Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales
Graham Kemish v The Information Commissioner
1.This is an appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) dated 26 January 2026, reference IC-392029-J1X1 (the “Decision Notice”).
2.The hearing took place via CVP on Wednesday 16 September 2026. The Appellant represented himself. The Respondent did not attend, having indicated in advance that they did not intend to do so.
Factual background
3.The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“the FOIA”) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“the EIR”). It concerns information requested from Southampton City Council (“the Council”).
The request and response
4.The Appellant made a number of requests for information relating to the enforcement of a specific bus gate between 16 April 2025 and 17 May 2025.
5.The first four requests were submitted in one document on 16 April 2025 from the Appellant’s personal email address. The requests read as follows:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI Act) may I please request the information described under each of the following four items Please note that I have transmitted this email for the attention of information@southampton.gov.uk and also the Head of Legal Services, Richard Ivory.
FOI 1: Violet Road’s Classification
Request:
Provide the Traffic Regulation Order (TRO) and DfT compliance assessment used to classify Violet Road as a 'bus gate’.
FOI 2: Tribunal Attendance Policy
Request:
Provide the SCC’s written policy on attending Traffic Penalty Tribunal hearings including consequences, if any, for non-attendance.
FOI 3: PCN Revenue vs. Safety
Request:
Provide the 2023 cost-benefit analysis for Violet Road enforcement, including projected revenue vs. safety outcomes.
FOI 4: Air Quality & Safety Monitoring
Request:
Provide all air quality monitoring reports for Violet Road School Street Scheme from 2021 to present, including correspondence discussing the necessity (or lack thereof) of such monitoring”.
6.The Appellant submitted nine separate requests on 22 April 2025 via the WhatDoTheyKnow website.
7.FOI request number 5 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 2020, I request:
1.SCC’s written policy on issuing warning (vs PCNs) to first-time Violet Road violations, including (a)
Criteria for age / vulnerability / financial hardship discretion.
(b)
Process for verifying “first-time offender” status via ANPR historical records.
2.Data 2021-2024:
(a)
Number of warning letters issued vs. PCNs for first-time violations.
(b)
Cases where discretion was applied due to mitigating circumstances.
3.Training materials for officers on the subject of ‘exercising discretion’”.
8.FOI request number 6 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 2020, I request:
1.Actual revenue from Violet Road PCNs (2021-2024) including:
(a)
Total fines issued / paid.
(b)
Allocation of revenue to “road safety” vs general funds.
2.Internal emails / reports discussing:
(a)
Revenue targets for Violet Road enforcement.
(b)
Safety outcomes (e.g. accident reduction, air quality)”.
9.FOI request number 7 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 200, I request:
1.Post-Mohammed Compliance;
(a)
All internal reviews of ‘bus gate’ related signage to ensure compliance with Mohammed v Southampton CC [2021 (EWHC 1669), including:
- Revisions to evidence submissions to avoid repeat of unlawful PCNs
- Audits of signage compliance post-ruling.
(b)
Legal advice received about risks in continuing ‘bus gate’ enforcement without reforms.
2.Evidence Submission Policies: SCC written policies on:
(a)
Including / excluding documents in TPT hearings (e.g. Experimental Orders, Statements of Reasons (SoR).
(b)
Legal team reviews to ensure TROs submitted are complete and current.
(c)
Training materials for staff on evidence standards post-Mohammed.
3.SCC-TPT Communications. All SCC’s internal policies on evidence submission for TPT hearings, including:
(a)
Lessons from Mohammed case to avoid future losses.
(b)
Guidance to adjudicators when:
- SCC omits key evidence (e.g. historic TORs with SoR)
- Appellant submits the pertinent evidence which was omitted by the SCC.
4.Tribunal Case Data. Statistics (2021-2024) on:
(a)
Cases where SCC submitted incomplete TROs (e.g. missing SoRs)
(b)
Cases where adjudicators disregarded key appellant-submitted evidence (c)
SCC no-show at hearings where PCN content omissions, and legitimate appellant challenges, were upheld”.
10.FOI request number 8 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 200, I request:
1.Raw data from air quality monitors near Violet Road (2021-2024), including:
(a)
Pre – vs – post-enforcement pollution levels.
(b)
Reports evaluating safety impact of enforcement.
2.Emails between SCC officers questioning:
(a)
Lack of monitoring or flawed data”.
11.FOI request number 9 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 200, I request:
1.Risk assessments (2023-2024) on:
(a)
Potential refund costs if Violet Road PCNs are voided due to unlawful findings.
(b)
Judicial review risks
2.Legal advice received by SCC regarding:
(a)
Challenges to Violet Road enforcement”.
12.FOI request number 10 read:
“Submitted under FOI Act 200, I request:
1.TPT related training materials on:
(a)
Handling cases where SCC submits inadequate evidence (e.g. no TROs with Statement of Reasons, no school-day time restrictions, no signage photos).
(b)
Avoiding improper advocacy by the tribunal adjudicator in defending councils.
2.Statistics (2021-2024):
(a)
Cases where adjudicators cited evidence and non-public / undisclosed rules”.
13.FOI request number 11 read:
“Submitted under the FOI Act 200, I request:
1.SCC’s evidence standards for enforcing PCNs at locations classified as:
(a)
“Part time bus gates” (e.g. Violet Road)
(b)
“School Street Scheme (per local government website)
2.Training materials on assessing:
(a)
Signage compliance with actual legal designations (e.g. “School Street” signage requirements).
(b)
Historical error rates at disputed sites (e.g. driver confusion at Violet Road).
3.Cancelled PCNs due to:
(a)
Incorrect classification (e.g. enforcing as a bus lane without proper TROS).
(b)
Inadequately sighted signage failing to give drivers time to understand and react”.
14.There was an error in the numbering of the requests and therefore no FOI request number 12 exists. FOI request number 13 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request:
1.All internal guidance/policies on using Code 34 (bus gate) vs. Code 34J (bus lane) for Violet Road enforcement.
2.Legal advice received about risks of misclassifying enforcement codes.
3.Cases (2021-2024) where PCNs cited “bus lane” contraventions but used Code 34”.
