Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales
EUNICE ASIEDU-BANING v THE NURSING AND MIDWIFERY COUNCIL
Mr Justice Kolinsky:
1.This appeal is brought by Mrs Eunice Asiedu-Baning (“the Appellant”) pursuant to Articles 29(9) and 38(1) of the Nursing & Midwifery Order 2001 (“the Order”).
2.The Appellant is a registered midwife on the Respondent’s register.
3.Her appeal seeks to overturn decisions made by a panel of the Respondent’s Fitness to Practise Committee (“the Panel”) which concluded on 17 October 2025. The Panel determined that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired and imposed a striking-off order and an interim suspension order for 18 months to cover any appeal period.
Disciplinary Charges
4.The disciplinary proceedings relate to the Appellant’s work as an agency midwife at Milton Keynes University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (“the Hospital Trust”) during the night of 3-4 November 2017.
5.On 23 February 2018, the Respondent received a referral from the Hospital Trust that it had evidence that the Appellant had documented and signed observations in respect of two patients and their newborn babies which had not been carried out. It also alleged that an unknown medication had been administered without explanation.
6.The disciplinary proceedings have taken a very long time to reach their conclusion. I discuss this further below.
7.The allegations considered by the Panel were as follows:
“That you, whilst you were working as a registered midwife at Milton Keynes Hospital, on the night shift 03-04 November 2017
[charge 1] In relation to Baby A you i)
Made an incorrect entry in Baby A's medical records that you had taken a blood sugar reading at approximately 2415 [00:15], when you had not done so ii)
Made an incorrect entry in Baby A's medical records in that you recorded that you took a blood sugar reading of 5.3 mmols at approximately 0400 which was not an accurate record of a test you had carried out.
[charge 2] Your conduct at Charge 1i) and/or Charge 1ii) was dishonest because you created a record/s providing information about the state of Baby A's health which was not true.
[charge 3] In relation to Baby B you i)
Made an incorrect entry in Baby B's medical records that you had taken a blood sugar reading at approximately 0230, when you had not done so;
ii)
Made an incorrect entry in Baby B's medical records that you had taken observations at approximately 0230, when you had not done so.
[charge 4] Your conduct at Charge 3i) and/or Charge 3ii) above was dishonest because you created a record/s providing information about the state of Baby B's health which was not true.
[charge 5] You administered medication to Patient B, namely a "brown tablet", i)
Which was not clinically indicated for her at that time and/or ii)
Which you were later unable to identify and/or advise upon.
AND in light of the above, your fitness to practise is impaired by reason of misconduct."
8.The findings of the Panel were as follows:
Charge 1 – proved
Charge 2 - proved
Charge 3 – part i) not proved; part ii) proved
Charge 4 – proved in respect of charge 3ii)
Charge 5 – not proved.
9.The Panel then concluded: (a) that the findings amounted to misconduct; (b) that the Appellant’s fitness to practise was impaired on both public protection and public interest grounds; (c) that the appropriate and proportionate sanction was a striking off order; (d) that an interim suspension order should be imposed to cover the period of any appeal.
The Disciplinary Process
10.The lengthy procedural chronology is best described in two parts: (a) the period prior to the Panel hearing (which commenced on 23 January 2023) and (b) the Panel hearing.
11.As to the first period, the key stages were as follows.
12.The Respondent’s case examiner decided to refer the case to the Panel on 2 November 2018.
13.Pursuant to rule 7A of the Nursing and Midwifery Council (Fitness to Practise) Rules 2004 (SI 2004/1761) (as amended) (“the Rules”), the extent of that referral was reviewed by the Registrar. That review focussed on whether the referral was too narrow.
14.The Rule 7A process was completed on 12 September 2019. More extensive charges were referred to the Panel than the Case Examiner had recommended.
15.A panel hearing had been scheduled to take place on 20-28 April 2020, but this was postponed on 24 March 2020 due to the Covid 19 pandemic.
16.A panel was convened on 25 October 2021. It sat for six days. It determined certain preliminary matters (including the wording of the charges) and started to hear evidence. On the sixth day (2 November 2021), the chair of the panel had to recuse themselves as they recognised one of the witnesses.
17.On 29 April 2022, a preliminary hearing was held to determine the status of the procedural decisions taken by the 2021 panel. The approach taken was that their determinations as to the wording of the charges stood but a new panel would be convened to hear the evidence afresh.
18.The Panel commenced its hearing on 23 January 2023.
19.As it turned out, the hearing ran for 76 days (spread over a period of 2 years and nine months). This was much longer than had been anticipated. The hearing had originally been listed for 15 days. There were numerous adjournments during the process. The Panel’s decision chronicles key rulings made during the hearing.
20.At the start of the hearing, the Appellant was represented by Ms Neomi Bennett from the organisation “Equality 4 Black Nurses”. Ms Bennett is a nurse (not a trained lawyer) with experience of representing registrants in disciplinary proceedings. On day 12 of the hearing, the Panel expressed concern that Witnesses 1 and 2 had been subjected to unfair questioning and had been severely inconvenienced by the amount of time they had been on call waiting to give evidence. Following this the panel directed that written questions needed to be supplied by the Appellant’s representative in advance of witnesses appearing. It supplemented this direction with a clarification that this “did not preclude essential supplementary oral questions as directly relevant to the charges”.
21.On 21 October 2024, Equality 4 Black Nurses was unable to continue representing the Appellant. The Panel granted an adjournment to the Appellant notwithstanding opposition from the Respondent to allow her some time to seek new representation.
22.In March 2025, the Appellant was represented by Counsel who made two applications on her behalf: (a) that there was no case to answer; and (b) that the proceedings should be dismissed as an abuse of process due to the length of time which had elapsed since the incident to which the charges relate. The Panel gave reasoned decisions dismissing each application.
23.Thereafter, the Appellant did not attend the Panel proceedings. She sought to adjourn the process pending an application for judicial review (to which I will refer below). She sought to have the proceedings adjourned on grounds of her ill health. The Panel was not satisfied that her health issues had been sufficiently evidenced or that it was appropriate to adjourn. It proceeded in her absence.
24.Final decisions were made on 17 October 2025 with the full reasons being published on 30 October 2025.
Other Proceedings
25.As mentioned, following the refusal of the Panel to dismiss the case on grounds of abuse of process, the Appellant commenced a judicial review challenge. Permission to proceed with that claim was refused on the papers by Mr Mark Ockleton sitting as Judge of the High Court on 5 September 2025 and at an oral renewal hearing by Mrs Justice Lang on 11 December 2025.
26.The Appellant sought to overturn the interim suspension order by bringing a challenge pursuant to article 31(12) of the Order. That challenge was dismissed by HHJ Walden-Smith sitting as a Judge of the High Court on 27 July 2026 (following a hearing on 14 May 2026). Her judgment has the neutral citation number [2026] EWHC 1936 (Admin) .
