Пульс · Документы · Великобритания · Суды Англии и Уэльса

Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: нарушение авторских прав на изображения

Charles And Ivy Ltd & Anor v Chelsea Supplies Ltd

судебное решение 2026-10-09 49 130 знаков Интеллектуальная собственность в цифровой среде Мессенджеры
Скачать На сайте источника Файл оригинала
Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-10-13.

Her Honour Judge Melissa Clarke:

A.

INTRODUCTION

1.This is the inquiry directed by my order of 30 April 2026 following the Defendant’s formal written admission of liability for copyright infringement of the Claimants’ Images on 29 April 2026, the day before the case management conference (“ CMC ”) for the liability trial.

2.The First Claimant is a retailer and wholesaler of, inter alia , fencing products. The Second Claimant is its holding company. The Defendant is a retailer of, inter alia , fencing products. The parties’ businesses are geographically fairly closely located, the Defendant being in Bolton and the Claimants in Middleton, to the north west and north east of Manchester in the historic county of Lancashire. They are about 17 miles apart by road.

3.“

Claimants’ Images

” is defined in the Particulars of Claim as being the images shown in Annex 1A to Annex 1E to the Particulars of Claim. These are 20 images of fencing elements and finishes. The Claimants plead that each of the Claimants’ Images was an original artistic work created by Mr Greg Robinson, a British self-employed designer at all material times resident in the UK, who had assigned, inter alia

, the copyrights subsisting in the Claimants’ Images to the Second Claimant by a written assignment dated 7 July 2025. They plead that the Second Claimant granted a worldwide exclusive licence to the First Claimant of, inter alia

, the copyrights subsisting in the Claimants’ Images, by way of an intellectual property licence agreement dated 19 August 2025.

4.The copyright infringements alleged in the Particulars of Claim are that the Defendant has, without licence from the Claimants, copied the Claimants’ Images and/or communicated each of them to the public and/or authorised others to do the same, by uploading copies of each of the Claimants’ Images to the Defendant’s website, at some point prior to 12 June 2025, to promote on behalf of the Defendant similar, competing goods to those of the Claimants’ goods. The Defendant’s website is at chelseasupplies.com (“ Defendant’s Website ”).

5.The Claimants plead that each of the Claimants’ Images were available from the Claimants’ website at charlesandivy.co.uk (“ Claimants’ Website ”) such that the Defendant had access to them, and each of the images from the Defendant’s Website identified in Annex 3 to the Particulars of Claim is identical to the corresponding image in the Claimants’ Images. At paragraph 7(d) of the Particulars of Claim they plead “ For images identical to the Claimants’ Images to appear on the Website, the Defendant must have put them there or authorised another to do the same ”.

6.Screenshots of examples of how the Claimants’ Images were used on the Claimants’ Website and used on the Defendant’s Website are shown at Annex A to this judgment.

7.The Defendant’s written admissions were in the following terms, so far as is relevant:

“2.

The Defendant admits that the Second Claimant is the owner of the copyright in the Claimants’ Images, as defined in the Particulars of Claim dated 19 September 2025;

3.The Defendant admits that a web developer hired by the Defendant to create its website used the Claimants’ Images in creating the Defendant’s website, and also admits that at all times the web developer was acting as an agent of the Defendant. The Defendant accepts responsibility for its agent’s actions and as such admits liability for infringing the copyright, save that:

a.

the Defendant does not admit that it knew about the infringement until it was notified by the Claimants’ legal representatives of the same; and b.

the Defendant does not admit that its actions have shown flagrant disregard for the Claimants’ intellectual property.

4.The Defendant maintains that any damages to be awarded, either on the basis of inquiry as to damages or account of profits, must be assessed and no sum is admitted. The Defendant also maintains its denial of any entitlement to additional damages and/or exemplary damages.”

8.At the CMC the Defendant consented to judgment on liability and offered undertakings not to infringe in future. By the 5 th recital to and paragraph 3 of my CMC order of 30 April 2026, certain pleaded factual issues which remained live, and the question of quantum including, inter alia , additional damages, were reserved for determination at the inquiry.