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15.FOI request number 14 read:
“Under the FOI Act 2000, I request:
1.All records discussing the reclassification of Violet Road from a School Street to a “bus gate” including:
- DfT correspondence about this non-standard designation.
- Data on bus frequency (e.g. 2 buses/hour) justifying the change.
2.Cost-benefit analyses comparing “bus gate” enforcement vs. School Street compliance”.
16.The Appellant submitted two further separate requests on 23 April 2025 via the WhatDoTheyKnow website. FOI request number 15 read:
“Under the FOI Act 2000, I request:
1.SCC’s policy for enforcing PCNs at Violet Road after the tribunal ruled “no bus lane contravention occurred”.
2.Communications with TPT about ignoring the tribunal’s finding and continuing enforcement”.
17.FOI request number 16 read:
“Under the FOI Act 2000, I request:
1.All records explaining why Violet Road is:
(a)
Listed as a ‘Permanent School Street Scheme’ on the southampton.gov.uk website ( https://transport.southampton.gov.uk/atf ....).
(b)
Signposted as a “part time bus gate”, and (c)
Enforced on PCNs as a “Code 34: being in a Bus Lane as set out in Part 2 of Schedule 7 of the TMA 2004 ” when Code 34J is the designation for a ‘bus lane’. [NOTE: Code 34 relates to a ‘bus gate’, which is contradictory.]”.
18.On 01 May 2025, the Appellant submitted one further request via the WhatDoTheyKnow website. FOI request number 17 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request the following information regarding The City of Southampton (Violet Road)(Bus Gate) Order 2022:
1.Enactment Documentation:
- The Statement of Reasons (SoR) for making the 2022 Order permanent, including:
- Evidence of public consultation responses.
- Minutes from any public inquiry held to address objections.
- The final decision notice approving the Order.
2.Legal Compliance;
- Copies of legal advice received by SCC confirming the 2022 Order complies with:
- The Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ( Sections 6 , 9, 10).
- The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 (e.g., signage placement).
3.Publication and Accessibility:
- Why the 2022 Order is hosted on the Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT) website instead of SCC’s official portal, which only shows the 2021 Experimental Order.
- All correspondence between SCC and TPT regarding the hosting/promotion of the 2022 Order.
4.Post-Experimental Process:
- Documentation proving SCC;
- Published a Notice of Proposal to make the 2021 Experimental Order permanent.
- Addressed objections raised during the experimental period (1-Nov-21 to 1-May-23).
5.Internal Communications:
- Emails/reports discussing the decision to submit the 2022 Order to TPT hearings despite its procedural flaws”.
19.On 06 May 2025, the Appellant submitted four further separate requests via the WhatDoTheyKnow website. FOI request number 18 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request:
1.SCC’s policy on issuing warning letters (vs. PCNs) for MTE schemes to:
- First-time offenders (no prior PCNs at the same location).
- Drivers aged 65+, those with medical conditions, or neurodivergent (e.g., autism, ADHD).
- Training materials for staff on applying discretion to avoid disproportionate harm.
2.Equality Impact Assessments evaluating risks of PCNs to:
- Low-income households;
- Elderly, medically vulnerable, or neurodivergent drivers.
3.Data (2021-2024):
- PCNs vs. warnings issued to the above groups.
- Cancellations due to financial hardship/medical evidence”.
20.FOI request number 19 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request:
1.Total PCNs issued (2021-2024) at school street schemes during road traffic restriction times when pupils are in school:
(refer https://transport.southhampton.gov.uk/atf ...)
- For example, 9:00-9:30am and 2:15-3:00pm at locations where school times are 9:00 to 3:00 pm.
- Cancellation rates for these PCNs.
2.Safety/traffic data justifying why Cantell School (Violet Road) enforces 90-minute restrictions vs. 45-minute windows at St John’s/St Mary’s CE Primary Schools.
3.Internal discussions (post-2021) about retaining 90-minute restrictions post-COVID”.
21.FOI request number 20 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request:
1.A copy of the signed, sealed TRO SN443 and Certificate of Compliance proving it lawfully replaced ETRO SN417 (expired 1 May 2023).
2.All emails, meeting minutes, or reports (May-December 2023) discussing:
- Risks of enforcing SN443 after SN417s expiry.
- Contingency plans to pause PCNs if SN443 was challenged.
3.Manual or automated system logs showing how SCC verified:
- Each Violet Road PCN issued post-1 May 2023 complied with SN443’s terms.
- Signage matched SN443’s restrictions (not SN417’s)”.
22.There was an error in the numbering of the requests and therefore no FOI request number 21 exists. FOI request number 22 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I request:
1.Cognitive Load Trials:
- All trials/reports assessing driver decision-making under time pressure at say, 20 & 30 mph, for signs with dual-time restrictions (e.g., “8:15-9:45 and 2:15-3:45), including:
- Comparisons to single-time restrictions (e.g. “10am – 4pm or 1pm – 6pm”).
- Analysis of errors caused by split-second time calculations related to MTE events (e.g. misreading multiple periods).
2.Testing Gaps in Today’s World:
- Documentation confirming whether SCC has:
- Assessed dual-time signs against modern driving conditions (e.g. increased traffic density, GPS reliance).
- Acknowledged that MUTCD 2009/TSRGD 2016 standards do not address cognitive risks of dual-time restrictions.
3.Equality Impact Assessments (EIAs):
- EIAs evaluating risks to neurodivergent drivers (e.g., autism, ADHD), elderly drivers, or those with cognitive processing differences, specifically:
- Difficulty processing dual-time formats under pressure.
- Stress from frequent enforcement in multiple zones, within and between cities.
4.Enforcement Data (2021-2024):
- PCNs issued at single-time zones vs. dual-time zones vs with or without flashing lights, including:
- Appeals won due to confusion over time restrictions.
- Cancellation rates for vulnerable groups (e.g. neurodivergent drivers)”.
23.On 17 May 2025, the Appellant submitted one further request via the WhatDoTheyKnow website. FOI request number 23 read:
“Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 , I hereby request the following information regarding public education and awareness initiatives for new or modified traffic schemes – specifically School Streets and Bus Gates, introduced in Southampton since 2020:
1.Policies & Guidelines
•
Internal policies or guidance documents outlining SCC’s responsibilities for public education relating to new or evolving traffic restrictions (e.g., school streets, bus gates).
