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Fairmead Insurance Limited & Ors, Re

судебное решение 2026-10-16 69 517 знаков Персональные данные
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Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-10-17.

Mr Justice Richards :

INTRODUCTION

1.Before the court are applications, brought by way of Part 8 Claim Form, for the following broad categories of order:

i)

An order under s111(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ( FSMA ) sanctioning an insurance business transfer scheme (the Scheme ) which effects the transfer to Allianz Insurance PLC ( AZI ) of insurance businesses ( Transferring Businesses ) carried on by other insurance companies (the Transferors ).

ii)

Ancillary orders under s112 of FSMA, which include an order transferring assets and liabilities which support the Transferring Businesses from Liverpool Victoria General Insurance Group Limited ( LVGIG ) to Allianz Management Services Limited ( AMSL ) which is another service company within the Allianz group of companies.

2.In more detail, the relevant Transferors are Fairmead Insurance Limited ( FIL ), Highway Insurance Company Limited ( HICO ), Liverpool Victoria Insurance Company Limited ( LVIC ) and Trafalgar Insurance Limited ( TIL ).

3.The Scheme concerns general insurance only as distinct from long term, annuity or pensions business.

4.The Transferring Businesses are of significant size. LVIC’s business is the largest: as at 31 March 2026, it had technical provisions net of reinsurance of over £1bn. HICO’s technical provisions at the same date were £301.9m. FIL and TIL have smaller businesses.

5.AZI is an existing substantial insurer, previously writing business under the Cornhill Insurance name. As at 31 March 2026 its technical provisions amounted to some £1.83bn.

6.Much of the Transferors’ insurance business is reinsured into AZ Re, a reinsurance company in the Allianz Group. It too is a substantial entity: its own funds as at 31 December 2026 amounted to some EUR 2.5bn.

7.The Scheme is an entirely intra-group arrangement. The Transferors and AZI are all members of the Allianz UK subgroup which is part of a wider group (the Allianz Group ) headed by Allianz SE which is headquartered in Germany. The Scheme is not being effected to “rescue” the business of the Transferors. Rather, proponents of the Scheme consider that there are operational efficiencies and regulatory capital efficiencies to be found if all the Transferring Businesses are conducted within AZI. To a significant extent regulatory capital efficiencies are expected to benefit shareholders since those efficiencies are hoped to enable a dividend of up to £130m to be paid out of the UK subgroup. The Scheme’s proponents also hope that, once the Transferring Businesses are housed in AZI, there will be greater risk diversification than is the case with the Transferring Business as presently conducted. That is a benefit in which policyholders share.

8.On 5 October 2026 I made orders of the kind requested as summarised in paragraph ‎1 above and said that my reasons would follow. This judgment contains my reasons.

HOUSEKEEPING MATTERS

9.I have had a large quantity of evidence on behalf of the Transferors and AZI supporting the Scheme. I also have the report and supplementary report (together the IE Report ) of Mr Sheaf (the Independent Expert ) to which I will refer later. I have the benefit of reports from the Financial Conduct Authority ( FCA ) and Prudential Regulation Authority ( PRA ). The FCA’s view is that the Scheme is within the range of reasonable and fair schemes available to the Transferors and AZI. The PRA has confirmed that it is not aware of any issue that would cause it to object to the Scheme.

10.However, there are dissenting voices too. 123 objections have been received in relation to the Scheme, all from policyholders of the Transferors. Some of those objecting specifically requested that their objections be shown to me. Some were concerned that I would not be shown their objections. However, AZI and the Transferors have done so. I have read over 200 pages of material that explains objections in policyholders’ own words.

11.Three individuals attended the hearing to make oral submissions outlining their objections:

i)

Mr Carroll spoke on his own behalf having provided a helpful speaking note prior to the hearing.

ii)

I permitted Mr Pattinson to make oral representations on behalf of his mother who is a policyholder in a Transferor. Mr Pattinson provided no evidence or speaking note.

iii)

I permitted Mr Doble to make oral representations on behalf of his grandfather, Mr Clark who is a policyholder in a Transferor. Mr Clark had obviously put a good deal of work into preparing a speaking note and a pack of supporting documentation which Mr Doble handed me at the start of the hearing. I paused the hearing to consider this and other material. Mr Doble supplemented that written material with oral submissions.

12.As I said to all of those who spoke, I was grateful to them for taking the time to put a contrary point of view before me. I will address their objections later in this judgment.

13.Finally, I note that Mr Jack Kerley, a party to a claim or possible claim against one of the Transferors sent me a letter requesting that the sanction hearing be adjourned so that he could have more time to consider its implications. Mr Kerley did not attend the hearing to make oral submissions and filed no evidence in support of his application (although his letter did explain the relevant background clearly). I refused that application at the beginning of the hearing and gave oral reasons for doing so.

THE COURT’S JURISDICTION ON PART VII TRANSFERS

Threshold questions of jurisdiction

14.As will be seen, the Court has a wide-ranging discretion to sanction, or decline to sanction, a scheme that is put before it under Part VII of FSMA. However, before the Court’s discretion is engaged, the scheme put forward must be one that the Court has power to sanction. Accordingly, there are some threshold points of detail, albeit important ones, that must be satisfied before I consider the exercise of the Court’s discretion in this case.

15.The Scheme is an “insurance business transfer scheme” described in s105 of FSMA. It is not an excluded scheme as defined in s105(3). It follows that, by s107 of FSMA, the Scheme requires the sanction of the Court.

16.All of the Transferors and AZI have their registered offices in England and Wales. Section 107(3) provides that the application for sanction of the Scheme is properly before the High Court in England and Wales.

17.Section 108 permits the Treasury to make regulations imposing requirements on applicants seeking sanction of the Court for insurance business transfer schemes which may include provisions enabling the Court to waive a requirement. The relevant regulations are The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Control of Business Transfers) Requirements on Applications Regulations 2001 (the Regulations ). Section 108 of FSMA also provides that, if a prescribed requirement is not satisfied, the Court may not sanction the Scheme.

18.Regulation 4 of the Regulations provides that the Court may not sanction a scheme unless the following requirements have either been satisfied or waived:

i)

Regulation 3(2)(a) requires notice to be published in the London Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes and in two national newspapers in the UK. Dr Ruf’s witness evidence on behalf of the Transferors confirms that this has happened.

ii)

Regulations 3(2)(b) and 3(2)(c) require notice to be given to every policyholder of the Transferors and of AZI and also to various reinsurers. However, by order of Deputy ICC Judge Baister of 22 May 2026 (the 22 May Order ) these requirements were permissibly waived under Regulation 4(2).

iii)

Regulation 3(3) requires notices sent to stakeholders to be approved by the “appropriate regulator” (in the present case the PRA) before they are sent or published. I am satisfied that this requirement has been met as PRA has confirmed as much in paragraph 17 of its First Report.

iv)

Regulation 3(5) requires that certain documents are given to the PRA and to the FCA within applicable time limits. Dr Ruf’s witness evidence satisfies me that this requirement has been met.