9.The court ordered the Defendant to pay the Claimants’ costs of the claim so far as they relate to liability, to be assessed at the inquiry hearing if not agreed, and made directions for this inquiry hearing, including directions for disclosure and witness evidence. The parties could not agree the costs of the liability stage of the proceedings before the inquiry and so it remains for me to assess.

10.Since the CMC the issues have narrowed further: the Claimants pleaded a claim in exemplary damages, but do not pursue it; and the Defendant pleaded a s97(1)

Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“ CDPA ”) defence to damages for innocent infringement (“ Where in an action for infringement of copyright it is shown that at the time of the infringement the defendant did not know, and had no reason to believe, that copyright subsisted in the work to which the action relates, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages against him, but without prejudice to any other remedy .”), but does not pursue it.

11.Knowledge of the Defendant does remain in issue for the purposes of considering flagrancy pursuant to the Claimants’ claim for additional damages under s.97(2) CDPA, however.

12.Accordingly the issues for my determination are:

i)

Did the Defendant and/or its admitted agents know, or have reason to believe, that copyright subsisted in the Claimants’ Images?

ii)

What is the quantum of the Claimants’ claim to compensatory (general) damages?

iii)

Should additional damages be awarded pursuant to s97(2) CDPA and/or Regulation 3 of the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2006 and if so, what quantum?

13.I must also assess the Claimants’ costs of the liability phase to be paid by the Defendant pursuant to the CMC Order, and also deal with the costs of the quantum phase.

14.The Claimants are represented by Mr Michael Smith and the Defendant is represented by Mr Christopher Cook. I am grateful to both of them for their skeleton arguments and oral submissions. Neither I nor they discerned any difference between them on the applicable law.

B.

DISCLOSURE

15.The Claimants gave disclosure by list in accordance with the CMC Order. Their form N265 was signed by two directors of the Claimants, Jack Thomas Coe and Joanne Lomax on 9 June 2026. The documents disclosed were a number of invoices from Greg Robinson for work done, including work said to be done in relation to the Claimants’ Images, from 8 February 2021 to 2 January 2023.

16.The Defendant gave disclosure by list dated 12 June 2026. Its form N265 was signed by the Defendant’s director Mr Mohammed Majid. In it, he ticked a box stating that he did not search for, inter alia :

i)

Documents predating May 2025;

ii)

Documents located elsewhere then in his possession or his solicitors’ file of papers;

iii)

Electronic documents.

17.The box to be ticked and completed dealing with a search for electronic documents was also left blank. Mr Majid reiterated on the following page that he did not search for documents created before May 2025, or any documents contained on PCs, databases, back-up tapes, mobile phones, notebooks, PDA devices, portable data storage media, servers, off-site storage, laptops, handheld devices, mail files, calendar files, spreadsheet files, document files, web-based applications or graphic and presentation files.

18.The Defendant only disclosed: (i) something called a “ CGI Images Invoice

”, which was dated 22 May 2025 in the sum of £1104.32, addressed to the Defendant, but which had any identifying information about who it was from redacted; and (ii) ten of the Defendant’s own invoices to customers relating to fencing, dating from 14 June 2025 to 6 July 2025, six of which were for fencing samples charged at £1 each, with only 4 relating to product sales, but in each case with the customer details and delivery addresses redacted. He later disclosed an unredacted image of the CGI Images Invoice. It is the Defendant’s evidence that this was an invoice for the creation of the Defendant’s own CGI images for use on the fencing pages of the Defendant’s Website, not any invoice relating to the work carried out by the web developer said to have developed those fencing web pages (“

Web Developer

”). Accordingly, following this initial disclosure the Claimants had no idea of the identity of the Web Developer, as the same had not been identified in the earlier pleadings, in correspondence, or at the CMC and no documents had been disclosed of any communications between the Defendant and the Web Developer.

19.Accordingly, the Claimants requested further disclosure of communications between the Defendant and the Web Developer and in response Mr Majid provided a witness statement (headed “ supplemental disclosure statement

”) dated 6 July 2026. In it, he stated that he had undertaken further enquiries and reasonable searches but those had not identified any correspondence between the Defendant and the Web Developer concerning the uploading or use of the Claimants’ Images. He said, “

To the best of my knowledge and belief, no such correspondence now exists or remains within the Defendant’s possession or control

” and so, he said, the Defendant had no further documents to disclose. Mr Majid did not provide any explanation in this statement for why there was no such correspondence or other documentation.