27.Further, the Appellant has made complaints about the Respondent’s approach to data protection. There has also been passing reference to other disciplinary proceedings (which are not relevant to this appeal).
Statutory Context and Scope of Review
28.The Respondent’s functions in respect of allegations of impaired fitness to practise against registered nurses, midwives, and nursing associates (known as “registrants”) are governed by the Order.
29.The proceedings of the Respondent’s Fitness to Practise Committee are governed by the Rules.
30.The Respondent publishes guidance to parties involved in fitness to practise proceedings. This guidance is not binding on panels, but panels are expected to provide explanation if they depart from this guidance in their decision making. In the present case, it is apparent that the Panel drew on such guidance (as mentioned further below).
31.Articles 29(9) and 38 of the Order provide an appeal against an order made by a panel of the Respondent’s Fitness to Practise Committee. By virtue of Article 38(3) of the Order, the Court may:
a)
Dismiss the appeal;
b)
Allow the appeal and quash the decision appealed against;
c)
Substitute the decision appealed against for any other decision of the Panel; or d)
Remit the case to the Panel or the Respondent to be disposed of in accordance with the directions of the Court.
32.By virtue of CPR 52.21(3), the Court will only allow such an appeal where the decision was (a) “wrong”; or (b) “unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity”.
33.The approach to such appeals has been summarised in Cheatle v GMC
[2009] EWHC 645 Admin at paras 12 -15 as follows:
a)
The appeal is not confined to a point of law, but neither at the other end of the spectrum is it a de novo hearing, where the court hears the witnesses giving evidence again (para 12).
b)
The Court’s function is not limited to review of the panel’s decision, and in relation to findings of fact, it is entitled to exercise its own primary judgment on whether the evidence supported such findings. However, it will not interfere with a decision unless persuaded that it was wrong (paras 12 and 15).
c)
In relation to findings which reflect a professional judgement concerning standards of professional practise and conduct, the Court will exercise a distinctly secondary judgment. The extent of deference must be calibrated to the nature of the issues. The Panel will be best placed to assess fitness to practise and the seriousness of misconduct as these are questions which may turn on an exercise of professional judgment. Moreover, the Panel will have had the advantage of hearing oral evidence as assessing the reliability of the evidence which it heard (see para 15).
Preliminary Procedural Matters
34.The Appellant represented herself in these proceedings. At the outset of the hearing (on 13 October 2026), I dealt with two procedural matters.
35.First, I refused the Appellant’s request that the Court issue witness summons to compel the attendance for oral evidence to be heard from Witness 1 (duty matron) and 2 (midwife to whom the Appellant handed over) both of whom had given evidence before the Panel, the CEO of the Hospital Trust and the Case Presenter before the Panel. I did so because the Court does not ordinarily hear oral evidence in these appeals. The nature of the hearing (as explained above) is not a de novo hearing and I was not satisfied that it would impede a fair hearing for the Appellant to advance her case by reference to the documentation available to the Court (which included transcripts of all of the evidence heard by and submissions made to the Panel).
36.The second procedural issue that I had to consider was whether the Appellant should have permission to amend her grounds of appeal. Her original grounds of appeal contained nine grounds of challenge. She sought to rely on an amended notice of appeal which contained 19 grounds of challenge. There was some overlap but many new grounds.
37.The Respondent contended that it would be prejudiced by the expansion of these grounds and that the amendment did not meet the criteria for amendment in such cases explained by Mr Justice Chamberlain in Kavaarupo v NMC
[2020] EWHC 731 (Admin) at paras 20-24. Those criteria focus on (a) whether the grounds could have been raised earlier, (b) whether the amendment would cause prejudice, and (c) the extent to which the grounds had substance.
38.The circumstances of the present case differ from the situation which arose in Kavaarupo where the application to amend was made for the first time at the hearing. Here, the Appellant had sought to amend her grounds in June 2026. However, she had not obtained permission of the Court. The Respondent had only responded to the new grounds in bare outline in its skeleton argument (and contended that the expansion of the grounds was impermissible).
39.In these circumstances, the pragmatic course I adopted was to allow the Appellant to advance her arguments in respect of all matters but leave open the question of whether (and if so, to what extent) she should be permitted to amend. This meant that the Court could assess the extent of any prejudice to the Respondent in the context of the arguments in fact advanced.
40.This was an imperfect approach which sought to enable the appeal to be completed in the available Court time. Both parties agreed to proceed on this basis.
41.It plainly would have been much better for the scope of the appeal to be determined well in advance of the start of the hearing. It is important for there to be clarity as to the basis of the challenge and this need is not diminished by the fact that the Appellant is representing herself. There are risks of unfairness (potentially to both sides) if there is a lack of clarity as to the status of the grounds. Moreover, there is a substantial risk that Court resources will be inefficiently used if decisions about the status of grounds are left undetermined until the day of the substantive hearing. In this case, it would have been more helpful to the Court if the Respondent had been more proactive about seeking clarification as to the status of the amended grounds at an earlier stage.
The Appellant’s grounds of challenge
42.As originally pleaded, the Appellant raised the following nine grounds of challenge.
1.Procedural Unfairness
2.Disregard for Health & Vulnerability
3.Disregard for Judicial Review Process
4.Safeguarding Failures
5.Unreliable / False Witness Evidence
6.Delay Amounting to Abuse of Process
7.Legal Errors in the Decisions of 20 March 2025 and 17 October 2025
8.Delay in the provision of transcripts
9.Differential and discriminatory treatment.
43.In her amended grounds, 19 grounds were formulated as follows.
A1 - Procedural unfairness - this is the same as ground 1.
A2 - Delay- this is the same as ground 6.
A3 - The “Judicial Review Catch-22”- this is the same as ground 3.
A4 - Legal errors - this is an expanded version of ground 7.
A5 - Safeguarding failures (same as original ground 4) and GDPR breaches (new point).
A6 - Chair’s conduct: Structural Bias in the management of crossexamination (new point).
A7 - Discrimination and racial bias (original ground 9).
A8 - Lack of investigation (new point).
A9 - Broken complaint pathway (new point)
A10 - Lack of evidence integrity (new point).
A11 - Failure of the legal assessor (new point)
A12 - Breach of article 6 and 8 (new point albeit related to original ground 6).
A13 - Misfeasance in public office (new ground which relates to a separate complaint).
A14 - “six months of non-engagement and contradictory interim suspension order complaint” (this is mostly a new point).
A15 - Genuine panel determination has not been produced (new point)
A16 - Respondent’s summary is not a reliable record (new point)
A17 - Concern about document integrity (new point)
A18 - Disproportionate sanction (new point)
A19 - Cumulative unfairness (new catch all category drawing on previous grounds).