19.The 22 May Order disapplied the requirement to notify every policyholder so that, in effect, failure to notify a particular policyholder would not be a hard-edged jurisdictional objection to the Scheme being sanctioned. The 22 May Order did not specify in granular detail what was to be done instead. That is not to say no notification to stakeholders took place. On the contrary, there has been a huge communication exercise that involved some 6m packages of documents being sent through the post or by email to affected policyholders. Given the 22 May Order, I do not need to consider whether there has been proper notification to stakeholders as a threshold question of jurisdiction. However, it remains relevant to the exercise of my discretion since, if insufficient notice has been given to stakeholders, that might suggest it would be inappropriate for the Court to sanction it. I therefore return to the question of notification later in this judgment.

20.Section 109 requires a “scheme report” to be provided in a form approved by the PRA following consultation with the FCA. The IE Report is that scheme report and it has been prepared by the Independent Expert who is a Fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries and a partner at Grant Thornton. He clearly has the necessary and appropriate expertise. The Independent Expert’s appointment was approved by the PRA following consultation with the FCA and so has the form of his report, as the PRA confirms in its First Report. The requirements of s109 are accordingly met. I will consider the conclusions of the IE Report later.

21.There are two further technical requirements. First, s111(2) (a) requires that an “appropriate certificate” has been obtained. That is a certificate under paragraph 2(1)(a) of Part I of Schedule 12 to FSMA given by the PRA which must (so far as relevant to the present Scheme):

[certify] that taking the proposed transfer into account … the transferee possesses, or will possess before the scheme takes effect, the necessary margin of solvency..

22.The PRA has given the following certificate in Annex 2 of its Second Report:

The Prudential Regulation Authority certifies pursuant to paragraph 2(1)(a) of Part I of Schedule 12 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 , that on the basis of the information provided to it , Allianz Insurance Plc will, taking the proposed transfer into account, possess before the Scheme takes effect, the necessary margin of solvency. [emphasis added]

23.It can be seen, therefore, that the PRA’s certificate contains a caveat or qualification to the effect that it has taken at face value “information provided to it”. It is, therefore, possible to envisage a scenario in which (i) the PRA has been provided with inaccurate information, (ii) AZI does not actually possess the necessary margin of solvency, but (iii) if the information provided to the PRA had been accurate, AZI would have had the necessary margin of solvency. During the hearing, I discussed with Mr Moore KC whether a qualified confirmation such as this meets the statutory requirement.

24.It is, of course, possible to read paragraph 2(1)(a) as imposing a requirement that the PRA provide an unqualified certificate. The PRA could only provide such a certificate if it verified, for itself, every piece of information that it received from AZI and the Transferors. On such an interpretation, it could not take at face value figures that appear in AZI’s audited accounts. Nor could it trust figures that appear in regulatory returns. It would need to verify those figures for itself.

25.Parliament would have been aware, when enacting paragraph 2(1)(a) that the certificate in question was to be provided by a regulator. I will not conclude that, when enacting that requirement, Parliament was requiring that regulator effectively to act as an auditor. People frequently express opinions on raw data provided by another. A specialist expressing a conclusion on medical test results, for example, will not invariably perform the tests again to check their results. I consider that Parliament had in mind a process such as this, although of course if the information provided to a regulator appears doubtful the regulator will naturally ask questions on it. Whether or not it said so on the face of its report, the PRA was necessarily basing its conclusion on information it had received and I consider that the PRA’s certificate meets the statutory requirements.

26.Section 111(2) (b) requires that AZI has the requisite authorisation under FSMA to carry on the business transferred. The PRA has confirmed satisfaction of this condition.

27.Overall, I conclude that the preconditions for the Court to consider the Claimants’ application are satisfied. There is no jurisdictional bar to me sanctioning the Scheme. That leaves the requirement of s111(3) with which much of this judgment will be concerned, namely whether the Court is satisfied that in all the circumstances of the case it is appropriate to sanction the Scheme.

The proper approach to the exercise of the Court’s discretion

28.Re Prudential Assurance Company Limited

[2020] EWCA Civ 1626 ( Prudential CA ) contains guidance, binding on me, on the proper approach to the statutory question set out in s111(3) . I have borne the entirety of the Court of Appeal’s guidance in mind and will simply summarise the essence of the approach I should follow in this case.

29.The Court has a wide discretion under s111(3)

. That discretion must be exercised against the backdrop of the fact that stakeholders have had no opportunity to vote on the Scheme. The present application, therefore, is very different from (for example) an application under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 which creditors or members have already approved. Since the discretion is so broad and since stakeholders have not been given any opportunity to vote on the Scheme, it is not possible to set out general criteria that will determine how the discretion should be exercised in any particular case.

30.A critical first step is to identify the nature of the business being transferred and the underlying circumstances giving rise to the Scheme. That is largely to identify the stakeholders whose interests are to be considered, the respective interests of those stakeholders and the extent to which any question of fairness as between competing interests of different stakeholders could arise.

31.It is also necessary to consider the circumstances in which the Scheme is effected. A Scheme implemented because it is perceived to be necessary to rescue an insurance business may be approached differently from a scheme effected for the commercial benefit of two unconnected groups of insurance companies.

32.The Court’s discretion is unfettered and is not to be exercised by way of a rubber stamp. The Court must of course take into account and give proper weight to all relevant factors and ignore matters that ought not properly to be taken into account. That said, the Court has the benefit of evaluations performed by the Independent Expert, the PRA and the FCA and the boards of directors of the Transferors and AZI. The Independent Expert has considerable expertise and has drawn on the expertise of other highly experienced professional advisers before reaching the conclusions set out in his report. The Regulators do not suggest that the Court should not approve the Scheme. These opinions are not determinative, but full weight must be accorded to them so that the Court should not depart from them without significant and appropriate reasons – particularly as regards financial and actuarial assessments that have been performed on the security of financial benefits.

33.The Court should take the same approach when considering more general comparisons between the positions that would exist with or without the Scheme in respect of security of policyholder benefits and standards of service or corporate governance. In that connection, the Court should consider the contractual rights and reasonable expectations of policyholders, including the standards of service and governance that can be expected if the Scheme is implemented.

34.The Independent Expert has a status that is similar to that of an expert witness in adversarial litigation whose duties are governed by CPR 35.3. However, the present application is not made in the context of normal adversarial litigation in which opposing parties can call evidence (including expert evidence) and test each other’s evidence by cross-examination. The statutory code therefore envisages a somewhat different role for the Independent Expert from that performed by an expert witness in adversarial litigation. In the words of Pumfrey J in In re Eagle Star Insurance Company Limited

, [2006] EWHC 1850 (Ch)

, the report of the Independent Expert is intended to be “an objective assessment of the scheme by a person to whom the importance of retaining their independence and objectivity has been repeatedly emphasised”.