•
Any formal strategy linking public education efforts to enforcement objectives.
2.Public Information Campaigns
•
Records of public-facing education campaigns (e.g., leaflets, signage explanations, local press releases, social media outreach) conduced prior to enforcement commencement at Violet Road.
•
Budgets, communication materials, and distribution methods for these campaigns.
2.Post-Implementation Review
•
Reports or internal reviews assessing the effectiveness of public educations initiatives for Violet Road and comparable schemes.
•
Any assessments or recommendations regarding further public information needed to reduce driver confusion and ensure compliance.
3.Discretionary Measures
•
Policies or procedures outlining the use of warning letters or education-first measures for first-time offenders, particularly for older motorists or those unfamiliar with newer restrictions.
Clarification if No Records Exist
If no such records are held, please confirm whether:
(i)
They have never been produced, or (ii)
They existed but have since been deleted or destroyed, including dates and authorisation details”.
24.The Council responded in writing on 19 May 2025 as follows:
“Thank you for your Freedom of Information requests received on 22/04/2025, 23/04/2025, 01/05/2025 and 06/05/2025. The Council initially dealt with your first request under a separate reference (SCC-065680). However, as per my recent email of 07/05/2025, these requests have all been logged under one matter referenced SCC-065726.
Whilst the requests came from separate email addresses, the Council is satisfied that they were made by the same individual. On review, the Council considers that it is not obliged to comply with these requests in accordance with section 14 of the FOIA, as they have been deemed to be vexatious for the following reason(s):
Burden
The Council received 18 individual requests, comprising of 94 total pieces of information. The requests were not made at the same time, but were submitted over the course of 2 weeks, coming at regular intervals.
Motive
It is the Council’s belief that the requests have been made due to the Requester’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of a related matter. The Requester has been involved in an ongoing dispute with the Council regarding enforcement action at Violet Road, the subject of the request submitted.
Value / Serious Purpose
It is the Council’s view that the requests have been submitted to aid the Requester’s personal dispute with the Council, and the value to the wider public is therefore limited.
Harassment or distress
The requests make several unsubstantiated allegations around the Council’s polices and processes, and the manner in which the requests were submitted suggests that the intention is to disrupt the Council. As such, the Council is satisfied that processing this request would place a disproportionate burden on the Council, as there is insufficient public interest in the disclosure of the information to warrant the resources involved in responding”.
25.The Appellant sought an internal review on 20 May 2025 in the following terms:
“I have formally requested an internal review of the Council’s refusal to answer this FOI, which was rejected under Section 14 as “vexatious”. I believe this characterisation is unjustified.
There is a clear difference between persistent resolve to uncover the truth, and vexatious behaviour. Requests like this are rooted in law and public interest, and would present no difficulty to answer if the Council had nothing to hide.
It’s easy to misrepresent intent, especially when those in authority find themselves unable to answer difficult questions without exposing shortcomings. I invite anyone reviewing this to read the request and judge for themselves what’s being avoided, and why”.
26.On the same date, the Appellant sent an email to the Council’s Legal mailbox as well, in which he also requested an internal review of the decision, stating that the decision to apply section 14 of the FOIA across all of his requests was a misuse of that provision. He stated that “To characterise such lawful and time-sensitive requests as burdensome or lacking value is to sidestep accountability. The public has a right to clarity on enforcement measures that may affect hundreds of residents. Suppressing scrutiny under the label of “vexatiousness” risks undermining trust in the Council’s own legal and compliance frameworks”.
27.The Council provided a comprehensive response to the request for an Internal Review on 17 June 2025 stating, in summary:
i.
The Council had received eighteen emails making requests under the FOIA between 16 April 2025 and 17 May 2025. Whilst the first request (FOI requests 1-4) was made from the Appellant’s personal email address, the remaining seventeen requests were made from separate Whatdotheyknow email addresses (which generated a new email address to be used to respond to each separate request);
ii.
The reviewer noted that, whilst section 12 of the FOIA had not been applied to the requests, it should have been considered because it was an alternative route to refusing burdensome requests and was indicative of the level of burden that a public authority might reasonably expect to incur when answering a FOIA request. However, the reviewer then concluded that the Council could not have refused the requests under section 12 of the FOIA without further clarification of a large proportion of the request(s);
iii.
The reviewer was satisfied that all of the requests originated from the same person, and that they were all linked to the bus gate or similar restrictions on Violet Road, the decision to apply the restrictions and the enforcement of those restrictions;
iv.
The Council were entitled to consider all of the requests together when considering whether to refuse some or all of them under section 14 of the FOIA. Once it had been established that the Council deemed all of the requests to be vexatious, it was reasonable for the Council to issue a single response;
v.
Regarding the burden involved in responding to the requests, the reviewer noted that the eighteen requests had fifty-two numbered parts, some of which were broken down into subsections. A significant number of the requests sought comment from the Council or would require the Council to make judgments about the data that it held, which would need the Council to expend significant efforts in attempting to aid the Appellant to make relevant requests for information. In addition, as the requests were made from eighteen separate email addresses, it would impose a significant burden on the Council to log, administer and respond to each email separately. The reviewer noted that, whilst some of the requests would likely have only taken a negligible time to respond to, many parts of the request would require a significant answer to the extent that the Council would have been able to rely on section 12 of the FOIA;
vi.
Regarding the motive of the requester, it was noted that the Appellant had been in dispute with the Council in relation to the bus gate on Violet Road. Whilst the reviewer recognised that the Appellant may have been seeking the information to properly further his cause or to allow scrutiny of the Council’s decision-making, he also recorded that it had been suggested that the request was only being made to cause an unnecessary burden to the Council. In support of that conclusion, the reviewer noted that “the timings of the requests especially the 7 requests on 22 April 2025 between 09:58 and 10:41 are indicative of requests being sent in a way to cause disruption rather than the Requester identifying new pieces of information they would like to have”. The reviewer was therefore satisfied that the Council had reasonable grounds to conclude that the purpose of the request was at least in part to cause significant disruption to the Council;
vii.