44.As is apparent from this list, the proliferation of points and introduction of new concerns causes difficulties.
45.I should say that, at the hearing, the Appellant made helpful oral submissions which sought to draw out the essence of her concerns with the process.
46.To assist with this, she handed in a speaking note which framed her submissions. This provided a helpful encapsulation of her concerns albeit that it was not cross referenced with her grounds or putative amended grounds.
47.I propose to consider her case taking account of the points which she emphasised in oral submissions. I will relate my conclusions to the pleaded and putative amended grounds (as identified above).
48.Mr D’Alton (Counsel for the Respondent) reasonably expressed concern about the difficulties which multiple iterations of the Appellant’s case caused him in terms of being prepared to address each point. He also noted that the reorganisation of points in the speaking note compounded these difficulties. I recognise some force in these concerns. However, he was able to help the Court address specific issues. I gave time for him to take instructions on a point in respect of which he needed time. He did not apply to adjourn or seek permission to produce further written submissions. I have, however, kept in mind the possibility that fairness may require the affording of such an opportunity where the Appellant’s case has materially shifted from how it was put in writing. I am grateful to his assistance to the Court in somewhat challenging circumstances.
Discussion
The Hospital Trust’s Investigations ( Amended Grounds A8, A9 and A10)
49.In oral submissions and in the amended grounds, the Appellant stressed her significant concerns in respect of the investigations which had been conducted by the Hospital Trust. These included (a) concerns about the pathway of the complaint (whether it had originated from a patient or a staff member), (b) concerns about the thoroughness of the Hospital Trust’s investigation and (c) her contention that black members of staff had not been interviewed and there was bias in the way which the investigation had been conducted.
50.It is clear from the transcript of the Panel proceedings that these points were tested in the evidence which the Panel heard. The Panel heard the evidence of Witness 1 (the matron) and Witness 2 (the midwife to whom the Appellant handed over). These witnesses were questioned extensively about the above matters by the Appellant’s representative.
51.I observe that there was a tension about how germane these concerns were to the Panel’s task in determining whether the charges had been proved. The Panel’s primary task was to adjudicate on the issues raised by the charges and decide whether any of the five charges had been proved on the balance of probabilities. It was not their task to undertake an inquiry into the systems at the Hospital Trust albeit that such matters may have contextual relevance.
52.The transcripts of the hearing show that this tension played out as the evidence was given. The Appellant’s representative undertook detailed cross examination about these concerns. The witnesses answered those questions. The exchanges were lengthy and at times, it seems, heated. The Panel Chair intervened to manage how the evidence came out (making reasonable interventions such as requesting that multiple questions were not asked, asking for pauses to allow evidence to be noted, ensuring that witnesses were not interrupted).
53.At first, considerable latitude was afforded to the Appellant’s representative to put the questions which she wanted to put. However, time estimates were significantly exceeded, and the hearing ran seriously behind schedule. As that happened, case management problems compounded. Witnesses were kept waiting and inconvenienced.
54.There came a point where the Panel felt it necessary to give guidance on the tone of the questioning and express concern about the cumulative impact of the way in which questions were being put and the overall experience for the witnesses.
55.Eventually, the Panel gave case management directions. These were designed to ensure that relevant questions were put, evidence was not repeated and more effective case management could take place. By the time this happened, most of the originally scheduled 15 days had been used up and the hearing was nowhere near finished.
56.The Panel permitted the Appellant’s concerns about the investigations at the Hospital Trust to be canvassed in detail. In their substantive decision, the Panel was entitled to assess for themselves the extent to which they were assisted by these points in deciding whether the charges before them were proved. The Panel considered the evidence it heard but maintained an appropriate focus on whether the specific allegations were established in respect of each of the five charges.
57.The Panel found that some of the charges were established and rejected others. They did this undertaking their own assessment of the witness evidence which was informed by their conclusions on the oral evidence including the cross-examination which focused on the investigation at the Hospital Trust.
58.I do not consider that the Appellant’s concerns about the investigations at the Hospital Trust emphasised in this Court undermine the Panel’s assessment or render it unjust by procedural irregularity. This was a matter which the Panel evaluated for itself in reaching its determination.
Delays (grounds 1, 6 and 7; amended Grounds A1, A2, A4, A12 and A19)
59.The Appellant raised concerns about the progress of the disciplinary process at all stages and cumulatively.
60.The approach to the evaluation of the impact of delay under article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights was addressed by Leggatt J (as he then was) in Okeke v Nursing and Midwifery Council
[2013] EWHC 714 (Admin) drawing on the Privy Council’s decision in Dyer v Watson
[2004] 1 AC 379 .
61.The approach in essence is to consider the length of delay to see if it gives rise to real concern. If it does, then it is appropriate to consider the complexity of the matter. At this stage, the explanation for the delay including the conduct of the parties is relevant. It is necessary to look at the consequences of any breach of the right to be heard in a reasonable period including whether it is unfair to continue with the proceedings.
62.Following this framework, I start by noting that the period of delay in this case – which at the time the application to strike out the proceedings for abuse of process was made– exceeded seven years. That lengthy period plainly gives rise to concern. On the face of it appears to be an inordinately long period.
63.It is necessary to evaluate the causes of this. I examine the process in sections and then consider the overall position.
64.The investigation stage to the production of the Case Examiners report on 2 November 2018 seems to me to have proceeded at a pace that cannot be criticised.
65.Thereafter, the case took an unusual (but not unprecedented) course. The Registrar reviewed the extent to which the Case Examiner had recommended charging the Appellant and expanded the basis of this. This reflected a process within the Rules (in rule 7A). This stage accounted for one year of the overall process. I do not consider that this stage was unreasonable. The availability of this review process is part of the safeguards within the Rules that are designed to ensure that the Respondent carries out their duties effectively having regard to the public interest of their regulatory functions.
66.Thereafter, the progress of the case was impacted by Covid 19. A scheduled hearing was postponed. This was an unsurprising outcome given events at that time. In the context of widespread disruption, this case was not regarded as amongst the most urgent for relisting. This was because that there was no interim suspension order in place. That seems to me to have been an appropriate system of prioritisation. Whilst there is a need for the timely determination of all disciplinary proceedings, it is appropriate (other things being equal) to treat the cases of those who are subject to interim suspension as more urgent due to the immediate impact of preventing registrants from practising during the disciplinary proceedings. The Appellant did not fall within that category as she was not subject to an interim suspension order whilst her disciplinary charges awaited determination.
67.A panel was convened in October 2021. Preliminary issues were determined and evidence was called. Then it transpired that the Chair knew a witness and decided it was necessary to recuse himself. That was unforeseen and caused delay. It added to the cumulative delay, but I do not consider that the cause of the delay rests with the Respondent. It was simply the result of an unfortunate and unforeseen turn of events.