20.Mr Majid filed a further witness statement dated 24 July 2026. He attended court and was cross-examined and re-examined. Some of the cross-examination focussed on the Defendant’s disclosure. In my judgment both the Defendant’s disclosure and Mr Majid’s evidence about disclosure were extremely unsatisfactory. I found him to be evasive, somewhat argumentative, he produced oral evidence on relevant matters for the first time in the witness box without any adequate explanation for why he had not produced it before, and I am not satisfied that he came to court to assist it to the best of his abilities.

21.In terms of the total lack of any disclosure of communications with the Web Developer, Mr Majid said that he had not personally corresponded with the Web Developer in the development phase, because other employees had done so. However, when he got the original letter of claim of 12 July 2025 from the Claimants’ solicitors, “

I walked to the desk of the lady who had been dealing with it

[who he later said was called ‘Ellie’]

and sent an email from the lady’s computer… she sent an email saying take the images off the website

”. This was new information provided for the first time in the witness box. When asked why he had not disclosed that 12 June 2025 email, he said, “

We had an email culling system where emails were deleted

”, and that he did not think at that point to start to preserve communications.

22.There was no reference to systematic email culling in the disclosure statements, or his witness statement, or the early correspondence between the parties’ solicitors where the Claimants’ solicitors raised concerns about the adequacy of disclosure. It was not until an email from the Defendant’s solicitor of 14 July 2026 that a systematic email deletion policy was mentioned. This mistakenly referred to his client throughout as the Claimant, rather than the Defendant, but it said that “ the [Defendant] confirms that no correspondence specifically concerning infringing images ever existed between the [Defendant] and the website developer

”. I pause to note that that is inconsistent with Mr Majid’s evidence about the email sent to the Website Developer on 12 June 2025 requesting he remove the Claimants’ Images from the Defendant’s Website. It continues “

There was, however, general correspondence with the website developer relating to the development of the [Defendant’s] website. That correspondence is no longer available because, as part of the [Defendant’s] management practice, emails are periodically deleted to manage mailbox storage and capacity. This is a longstanding business practice adopted in the ordinary course of business and was not implemented in anticipation of these proceedings

”.

23.Mr Majid said in his witness statement of 26 July 2026 “ As part of my normal practice, I regularly delete and permanently cull emails from my mailbox due to storage and capacity constraint s”, but this does not appear to describe an automatic and system-wide process of the type referred to in his solicitors’ letter of 14 July 2026. It suggests that Mr Majid was carrying out his own mailbox management.

24.The Claimants’ solicitors in reply to the Defendant’s solicitors letter of 14 July 2026 asked when the relevant emails were deleted, and in response they were sent a copy of a chain of emails sent between Mr Majid and a Martin Astley between 29 July and 5 August 2026. In one of those Mr Astley stated, in a manner which was inconsistent with Mr Majid’s witness evidence:

“

Prior to migrating to Microsoft 365, Mahmood Holdings

[being a group of companies associated with Mr Majid]

used a basic third-party IMAP email hosting provider with very limited mailbox storage. To prevent mailboxes from becoming full, which would have caused users to stop receiving new emails, we operated automatic housekeeping routines that deleted older emails on a regular basis. This was simply a technical measure to keep the email system operational and formed part of the normal day-to-day management of the platform. Following the migration to Microsoft 365, these storage limitations no longer existed and the automated deletion process was permanently discontinued. We do not hold copies of emails that were deleted by these automated routines, nor do we have any audit logs or records showing the dates on which individual emails were deleted. As such, it is not possible to identify when any specific historic email was removed.”

25.Mr Astley also said that migration to Microsoft 365 was completed on 29 July 2025. This migration has not been pleaded or evidenced. In cross-examination Mr Majid accepted that he had not asked Mr Astley how old the oldest email which migrated onto Microsoft 365 was, nor how long emails were held before they were deleted pursuant to the previous policy, and he was not able to answer any questions on these points himself. He did not have any real answer to give to the question of why he had not sought a witness statement from Mr Astley so that he could come to court and be cross-examined. It seems to me to be inherently unlikely that an email of 12 June 2025 (such as that from ‘Ellie’ to the Web Developer) was not migrated over to Microsoft 365 some six weeks later at the end of July 2025, but deleted instead.

