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HELEN CHISHOLM v THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

court decision 2026-11-02 18 895 characters Personal data
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Introduction

1.The proceedings concern an application pursuant to section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the DPA”) for an order requiring the Respondent to take the appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint relating to a failure by the Northamptonshire Children’s Trust to respond properly to a Subject Access Request (“SAR”) made by the Applicant.

Background

2.On 05 February 2025, the Applicant submitted a SAR to Northamptonshire Children’s Trust. Despite repeated follow-up emails, no response to the SAR was received by the Applicant.

3.The Applicant submitted a complaint to the Respondent on 29 May 2026. The complaint was dealt with under reference IC-520699-J2G6. The Respondent replied to the complaint by letter dated 18 August 2026 as follows:

“We have considered the information you have provided in line with our published framework and have decided not to undertake a more detailed investigation.

We recognise that the circumstances surrounding your subject access request are personal and emotionally significant, and that not receiving a response to a subject access request can be frustrating and concerning. However, based on the information provided and the subject access request itself, we have not identified factors such as significant data protection harm, wider impact, or a broader data protection concern that would justify us looking into the matter in more detail at this stage.

We will therefore record your complaint for information purposes We assess every complaint we receive, but we do not look into every case in detail. This approach helps us focus on complaints where there is a higher risk of harm or wider impact”.

4.The response included a hyperlink to the Respondent’s ‘published framework’, which sets out how the Respondent assesses and handles data protection complaints. It includes the criteria applied for triaging complaints, and what factors will be considered when the Respondent determines whether a complaint needs to be looked into in detail.

5.The Applicant submitted a GRC3 form applying for an order to progress the complaint that had been made to the Respondent on 18 August 2026. The Applicant stated that the Northamptonshire Children’s Trust had breached UK GDPR principles by sharing data relating to their daughter and had failed to respond to her SAR. The remedy sought was to “insist ICO undertake a detailed investigation to determine why NCT never provided the data details for my SAR request and confirm if they breached UK GDPR”.

The Respondent’s application for strike out

6.The Respondent lodged its Response to the GRC3 on 14 October 2026, accompanied by an application, submitted on a GRC5, that the Applicant’s case be struck out pursuant to rule 8(2)(a) and/or rule 8(3)(c) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Rules”). The Respondent asserted that it had taken appropriate steps to investigate the Applicant’s complaint and had provided the Applicant with an outcome. Consequently, the Respondent submitted that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the application and/or the application has no reasonable prospect of succeeding.

7.The Respondent submitted as follows:

“The Commission’s approach to the handling of data protection complaints focuses on cases where it’s clear that there’s serious harm and where we can help organisations improve how they protect people’s data through advice, training, or action. Each complaint is individually assessed against criteria set out in the ICO’s published data protection framework individually and use the criteria below to decide how much investigation is needed. This can range from a light-touch review to carrying out more detailed enquiries”.

8.The Respondent submitted that section 166 of the DPA is concerned with remedying ongoing procedural defects in relation to the handling of a complaint. It is not concerned with the merits of the underlying complaint, and nor is it intended to provide a right of challenge to the substantive outcome of the Respondent’s investigation into a complaint.

9.The Respondent submitted that he had a broad discretion in deciding the extent to which he investigated each complaint, and highlighted that the Tribunal does not have the power to alter the conclusion reached by the Respondent in relation to a complaint. In addition, the Tribunal does not have an oversight role over the Respondent’s exercise of his functions or internal processes.

10.In considering the appropriateness of steps carried out by the Respondent in relation to a complaint, the Respondent submitted that the Tribunal was bound to take into account, and give weight to, the views of the Respondent as an expert regulator.

11.The Respondent submitted that the remedies sought by the Applicant were not outcomes that the Tribunal could grant pursuant to an application under section 166 of the DPA against the Respondent. Here, the Respondent had taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint and had provided an outcome on 18 August 2026, thereby complying with the procedural requirements as set out in section 166(1) of the DPA.

The Applicant’s response to the strike out application

12.The Applicant filed a response to the application for strike out on 16 October 2026. The Applicant submitted that the Respondent had failed to demonstrate that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success, and that the appeal raised issues around whether the Respondent had taken ‘appropriate steps’ in response to the Applicant’s complaint.

13.The Applicant submitted that the appeal fell within the statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal, as the Tribunal’s functions included consideration as to whether the Respondent had appropriately discharged the duties imposed on it by sections 165 and 166 of the DPA. The Applicant asserted that the existence of an outcome letter did not, in itself, determine whether appropriate steps had been taken.

14.The Applicant stated that the appeal raised “a genuine and arguable issue for determination”, namely whether the Respondent had adequately investigated the matters raised by the Applicant before closing the complaint. In particular, the Applicant stated that her understanding was that:

i.

No substantive investigation was undertaken into the alleged failure by Northamptonshire Children’s Trust to comply with SAR obligations;

ii.

No meaningful examination was undertaken of the Applicant’s concerns regarding the processing and disclosure of personal data;

iii.

No material evidence appeared to have been obtained from Northamptonshire Children’s Trust concerning those matters prior to closure of the complaint;

iv.

Key issues raised by the Applicant were not addressed before the complaint was concluded.