68.It then took a further 14 months for the hearing to start properly. In April 2022 a preliminary hearing was convened to determine the status of the preliminary decisions taken by the last panel. It was then possible to start the hearing of the (new) Panel on 23 January 2023. Given that the hearing was listed for 15 days, it cannot be said that there was unreasonable delay in finding available hearing time.
69.From 23 January 2023, the Panel heard the case. As I have already said, it took much longer than expected. The way in which the Appellant’s case was put added to the length of the hearing materially. It is to be expected that if a hearing cannot be completed in the time allotted, there will be delays in relisting the matter. A part-heard matter needs to find available slots for rehearing that are possible for all essential participants.
70.As to the complexity of the case, I do not consider that the case itself can be described as complex. It relates to a few incidents on a single night shift. That said, from January 2023, there was added complexity resulting from the broader focus of the defence to the charges. This created issues which needed to be case-managed effectively. I have to say that I am not satisfied that the case management was always effective. The length of time which the matter took to conclude suggests that control over the proceedings was not maintained throughout. I acknowledge that the Panel faced a difficult and demanding situation to manage. However, I consider that the Panel hearing took much longer than was reasonable to conclude. In part, this results from the way in which the Appellant’s defence was advanced. However, part of the responsibility rests with the Panel itself which did not ensure that the matter was concluded as expeditiously as it might have been.
71.In March 2025, the Panel considered the abuse of process application. Its reasoned decision (bundle, p.287) referred to applicable NMC guidance (Reference: DMA-4). That guidance referred to the Appellant’s right to have her case heard in a reasonable time. It noted that time runs from the date of notification of the investigation. It advised: “the panel will only use its power to stop all or part of a case due to delay, in exceptional circumstances. This could be where there is real prejudice to the …midwife… which means that a fair hearing would be impossible because of the delays”.
72.The Panel considered the chronology of the proceedings. It directed itself that the relevant period is “approximately seven years from February 2018”. It analysed the reasons for and circumstances surrounding the delay. It specifically discussed (and rejected) the Appellant’s contention that fourteen months of delay was attributable to the availability of Witness 2; noting that on 17 October 2023, the Respondent was in a position to proceed without recalling this witness.
73.It addressed the impact on participants’ recollection of events as follows: “[the Panel] has already heard from the NMC witnesses, it has had sight of local statements and witness statements, and there are contemporary documentary records, including from [the Appellant]”.
74.It regarded the cause of the delay as “multifactorial”. It considered whether continuing would “offend the panel’s sense of justice and propriety” but concluded that it would not. Whilst delay was “clearly undesirable”, “these are serious allegations and there is a duty to ensure that serious allegations are considered, and resolving questions regarding [the Appellant’s] fitness to practise is in the public interest”.
75.Accordingly, the Panel rejected the application to stop the hearing on grounds of abuse of process.
76.The Panel did not follow the structured process identified by Leggatt J in Okeke . However, it does seem to me that in substance the Panel correctly addressed the relevant factors. They identified the delay and its causes. They weighed up the extent to which the Appellant would be disadvantaged focusing on the nature of the evidence which was most relevant to the case. They also appropriately focussed on the public importance of determining disciplinary charges of a serious nature.
77.Their approach was consistent with Attorney-General’s Reference (No.1 of 1990)
[1992] QB 630 (CA) which indicates that a stay for delay should only be imposed in “exceptional circumstances”. The guidance is that a party must establish “on the balance of probabilities that, owing to the delay, he would suffer serious prejudice to the extent no fair trial could be held”.
78.The Panel distinguished the case of Okeke in which four and a half years’ delay had been held to breach article 6 rights. In that case, the delay was unjustified. The Panel explained why it regarded the circumstances of the present case as distinguishable in that the delay had a variety of causes. In addition, I observe that in Okeke an interim suspension was in effect (pending determination of the disciplinary proceedings); that was not so here.
79.In my assessment the cumulative delay in these proceedings was extensive. By the time the Panel determined the matter, that delay was more than seven and a half years. That gave rise to real concern.
80.However, I consider that the Panel properly directed themselves (in March 2025) as to the multifactorial causes of the delay, the potential impact on the fairness of continuing and the public interest considerations in favour of determining the decision.
81.I do not consider that their approach was wrong.
82.Moreover, looking at the matter in the round, I evaluate the position as follows. The delay was very extensive. The underlying matter was not complex. Some additional complexity arose from the way in which the charges were defended but this could have been managed better by the Panel. There were additional stages (the rule 7A) review (but this was not unreasonable). There was lost time due to Covid (not unreasonable). There was unfortunate lost time due to the false start in October/November 2021 (but this was an unforeseen misfortune rather than the result of culpable delay). The need for adjournments of a part heard case after it had commenced in January 2023 were unfortunate but it would be difficult to find substantial time for a part-heard hearing which is suitable for all participants.
83.Overall, the delay was excessive. There were mostly but not wholly reasonable explanations for why it took so long. Ultimately, the critical focus is on whether a fair hearing can take place. As to that, I consider that the Panel was correct to focus on the nature of the evidence, whether it could decide the contentious issues and the public interest in determining whether the charges were well founded. I do not consider that it was wrong to conclude that the matter could still be concluded fairly.
84.For completeness, I mention two other points.
85.First, it was suggested that the Panel had a materially misleading chronology presented to them. I reject that suggestion. They had in mind the key points which had occurred and set them out clearly in their decision.
86.Second, the Appellant suggested in writing (in her amended grounds) that there was a breach of article 8. No submissions were developed on this. I have not identified any such breach. To the extent that this complaint relates to data protection issues, it seems to me that any potential remedy lies elsewhere.
The Decision to Proceed in the Absence of the Claimant (ground 1 and 2 and amended grounds A1)
87.The issue of the Appellant’s health was raised at various points during the hearing specifically in the context of seeking adjournments on 9 April 2025 and in September 2025 (when the request to adjourn related both to the judicial review proceedings and an assertion of ill health).
88.The Appellant did not provide the Panel with any supporting medical material.
89.In her oral submissions, the Appellant took the Court to emails sent in April 2025 to the Respondent’s case presenter which she asserted did contain supporting medical evidence in the form of details of prescriptions which she had and a sick note (said to indicate that she was suffering from stress). It is clear from this correspondence that the Appellant specifically directed that this material should not be passed on to the Panel. The Appellant explained this was due to data protection concerns.
90.In Lindsay v SRA
[2018] EWHC 1275 (Admin) at para 9, Mrs Justice Lang observed that “An application for a stay or adjournment on medical grounds must be supported by proper medical evidence”.