26.Going back to communications with the Web Developer, Mr Majid was asked why he did not seek from the Web Developer copies of emails between him and the Defendant. Mr Majid said “ I attempted to contact him. I had a WhatsApp number, I tried to call it and the number didn’t exist ”. This evidence about having the Web Developer’s WhatsApp number, and trying to call it, was provided for the first time in cross-examination. When it was put to him that he had not disclosed any WhatsApp messages, he reiterated that he tried to call the number “ but could not get any response .”

27.When it was put to Mr Majid that he had not even disclosed an email address for the Web Developer, he said “

It doesn’t exist no more. I don’t have it – what I have is invoices

”. In fact, the Defendant has not disclosed any invoices of the Web Developer, and Mr Majid’s oral evidence was the first mention that the Defendant had such invoices. When asked in cross-examination where those invoices were and why they had not been disclosed, he said “

I didn’t know the invoices from my Web Developer were needed. What is the purpose? We admitted the breach. We instructed a Web Developer to make the pages. Nobody said we needed to disclose invoices

.”. This was unconvincing, given that the length of the project, and the time that the Claimants’ Images were used, and time that the website fencing pages were live, are all potentially relevant to the issues before me. Mr Majid did not explain how he came to know or believe that the Web Developer’s email no longer existed.

28.When it was put to Mr Majid that his initial disclosure statement said that he had not searched for documents pre-dating May 2025, although his own evidence was that the Web Developer was instructed in March 2025, he acknowledged that was a failure in his disclosure obligations. When it was put to him that he had certified in that initial disclosure statement that he had not searched for electronic documents at all, he first said “

That’s just silly, I’ve disclosed documents and emails

” and when it was put to him again that he had not disclosed any emails and hardly any documents, and none relevant to the Web Developer, he showed that he understood the importance of the disclosure process by saying “

That is totally going against the whole court process, saying I haven’t searched anything. That looks horrible. But that is definitely not the case… it is very embarrassing. This document contradicts what happened

”. I do not accept that it does. It seems to me more likely than not that he did not carry out the searches that he certified he did not carry out.

29.It was put to Mr Majid by Mr Smith for the Claimants that he had not carried out the Defendant’s disclosure obligations properly because he did not want the Court to see the correspondence that the Defendant’s agents had with the Web Developer, and he denied it, but in my judgment that is more likely than not to be the reason. I find that correspondence would likely not have supported the Defendant’s and Mr Majid’s account.

30.I also find that is also more likely than not to be the reason that the Defendant did not put before the court: (i) witness evidence from ‘Ellie’, who he says was the main employee dealing with, and instructing, the Website Developer; (ii) witness evidence from Martin Astley relating to the email retention policy and email migration at the end of July 2025; and (iii) any name or contact information which would enable the Claimants to identify and investigate the Web Developer, including the invoices Mr Majid referred to. I am entitled to, and do draw the inference that such witness evidence and/or evidence arising out of such an investigation would not support the Defendant’s case.

C. EVIDENCE

31.As is usual in IPEC, and by the CMC order dated 30 April 2026, the pleadings stand as evidence.

Claimants’ witness evidence

32.The Claimants’ filed a witness statement from Mr Greg Robinson, who was the creator of the Claimants’ Images, and from Mr Philip Lomax, a shareholder of the First Claimant and director and shareholder of the Second Claimant. Both attended court and were cross-examined. Mr Robinson was also re-examined. I considered both of them to be good witnesses who came to court to give honest evidence to the best of their ability and the Defendant does not suggest otherwise.