35.The Court must carefully scrutinise the reports of the Independent Expert and the Regulators, not with a view to substituting its own expertise, but so that it can understand and test the Independent Expert’s reasoning. That will enable the court to identify any errors, omissions, or instances of inadequate or defective reasoning that might undermine the weight to be given to those opinions.

36.The Court should also consider carefully the evidence of any person entitled to be heard under s110 of FSMA who alleges that they would be adversely affected by the carrying out of the Scheme.

37.Those guidelines set out the parameters within which the Court must address the crucial question of whether the Scheme will have any material adverse effect on policyholders, employees or other stakeholders. For these purposes, an adverse effect will be material to the Court’s consideration only if it is: i) a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case, ii) a consequence of the Scheme and iii) material in the sense that there is the prospect of real or significant (as opposed to fanciful or insignificant) risk to the position of the stakeholder concerned.

38.Even if the Court finds that the Scheme will have a material adverse effect on some stakeholders, it may still sanction the Scheme in the exercise of its discretion. If there are differential effects on the interests of different classes of person affected, the Court will need to consider whether the proposed Scheme is fair as between those interests.

39.The Court’s choice is between sanctioning the Scheme and declining to sanction it. It cannot require applicants to vary or alter the Scheme (although applicants may choose to do so in order to address concerns identified by the Court). In a related point, the Court should not withhold its sanction of a scheme on the basis that a better scheme could have been found. The question is whether the Court should sanction the scheme that is before it.

THE EXERCISE OF THE DISCRETION IN THIS CASE

Overview of the Scheme

40.I have already outlined the parties to the Scheme and its broad effect.

41.Although necessarily the subject of complicated drafting, the Scheme itself is quite straightforward to understand conceptually. Part A and Part B set up definitions and identify the parties involved. That enables Part C to make provisions dealing with the transfer of:

i)

policies of insurance – so that policyholders’ rights will be against AZI rather than the relevant Transferor;

ii)

assets and liabilities – all assets of the Transferors (including investments made to yield returns to fund claims on policies) and all liabilities associated with the policies pass to AZI; and iii)

assets and liabilities of LVGIG which also pass to AMSL.

42.Part C also has provisions dealing with continuity of proceedings. Very broadly, all claims including pending, potential or threatened claims which are, or could be, brought against a Transferor or LVGIG become liabilities of AZI or AMSL as the case may be. That provision applies in broad terms and is not dependent on the relevant Transferor being aware of the potential claim, or even on the potential claim having been made or intimated.

43.Significantly, the Scheme makes no changes to existing policy terms. Nor does it change servicing and administration arrangements. Rather it effects what can be conceptualised as a “lift and drop” arrangement. Currently applicable policy terms and conditions, and existing arrangements regarding administration, are preserved. However, the liabilities and assets associated with the policies are housed within AZI rather than the relevant Transferor.

44.The Scheme also deals with reinsurance arrangements. AZI will acquire both the benefit and burden of contracts of reinsurance that are currently in place with the relevant Transferors.

45.LVGIG is not an authorised person and it carries out no regulated insurance business. LVGIG is a service company that supports the provision of non-insurance components of insurance policies, particularly motor and travel insurance policies, written by Transferors. Those insurance policies frequently include provisions that entitle policyholders to receive a service rather than monetary compensation for loss that they have suffered. For example, a motor insurance policy might entitle a policyholder to have use of a replacement vehicle after an accident. Such a policy might entitle a policyholder to have damage to a windscreen repaired. In order to honour these contractual provisions, a Transferor needs access to a person who can provide a replacement vehicle, or repair a windscreen. The way in which that access is currently provided involves LVGIG (i) contracting with an underlying service provider and (ii) agreeing with the relevant Transferor that it will make relevant services available to a policyholder to enable that Transferor to honour its contractual obligations.

46.The Scheme proposes that both kinds of assets and liabilities described in paragraph 45 will transfer so that AMSL takes LVGIG’s place as a service company. Thus:

i)

AMSL will acquire both the benefit and burden of LVGIG’s contracts with underlying service providers.

ii)

The benefit and burden of contracts previously in place between Transferors and LVGIG will pass so that those contracts become contracts between AZI and AMSL.

47.A small number of the policies written by Transferors are subject to the laws of Jersey. The sanction of the Jersey court is needed for the transfer of those policies. That is being sought on 6 October 2026 (the Jersey Scheme ). The Jersey Scheme is conditional on the Scheme becoming effective, but the Scheme is not conditional on the Jersey Scheme being approved.

Stakeholders affected by the Scheme

48.In my judgment, the principal categories of stakeholder whose interests should be considered are as follows:

i)

Policyholders in the Transferors and in AZI . Their interests are primarily in:

a)

“policyholder security” namely the confidence that, following the Scheme, AZI will have the financial resources to pay valid claims that are made;

b)

other financial matters such as the investment strategy that AZI adopts after the Scheme is implemented; and c)

non-financial factors such as (without limitation) the quality of administration of policies, the way complaints are dealt and continuing access to aspects of consumer protection such as the Financial Services Compensation Scheme ii)

Reinsurers are also relevant stakeholders. They will be interested in the extent to which the Scheme could affect their liabilities under existing reinsurance contracts. They will also be interested in AZI’s credit worthiness as a counterparty in comparison to that of the existing Transferors with whom they deal.

49.If the Scheme were an arrangement between unconnected insurance groups and did not have the “lift and drop” feature that I have described in paragraph 43 above, the interests of other categories of stakeholder would be engaged as well. For example:

i)

Shareholders in the two groups might be interested on how a scheme might affect the value of their shares or potential returns from them.

ii)

Employees might be concerned to know whether the scheme would result in job losses.

iii)

Service providers might be concerned as to whether there would be rationalisations such that some would longer be called upon to provide services after the scheme is implemented.

50.However, the “lift and drop” nature of the Scheme, coupled with the fact that it takes place entirely within the Allianz Group means that these stakeholders will necessarily be in the same effective position after the Scheme as they are currently. It follows that I will focus my analysis on policyholders and reinsurers.

Stakeholder analysis – policyholders

Introduction

51.The interests of two categories of policyholder are engaged:

i)

Existing policyholders in the Transferors ( Transferring Policyholders ) will, if the Scheme takes effect, find that their rights are against AZI. It is relevant to consider whether this would leave them materially worse off than they would have been if they had remained policyholders in the relevant Transferor.

ii)

Policyholders in AZI ( AZI Policyholders ) still hold a policy with AZI. However, AZI’s financial and other fortunes could conceivably be affected by the economic profile of the policies acquired from the Transferors and other matters.

