the rear of the existing fence, with a strip of land between the two fences for maintenance and access. The new fence was marked on the property deed plan and the plans for the school.

36.At the time of the purchase, the Appellant had carried out a series of property searches on the Council’s Planning Portal, which showed that specific Planning Conditions had been discharged based on proposed implementation measures, namely the construction of the additional fence.

37.The 2.4 metre-high acoustic fence was, in fact, never constructed. The Appellant stated that, in his view, the Council had misrepresented the discharged planning conditions and had provided his property search provider with fraudulent information. The Appellant stated that, if he had known that the fence was not going to be constructed, he would not have purchased the property.

38.The Appellant stated that the school was now using his property fence to secure their boundary. In addition, he had been informed that the maintenance of the fence was his responsibility but that he was required to obtain permission from the Council to carry out any repairs.

39.The Appellant also stated that he had discovered that the Council and the property developer had discussed the issue of construction of the additional fence in 2016, and had agreed that, rather than build another fence, the existing fence at the rear of his property would be replaced to meet the planning specification. The Council had agreed to pay half of the cost of the replacement fence, namely over £4,000. These discussions and the payment by the Council were not referenced anywhere on the Council’s Planning Portal. The fence had never been constructed, and so there had been a fraudulent discharge of Planning Conditions and a waste of public funds.

40.When the Appellant purchased the house, he noted that the rear fence was buckling. It was confirmed at that stage that the fence had not been constructed in compliance with the specification. The Council had then paid further money from public funds to implement drainage in March 2024, even though this had already been paid for in 2016.

41.The Appellant stated that obtaining information about the payments was in the public interest as it related to the use of public funds. In addition, public Council records should be kept up to date, whereas the Appellant’s contention was that the Planning Portal records were incorrect.

42.The Appellant confirmed that not all of his requests for information to the Council related to the fence, referring to at least one request that concerned parking restriction enforcement. On that occasion, he had asked the Council informally to provide the number of parking tickets issued on a particular day and had been told to submit a FOI request.

43.The Appellant stated that, in relation to information concerning the fence, it had been the Council who had told him to submit FOI requests or that the information was already on the Planning Portal.

44.The Appellant concluded by stating that he was just trying to find out why the Council had not updated the Planning Portal with the correct information and why the fence had not been built.

45.In response to questions from the Tribunal, the Appellant indicated that the gap in his requests between June and December 2024 was due to his ill-health. He stated that there were a number of requests relating to the fence as he had been drip-fed the information by the Council. He confirmed that he was particularly interested in how it transpired that the fence was not going to be built and why the Planning Portal had not been updated.

Oral submissions – Second Respondent

46.The Second Respondent accepted that at least two of the requests that had been referred to did not relate to the fence. It highlighted that, in relation to the requests concerning the school, the requests related to the Appellant’s disgruntlement about the construction of the fence, rather than about the information that had been supplied.

47.The Second Respondent stated that, if the Appellant believed that he had a legal complaint against the Council, he should address that through the courts rather than seeking to use the Tribunal as a mediator. It stated that it was not appropriate for the Appellant to be chasing information to supply evidence for a legal complaint where the information was already available publicly, had been previously supplied to him, or did not exist.

48.The Second Respondent said that the Planning Portal would never contain information about discussions between the Council and a developer on the exchange of funds and that any agreement reached in 2016 would have been superseded by the Planning Conditions in 2018.

49.The Second Respondent was referred to its schedule which purported to show thirty-three emails between the Appellant and multiple departments of the Council stating that, when the Appellant didn’t get the response that he wanted, he would escalate his request to the Ombudsman and the Commissioner. When questioned by the Tribunal, the Second Respondent acknowledged that the Appellant was neither the sender or the recipient in relation to all of the emails, stating that some of them related to members of the Council dealing with the Appellant’s requests instead.

50.The Second Respondent submitted that the Appellant had made repeated requests and had been told that they were either burdensome or that the requested information had already been provided. It confirmed that everything within the scope of the Appellant’s request had been provided already or was publicly available.

Discussions and conclusions

51.The Tribunal considered the non-exhaustive list of issues as set out by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield and the overall circumstances of the case, including the history of the relationship between the Appellant and the Council.

52.The burden imposed on the public authority by the request. This is a key factor relied upon by the Council. Whilst the mere fact that responding to a request may be burdensome, that in itself does not absolve the Council from their legal obligations under EIR. However, each request must be considered in context, and the Tribunal has therefore taken the previous dealings between the Appellant and the Council into account when assessing whether the request is manifestly unreasonable.