91.The Panel were referred in the hearing by the Respondent’s Case Presenter to the case of The Financial Conduct Authority v Avacade Ltd
[2020] EWHC 26 (Ch) at para 61 which cites the observations of Lewison LJ in Forresters Ketley v Brent
[2012] EWCA (Civ) 324 at para 25 addresses an adjournment application by reason of health related to stress and anxiety. The relevant passage states:
“Judges are often faced with late applications for adjournments by litigants in person on medical grounds. An adjournment is not simply there for the asking. While the court must recognise that litigants in person are not used to the stresses of appearing in court as professional advocates, nevertheless more than stress occasioned by the litigation will be needed to support an application for an adjournment. In cases where the applicant complains of stress-related illness, an adjournment is unlikely to serve any useful purpose because the stress will simply recur on an adjournment hearing”.
92.In deciding whether to adjourn (appeal bundle p.327), the Panel directed itself in accordance with the NMC guidance (CMT-11) to consider the public interest in the efficient disposal of the case, the potential inconvenience of adjourning and the fairness to the Appellant.
93.The Panel noted that the stress had been linked to the proceedings and that it had requested medical evidence to be provided. They noted the lack of medical evidence. They regarded it as a “finely balanced” decision whether to proceed but took account of the public interest in continuing with the disciplinary proceedings and the protracted nature of the proceedings. It therefore rejected the request to adjourn.
94.In the light of the refusal of the Appellant to allow the Panel to see any specific medical evidence which may have existed, I do not consider that this evaluation was wrong.
95.The Panel exercised their case management powers in the difficult circumstances of a protracted case which needed to be concluded in a timely manner. I do not consider that it was unfair to proceed in the Appellant’s absence given her refusal to provide medical evidence to the Panel. I note that HHJ Walden-Smith reached a similar conclusion in paras 21-23 of her judgment.
“The Judicial Review Catch-22” (ground 3, amended ground A3)
96.The Appellant complains about the Panel continuing with its determination whilst her judicial review was on foot. She contends that this created a “catch-22” situation. The judicial review was ultimately dismissed, she says, as by the time of the oral renewal hearing, the Panel had already given its decision.
97.I am not persuaded that there is any unfairness in what occurred. The Court assessed whether the Appellant had an arguable case that the Panel had erred by rejecting her abuse of process application. On two occasions, it determined that she did not. She did not obtain a stay of proceedings.
98.The Panel considered for itself whether it was appropriate to proceed. It balanced fairness to the Appellant against the public interest in determining these disciplinary charges taking account of how protracted the process had been. In my judgment there was no error in how the Panel approached the judicial review. I assess in this judgment whether the overall process itself was unfair taking account of the totality of the process.
The Panel’s Approach to Restricting Questions (amended ground A6)
99.I have described above how by day 12 of the proceedings the evidence was running behind schedule. It is apparent that the Panel was concerned that witnesses were having an unreasonable experience because of the length of time which they had spent waiting to give evidence and due to the nature of the questioning which they had experienced.
100.In respect of the nature of the questioning, the Panel was careful to differentiate between (1) allowing robust and thorough cross-examination and (2) ensuring that the tone and nature of the cross examination did not become oppressive. I give a few examples of this distinction from the transcript.
101.At line 19 of page 2099 of appeal bundle (in the course of Witness 1’s evidence), the Chair reminded the parties in neutral terms of the “collaboration, fairness and kindness”. This was a reference to the tone in which questions were put to witnesses.
102.To similar effect, at line 19 of page 2215, the Chair stated: “it is incumbent upon everyone who is participating in this hearing to be mindful of the well-being of everyone else who’s participating in the hearing and to that end, I would remind the representatives to be mindful of their tone and manner when asking questions, and specifically that they should be respectful in their tone and manner at all times when asking questions of the witnesses”. As I read this, this was expectation setting expressed in neutral language (albeit that the only cross examination which had taken place by that stage was by the Appellant’s representative).
103.Finally, at line 12 of page 2293 of the appeal bundle, the Chair discussed her concerns in respect of questioning which had taken place in the following terms: “It wasn’t the content it was the question. It was the manner in which the question was delivered that the Panel felt was inappropriate” She then clarified (at line 25) that this meant that it was “delivered in a raised voice” and “in a hostile manner”.
104.It is clear that the Panel were concerned about the tone of some of the questioning on behalf of the Appellant. From reviewing the transcript, this concern was expressed neutrally at first but then it was specifically directed to the Appellant’s representative.
105.There was a clear demarcation between the subject matter of the questions (as to which no adverse comment was made) and the tone of the question (which gave rise to concern).
106.The Panel had in mind the need to ensure that the case which the Appellant wished to advance was not unreasonably restricted. However, they also kept in mind their duty to ensure that the overall proceedings were fair to all participants. The experience of witnesses at Panel proceedings is part of the responsibilities of the Panel. It may be that some discomfort in being subjected to questions and having to wait around is inherent in the process of giving evidence. But the nature of that experience is a matter in which the Panel can take a legitimate interest. If cross-examination becomes oppressive or hostile in tone, this is a matter that the Chair of the Panel should address.
107.It is necessary to tread carefully and strike the right balance. On the one hand, interventions should not have a chilling effect on an advocate’s ability to advance their client’s case. However, equally, advocates must ensure that their questioning does not become overbearing and oppressive.
108.The Panel were able to judge this in real time far better than I can assess it from reading the transcript. I am satisfied that the Panel trailed their concerns carefully and appropriately.
109.By the intervention on day 12, the Panel clearly felt that a tipping point had been reached. They were concerned that the tone of questioning was not improving and witnesses’ overall experience had become unacceptable (taking account of the tone of the questioning and the impact of the timetable overruns on them).
110.It was in that context that the Panel gave directions for written questions to be issued in advance. I consider that was a reasonable exercise of their responsibility to manage proceedings efficiently that was not incompatible with the requirements of a fair hearing. It arose from the timetable falling far behind schedule, their concerns as to the nature of the cross examination (as referred to above) and a reasonable desire to avoid repetition of evidence already given.
111.I recognise that it is impossible for me to judge tone based on transcripts. I can see from the transcript that the Panel had recurring concerns which they raised with increasing directness. I am not satisfied that in doing so they acted inappropriately or in a way which undermines their decision.
112.I do, however, add this general observation. Adjudicators need to be mindful that the concept of an inappropriate tone might carry with it cultural expectations which might impact unequally on participants in the proceedings. The Equal Treatment Bench Book sounds a relevant note of caution in this regard at p.152 (para 73) which states as follows: “Parties may demonstrate emotion differently, both when telling their story during evidence and when arguing their case. For example, in one study, African Caribbean tribunal users expressed concern that they were culturally more likely to express emotion in a legal setting, which might have an adverse effect on how they were perceived”.