52.For obvious reasons, the Independent Expert has placed the analysis of policyholders’ positions right at the heart of the IE Report. In the IE Report, he expresses the following conclusions:

i)

that the Scheme will not have a material adverse impact on the reasonable benefit expectations of any type or group of policyholders. There can be little doubt on that conclusion since the “lift and drop” nature of the Scheme means that the terms of policies remain unchanged;

ii)

that the Scheme will not have a material adverse impact on the security of benefits for either Transferring Policyholders or AZI Policyholders, including on an insolvency;

iii)

that implementation of the Scheme will not have a material adverse impact on levels of service and administration. That also is a secure conclusion given that the same centralised teams that currently provide these services will continue to do so following the Scheme.

53.The Independent Expert also considers a range of other financial and non-financial considerations, expressing the opinion that he does not expect any material adverse effect to arise out of those matters either.

54.The Independent Expert has carefully explained in the IE Report what he understands by the concept of “material adverse effect”. His approach aligns with that required by Prudential CA (see paragraph 37 above). There is, therefore, no daylight between the issues that the Independent Expert is considering and those I must address.

55.The Independent Expert has kept his conclusions under review. Shortly before the sanction hearing, he prepared a supplemental report that updated in the light of new information received. He confirmed that the conclusions summarised in paragraph 52 remain unchanged.

56.In my judgment, the Independent Expert has adopted a careful and rigorous approach before reaching his conclusions. As I have explained, those conclusions should be accorded full weight not least since they are to a large extent dependent on specialist financial and actuarial assessments which the Court is simply not equipped to perform for itself. That said, it is right that I enquire more deeply into the basis for the Independent Expert’s conclusions to check whether they contain errors, omissions, or instances of inadequate or defective reasoning that might undermine the weight to be given to his opinions. I should also test his conclusions against points made by stakeholders who object to the Scheme.

Security of benefits

57.The length and detail of the IE Report means that it is not susceptible to a short summary. I will not attempt to provide one. However, I consider that the Independent Expert has adopted a sound process:

i)

He compares the financial and regulatory capital position of the Transferors prior to the Scheme with the financial and regulatory capital of AZI following the Scheme in order to assess whether the interests of Transferring Policyholders are adversely affected.

ii)

He compares the financial and regulatory capital position of AZI before it acquires policies from the Transferors with its financial and regulatory capital after the Scheme in order to assess whether the interests of AZI Policyholders are adversely affected.

58.That analysis is informed by a deep understanding of the applicable regulatory environment applicable to the Transferors and to AZI. Specifically, the Independent Expert has considered the solvency capital ratio ( SCR ) of all of the Transferors and of AZI before the Scheme and the SCR of AZI after the Scheme. Complicated actuarial calculations underpin these measures of solvency, but very broadly, an SCR of 100% is designed to ensure that an insurer could, over the next year, suffer a 1-in-200-year stress event and still have sufficient resources available to pay its liabilities falling due in that year and still remain solvent.

59.In essence, the Independent Expert concludes that the SCR of AZI after the Scheme will be strong enough to enable him to conclude that there is no material adverse effect on either Transferring Policyholders or AZI Policyholders. He concludes that all policyholders, in both the Transferors and AZI, will retain a high degree of assurance that policyholder benefits will be paid.

60.I am in no position to check the actuarial calculations that the Independent Expert has performed. Nor am I able to second-guess the judgments that he has expressed. I am not an actuary and must approach the matter with the benefit of a day’s pre-reading rather than the lengthy period that the Independent Expert has had in which to prepare his report. However, I have carefully considered the report to consider whether it contains any gaps of logic, questionable assumptions or defective reasoning. I consider that it does not.

61.Indeed the Independent Expert himself considers possible points of objection. For example, he notes the fact that (on the figures in his original report) HICO, FIL and TIL have SCRs of 178%, 387% and 255% that are higher than the 148% SCR projected for AZI post the Scheme. On the face of matters that might suggest that policyholders in those companies are worse off following the Scheme. However, the Independent Expert explains why a comparison of pure percentage figures risks being misleading including:

i)

Having capital of 100% of SCR itself offers a high level of assurance that an entity will be able to discharge its liabilities over the next year as it would enable an insurer to survive a 1-in-200-year stress event. Diminishing returns set in above this figure so that a solvency ratio of 200% should not, for example, be regarded as “twice as good” as an SCR of 100%.

ii)

AZI calculates its SCR using an “internal model” which is more risk-sensitive than the standard formula used by LVIC, HICO, FIL and TIL. The SCRs are not therefore directly comparable.

iii)

There is an incremental benefit in risks being concentrated in AZI, a single entity, as the broader spread of risks enhances its ability to absorb adverse events. That, coupled with the fact that AZI will hold a larger capital base than each of the individual Transferors produces an overall benefit for policyholders in the Transferors.

iv)

Putting all those together, he acknowledges that the reduction in the SCR of HICO, FIL and TIL could be categorised as adverse, but considers it falls far short of being materially adverse. Paragraph 2.21 of his Report makes it clear that he is applying the same threshold of “materiality” as is required by the case law.

62.I have tested whether the “diversification benefits” to which the Independent Expert refers risks just being a piece of management jargon that does not deliver much by way of actual benefit. However, I have concluded that the assertion has a solid statistical foundation that can be illustrated by a hypothetical example. Suppose that Company A has a business that gives it £1000 of exposure to Risk 1 and Company B has a business giving it £1000 of exposure to Risk 2. If regulators require both Company A and Company B to hold £100 of capital against their respective risks then Company A and Company B between them are required to hold £200 of capital. However, suppose that Risk 1 and Risk 2 are mutually exclusive: if Risk 1 transpires, Risk 2 will not and vice versa. In that case, if the businesses of Company A and Company B are brought together in a third company (Company C), the mutually exclusive nature of the risks means that Company C has exposure to only £1000 of risk and so requires only £100 of capital.

63.Of course that is a stark example: few risks truly are mutually exclusive. However, when I raised this as a question, the Independent Expert confirmed that it explains conceptually how diversification benefits can arise. He amplified my example by considering two hypothetical businesses that underwrite product liability risks associated with Christmas trees and ice-cream sales respectively. In the UK there could be real diversification benefits if such benefits were brought together. The position would be otherwise in Australia.

64.In short, I accept the Independent Expert’s conclusion that bringing together different risks, previously run by separate companies, into a single company can reduce the amount of capital needed to be held against those risks with the amount of the capital saving dependent on the correlation between the risks in question.

65.I also consider that the Independent Expert has applied a good degree of conservatism. He assumes, for example that AZI would pay a dividend of £130m to its shareholders out of capital savings generated from the Scheme. He therefore assumes that this sum will represent a reduction of available capital even though there can be no certainty that it will be paid, or will be permitted to be paid.