Regarding the value or serious purpose of the request, the reviewer recognised that “there are several parts within the requests where I can see at least some value to the public at large”. However, the reviewer concluded that, given the volume of the requests, the manner in which they were sent, and the number of points raised as part of each request, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the purpose was to cause disruption and that any attempt to gain information was secondary – and therefore that there was no serious purpose to making the request(s);
viii.
There was no evidence of unacceptable language or an intent to cause offence in the requests. The reviewer was not satisfied that there was an attempt to harass or cause distress to individuals within the Council or that distress was likely to have been caused;
ix.
The internal review concluded that the Council had correctly concluded that the request was vexatious in line with section 14 of the FOIA. The conclusion reached was that “processing the request would be a disproportionate burden on the Council, as there is insufficient public interest in the disclosure of the information to warrant the resources involved in responding” ;
x.
In response to ancillary matters raised by the Appellant, the reviewer confirmed that the review had been carried out in accordance with the Council’s published review procedure, including the seniority of the officer conducting the review. He had been sufficiently independent to conduct the internal review and, as the internal review response covered all of the requests made by the Appellant, there was no requirement to consider requests in isolation.
The complaint to the Commissioner
28.The Appellant lodged a complaint with the Commissioner on 03 June 2025, stating as follows:
i.
He was submitting the complaint by email as the Commissioner’s online form did not allow complaints about internal reviews to be made unless 40 working days had elapsed since the date of the request for the review. He believed that the matter warranted earlier attention due to the nature of the refusal and the wider pattern of conduct involved;
ii.
The Appellant stated that, prior to submitting his requests, he had made
“two well structured and evidence-based submissions through the Council’s internal channels”
. The first of those had been a PowerPoint presentation titled
“Alienating Motorists and Losing Trust”
, which had been submitted in December 2024, but which had only received a
“broad brush”
Stage 2 complaint response that had failed to address the specific points that he had raised. The second had been
“a detailed catalogue of legal, procedural, and governance concerns”
, submitted in February 2025, which had not received a response;
iii.
The Appellant stated that he had only submitted his FOI requests after both of the earlier submissions had been dismissed or ignored, and that “each request was framed respectfully, lawfully, and clearly, focused on specific factual gaps relating to the legal foundation of a Traffic Regulation Order (TRO), the legitimacy of PCN issuance, and the Council’s broader Moving Traffic Enforcement (MTE) processes” ;
iv.
The Appellant stated that “Rather than engage with the substance of these requests, the Council has applied a blanket “vexatious” label – without distinguishing between them by tone, relevance, or public interest value. In doing so, it appears to treat the number of related questions as justification for avoiding scrutiny. This mirrors the earlier evasion of accountability through internal channels, despite the breadth of questions being a direct consequence of the Council’s own failure to provide timely and substantive answers” ;
v.
The Appellant stated that his requests were “respectfully framed and tightly focused; rooted in unresolved legal, procedural, or governance issues; clearly in the public interest; straightforward to answer, if the Council had no reason to withhold the truth” ;
vi.
The Appellant concluded his complaint to the Commissioner by stating that, rather than being vexatious conduct, the requests were a principled and proportionate attempt to secure transparency from a public authority whose actions had raised significant concerns regarding legal compliance.
29.The Appellant sent a further email to the Commissioner on 18 June 2025 to provide an update following receipt of the internal review outcome stating, in summary, that;
i.
There was no indication that the internal review had been conducted by an individual who was independent of the original decision;
ii.
The number of FOI requests had been inflated from 20 to 23 to support a “burden” claim, which was inconsistent with ICO guidance that cautioned against using volume alone to justify a section 14 refusal, particularly where that volume had been misrepresented;
iii.
ICO guidance cautioned against “treating persistence or structured scrutiny as inherently vexatious, particularly in cases involving legal governance and public accountability” ;
iv.
The patterns raised serious concerns about the adequacy of governance and the approach to transparency within the Council;
v.
The Appellant stated that “I used AI tools to frame and structure my FOIs clearly and efficiently. The number submitted simply reflects the breadth of unresolved concerns after internal routes failed. These were not designed to overwhelm; they are respectful, specific, and lawful” ;
vi.
The Appellant further stated “The rejection of factual information and repeated evasion of accountability have been recurring features of my 18-month experience. That this has been allowed to affect an honest gentleman in my 70s, pursuing answers respectfully and in good faith, speaks volumes. The Council’s conduct has fostered a culture in which scrutiny is suppressed rather than welcomed, and discipline is pursued through enforcement, not truth”.
30.The Commissioner accepted the complaint for investigation on 24 June 2025.
31.On 25 June 2025, the Appellant sent an email to the Commissioner in which he clarified that FOI request number 7, which had been included in the Council’s review of 18 listed requests, had been withdrawn by himself on 09 May 2025. He had withdrawn the request because he had recognised that the request mistakenly referenced a fictitious case name, which had been suggested in error by a third-party legal source. The inclusion of FOI 7 in the “burden” assessment in the internal review was therefore misleading.
32.On 28 July 2025, the Appellant emailed the Commissioner to provide a short summary to assist the case officer. He outlined that the summary provided relevant background on the evidence submissions that he had made to the Council prior to submitting his FOI requests. He stated that his FOIs were a rational continuation of his evidence submissions, made after the Council had declined to engage meaningfully with them, and were not a form of disruption or burden.
33.The email was accompanied by a document titled “Clarifying the Rationale Behind my FOI Requests”. The document contained the following assertions:
i.
The Appellant had submitted two “major evidence-led documents” to the Council – the PowerPoint presentation which identified ten categories of concern around enforcement legitimacy, signage, justification, and process, and then a detailed Excel-based analysis that had mapped his findings directly to legal obligations and prior correspondence;
ii.
He had submitted his FOI requests after the Council had failed to engage with or respond substantively to the two evidence submissions. Many of the FOI requests were direct follow-ups to the issues raised in the two documents, which sought factual information to validate or clarify omissions in the Council’s prior responses and which were specifically framed to avoid repetition. He provided examples of alignment between the evidence submissions and the FOI requests, stating that “these were not obsessive or burdensome requests – they are targeted, thematic, and proportionate to the lack of engagement from SCC” ;
iii.