15.The Applicant disagreed with the Respondent’s assertion that she was seeking to challenge the Respondent’s substantive outcome. The Applicant stated that she was not seeking an order requiring the Respondent to find that the Northamptonshire Children’s Trust had breached the UK GDPR, but rather that she was seeking to challenge whether the appropriate procedural steps had been taken before a determination had been made by the Respondent that no further action was required.

16.The Applicant submitted that material issues remained in dispute which were unsuitable for summary disposal, including what investigative steps had been taken by the Respondent and whether there had been an adequate investigation.

17.The Applicant submitted that the appeal had a realistic prospect of success because:

i.

The Tribunal had jurisdiction under section 166 DPA 2018;

ii.

The appeal raised a genuine question regarding the adequacy of the Respondent’s response to the complaint iii.

The challenge concerned procedural matters rather than the substantive merits of the underlying complaint;

iv.

Material factual matters remained in dispute.

18.The Applicant asserted that the high threshold for strike out had not been met, and invited the Tribunal to dismiss the Respondent’s strike out application.

19.On the same date, 16 October 2026, the Applicant submitted a GRC5 form, seeking permission to amend section 3 of her GRC3 form to clarify the grounds of her application. The Applicant provided a summary of her complaints against the Northamptonshire Children's Trust and invited the Respondent to investigate whether the Trust had:

i.

Failed to comply with Articles 12 and 15 UK GDPR concerning Subject Access Requests ii.

Processed or disclosed personal data without a lawful basis under Article 6 UK GDPR iii.

Failed to comply with the principles of lawfulness, fairness, transparency, accountability and accuracy under Article 5 UK GDPR iv.

Failed to implement appropriate safeguards when processing personal data relating to a vulnerable child v.

Maintained records that may be inaccurate or incomplete.

Legal framework

20.Section 165 of the DPA sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the Respondent about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation as follows:

s.165 Complaints by data subjects to the Commission

(1)……

(2)A data subject may make a complaint to the Commission if the data subject considers that, in connection with personal data relating to him or her, there is an infringement of the UK GDPR or Part 3 or 4 of this Act .

(3)……

(4)If the Commission receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commission must – (a)

take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)

inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)

inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d)

if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.

(5)The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes (a)

investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)

informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including whether further investigation or co-ordination with a foreign designated authority is necessary.

21.Under section 166 of the DPA, a data subject can make an application to the Tribunal for an order as follows:

s.166 Orders to progress complaints

(1)This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner – a)

fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b)

fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c)

if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.

(2)The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner a)

to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or b)

to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.

22.The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) of the DPA if one of the conditions contained within section 166(1) of the DPA is met. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers in relation to section 166 of the DPA are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated –

"…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under

section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals”.

23.The very wide scope of the Respondent’s discretion to handle complaints under section 165 of the DPA as he thinks best was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Delo) v Information Commissioner and Wise Payments Ltd

[2023] EWCA Civ 1141

, where it was stated that

“the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint”.

24.The importance of the Respondent’s role as an expert regulator was confirmed in Killick as follows:

“ However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber”.

25.The provisions relating to strike out are contained within rule 8 of the Rules as follows:

s.8 Striking out a party’s case

(1)……

(2)The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal – (a)

does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and (b)

does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.

(3)The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if – (a)

the appellant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the appellant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them;

(b)

the appellant has failed to co-operate with the Tribunal to such an extent that the Tribunal cannot deal with the proceedings fairly or justly; or (c)

the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.

Discussion and conclusions

26.Both parties have submitted written submissions in relation to the Respondent’s application for a strike out. I have determined that it is in accordance with the overriding objective to determine this matter without a hearing. I note that rule 32(3) of the Rules permits the Tribunal to dispose of proceedings without a hearing under rule 8.

27.I have firstly considered whether the Respondent provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint as required by section 165(4)(b) of the DPA. I am satisfied that the letter dated 18 August 2026 that was sent to the Applicant by the Respondent provides an outcome to the complaint, indicating that it would not be investigated further but that it would be recorded. The fact that the Applicant may not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.

28.I have then considered whether the Respondent took appropriate steps in responding to the complaint which resulted in the outcome letter. I note that it is for the Respondent, as the expert regulator, to determine how to handle a complaint and the extent to which a complaint is investigated. I also note that the Respondent provided the Applicant with a hyperlink to his online guidance which clearly sets out the criteria that the Respondent will consider when determining the level of any investigation. Further, the letter that was sent to the Applicant details the absence of factors which would justify a more detailed investigation, which I am satisfied demonstrates that the Respondent has assessed the complaint against the relevant criteria.

29.I therefore conclude that the Respondent has satisfied the requirement in section 165(4)(a) of the DPA in taking appropriate steps to progress the complaint. In coming to this conclusion, I have given significant weight to the view of the Respondent, as the expert regulator, that he did take appropriate steps in respect of the complaint.

30.I remind myself that section 166 of the DPA is a forward-looking provision, and that its scope is confined to procedural issues. In an application under

section 166 of the DPA , the Tribunal has no power to direct the Respondent to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request, or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought by the Applicant.

31.In concluding that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that appropriate steps had been taken to respond to the complaint, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.

32.The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.

33.As the case has been struck out, I have not gone on to consider the Appellant’s GRC5 application.

Signed: Tribunal Judge Muzaffer

Date: 31 October 2026