66.Overall I have no concerns about the Independent Expert’s conclusions on security of benefits.

Other financial factors

67.Matters such as the investment strategy, the liquidity position, levels of expenses and tax liabilities will also be of relevance to policyholders. The Independent Expert concludes that these will not result in material adverse effects largely because the existing arrangements are expected to continue, consistently with the “lift and drop” nature of the Scheme.

68.That conclusion obviously makes sense. I have considered whether this analysis overlooks a possibility that AZI may decide, unexpectedly and after the Scheme to change its policy on these matters. However, since contractual arrangements are not altering, it must follow that AZI has just the same power to alter policies as the Transferors had. It is not suggested that there is any plan for AZI to change these policies. The mere possibility that AZI might decide to do so, in circumstances where the Transferors could have made the same decision, does not strike me as coming close to a material adverse effect on policyholders.

69.I have no concerns about the Independent Expert’s conclusions in this regard.

Levels of service and other matters

70.The Independent Expert concludes that service levels will be unaffected because administration will be conducted by the same team after the Scheme as before the Scheme. He also considers other factors such as the consumer duty owed by AZI and the Transferors. He concludes, in essence, that the “lift and drop” nature of the Scheme means that there will be no material change, still less a material adverse effect, in relation to those factors. That conclusion makes obvious sense. If the existing service model is retained, the Scheme can neither improve, nor make worse, current standards of administration.

71.The Independent Expert concludes that AZI has the necessary “operational readiness” to take on a large number of policies from the Transferors. Again, there is no obvious problem with that analysis. AZI is already a large insurance company. It will be able to draw on the same administrative support that both it and the Transferors had previously. I have no concerns about that conclusion.

Stakeholder analysis – reinsurers

72.The Independent Expert concludes that no reinsurer would be materially adversely affected by the Scheme. That conclusion makes sense. Reinsurers will be reinsuring the same risks as previously and the terms of their reinsurance contracts are not changing.

73.Moreover, the Independent Expert’s conclusions on security of benefits lead to the conclusion that AZI after the Scheme is no less creditworthy than either it, or the Transferors, were before the Scheme. Just as importantly, the reinsurers concerned are sophisticated businesses who can be expected to defend their commercial interests assiduously. If any of them were being asked to deal with a less credit-worthy entity than they were dealing with before the Scheme, they would doubtless have registered an objection.

Communications

74.As I have noted, the adequacy or otherwise of the communications strategy goes to the exercise of my discretion rather than operating as a hard-edged jurisdictional requirement.

75.To the extent that the 22 May Order imposed requirements as to the notification of stakeholders, I am satisfied from Dr Ruf’s evidence that the requirements have been met. There have been some glitches along the way to which I will return when considering policyholders’ objections. Some materials have been returned undelivered through the post, but again I regard that as inevitable with a large communications exercise and I do not consider it calls into question whether the Scheme should be sanctioned.

76.I have considered the communications relating to the Scheme carefully. Communication is of fundamental importance. It is essential that the Scheme is described, clearly and dispassionately. If it does not do so, stakeholders might not understand it and the objections received might not give a true picture. Overall, I considered the communications to be appropriately phrased and am reassured that the FCA agrees.

77.It is also obviously important that assiduous efforts are made to draw the Scheme to the attention of stakeholders. As the Independent Expert notes, not all stakeholders have been notified. For example, AZI Policyholders have not been notified. Holders of policies in a Transferor issued before 1 May 2024 have not been notified. The Independent Expert gives cogent reasons as to why notification of stakeholders such as this is not necessary. Given the nature of the policies that the Transferors write, the vast majority of claims (historical data suggests over 98%) are made within 2 years of the policy incepting. There can be a high degree of confidence that AZI Policyholders will not be materially adversely affected. Moreover, AZI Policyholders are not being required, potentially against their will, to change insurers. I do not consider that a failure to notify AZI Policyholders should cause me to withhold sanction of the Scheme.

78.I consider that AZI and the Transferors have made strong and appropriate efforts to deal with more difficult situations, such as notifying an insured who has entered into a policy via an intermediary. I share the Independent Expert’s conclusion that AZI and the Transferors have done (at least) enough in this regard.

79.Dr Ruf’s WS on behalf of LVGIG makes it clear that the communication exercise has included a comprehensive notification of LVGIG’s counterparties.

80.Overall, I acknowledge that not every possible stakeholder has been contacted. However, I consider that the communications exercise is appropriate.

Position of Regulators

81.PRA has substantial expertise in prudential regulation. It does not object to the Scheme. That position is all the more reassuring in circumstances where it has seen successive drafts of the IE Report and obviously has the expertise to interrogate the conclusions the Independent Expert expresses and speak up if it has concerns about these conclusions.

82.The FCA is not responsible for prudential regulation but certainly is very familiar with the importance of treating customers fairly and the importance of open and transparent communication. FCA has, among other matters, considered the adequacy of the communication plan in light of the fact that the requirement to notify every policyholder and reinsurer has been waived. It has no difficulty with the communication strategy adopted and I derive reassurance from that position.

The objections advanced by those who made oral submissions

Mr Carroll

83.Mr Carroll’s written speaking note provided a lot of information about an insurance claim that one of the Transferors had refused. It was clear that this refusal had caused Mr Carroll a good amount of distress. Mr Carroll was also concerned that other policyholders’ details had found their way into documentation relating to his claim. He said in his oral submissions that his distress had been amplified by ADHD from which he suffered. The dispute about the unpaid insurance claim has expanded to include allegations of a breach of data protection legislation ( GDPR ) and allegations that Mr Carroll made about professional misconduct of solicitors who acted for the relevant Transferor on the claim. Mr Carroll’s speaking note included a request that I make various orders for disclosure in connection with the dispute.

84.While I reiterate my thanks to Mr Carroll (and the other objecting policyholders) for putting a contrary view before the court, I cannot adjudicate on the rights and wrongs of the dispute over the unpaid claim. That is not the function of this hearing. Nor can I make the kind of disclosure orders that Mr Carroll seeks. Mr Carroll submitted that the problems he had suffered were symptomatic of the Transferor adopting a flawed claims handling and administrative process. While I understand, at a human level, why Mr Carroll might feel that his own particular experience was symptomatic of a flawed system generally, no evidence was put forward to substantiate that assertion. Moreover, there is no suggestion in the report of either the PRA or the FCA that the Transferors’ existing administrative processes generally were inadequate. The Independent Expert made no such suggestion either.

85.Beyond saying that he disbelieved AZI’s assertion that claims handling and administration would be handled by precisely the same team that deals with these matters on behalf of the Transferors currently, Mr Carroll did not explain why he considered the Scheme would have an adverse effect on either him or other policyholders. I concluded that, at the highest, Mr Carroll’s experience might suggest that there had been problems in dealing with his claim. That is not the same as a material adverse effect that is produced by the Scheme (see paragraph 37 above).