As a summary, the Appellant stated that “If my FOI requests appear persistent, it is only because prior attempts at informal, internal, and policy-based resolution were unsuccessful – despite clear, structured, and courteous communication on my part” .
34.As part of the summary document, the Appellant included a paragraph titled “Rapidity of Submissions” which read as follows:
“I appreciate that several requests were submitted within a short timeframe. This was not due to any intent to overwhelm or burden the Council, but rather a result of grouping them by topic to maintain clarity and prevent overlap. I used AI-assisted tools to organise these logically and efficiently, so that each request addressed a discrete and justifiable issue – often mapped directly to prior evidence the Council had chosen not to address. Had SCC engaged with the earlier documents in good faith, many of these questions would have been unnecessary. The concentration of requests reflects effort to clarify and contain the enquiry, not to multiply it unnecessarily”.
35.On 11 August 2025, the Appellant sent a joint email to the Council and to the Commissioner, setting out the FOI activity and related correspondence in chronological order. He highlighted the gap of approximately seven months between this initial approach to the Council and the first set of FOI requests, which he pointed to as demonstrating that he had exhausted other avenues before turning to FOI requests and to demonstrate that his FOI activity was driven by unresolved matters, rather than by any repetitive or unfounded intent.
36.A “Schedule of Events” accompanied the email which the Appellant stated “shows that my approach was targeted, proportionate, and focused on securing transparency. While the concentration of requests within a short period may have appeared unusual, it reflects the Council’s own delays in addressing earlier representations, not any intent to cause disruption. The information sought is of wider public interest, particularly given the serious compliance issues at stake”.
37.The Commissioner wrote to the Council on 28 November 2025, inviting the Council to explain why, in the circumstances of the case, it relied on section 14(1) of the FOIA to refuse all of the requests.
38.The Council responded to the Commissioner on 12 December 2025, providing further information in relation to the four main themes outlined in the Commissioner’s guidance. The Council’s response outlined the following:
i.
The manner in which the requests were made was considered to place a disproportionate burden on the Council in responding to them. A total of eighteen requests were received over a period of a few weeks, with nine requests being received over a span of six hours on one day alone. The requests came from eighteen different email addresses, which would have required the Council to respond to each of them individually. In addition, each request contained multiple parts and the ‘scattergun’ approach to seeking information added to a disproportionate level of administration when processing the requests;
ii.
The Appellant had been issued with a Penalty Charge Notice by the Council for driving in a bus gate in November 2023. The Appellant had appealed to the Traffic Tribunal, who had found in the Appellant’s favour. The Council had cancelled the Penalty Charge Notice and a refund had been issued. The Appellant had then raised several complaints to the Council regarding the handling of the matter, which were escalated through the Council’s complaint process. The process ended in January 2025, but the Appellant had then sent a series of correspondence addressed to Council Members and the Chief Executive to challenge the lawfulness of the bus gate restrictions and the signage. The Council provided the Commissioner with a timeline of interactions and communications from the Appellant in relation to his complaint concerning the bus gate, from September 2025 onwards. The Council’s legal team provided a response to the Appellant on 03 April 2025. The Appellant had then sent a further letter to the Council on 17 April 2025, making a claim against the Council for a series of legal breaches and seeking £120,000 in damages;
iii.
In the claim letter, the Appellant included a section titled “Non-Compliance Consequences” , in which he stated that “rejecting this offer triggers….FOI blitz + mass refund demands from motorists similarly accused” ;
iv.
The Council stated that the above letter coincided with the first of the FOI requests. As such, it was the Council’s belief that the Appellant was prompted to submit his requests in frustration at not receiving the outcome that he desired in relation to his complaint and challenges regarding the bus gate. The Council also contested that “the requests were made in a manner to cause utmost disruption to the Council; they were spread out over a period of weeks, from separate email addresses, each involving a number of parts, and each being required to be processed individually” ;
v.
Whilst the Council conceded that the information sought was not of a trivial nature, the volume, manner of the requests and the number of points raised demonstrated that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the primary purpose for making the requests was to cause disruption, and any attempt to gain information was secondary;
vi.
Earlier communications with the Appellant had led the Council to refer him for consideration under its “unreasonably persistent / vexatious complainer” policy. Although there was no evidence of unacceptable language when making the requests the Appellant had separately been deemed to be persistent and vexatious under the Council’s applicable policy due to his wider interactions and communications with the Council.
Decision notice
39.The Commissioner’s decision was that the requests were vexatious and that the Council was correct to rely on section 14(1) of the FOIA to refuse the majority of them. However, the Commissioner noted that some of the requested information constituted environmental information. In relation to those parts of the requests, the Commissioner was satisfied that regulation 12(4)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“the EIR”) was applicable and that the balance of the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption in relation to that environmental information.
40.The Commissioner noted that FOI request number 7, submitted on 22 April 2025, had been withdrawn. He therefore considered that the scope of his investigation was to determine whether the Council was entitled to refuse the remaining seventeen requests on the basis that they were vexatious.
41.The Commissioner was satisfied that some of the requested information would fall within the definition of the state of the elements of the environment as per regulation 2(1)(a) of the EIR. The Commissioner considered that, in practice, there was no difference between a request that was vexatious under the FOIA and one that was manifestly unreasonable under the EIR, save that the public interest must also be considered when refusing a request under the EIR. The Commissioner therefore considered the extent to which the requests could be considered as vexatious.
42.The reasons for the Commissioner’s decision, in summary, were:
i.
The Commissioner was satisfied that the requests were attempts to re-open matters that had already been considered via the appropriate channels. He noted that the FOIA and EIR were not alternative means of redress in scenarios where the appropriate avenues had not delivered the outcome sought by the Appellant;
ii.
The Commissioner considered that eighteen related multi-part requests over a thirty-one day period was excessive. Even though one of the requests had been withdrawn, the Commissioner considered that this would have had a minimal impact on the sizable burden imposed on the Council, particularly as the request was not withdrawn until over two weeks after submission;
iii.
