Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales

Jeffrey Leeks v Information Commissioner

court decision 2026-11-05 9 150 characters Personal data
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Current version. Last change recorded on 2026-11-06.

Acronyms used

DPA

the Data Protection Act 2018

FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber

ICO

Information Commissioner’s Office

Background

1.This Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress made about ICO reference number IC-521635-L2D2.

2.The underlying issue is that, in April 2026, Mr Leeks asked a firm (now referred to as “HR firm”) to provide to him all personal data which they held about him.

3.On 01 June 2026, Mr Leeks filed a complaint with the ICO about that firm’s handling of his request.

4.On 13 July 2026, the ICO acknowledged the complaint and explained that it would be allocated to a Case Officer, further information was sent by Mr Leeks and received by the ICO on 28 July and 17 August 2026. On 21 September 2026, the ICO informed Mr Leeks that his complaint was still awaiting allocation to a Case Officer.

5.By GRC3 dated 21 September 2026, Mr Leeks sought an Order to Progress.

6.On 08 October 2026, the ICO wrote to Mr Leeks informing him that they had found a potential breach of his access rights under the data protection legislation. On that same date the HR firm indicated that it would provide a response to Mr Leeks’ request within a timeframe which the ICO had specified.

7.By GRC5 dated 22 October 2026, the ICO responded applied to the Tribunal for the application to be struck out; that application was accompanied by the ICO’s rule 23 response to the application within which the ICO set out their submissions concerning the strike out application. The ICO accepted there had been a delay in responding to Mr Leeks’ complaint. They argued that, as a response had, by that time, been provided, there is no reasonable prospect of the Tribunal making an order under section 166.

8.The initial directions (dated 24 September 2026) gave Mr Leeks the opportunity to respond to such application. Mr Leeks sent an email to the Tribunal (copied to the ICO) on 29 October 2026 at 18:32 hours. Mr Leeks sets out that he has sent the ICO 4 further emails to which he has not received a response; he acknowledges the limit of the FtT’s jurisdiction. I acknowledge that in that email, Mr Leeks wrote:

Please add this correspondence to the existing case file and advise whether the Tribunal requires any further submissions from me in response to the Information Commissioner’s strike-out application.

9.It is not for the Tribunal to decide whether Mr Leeks should make further representations about the strike out; he was given the opportunity to make representations, and I take account of what he sent to the Tribunal.

The Law

10.The key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are Killock and VeaIe v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 ( Killock ), R (Delo) v Information Commissioner ( Delo ) in the High Court ( [2023] 1 WLR 1327 ) and Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) and Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) ( Smith ).

11.In Killock , the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances in which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section 165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an appropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The Upper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast a critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to achieve a different complaint outcome.”

12.In

Killock

, the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in terms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed the view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any particular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal indicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources effectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special position. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in Killock

.

13.In R (Delo) v Information Commissioner

[2023] EWCA Civ 1141

, in the Court of Appeal, Warby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant legislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a complaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that, having done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80).

14.In Delo , Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits would clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader connotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in Killock that the word “outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also agreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in Delo in the High Court that outcome would properly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint, having informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with UK GDPR.

15.Therefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the merits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision in Smith confirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the Commissioner has issued a complaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application. But, as Judge Stout also explained in Smith at [60], in a case where the Commissioner has carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a section 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons.

16.The first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a procedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether the Commissioner has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application to the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages against the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision (see further [74] of Killock ).

17.The second reason is because the Commissioner has a wide discretion under section

165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the scope for the FTT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is limited.

EW

, decided alongside

Killock

, was an exceptional case where the Commissioner, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at

all. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Delo

, the Commissioner is not required to determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further

([64]), the Commissioner is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78])

and has a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent” ([80]).

Application of law to facts

18.An outcome has now been provided by the ICO to Mr Leeks about his original request that the ICO consider the HR firm’s response made in April 2026. The FtT’s role is to cast a critical eye on that outcome.

19.The outcome appears to meet what is required – the ICO sets out its view (as Regulator) about the response and also sets out actions that it told the HR firm to take. In the outcome the ICO also refers to Mr Leeks’ ability to enforce his data rights through the courts (i.e. County Court or High Court).

20.On balance, I consider that the ICO response provided, whilst late, is sufficient to conclude that this Tribunal, properly applying the law, is highly unlikely to make an Order to Progress under Section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 . The ICO, in its role as expert regulator, has considered that it they have provided an appropriate response to the issue raised by Mr Leeks’ complaint to them.

21.I accept that Mr Leeks still pursues matters with the ICO by sending further correspondence; that does not, however, mean that the Tribunal would make an Order to Progress. As set out above, it is not for the ICO to order disclosure; the ICO’s role is as Data Protection Regulator, the Data Protection Act 2018 is clear that it is for a Court to make an order for disclosure.

Signed: Judge Worth

Date: 05 November 2026