Mr Pattinson

86.Mr Pattinson’s objection, advanced on behalf of his mother, was similar in nature to that of Mr Carroll. He was concerned that his mother’s claim for subsidence had been poorly handled and that the relevant Transferor had appointed a consultancy based in the north of England when his mother lived in the south to consider the subsidence issue. That consultancy subsequently became insolvent. Mr Pattinson was concerned that the service levels his mother received were made worse by the fact that those involved in the claim seemed to work from home a lot of the time. Like Mr Carroll, he too alleged a flawed claims handling system, but was really drawing only on his own experience of a particular claim.

87.Mr Pattinson did not satisfy me that his mother’s experience showed that the Scheme would produce a material adverse effect, whether on his mother or on other policyholders particularly given that administration and handling of claims following the Scheme would be performed by the same team.

Mr Doble

88.Mr Doble amplified on written material put forward by his grandfather, Mr Clark. Mr Clark was complaining of GDPR breaches. He made a serious allegation that the administrative team at the relevant Transferor insurance company had altered documents in an attempt to cover up their failure to comply with a subject access request on time. He too alleged a flawed compliance process within the Transferors. However, as with similar allegations made by Mr Carroll and Mr Pattinson these were not backed up by evidence and represented simply an extrapolation from perceptions about his own specific case. The allegation of a flawed system was at odds with the analysis of the PRA and the FCA, who were in a position to consider the wider picture. Neither Mr Doble or Mr Clark really explained why the Scheme was said to produce a material adverse effect whether for Mr Clark or any other policyholder.

89.Moreover, if as Mr Doble suggested, the relevant Transferor has failed to comply with GDPR and has sought to cover up its failure, any necessary sanction could, by virtue of the Scheme, be imposed on AZI. The Scheme will not enable the relevant Transferor to escape the consequences of any GDPR breaches to date.

The objections considered together, and my overall conclusion on them

90.It is right that I consider the cumulative effect of the objections and not just consider them in isolation. However, even doing so, at most they demonstrate that particular policyholders consider that they have had a bad experience when making claims. Without in any way downplaying their individual concerns, it would not be surprising, given the large number of policyholders in the Transferors if some have had bad experiences. Overall, even considering the objections together, I saw nothing approaching a material adverse effect on the objecting policyholders that was produced by the Scheme. I did not consider, therefore, that these objections were sufficient for me to withhold sanction of the Scheme.

The objections notified in writing

91.Some 123 objections to the Scheme have been received: mainly from transferring LVIC policyholders. I cannot consider them individually. Therefore, like the Independent Expert, I will consider those by theme.

92.Concerns about market share : I am not satisfied that concerns that Allianz’s market share will be increased comes close to being a material adverse effect. Of course, the Scheme means that AZI’s market share increases: it has more policies than it did before. However, AZI and the Transferors are members of the same group. There is no increase in the market share of the Allianz Group as a whole. This country has regulators charged with ensuring that competition within business sectors is preserved. No regulator has suggested that the Scheme has an adverse effect in this regard.

93.Concerns about loss of mutual status : These concerns appear to be borne out of a misconception. Until 2020 LVIC was part of a group controlled by Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society which was a mutual organisation. However, since then it has been a member of the Allianz Group and has, in any event, never been a mutual insurer.

94.Concerns about lack of notification at renewal : Some policyholders noted that they renewed their policies with LVIC only to find out about the proposals a few days later. I can understand that these policyholders might feel annoyed about this. I can accept that it might look as though something has been kept from them. However, in reality, a line has to be drawn as to when notifications are going to be given and with large insurers such as LVIC and HICO, policies are being renewed and incepted all the time. I do not consider this to be a material adverse effect, although I can accept that the relatively few policyholders complaining about this would have found it annoying.

95.Communications concerns : I understand dissatisfaction with the level of paperwork sent to policyholders. To a large extent, however, that is imposed by the regulatory environment. It is not a material adverse effect of the Scheme. In a mass mailing exercise such as this there were, unfortunately some gaffes and mistakes. I can quite understand those were upsetting for individuals concerned, particularly when they involve deceased relatives. The Allianz Group has rightly apologised when it has made mistakes, but in my judgment, mistakes such as these do not provide a sufficient reason to decline to sanction the Scheme.

96.Concerns about independence of Independent Expert: Some concerns were raised that the Independent Expert might not be independent since he is being paid by AZI. I have no such concerns. The statutory regime makes no provision for the Independent Expert to be paid out of public funds and can scarcely be expected to work for nothing. Having read his two reports, I see both his expertise and the degree of rigour that he has applied to his task.

97.Policyholders would prefer not to have their policies moved: Policyholders are entitled to feel an attachment to their present insurer. They are also entitled to prefer that they should remain with that insurer. They are entitled to conclude that they would not have purchased a policy from AZI (as distinct from the Transferor). However, this sentiment, expressed by a relatively small number of policyholders articulates no material adverse effect and does not represent a good reason to decline to sanction the Scheme.

98.Perception of previous poor customer service of AZI: I have dealt with this in some detail when considering the objections of Mr Carroll, Mr Pattinson and Mr Doble. AZI has a large number of policyholders. Inevitably not all of its interactions with customers will be satisfactory. Some individual policyholders may have good reasons not to wish to deal with AZI. However, I am not satisfied that this means that the Scheme as a whole should not proceed. The administration of the policies and claims will continue to be dealt with by the same team in the Allianz Group as currently. Neither Regulator nor the Independent Expert suggests that these arrangements are systemically unsatisfactory.

99.Concerns about capital protection: I consider this concern is addressed in the IE Report

100.Concerns about possible premium increases or less access to cover : I can understand why people worry about these things, particularly in the current environment. However people are always exposed to the risk of premiums rising. The Scheme does not change existing terms and conditions. In reality, policyholders are in the same position as they have always been: they are purchasing policies in a competitive marketplace with the associated risk that premiums might rise if market conditions dictate or permit. This concern does not articulate any material adverse effect.

101.Impact on existing claims : Since administrative arrangements remain unchanged I am not persuaded that the concern, articulated by a few objecting policyholders, that existing claims will be dealt with differently amounts to a good reason to withhold sanction.

102.Concerns about data transfer to AZI : This is effectively the same objection as that made by policyholders who simply do not wish to do business with AZI. AZI will have to comply with data protection legislation just as did the Transferors. I do not consider this concern is sufficient for me to withhold sanction.