The Commissioner considers “that the motive and purpose stated by the complainant in their correspondence to the Commissioner – i.e. a proportionate attempt to secure transparency – appears to be plainly contradicted by their threat of an “FOI blitz” should they not receive the six-figure settlement sum they were seeking” ;
iv.
Whilst the Commissioner acknowledged that the information being requested may hold some value to any member of the public who may come across a bus gate within the Council’s boundaries, the level of detail would likely be completely disproportionate to what would be required by the vast majority of the general public;
v.
The Commissioner considered that the submitting of the requests to be a continuation of the pattern of ongoing correspondence to the Council about this matter (namely the bus gate), often repeating the same points, and seemingly a refusal to accept the outcome of the process. Whilst he acknowledged that there was no evidence of unacceptable language or an attempt to cause offence, he did consider the Appellant’s approach to be entirely disproportionate in the circumstances of the case where the matter had already been considered by the Traffic Tribunal and the penalty charge being refunded;
vi.
The Commissioner noted that the Council did not separately set out a public interest test with regard to the environmental information as required by regulation 12(1)(b) of the EIR. However, the Commissioner was satisfied that the Council gave relevant consideration to the public interest within its wider arguments regarding why it had concluded that the requests were vexatious. In addition, there was always a strong public interest in allowing a public authority to protect itself from manifestly unreasonable requests;
vii.
The Commissioner stated that “In this case the Commissioner’s view is that the balance of the public interest favours the maintenance of the exception, rather than being equally balanced. This means the Commissioner’s decision, whilst informed by the presumption provided by regulation 12(2), is that the exception provided by regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR was applicable to the parts of the request that constituted environmental information” ;
viii.
The Commissioner concluded by stating that “with all of the above factors taken into consideration, the Commissioner concludes that the requests were a disproportionate and improper use of the legislations, and therefore they were vexatious and manifestly unreasonable. On this basis, he finds that section 14(1) of FOIA and regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR are engaged, and the balance of the public interest favours maintaining the exception for the environmental information” .
Grounds of appeal
43.The Appellant initially his lodged his appeal on 03 February 2026 and then resubmitted it on 07 April 2026.
44.The Grounds of Appeal were, in essence, that:
i.
The Commissioner gave insufficient weight to the public interest in transparency concerning enforcement practices;
ii.
The Commissioner placed disproportionate emphasis on the number and timing of requests, rather than their substance and purpose;
iii.
The Commissioner faired to properly consider the context of prior structured engagement and the absence of meaningful responses from the Council;
iv.
The Appellant stated that “the use of AI-assisted tools enabled the efficient preparation and submission of requests within a short timeframe. While this may have created an impression of volume, it reflects efficiency of preparation rather than vexatious intent and should not have been determinative. The substance and purpose of the requests were considered but the analysis focused primarily on volume and pattern rather than individual merits”.
45.In written submissions that accompanied his GRC1 form, the Appellant outlined four grounds of appeal as follows:
i.
Internal inconsistency between findings and conclusion: Notwithstanding that the Commissioner found that the requests were not offensive, that some were acknowledged to have a potential public interest value, and that the Appellant submitted that the requests were intelligible and structured, the Commissioner upheld a blanket refusal of all requests under section 14(1) without explaining why no lesser or proportionate outcome was appropriate;
ii.
Failure to address proportionality: The decision did not adequately explain why partial compliance, phased disclosure, or engagement to narrow or prioritise requests were not considered viable, notwithstanding the nature of the requests and the Commissioner’s own findings;
iii.
Insufficient consideration of section 16 FOIA: The decision did not clearly explain how the duty to advise and assist under section 16 was discharged or why it was inapplicable in its entirety;
iv.
Over-reliance on request volume and timing: The Appellant stated that “the reasoning appears to rest substantially on the frequency and volume of requests rather than their substance, without explaining why this justified the exceptional step of refusing all requests outright” .
46.The Appellant submitted that the appeal should be allowed, the Decision Notice set aside, and the Council should be required to comply with the requests.
The response of the Commissioner
47.The Commissioner filed his response on 20 May 2026, in which he stood by the Decision Notice. In relation to the requests that fell under the FOIA, the Commissioner maintained that, in all of the circumstances of this case, the requests were vexatious. In relation to the requests that fell under the EIR, the Commissioner maintained that, in all of the circumstances of this case, the requests were manifestly unreasonable. In relation to the requests falling under the EIR, the Commissioner also concluded that the maintenance of the exception in regulation 12(4)(b) outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the withheld information.
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Legal Framework
48.The relevant provisions of the FOIA are as follows:
s.1 General right of access to information held by public authorities
(1)Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled – (a)
to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and (b)
if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.
(…)
s.14 Vexatious or repeated requests
(1)Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.
(2)Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.
49.The FOIA does not provide any assistance as to what is meant by ‘vexatious’. The Upper Tribunal gave guidance in Information Commissioner v Devon County Council and Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) , as upheld and clarified by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner and Devon County Council [2015] EWCA Civ 454 .
50.As noted by Arden LJ in her judgment in the Court of Appeal in Dransfield, the hurdle of showing a request is vexatious is a high one: “…the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious” (para 68).
51.Judge Wikeley’s decision in the Upper Tribunal sets out more detailed guidance that was not challenged in the Court of Appeal. The ultimate question is,
“is the request vexatious in the sense of being a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA?”
(para 43). In the context of reviewing the Commissioner’s Guidance, Judge Wikeley highlighted
“the importance of adopting a holistic and broad approach to the determination of whether a request is vexatious or not, emphasising the attributes of manifest unreasonableness, irresponsibility and, especially where there is a previous course of dealings, the lack of proportionality that typically characterise vexatious requests”
(para 45). Arden LJ in the Court of Appeal also emphasised that a
“rounded approach”
is required (para 69).
52.The Upper Tribunal set out four non-exhaustive broad issues which can be helpful in assessing whether a request is vexatious:
a.
The burden imposed on the public authority by the request.
This may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings between the parties. “…the context and history of the previous request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious. In particular, the number, breadth, pattern and duration of previous requests may be a telling factor” (para 29).
b.
The motive of the requester.
Although FOIA is motive-blind, the Upper Tribunal observed that “what may seem like an entirely reasonable and benign request may be found to be vexatious in the wider context of the course of dealings between the individual and the relevant public authority” (para 34).
c.