33.Mr Lomax filed a witness statement dated 23 July 2026, and he also confirmed the contents of the Particulars of Claim of 19 September 2025 and the Reply dated 2 January 2026. He gives evidence about:

i)

the commissioning of Mr Robinson to create the Claimants’ Images, and the payment for that work. His evidence supports Mr Robinson’s evidence which I will deal with below;

ii)

his discovery, by way of a Google alert on or around 12 June 2025, of the use by the Defendant of some of the Claimants’ Images on its website to market its products, and his same-day instructions to the Claimants’ solicitors to send a letter of claim and request for undertakings to the Defendant;

iii)

the assignment by Mr Robinson to the Second Claimant of the IP rights in the various works on 7 July 2025;

iv)

the grant from the Second Claimant to the First Claimant of a worldwide exclusive licence to use, inter alia, the Claimants’ Images to the First Claimant on 19 August 2025; and v)

that although he had noticed on or around 22 July 2025 that the Defendant had removed all of the infringing Claimants’ Images from the Defendant’s Website, the Defendant had failed to respond to the Claimants’ request for undertakings or cooperate with the Claimants’ solicitors. He said this prompted the Claimants to issue proceedings.

34.In cross-examination Mr Lomax said that he checked for use of the Claimants’ Images on the internet not regularly, but sporadically, and accepted that the Defendant’s case that they went live on Defendant’s Website on 31 May 2025 could be true. He also accepted that the majority of the Claimants’ Images had been removed from the Defendant’s Website on or before 3 July 2025, and they could have been removed some time before 3 July 2025. He said that as soon as he saw they had been removed, he told his solicitors, and they wrote a letter acknowledging that the majority had been removed by that date.

35.Mr Lomax was asked in cross-examination about the invoices of Mr Robinson for works carried out including creation of the Claimants’ Images. Mr Lomax accepted that these invoices represented the creation of thousands of images and also works going beyond the scope of the Claimants’ images, to include, for example, animation sequences for instructional videos. In Mr Robinson’s evidence he valued the works relating to the fencing images at £15,875 of these invoiced sums, being 63.5 days at a daily rate of £250. Mr Lomax accepted he would not have been willing to pay that sum for the few images which make up the Claimants’ Images and he said “

Not for 11 or so images, no. ” When it was put to him that he would only be willing to pay a few pounds for those images he said, “

Yes, I wouldn’t say a few pounds, but we have at least 100,000 fencing images in total

”. He also acknowledged that given that Mr Robinson had later assigned all his intellectual property rights in over 100,000 images, including the Claimants’ Images, to the Second Claimant for £1, the real value of the intellectual property rights in the works carried out by Mr Robinson was within the invoiced sums.

36.I accept all of Mr Lomax’s evidence summarised above.

37.Mr Robinson filed a witness statement dated 23 July 2026. His evidence is that he is a professional CGI artist, experienced in the preparation of images for commercial use by his clients, including the First Claimant. He says that he was instructed by Mr Lomax for the First Claimant to create a large number of images representing the First Claimant’s fencing products, and those included the Claimants’ Images.

38.Mr Robinson’s evidence is that the Claimants’ Images were original works created through a substantial process involving design development, photoshoots, modelling, 3D rendering and post-production work. I accept that, as does the Defendant accept they are original artistic works in which copyright subsists.

39.I also accept the evidence of Mr Robinson and Mr Lomax concerning the costs incurred in the course of their creation. The contemporaneous invoices for the commissions Mr Robinson carried out for the Claimants are in evidence and not challenged. Mr Robinson also accepted in cross-examination that those invoices relate to works much more extensive, or broader in scope, than merely the creation of the Claimants’ Images, and they total more than £64,000 plus VAT. Mr Robinson has carried out an analysis apportioning those invoices to identify a sum of £15,875 plus VAT which he says are the costs attributable to the creation of the Claimants’ Images.

40.Mr Robinson was cross-examined about this. In particular, it was put to him that it did not take 63.5 days to create the Claimants’ Images. He said that whether he builds 1, 100 or 1000 fencing images, he has to build the model that goes into each of them, and that requires meetings, development, computer works, etc. He said “ It is the same process whether I am creating one image or multiple. The 100,000 images are created at the end once all the work is done ”.

41.Mr Robinson presented as a straightforward, credible and reliable third party witness and I accept his evidence.

Defendant’s witness evidence

42.In the Defence, which was signed by Mr Majid on 8 December 2025, the following factual evidence (to the extent it survives the later admissions) can be discerned, so far as relevant:

i)

the webpages relating to composite fencing went live on the Defendant’s Website in May 2025;

ii)

the Defendant had hired the Web Developer, who was in Pakistan, to construct the website for him;

iii)

it appears that in doing so the Web Developer had copied the Claimants’ Images and placed them on the Defendant’s Website alongside hundreds of other images;

iv)

the Defendant had no personal knowledge of where to access the Claimants’ Images as it did not do so itself;

v)

the Defendant had only discovered the infringement of the Claimants’ Images when it was contacted by the Claimants’ solicitors in or around June 2025 and then began removing them from the Defendant’s Website;

vi)

the Defendant had no intention to commit copyright infringement and has no intention to infringe in the future.