103.Concerns about disproportionate benefit to Allianz : Some policyholders are concerned that the benefit from the Scheme will enure to shareholders in the Allianz Group rather than to them. They are partially correct in that assessment. Allianz has said expressly that it hopes that capital savings generated from the Scheme will enable a dividend of up to £130m to be paid out of the Allianz UK subgroup. However, the Independent Expert’s report highlights benefits to policyholders as well such as increased diversification of risks and AZI holding an overall greater level of capital than the Transferors between them do currently. If, for example, the Scheme imposed a material adverse consequence on at least some categories of stakeholder with the only benefit of the Scheme being a large dividend paid to the shareholders in the Allianz Group, the Court would need to weigh up the benefits and disbenefits when deciding whether to sanction the Scheme. However, that is not this case. No category of stakeholder has been shown to be in a materially worse position. The fact that the Allianz Group can arrange its regulatory capital position more efficiently, and its shareholders can share in the benefit of doing so does not, in those circumstances, strike me as a good reason to withhold sanction of the Scheme.

104.Holdings of Israel government debt : Some objectors take exception to the asserted fact that the Allianz Group has significant holdings of Israeli government bonds. However, the Transferors are already members of the Allianz Group. Opinions that some policyholders have about such holdings by the Allianz Group are not reasons for me to withhold sanction of the Scheme.

Conclusion on Scheme Sanction

105.Having considered this together with all the other matters referred to above, I have concluded that I should sanction the Scheme.

ANCILLARY ORDERS

The statutory provisions

106.Since some questions arise as to the source of the court’s power to make the ancillary orders sought, I need to set out some relevant statutory provisions in detail.

107.As already noted, the court’s jurisdiction in this case is engaged in relation to an “insurance business transfer scheme” which is defined in s105 of FSMA as follows:

105 Insurance business transfer schemes

(1)A scheme is an insurance business transfer scheme if it— (a)

satisfies condition set out in subsection (2);

(b)

results in the business transferred being carried on from an establishment of the transferee in the United Kingdom or Gibraltar; and (c)

is not an excluded scheme.

(2)The condition is that the whole or part of the business carried on in the United Kingdom by an authorised person who has permission to effect or carry out contracts of insurance (“the transferor concerned”) is to be transferred to another body (“the transferee”)…

108.There is no question in this case of the Scheme being an “excluded scheme” and therefore the remainder of s105 is not material for present purposes.

109.It is to be noted that the definition of “insurance business transfer scheme”, does not require a scheme only to transfer insurance businesses. An “insurance business scheme” is defined by reference to its result rather than by setting out a prescriptive list of its ingredients. Zacaroli J (as he then was) made a similar point in the context of the definition of “banking business transfer scheme” in Re Barclays Bank Plc

[2018] EWHC 2868 (Ch) .

110.Section 112 sets out the orders that a court can make when it sanctions an insurance business transfer scheme as follows. So far as material, s112 provides as follows:

112 Effect of order sanctioning business transfer scheme.

(1)If the court makes an order under section 111(1) , it may by that or any subsequent order make such provision (if any) as it thinks fit— (a)

for the transfer to the transferee of the whole or any part of the undertaking concerned and of any property or liabilities of the transferor concerned;

(b)

for the allotment or appropriation by the transferee of any shares, debentures, policies or other similar interests in the transferee which under the scheme are to be allotted or appropriated to or for any other person;

(c)

for the continuation by (or against) the transferee of any pending legal proceedings by (or against) the transferor concerned;

(d)

with respect to such incidental, consequential and supplementary matters as are, in its opinion, necessary to secure that the scheme is fully and effectively carried out.

(2)An order under subsection (1)(a) may— (a)

transfer property or liabilities whether or not the transferor concerned otherwise has the capacity to effect the transfer in question;

(b)

make provision in relation to property which was held by the transferor concerned as trustee;

(c)

make provision as to future or contingent rights or liabilities of the transferor concerned, including provision as to the construction of instruments (including wills) under which such rights or liabilities may arise;

(d)

make provision as to the consequences of the transfer in relation to any occupational pension scheme (within the meaning of section 150(5) of the Finance Act 2004 ) operated by or on behalf of the transferor concerned.

…

(3)If an order under subsection (1) makes provision for the transfer of property or liabilities— (a)

the property is transferred to and vests in, and (b)

the liabilities are transferred to and become liabilities of, the transferee as a result of the order.

…

(5)Property transferred as the result of an order under subsection (1) may, if the court so directs, vest in the transferee free from any charge which is (as a result of the scheme) to cease to have effect.

(6)An order under subsection (1) which makes provision for the transfer of property is to be treated as an instrument of transfer for the purposes of section 770(1) of the Companies Act 2006 and any other enactment requiring the delivery of an instrument of transfer for the registration of property.

A threshold question on the court’s powers

111.The ancillary orders sought would operate to transfer assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL. LVGIG is not a “transferor” for the purposes of the insurance business transfer scheme. AMSL is not a “transferee”. That follows from the definitions of those terms in s105 of FSMA and the fact that LVGIG is not an authorised person for the purposes of FSMA. It follows that the court’s power, if any, to make the ancillary orders cannot be found in s112(1)(a) of FSMA and must, instead, be found in s112(1)(d) of FSMA. That therefore leads to the question whether, properly construed, s112(1)(d) would entitle this court to make an order that transfers assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL.

112.There are some indications in s112 itself that suggest that it is concerned only with transfers from a “transferor” to a “transferee” as defined in s105. For example, s112(3) provides that, if an order under s112(1) is made which transfers assets or liabilities, those are to become assets or liabilities of the transferee . An order under s112(1)(a) can only operate to vest assets or liabilities in the transferee. Section 112(3) refers to any order under s112(1), which includes both s112(1)(a) and s112(1)(d), and could therefore be read as suggesting that any order under s112(1)(d) can, like an order under s112(1)(a), only transfer assets or liabilities to a transferee as defined. A similar point can be made in relation to s112(5).

113.However, as Zacaroli J pointed out in Re Barclays Bank Plc there are also indications that support the proposition that the court’s powers under s112(1)(d) can be deployed to transfer assets and liabilities from someone other than a “transferor” to someone other than a “transferee”. More generally, Zacaroli J conducted a comprehensive review of authorities in this area concluding that s112(1)(d) did indeed confer power on a court to transfer assets and liabilities from someone other than a “transferor” to someone other than a “transferee” (see [47] of his judgment).

114.As a matter of comity, I should follow

Re Barclays Bank Plc unless I am satisfied that it is incorrect. I am far from being so satisfied. Zacaroli J has extensive experience of reconstructions under Part VII of FSMA. He reached his conclusion after a detailed survey of statutory provisions and previous authorities aided by leading counsel (Mr Moore KC) who, as it happens, is appearing before me today. Mr Moore KC confirmed to me that other orders have been made transferring businesses of non-authorised persons in connection with insurance business transfer schemes and banking business transfer schemes. I will follow

Re Barclays Bank Plc and conclude that I have power, provided the requirements of s112(1)(d) are met, to make an order transferring assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL.