The value or serious purpose of the request .
Regard should be had to the inherent value of the request, specifically “does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?” (para 38), albeit that a lack of apparent objective value cannot provide a basis for refusal on its own.
d.
Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff . Vexatiousness “may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive” (para 39), although this is not a prerequisite for concluding that a request is vexatious.
53.Overall, the purpose of section 14 is to “protect the resources (in the broadest sense of that word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA” (Upper Tribunal, para 10).
54.The relevant provisions of the EIR are as follows:
s.5 Duty to make available environmental information on request
(1)Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request.
(…)
s.12 Exceptions to the duty to disclose environmental information
(1)Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if – (a)
an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and (b)
in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.
(2)A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.
(3)
(…)
(4)For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that – (a)
(…)
(b)
the request for information is manifestly unreasonable
(…)
55.In Craven v Information Commissioner and DECC [2015] EWCA Civ 454 , the Upper Tribunal held that, for all intents and purposes, the term ‘manifestly unreasonable’ in regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR has the same meaning as ‘vexatious’ pursuant to section 14(1) of the FOIA.
The role of the Tribunal
56.The Tribunal’s remit is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of his discretion, whether he ought to have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner.
Issues
57.The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the Commissioner’s Decision Notice was in accordance with the law – namely whether the Commissioner was correct in determining that parts of the request were vexatious under section 14(1) of FOIA and, where parts of the request fell within the EIR, whether the Commissioner was correct in determining that they were manifestly unreasonable under section 12(4)(b) of the EIR and that the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information.
Evidence
58.We read and took account of an open bundle containing 144 pages including indexes prepared by the Commissioner and served on 20 May 2026. In addition, we read and took account of a bundle containing 48 pages submitted on behalf of the Appellant which contained a witness statement dated 27 July 2026 and supporting documents.
59.We also heard submissions by the Appellant which we have taken into account.
Appellant’s evidence and submissions
60.The Appellant served a witness statement, dated 27 July 2026, as part of his bundle of documents. The witness statement stated the following, in summary:
i.
The requests for information were not an isolated collection of requests, but rather they arose from a much longer course of engagement with the Council and so should be viewed in that context;
ii.
The Appellant’s purpose in making the requests was to “identify practical lessons arising from my experience and to offer suggestions that could improve decision-making, public communication, traffic enforcement and the treatment of citizens" ;
iii.
The Appellant submitted that the Council did not have an effective route for recording and assessing constructive comments. As such, his suggestions were instead channelled into the Council’s complaints process and rejected as having no merit;
iv.
The engagement that the Appellant had prior to the submission of the FOI requests showed “a continuing progression from correspondence, to clearer explanation, to structured analysis. They demonstrate that my approach remained constructive, evidence-based and directed towards improvement” ;
v.
After the complaints process had concluded, the Appellant stated that there were still unanswered matters and so the FOIA provided the statutory route to request that outstanding information;
vi.
The Appellant stated that the requests arose from constructive suggestions that had been converted into complaints and rejected. The requests were a structured analysis of matters that remained unanswered;
vii.
The Appellant stated that “the concentration of requests reflected the number of unresolved subjects identified by that analysis and the speed with which modern technology enabled them to be drafted and submitted separately”. He further stated that focusing on the number and proximity of the requests without giving proper weight to the events that occurred prior to their submission gave a misleading picture of his conduct.
61.The Appellant made the following submissions during the hearing:
i.
He had initially sought to provide constructive feedback, but it had been channelled into the complaints process against his wishes. He had only moved on to making FOI requests as a consequence of the earlier process;
ii.
The concentration in time of the requests did not, in itself, make the requests vexatious, particularly when it was recognised that there was some public interest in the requests;
iii.
No effort had been made by the Council to manage the requests proportionally or to prioritise any of them – instead, each request had been bought to an end by the same collective conclusion without an analysis of their value;
iv.
In relation to the letter of claim, he was not trying to be opportunistic to gain money – instead, it was an incentive to the Council to change their processes;
v.
He had used AI to formulate his requests, using the information that he had compiled in his earlier PowerPoint presentation, which was why the requests were separated out into individual requests and also submitted so quickly – although he accepted that this would have placed a burden on the Council to respond;
vi.
Regarding the words ‘FOI blitz’, he is not sure that those words came out of his mouth – they may have been AI generated. It was a vivid way of describing a number of requests in a short period. The Appellant stated that, although he may have used those words so that the Council would take note of his queries, no weight should be placed on that expression as it didn’t alter the public interest in, or legitimacy of, his requests;
vii.
His conduct was evidence of his persistence, but that did not amount to the requests being vexatious.
Discussions and conclusions
62.The Tribunal considered the non-exhaustive list of issues as set out by the Upper Tribunal in Dransfield and the overall circumstances of the case, including the history of the relationship between the Appellant and the Council.
63.The burden imposed on the public authority by the request. This is a key factor relied upon by the Council. Whilst the mere fact that a responding to a request may be burdensome, that in itself does not absolve the Council from their legal obligations under FOIA.
64.The Tribunal notes that, between 16 April and 17 May 2025, the Council had received eighteen requests for information from the Appellant, seeking ninety-four pieces of information. Whilst one of those requests (FOI number 7) was subsequently withdrawn, this was not withdrawn until a fortnight after its submission and, in any event, we do not find that this withdrawal had a significant impact on the burden imposed by the Council.
65.The Tribunal notes that multiple separate requests were sent on the same day – for example, nine requests were sent on 22 April 2025 alone – and that all requests save for the first four were sent via the WhatDoTheyKnow website. Use of that website generated a separate email address for each request to be responded to, which meant that the Council would need to log and process each request separately.
66.We take the view that, even if the requests were to be responded to, it is likely that further questions and correspondence would be generated. In support of this contention, we note that the Appellant had raised several complaints about the handling of the PCN through the Council’s internal complaints process and subsequently to Council Members and the Chief Executive. Despite the PCN being overturned, the Appellant remained dissatisfied with the response. We therefore agree with the notion that the Appellant is attempting to re-open matters that have previously been considered, with a correlating negative impact on the Council’s resources.