113.Given the Appellant’s concerns regarding racial bias and discrimination, I have considered with particular care whether the Panel’s assessment of tone may have reflected inappropriate cultural assumptions. In this case, however, I am not satisfied that the Panel’s approach was unfair or unsound. They tried to ensure that the Appellant’s case could be put but also to ensure that witnesses were not subjected to an overall unacceptable experience and that the case did not keep overrunning. Those matters needed to be managed as part of a fair and effective process. They attempted to do so neutrally and with guidance but reasonably became more direct as the management of the hearing became increasingly difficult.
The Substance of the Panel’s Decision (ground 5 and amended ground A4)
114.The Appellant sought to challenge aspects of the Panel’s substantive decision. Before addressing these points, I set out a summary of the Panel’s conclusions.
115.The Panel accepted the evidence of Witness 3, a registered Biomedical Scientist that there was a reliable report of the blood glucose tests that had been taken on the night shift.
116.The Panel reviewed documents provided by the Appellant. It specifically found that it was unclear which version of the Hypoglycaemia policy was in effect at the Hospital Trust on 3-4 November 2017 but held that “this did not assist it with the charges as these relate to making incorrect entries and not whether or not blood sugar reading should have been taken in accordance with the policy” (bundle p.366-7).
117.In finding that charge 1 was proved, the Panel (i) noted the entry signed with the initials “AB”, (ii) identified the defence to the charge as being that this had been made deliberately by someone else pretending to be the Appellant, (iii) noted the inconclusive nature of the expert handwriting evidence, (iv) noted the evidence from Witness 1 (matron) that she believed the entry was made by the Appellant and (v) noted the emphatic denial of witness 2 to the suggestion that she had falsified the entry; (vi) noted the denial of Patient A that she had falsified the record.
118.Standing back and reviewing the evidence, the Panel assessed that: “in all the circumstances, and in the light of the Appellant’s acceptance that it was a busy shift and her record keeping was affected, it was more likely than not that the entry …was made by [the Appellant]”. They assessed Witness 1 and Patient A to be consistent and credible. They noted some inconsistencies in Witness 2’s evidence but assessed that it did not relate to this charge.
119.In respect of charge 1(ii), the Panel reviewed the evidence and concluded that there was no evidence of blood sugar test being carried out at 4am on Baby A and that the entry was incorrect.
120.In respect of charge 2 (dishonesty in respect of the charge 1 incorrect readings), the Panel rejected as implausible the alternative explanations put forward of deliberately falsified entries and that witnesses had acted to set up the Appellant.
121.Directing itself as to the meaning of dishonesty by reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67 , the Panel concluded that the Appellant knew that she had not taken the blood sugar reading and recorded that she had. The Panel therefore found the charge proved on the balance of probabilities.
122.In respect of charge 3(i) blood sugar reading for Baby B, the Panel found this charge not proved. The Panel took account of a contemporaneous denial by the Appellant that she had made this entry, that this was consistent with the Appellant’s local statement that Baby B did not require blood sugar monitoring and concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge.
123.In respect of charge 3(ii), the Panel found Patient B’s evidence to be consistent and relied on the evidence of Witness 2 in concluding that the charge was proved.
124.As to dishonesty (charge 4), the Panel concluded that the Appellant would have known that she did not take Baby B’s observations at around 02:30 and, in documenting that she did, the Panel considered her actions to be dishonest. Applying the Ivey test, this was dishonest by the standards of ordinary, decent people.
125.In respect of charge 5, the Panel discussed some inconsistencies in the evidence and found that in the absence of any corroborative evidence, the Respondent had failed to discharge its evidential burden.
126.As is apparent from the above summary of the decision, the Panel assessed the evidence carefully in respect of each charge. Some were established but, in respect of two matters where the evidence did not support the charge, they rejected the Respondent’s case.
127.The Appellant sought to impugn certain substantive matters in her oral submissions.
128.First, she relied on the absence of a clear Hospital Trust Policy in respect of blood monitoring. However, on a fair reading of the Panel’s decision they accepted this contention but did not consider that it assisted with the charges relating to incorrect entries (which did not concern whether blood sugar reading should have been taken in accordance with the policy). Accordingly, this point does not undermine the Panel’s approach.
129.Second, in her oral submissions, the Appellant emphasised that Witness 2 had handed over to the Appellant at the start of her shift. There was some inconsistency in Witness 2’s evidence on this but the Panel directed itself in terms that “whether or not Witness 2 did or did not hand over to [the Appellant] does not assist the panel in adjudicating on the charges before it”. Given that conclusion, the Appellant’s contentions that Witness 2 was incorrect in respect of the handover do not impact on the soundness of the Panel’s conclusion.
130.Third, the Appellant criticised the Panel’s approach to handwriting evidence. She said that it was wrong for the Panel to rely on the evidence of Witness 1 that she believed the entry was made by her when the handwriting evidence was “inconclusive”.
131.It is necessary to say something about how the expert handwriting evidence came to be introduced. This was not originally a case in which any expert evidence was to be adduced. The Appellant’s representative sought to introduce expert handwriting evidence in the course of cross-examination of a witness. The Panel acceded to this request admitting the evidence but made provision for the Respondent to similarly adduce such evidence. The experts were initially saying different things and then when joint discussions were directed, they agreed that the position was inconclusive.
132.The context therefore was that a time-consuming exercise was started reactively and ran its lengthy course without assisting the Panel. That fact does not prevent the Panel exercising its overall judgment as to the totality of the available evidence. It was open to them to have regard to such evidence including the evidence of Witness 1 and their assessment of the inherent probability of the competing explanations put forward.
133.As I assess it, this is what they did in concluding that there was sufficient entry in respect of two of the three contentious entries that they had been made by the Appellant. In my judgment, they were not precluded from weighing the available evidence in this way and there is nothing wrong in the way that they did so.
The Panel’s Approach to Sanction (amended ground A18)
134.The Appellant criticised the Panel’s approach to sanctions as disproportionate.
135.The approach to review of sanction was helpfully framed by Cranston J in Cheatle v GMC
[2009] EWHC 645 (Admin) at [33], after reference to Bolton v The Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 :
“… it would require a very strong case to interfere with the sentence imposed by a disciplinary committee, which is best placed weighing the seriousness of professional misconduct. That a sanction might seem harsh, but nonetheless be appropriate, could be explained by the primary objects of sanctions imposed by disciplinary committees. One object was to ensure that the offender did not repeat the offence; the other, indeed the fundamental, objective is to maintain the standing of the profession.”