Whether the requirements of s112(1)(d) are met

115.I can only make an order under s112(1)(d) if:

i)

the transfer of assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL is “incidental, consequential [or] supplementary”; and ii)

I form the opinion that the transfer of assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL is “necessary to secure that the scheme is fully and effectively carried out”.

116.As regards the requirement set out in paragraph 115.i) , the statute does not specify what the transfer must be incidental, consequential or supplementary to. In context, the reference must be either to the Scheme, sanction of the Scheme or, perhaps, to other orders the court is making under s112(1). Whichever of these is the correct comparator, the requirement is clearly met. The assets of LVGIG enable the Transferors to honour their obligations under the policies being transferred.

117.The requirement summarised in paragraph 115.ii) requires a bit more analysis. Viewed purely in isolation, the word “necessary” suggests a high threshold. If that high threshold is applied, it could be said that the transfer of LVGIG assets is not “necessary”. For example, if no transfer of LVGIG assets were effected, but the Scheme was otherwise given full effect, LVGIG would continue to have rights against services and AZI would acquire the benefit and burden of contracts with LVGIG that the Transferors formerly held. Therefore, to the extent that a Transferor had a contractual right to compel LVGIG to use its network of contacts to procure that a policyholder is, for example, provided with a replacement vehicle following an accident, AZI would have the same right. On that analysis, it might be said that the transfer of assets from LVGIG is not “necessary” to the Scheme, but rather saves the Allianz group the inconvenience, time and cost of having to persuade LVGIG’s counterparties to contract with AMSL instead.

118.I am certainly not the first judge to consider that possible interpretation. The judgment of Lindsay J in Re Norwich Union Linked Life Assurance Limited

[2004] EWHC 2802 (Ch) surveyed previous authorities. In Re Lincoln Assurance (unreported 6 December 1996), Rattee J appears to have been attracted to at least some variant of a possible high threshold analysis. By contrast, Knox J in Re Hill Samuel Life Assurance (unreported 10 July 1995), Harman LJ in Consolidated Life Assurance Co. Ltd (unreported 11 December 1996) and Neuberger J, as he then was in Sun Life of Canada Assurance Co (unreported 21 September 1999) were less attracted to it.

119.In Re Norwich Union , having surveyed previous authorities, Lindsay J preferred the less restrictive interpretation adopted by Knox J and followed in later authorities. Underpinning the interpretation favoured by Knox J and Lindsay J are the following indications of meaning:

i)

The word “necessary” does not appear in isolation. Rather, it is part of a composite phrase “necessary to secure that the scheme is fully and effectively carried out”.

ii)

While the “scheme”, in this case an insurance business transfer scheme, has to have a certain specified result in relation to a business, or part thereof, carried on by an authorised person (see s105(1) and s105(2) of FSMA), Parliament has not provided that an insurance business transfer scheme can only include provisions relating to the transfer of an insurance business (see [9] to [11] of Re Norwich Union ).

iii)

As a matter of ordinary English, the word “necessary” has a meaning somewhere in the middle between “vital” on the one hand and “desirable” on the other (see [8] of Re Norwich Union ).

iv)

Section 112(d) invites a consideration of what is “necessary” to secure that the scheme is “effectively” carried out. That is inconsistent with Parliament focusing only on matters that are “vital”. It is consistent with Parliament wishing to ensure that there is a means of the court making consequential or ancillary orders that mean that transferors and transferee obtain the full benefit of the scheme (noting that the scheme may include some provisions that do not relate only to the transfer of an insurance business as noted in paragraph 109 above).

120.Re Norwich Union is an authority that has stood the test of time. It considers in some detail previous judicial disagreement on the scope of s112(1)(d) and resolves that disagreement. I am far from being satisfied that Re Norwich Union is wrong and, in my judgment, I should follow it. I am reassured in that conclusion by the fact that in Re Alliance & Leicester Plc

[2010] EWHC 2858 (Ch) , Henderson J (as he then was) followed Re Norwich Union and said this about the scope of the power in s112(1)(d):

32.There has been some judicial debate about the force of the word "necessary" in this last provision. It appears by now to be fairly well settled, and certainly it is my own view, that the word "necessary" in this context does not mean "indispensable", but rather means something falling between indispensable and desirable. In addition, the word has to be read in the context of the phrase as a whole, so that if a step is necessary in order to implement the scheme in an effective and commercially sensible way, it will be perfectly proper to make an order under section 112 for that purpose.

121.Dr Ruf explains, in paragraph 35 of his witness statement of 11 May 2026 made on behalf of LVGIG why he considers the requirements of s112(1)(d) are met. Among other points, he made the follows:

i)

AMSL is an existing service company providing services to AZI. LVGIG is the existing service company that provides services to the Transferors.

ii)

The whole point of the Scheme is to transfer the Transferred Business seamlessly into a single entity (AZI).

iii)

Having achieved that rationalisation, it would make no commercial sense for LVGIG to continue in existence so that AZI receives some services from AMSL and some services from LVGIG.

iv)

This is not just a question of Allianz’s commercial convenience. If LVGIG’s assets are not dealt with by way of an order under s112(1)(d), LVGIG and AMSL would need to deal individually with some 115 service providers and persuade them to provide services to AMSL rather than to LVGIG. No doubt in many cases there would be no difficulty, but some service providers might overlook correspondence or use it as an opportunity to seek to extract commercial advantages. While non-responding service providers are chased down, and negotiations with other service providers are ongoing, the continuity of service provision to policyholders might be affected.

122.I accept that analysis. It explains clearly why the transfer of assets and liabilities from LVGIG to AMSL is, in the words of Henderson J in Re Alliance & Leicester Plc “necessary to effect the scheme in an effective and commercially sensible way”. I conclude that a transfer of LVGIG’s assets to AMSL would fall within the scope of s112(1)(d) of FSMA.

Should I make the order under s112(1)(d)?

123.Even if though the statutory precondition is satisfied, I retain a discretion as to whether I should make the order. I consider I should exercise my discretion to do so. Making the order achieves the beneficial purpose that Dr Ruf has identified.

124.Moreover, there can be no question that making the order would involve any undue interference with the rights of LVGIG’s contractual counterparties. All of those counterparties have been notified in accordance with the communications process that I have described earlier. That process of notification has explained the precise effect of the order that LVGIG seeks. Dr Ruf’s evidence satisfies me that not a single one of those counterparties has even raised a query about the proposals. Still less has even a single counterparty notified any reservation or objection to either LVGIG or any of the transferors. None of LVGIG’s counterparties has appeared in person or by counsel today to object to the order.

125.I note that LVGIG and AMSL have appeared by counsel (namely counsel for the Claimants) for the purpose of giving their consent to the transfer of LVGIG’s business and undertaking to be bound by the ancillary orders that I have been asked to make in this regard.

126.I will make the order sought under s112(1)(d).

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