43.Mr Majid’s witness statement of 24 July 2026, save for the disclosure evidence which I have already dealt with, is that:

i)

the Defendant, who had been trading since 2021 selling radiators and valves online, decided to expand into composite fencing in early 2025;

ii)

in around March 2025 it instructed the Pakistan-based Web Developer (which he does not name) to build fencing pages for its website;

iii)

the Web Developer was instructed by a “ member of staff ” of the Defendant (who he does not name in the witness statement, but in oral evidence told us was ‘Ellie’);

iv)

at around the same time, his “ staff ” retained CSG Image Creator to create a large number of bespoke CGI images of products which were intended to and eventually did populate the fencing pages on the Defendant’s website, and paid CSG Image Creator $1008 for 336 such bespoke CGI images (“ Defendant’s CGI Images ”);

v)

he said “ I understand the web developer temporarily used placeholder images for site construction purposes. This was while the fencing pages were offline. These temporary placeholder images were intended to be replaced by [the Defendant’s CGI Images] before the fencing page went live. I understand that it is common practice during website development for placeholder images to be used while the final graphics are being produced ”. He does not explain the basis for his understanding, given his evidence that he had no communications himself with the Web Developer during the development process;

vi)

he understood that the Claimants’ Images remained on site when the fencing pages went live, but these should have been removed and were left in, in error. He said, “ the developer had replaced the temporary images with our CGI renders in all other instances ”. He does not explain the basis for this understanding and knowledge;

vii)

the fencing pages went live on the Defendant’s website on 31 May 2025, the Claimants notified the Defendant of two infringing Claimants’ Images by letter on 12 June 2025 which the Defendant immediately removed. The Claimants then notified the Defendant of the remaining Claimants’ Images by letter emailed to the Defendant on 20 June 2025 which were again immediately removed;

viii)

the infringement arose from an error during the web development process rather than any deliberate attempt to copy the Claimants’ Images or obtain an unfair commercial advantage;

ix)

only four sales were completed in the newly launched composite fencing side of the Defendant’s business before the Claimants’ Images were removed from the Defendant’s website.

44.In cross-examination Mr Majid said that what he referred to as CSG Image Creator was in fact Tran Linh Chi of Maam Store, and this is the invoice that he disclosed relating to the Defendant’s CGI Images. He accepted that there was no way of the Claimants knowing from the invoice what had been created or the terms on which any images created were licensed to the Defendant.

45.I have already said that I did not find Mr Majid to be a witness who came to court genuinely to assist it. I treat his evidence with caution unless it is supported by other credible and reliable evidence or the inherent probabilities. I make the following findings of facts:

i)

I do not accept Mr Majid’s evidence that the Claimants’ Images were put in the fencing pages of the Defendant’s Website as genuine “ placeholders ” because this seems to be mere speculation on Mr Majid’s part. If I take his evidence at face value, then he did not have any communication with the Web Developer during the development process, and he does not say that he was told this by Ellie or any other member of the Defendant’s staff. He simply says he “understands” it to be so and that they were accidentally left in when others were taken out. It seems unnecessarily complicated to put in, as a mere ‘placeholder’ image, one which exactly matches the fencing elements which are for sale, and it seems unnecessarily coincidental that a Web Developer in Pakistan (if indeed the Web Developer was in Pakistan, for which I have no reliable evidence) should by themselves and without direction find such images on a competitor operating only a few miles away from the Defendant itself. On the balance of probabilities I find that an employee of the Defendant brought the Claimants’ website to the Web Developer’s attention when describing what it is the Defendant wanted, and that the Web Developer took the Claimants’ Images because it was convenient for them to do so and use them on the Defendant’s Website.

ii)