53.In their response to the Commissioner’s request for information, the Council relied on the fact that the Appellant had made ten requests for information over a nine-month period, primarily relating to the boundary fence situated between his property and Backworth Park Primary School. The Tribunal notes that one of those requests was made after the date of the request that is the subject of this appeal and related to a wholly different issue, and that one of the other requests also sought information concerning an unrelated matter.

54.The Tribunal has had sight of three of the prior requests and responses (request Nos. 3538, 3634 and 3640). All of those requests are very specific in terms of what was sought, and generated very specific answers. We accept the Appellant’s evidence that one of the reasons as to why there were multiple requests was because, when he received information via a response, it would generate a further question – or, as he put it, he was being drip-fed the information by the Council.

55.The Council also initially asserted that the Appellant had been “persistently seeking” information from multiple departments within the Council since mid-2023. In support of that contention, the Council produced a spreadsheet titled ‘E-mail chronology’ which detailed a total of thirty-two emails between 05 September 2023 and 15 March 2024. In its submissions, the Council relied on the fact that emails were sent to multiple departments, occasionally on the same day, as evidence that the Appellant would not give the Council staff the time to respond to an email and as evidence that the volume of the requests was creating a disproportionate resource requirement on the Council.

56.However, having reviewed the spreadsheet, we note that only eight of the emails were sent by the Appellant and only five of them were sent to him, or copied to him. All of the other emails were sent between Council officials or other individuals relating to queries or actions associated with the Appellant’s requests. Whilst we recognise that the aggregated burden of dealing with a series of requests is a relevant factor that we can take into account, we are not satisfied that the nature, frequency and scope of the requests and emails is sufficient to support the Council’s contention that the requests are overly burdensome.

57.The motive of the requestor. It is the case generally that the application of the EIR and any request made under it is not dependant on the motive behind the request. However, regulation 12(4)(b) is an exception to this principle. The motive of the requestor can be an important factor as to whether a request is manifestly unreasonable or vexatious in the wider context of the dealings between an individual and a public authority.

58.On a narrow view, the principal motive of the Appellant is a private one, concerning whether the Council have complied with planning regulations and undertakings. However, we do accept that the Appellant’s motives extend beyond his private concerns and demonstrate a wider value in allowing oversight and scrutiny of the Council’s actions in whether they had implemented planning conditions, particularly where public funds had been expended. We also conclude that the Appellant’s motives were linked, in part, to his concerns about public safety as a result of the perceived failure by the Council to comply with their obligations.

59.Value or serious purpose of the request. The Tribunal recognises, as did the Commissioner, that there is a public value to the Council being transparent about its actions as a planning authority, particularly where there are concerns about public safety and / or the expenditure of public funds. We are satisfied that the request has value and serious purpose.

60.Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff.

It is not suggested that the Appellant has used the extreme type of language referred to in Dransfield and nor can his behaviour be categorised as ‘extremely offensive’.

It is right to stress that the Council are not asserting that any of the Appellant’s communications have been inappropriate in themselves, but rather that repeated requests for information in itself has created harassment and distress. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there is any evidence of harassment and distress being caused to the Council’s staff. In coming to this conclusion, we note the limited number of emails from the Appellant, the absence of any communications between June and December 2024 and the fact that it was the Council itself who would, on occasion, advise the Appellant to either submit a further request for information or to contact a different department within the Council.

61.We also note that the Commissioner took the view that responding to the request was unlikely to lead to the Appellant being satisfied, and that it was extremely likely that further requests would be made. We do not agree with this assertion – from a review of the previous requests that we have seen, we take the view that they had been sent to clarify information that had been provided or to fill obvious gaps. We are not satisfied that there is evidence that the Appellant would continue to make requests even if the information sought was provided to him.

62.Having considered all of the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal finds that the request is not manifestly unreasonable.

63.Having concluded that the Regulation 12(4)(b) EIR exception is not engaged, we do not then need to consider whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

64.The Tribunal accordingly finds that the Council was not entitled to rely on Regulation 12(4)(b) EIR to refuse to reply to the request that is the subject of this appeal.

Conclusion

65.The Tribunal allows the appeal for the reasons given above and makes a Substituted Decision Notice in the terms outlined.