136.The Panel’s approach to sanction was reasoned as follows:
a)
It directed itself as to how to focus on impairment. It stressed the egregious nature of falsifying records and dishonesty which had brought the profession into disrepute.
b)
The Panel found that the Appellant had shown very limited insight.
c)
It focused on a risk of repetition in concluding that her fitness to practise was impaired both on public protection and public interest grounds.
d)
It identified the following aggravating features:i)
The concerns arose out of direct patient care to vulnerable mothers and their newborn babies.
ii)
The Appellant’s actions and omissions placed vulnerable mothers and their newborn babies at risk of unwarranted harm.
iii)
The Appellant’s actions, omissions and dishonesty caused actual emotional and psychological harm to Patient A and Patient B.
iv)
The Appellant has demonstrated very limited insight into her failings.
v)
There is no evidence of remediation.
137.In addition to these factors, the Panel had regard as an aggravating factor to the nature and quality of the defences advanced by the Appellant. They noted – “in accordance with [the Appellant’s] instructions two mothers (Patient A and Patient B) were accused during cross-examination of mistakenly identifying [the Appellant], colluding with each other with a view to trying to “set up” [the Appellant], dishonestly altering the records of their own babies and “being perpetrators of racism”. “The Panel found no evidence to support these lines of defence and considered that this defence demonstrated a blatant disregard for Patient A and Patient B, who had already been caused emotional and psychological harm”. The Panel also commented on what it found to be an attempt to deflect blame on Witness 2 who was a newly qualified midwife - to whom it was put in cross-examination that she had an axe to grind and falsified documents - matters which the Panel found no evidence to support such serious allegations.
138.The Panel found that the nature and quality of the defences advanced “compounded the attitudinal concerns that arose out of the charges proved and amounted to a significant aggravating feature of the case”.
139.In the case of Sawati v GMC [2022] EWHC 283 (Admin) at paras 106-110 Mrs Justice Collins-Rice drew together guidance derived from the observations of Lord Hoffman in Misra v GMC
[2003] UKPC 7 at para 17 and subsequent cases including Nicholas-Pillai v GMC
[2014] EWHC 1048 (Admin) as to the need for care in the evaluative judgment as to the relevance of rejected defences in respect of sanction. The gist of that guidance is that fairness requires that practitioners are not penalised for defending themselves and specific analysis is required as to why the nature and quality of any rejected defence is being treated as an aggravating factor.
140.The Panel plainly had in mind Sawati which was cited to them and to which they make explicit reference. Their reasoning is carefully expressed and draws out what they regarded as being the impact on other participants of the hearing of the lines of defence that asserted dishonesty and racism on the part of others. The Panel found these allegations to be groundless and harmful. In these circumstances, it was consistent with authority for them to be weighed in the balance on sanction as part of the Panel’s evaluative exercise.
141.In their reasoning on sanctions, the Panel carefully evaluated all lesser steps to striking off and explained why they considered them to be insufficient before concluding that the striking off was the “appropriate and proportionate sanction”.
142.Given this well-reasoned evaluation of the circumstances, I do not consider that it has been established that their approach to sanction was wrong or disproportionate.
Allegations of Bias and Racial Bias (ground 9; amended ground A7)
143.The Appellant’s grounds contend that she was subjected to racial bias. As I understand this, this primarily relates to the underlying substance of the disciplinary issues. I have addressed this element above. The issue of racism was canvassed with witnesses and addressed by the Panel in its determination.
144.There was an exchange before the Panel where the Appellant’s representative raised a contention that the Panel itself may be biased. After reflection, this allegation was withdrawn. No application was made for the Panel to recuse itself. The application which was subsequently made to stop the proceedings for abuse of process did not raise these issues.
145.As I read the Panel’s approach, they were prepared to listen carefully to all of the evidence including suggestions of racism within the Hospital Trust subject only to their concerns about the tone of some of the cross-examination (addressed above) and their understandable concerns about timetabling and the impact on witnesses of those two matters.
146.The Appellant did express concern about the number of interventions made by the Chair. However, for the most part, these were entirely legitimate attempts to enable the evidence to come out. Her concerns were to avoid multiple questions (which were hard for everyone to follow), prevent interruptions and allow for pauses to enable accurate notes to be taken. There was one exchange about the accuracy of paraphrasing of evidence. In that the Chair was right to ensure that questions about evidence already given were formulated on a precise basis not the basis of an inaccurate paraphrase. I have dealt above with interventions about tone.
Alleged Contamination of Witnesses (new point raised orally)
147.One specific point which was raised in oral submissions (but not in the grounds or amended grounds) was a suggestion that witness evidence had been contaminated by seeking the witness statements of other witnesses (in October 2021).
148.As I understand it this point had not been raised in any application made to the Panel and as it has not been raised in the pleading, the Respondent has not been in a position to specifically address it.
149.I consider that it would be inappropriate to allow a late point which has not been raised before to be developed in this way and I refuse permission for this point to become part of the Appellant’s case.
150.I have seen nothing to substantiate this as a concern that might impact on the Panel’s decision.
Other Matters Raised by the Appellant
Safeguarding and Data Protection (ground 4 and amended ground A5)
151.The Appellant expressed concern about the publication of her address in material which went to witnesses in the case. As I understand, she has raised these concerns in separate data protection complaints. I do not consider that these points impact on the question of whether the Panel’s decision was wrong or rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
152.Similarly, the Appellant’s expressed “safeguarding” concerns relate to the disclosure of her address. She can and has separately pursued these concerns. They do not render the decision of the Panel wrong or rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
153.I should also mention that the Respondent sought permission to rely on post decision material in the form of a letter from the Information Commissioner (as it then was) responding to the GDPR complaint. I consider that it is unnecessary to admit this. The key point is that a separate process exists.
Concerns about documents (amended grounds A15, A16 and A17)
154.The Appellant raised in writing various concerns about the authenticity of documentation produced by the Respondent and the Panel. These points were not developed in oral submissions, and I see no force in them as providing a basis for rendering the Panel’s decision wrong or rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
Provision of Transcripts (ground 8)
155.The Appellant complained in her written submissions about a delay in providing transcripts of the proceedings before the Panel. The Respondent’s position was as follows. First, there were days when the Panel did not sit in open session (as it was deliberating in private). Thus, there were no missing transcripts for these days. Second, transcripts for open sessions in September 2025 were provided to the Appellant on 14 November 2025. For the sessions on 13-17 October 2025, the transcripts were provided on 20 November 2025. For context, the Appellant was provided with the reasoned decision of the Panel (which records in detail submissions made to it and its reasons in respect of the substantive determination and its various procedural rulings throughout the case) on 30 October 2025. It is from that date that the time for appeal ran.