67.The motive of the requestor. It is the case generally that the application of FOIA and any request made under it is not dependant on the motive behind the request. However, section 14 is an exception to this principle. The motive of the requestor can be an important factor as to whether a request is vexatious in the wider context of the dealings between an individual and a public authority. In this case, the Appellant states that his motive for making the requests relate to unresolved matters of legality, enforcement and governance surrounding the bus gate on Violet Road. He submits that he only moved to the FOI process because his two earlier submissions to the Council in December 2024 and February 2025 had effectively been ignored.
68.The Tribunal is satisfied that the history and content of the communications between the Appellant and the Council demonstrate that, in reality, the FOI requests were being used to cause disruption to the Council, borne out of a frustration by the Appellant that the Council was failing to listen to or act on his ideas and suggestions. The Tribunal accepts the analysis of the Commissioner that the motive stated by the Appellant, namely a proportionate attempt to secure transparency – is contradicted by the threat of an “FOI blitz” if the Appellant did not receive the six-figure sum sought. We note that the letter in which the Appellant claimed damages coincided with the timing of the first FOI requests.
69.We therefore conclude that the Appellant’s actions are primarily motivated by his perception that the Council was not listening to him following the PCN incident, rather than by a desire for transparency or accountability.
70.Value or serious purpose of the request. The Tribunal recognises the clear public interest in accountability and transparency of Council decisions – and indeed, the fact that there was some public value in at least some of the requests was accepted by the Commissioner and the Council. We also recognise the importance of individuals who are impacted by decisions of a Council being able to understand the basis for those decisions and, where necessary, being able to question and challenge them.
71.However, the Tribunal finds that the level of detail that was sought in the requests was entirely disproportionate to the public value or interest in the material. The Tribunal are satisfied that, whilst there is a limited value to the wider public in some of the requests, the reason for their submission was to benefit the Appellant in his own personal dispute with the Council flowing from the issuance of the PCN. We accept the Council’s submission that the primary purpose of the requests was to cause disruption, with any attempt to access information being secondary.
72.Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff. We recognise that the Appellant has not used the extreme type of language referred to in Dransfield and nor can his behaviour be categorised as ‘extremely offensive’. We accept, as per the Appellant’s contention, that the language used in his requests was respectful. However, we also note that, as a result of the Appellant’s conduct in relation to the PCN, he was deemed to be vexatious under the Council’s internal policy.
73.Notwithstanding the absence of unacceptable language or attempt to cause offence, we do find that the repeated attempts to reopen issues that have already been fully considered via the appropriate channels, and the volume and intensity of the communications, would have had a cumulative impact on the Council and their resources. We agree with the Commissioner’s submissions that the pattern on ongoing correspondence to the Council, often repeating the same or a similar point, is entirely disproportionate to the circumstances of the case. The amount of information sought, contained within seventeen (after the withdrawal of FOI number 7) separate requests for different email addresses, would have placed unnecessarily excessive demands on the Council’s resources.
74.In relation to the application of the EIR, the Commissioner notes that the Council did not separately set out a public interest test with regard to that environmental information. The Commissioner was satisfied that the Council gave consideration to the public interest aspects within its wider analysis of the requests, and that the balance of the public interest favoured the maintenance of the exception. The Tribunal accepts that approach by the Commissioner in relation to those parts of the requests that fall within the EIR.
75.Having considered all of the circumstances of this case and taking a holistic and rounded approach, we are satisfied that the requests were a disproportionate use of the FOIA (and EIR) regime. We are satisfied that the Appellant is making his requests as part of a wider campaign borne out of frustration due to his perception that the Council are not listening to his constructive suggestions and due to his previous engagement with the Council relating to the PCN. It is not in the public interest for the limited resources of the Council to be disproportionally spent on replying to the Appellant’s requests, as to do so will undermine their ability to carry out their core functions. In coming to this conclusion, we have taken into account the underlying purpose of section 14 of the FOIA to protect the resources of the public authority from being squandered on the disproportionate or improper use of the FOIA.
76.Finally, we note the Appellant’s submission that insufficient consideration was given to section 16 of the FOIA. Given the scale and timing of the requests, we take the view that it would have taken considerable time and resource for the Council to engage with the Appellant to prioritise or narrow down the key points in each request. For the reasons set out in our deliberations, we do not consider that this would have been warranted and have determined that it was reasonable for the Council to move directly to a response under section 14 of the FOIA.
77.We therefore find that the Commissioner was correct to conclude that the Council was entitled to rely on section 14 of the FOIA to deem the requests to be vexatious and to refuse to respond to them. Where any part of the request falls within the provisions of the EIR, we find that the Commissioner was correct to conclude that the Council was entitled to rely on regulation 12(4)(b) of the EIR to deem the requests to be manifestly excessive, and that the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information.
Conclusion
78.The Tribunal dismisses the appeal for the reasons given above.
Details
| Country | United Kingdom |
| Body | Courts of England and Wales |
| Type | court decision |
| Language | en |
| Document date | 2026-10-20 |
| Size | 64 031 знаков |
| Versions | 2 |
| First seen | 2026-10-21 |
| Last checked | 2026-11-16 05:33 |
| neutralCitation | [2026] UKFTT 01424 (GRC) |
| court | United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) |
Topics
Why this document is in the base
Selection matched on the following, total weight 3.
-
Information Commissioner
орган
Personal data
…Graham Kemish v The Information Commissioner Суд рассмотрел апелляцию гражданина против решения Информационного комиссара Великобритан…
Dropped as boilerplate or single passing mentions: traffic datasocial media
Found by query: «automated decision» (caselaw_uk)
Summary
Суд рассмотрел апелляцию гражданина против решения Информационного комиссара Великобритании отказать в доступе к информации от местного совета города Саутгемптона под предлогом чрезмерного использования законодательства о свободе информации и экологических информационных регламентах. Суд пришёл к выводу, что запросы были чрезмерными и необоснованными, поскольку заявитель неоднократно обращался с одними и теми же вопросами, что привело к неоправданной нагрузке на ресурсы совета. Суд поддержал решение комиссара и отклонил апелляцию.
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