156.I am not satisfied that the Appellant has suffered any prejudice from this chronology. She has not linked her case for amending her grounds to the availability of transcripts in any specific way which demonstrates that material information only became available to her after the time for commencing proceedings. Had she demonstrated this, it would have been relevant to the decision to amend pleadings and may have shed different light on whether any prejudice had occurred. However, I am not satisfied that there is any reasonable complaint as to the timing of the provision of the transcripts or that it renders the decision of the Panel wrong or rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
Different standards and interim strike off (amended grounds A14 and A19)
157.A recurring theme in the Appellant’s observations was that the Respondent was holding her to standards which it did not adhere to itself. This concern manifested itself in expressions of concern about bundles, the metadata of documents in the disciplinary proceedings and the approach to the record of the outcome of the proceedings (where it was said that the Respondent’s online records wrongly recorded her as having been struck off when she had appealed and the position was therefore that she was subject to interim suspension). This latter point was addressed by HHJ Walden-Smith at paras 26-28 of her judgment.
158.I understand from her perspective why such matters seem to suggest an inequality of expectation. However, I do not consider they give rise to any legally relevant comparison. The Appellant’s record keeping was central to the disciplinary adjudication in this case. The matter was determined against her. The Respondent is expected to run its disciplinary proceedings fairly, efficiently and accurately. To the extent that it may have fallen short of this (as to which I make no such finding) could impact on the question of whether there is a procedural irregularity which renders the proceedings unjust but does not lend itself to a direct comparison with the Appellant’s conduct on 3-4 November 2017. I have assessed relevant procedural issues above and found that none undermines the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.
159.The reference in amended ground 14 to six months of non-response appears to be a criticism of the Respondent’s lack of an earlier response in the appeal. I have not identified any procedural failing by the Respondent, and I am satisfied that this does not go to the substantive issue of whether the Panel’s decision is wrong.
No case to answer decision (ground 7 and amended ground A4)
160.In writing the Appellant also complained that the Panel applied an incorrect approach to determining that there was a case to answer. This point was not developed orally. I am satisfied that there is nothing in this. The Panel had the benefits of submissions from both sides and applied the applicable law (reflected in R v Galbraith
[1981] 1 WLR 1039 and the Respondent’s guidance DMA-6) correctly in deciding that there was a case to answer.
Legal Assessor (amended ground A11)
161.A complaint was made in writing that the legal assessor had failed to intervene. The transcript shows the legal assessor advising the Panel throughout its process. I have assessed above the key stages of the Panel’s determination. Their approach to key issues was informed by advice given to them by the legal assessor. There is nothing in this point.
Reliance on separate complaint (amended ground A13)
162.Ground A13 asserts misfeasance in public office. The basis of this complaint relates to a separate matter concerning the Respondent and the Appellant about which I have no information. This has no bearing on the Panel’s decision at issue in this appeal.
163.The Appellant also referred to the inconsistency between an approach where no interim suspension order was made during the disciplinary proceedings but one was made on their conclusion (to cover the appeal situation). I see no error here. The Panel took account of the fact that the proceedings had concluded adversely, and they had decided to strike off the Appellant. Moreover, the interim suspension order was separately challenged and rejected by HHJ Walden-Smith.
Conclusion
164.I have evaluated the Appellant’s case by focussing on the substantive points which she stressed in her oral submissions. I have related these to her pleaded and proposed amended grounds – albeit that this is necessarily an imperfect exercise due to the overlapping nature of some of the grounds. Having evaluated the concerns which the Appellant raised with the process and decision of the Panel, I do not consider that the Panel’s decision was wrong or rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
165.I acknowledge that these proceedings were very protracted. However, I consider that the Panel’s determination was fair and the Panel was right to conclude the proceedings. Their substantive findings reflected the evidence that they had heard and their conclusions on the charges, misconduct, impairment and sanctions are neither wrong nor rendered unjust by procedural irregularity.
166.I acknowledge the strong sense of unfairness that the Appellant feels and the impact that the disciplinary process has had on her. However, for the reasons given above, I do not consider that those concerns provide a basis for overturning the Panel’s decision.
167.In the light of the conclusions above, I deal with the amendment application as follows:
a)
It has been possible to address the substance of amended grounds A4, A6, A12, A18 and A19 and I accordingly grant permission to amend to include these grounds. I do not consider this causes the Respondent any prejudice.
b)
In so far as the amended grounds replicate the original grounds, there is no need to amend the claim (this applies to A1, A2, A3, A5 (safeguarding) and A7).
c)
Other grounds seem to me to have insufficient merit to support the grant of permission to amend. This applies to:
i)
A5 (GDPR; separate process), ii)
A8, A9 and A10 (investigation complaints addressed as part of Panel’s decision), iii)
A11 (failure of legal assessor – not particularised and adds nothing), iv)
A13 (allegation of misfeasance based on a separate matter; not pursued in oral argument), v)
A14 (in part not relevant to the challenge and in part dealt with by HHJ Walden-Smith already), vi)
A15-A17 (documentary points not substantiated).
168.This appeal is dismissed.
Details
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Body | Courts of England and Wales |
| Type | court decision |
| Language | en |
| Document date | 2026-10-30 |
| Size | 66 217 знаков |
| Versions | 1 |
| First seen | 2026-10-31 |
| Last checked | 2026-11-16 05:31 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] EWHC 2731 (Admin) |
| court | The Administrative Court (King's Bench Division) |
Topics
Why this document is in the base
Selection matched on the following, total weight 8.
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…in) . 27. further, the appellant has made complaints about the respondent’s approach to data protection. there has also been passing reference to other disciplinary proceedings (which are not r…
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gdpr
текст
Personal data
…expanded version of ground 7. a5 - safeguarding failures (same as original ground 4) and gdpr breaches (new point). a6 - chair’s conduct: structural bias in the management of cross-…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…this. i have not identified any such breach. to the extent that this complaint relates to data protection issues, it seems to me that any potential remedy lies elsewhere. the decision to proceed…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…is material should not be passed on to the panel. the appellant explained this was due to data protection concerns. 90. in lindsay v sra [2018] ewhc 1275 (admin) at para 9, mrs justice lang ob…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…impact on the panel’s decision. other matters raised by the appellant safeguarding and data protection (ground 4 and amended ground a5) 151. the appellant expressed concern about the publica…
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data protection
текст
Personal data
…went to witnesses in the case. as i understand, she has raised these concerns in separate data protection complaints. i do not consider that these points impact on the question of whether the pan…
Dropped as boilerplate or single passing mentions: spectrum
Found by query: «data protection» (caselaw_uk)
Summary
Суд рассмотрел апелляцию медсестры Еуники Асидью-Бейнинг против решений дисциплинарного комитета Совета медсестер и акушерок относительно ее профессиональной пригодности. Рассмотрены обвинения в неправильном ведении медицинских записей и необоснованном назначении лекарств пациентам. Несмотря на длительные судебные разбирательства, суд пришел к выводу, что выводы дисциплинарного комитета были справедливыми и обоснованными, и отклонил апелляцию.