I am willing to accept Mr Majid’s evidence that the fencing pages went live on the Defendant’s Website on 31 May 2025 because Mr Lomax accepted that as a possibility and said he had been checking for use of the Claimants’ Images sporadically, so there is some other evidence to support it;

iii)

I am also satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Claimants’ Images were uploaded before the fencing pages of the website went live. In the absence of any evidence from the Defendant about the timeline of the project and when first draft pages were produced, I find that it is more likely than not that they were taken and uploaded within a month or so of the of the commissioning of the project in March 2025, and about a month or so before the pages went live at the end of May 2025, so by around the end of April 2025;

iv)

I also do not accept that the Claimants’ Images were simply overlooked and there were existing commissioned Defendant CGI Images ready to replace them, because: (a) the Defendant has provided no evidence of the existence of such specific CGI Images; and (b) Mr Majid again cannot tell me how it is he has come to know this. It seems to me, again, to be mere speculation on his part. It is more likely than not, in my judgment, that the reason they were not replaced by the Defendant’s CGI Images is because there were no Defendant’s CGI Images for the fencing elements the subject of the Claimant’ Images, and that is why they were used;

v)

I also accept that the Defendant sought to remove the Claimants’ Images promptly on notification, the majority were removed by 3 July 2025 and the rest by 22 July 2025.

D.DETERMINATION OF ISSUES

Did the Defendant and/or its admitted agent know, or have reason to believe, that copyright subsisted in the Claimants’ Images?

46.Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Defendant has failed to satisfy me on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the infringement it, whether by its employee(s) or by its admitted agent the Web Developer, did not know and had no reason to believe that copyright subsisted in the Claimants’ Images.

47.That is because in selecting the Claimants’ Images, the Web Developer as the Defendant’s agent copied professionally-produced marketing images of specific fencing elements from a third-party commercial website which were taken from the website of a geographically nearby competitor and used on the Defendant’s own website to promote directly competing products. These were not generic stock images. I have rejected Mr Majid’s evidence that they were used merely as genuine placeholders and retained in the live version of the web pages accidentally. That explanation was unsupported by any evidence from the Web Developer or from any employee said to have dealt with the Web Developer, and was undermined by the absence of disclosure and by Mr Majid’s unsatisfactory evidence. I have inferred that the employees with direct knowledge have not been called because their evidence would not have assisted the Defendant. In those circumstances I find that the Web Developer as the Defendant’s admitted agent, and/or the Defendant’s employee(s) had at least reason to believe that copyright subsisted in the Claimants’ Images.

48.Their knowledge is attributable to the Defendant: It is trite law that an employer is fixed with the knowledge of their employees acting in the course of their employment. I also accept the Claimants’ submission that, given the Defendant’s admission that the Web Developer was acting as its agent, the Defendant is fixed with knowledge acquired by the Web Developer in the course of the very task for which the Web Developer was engaged, namely building the Defendant’s Website using the images. That is knowledge acquired while acting within the scope of that agency: see Article 95(1), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency

23rd Ed ¶8-208 – 8-217 citing, among other cases, Dresser -v- Norwood

144 E.R. 188; (1864) 17 C.B. N.S. 466 and Real Estate Opportunities Ltd -v- Aberdeen Asset Managers Jersey Ltd

[2007] EWCA Civ 197 , [2007] 2 All ER 791 .

What is the quantum of the Claimants’ claim to compensatory (general) damages?

49.Mr Smith has set out from paragraphs 36 - 39 of his skeleton argument the principles governing the assessment of ordinary damages for copyright infringement and the three typical categories for claiming damages, both as set out in General Tire v Firestone Tyre

, and the principles applicable to assessment on the basis of a notional licence fee, or the user principle, from Force India v 1 Malaysia Racing

, as approved and expanded by Newey J in 32Red OKC v WHG International Limited

. Mr Cook also refers to those cases in para 15- 16 of his skeleton. I have those principles well in mind and will not repeat them here.

50.Both the Claimants and the Defendant agree that a reasonable licence fee provides the appropriate measure, because the evidence does not permit any reliable conclusion that the Claimants lost sales to the Defendant, nor that the Defendant’s limited sales were caused by the infringing use of the Claimants’ Images. The proper approach is therefore to assess the value of the infringing use made of the copyright protected works to the Defendant and identify the fee which willing parties would reasonably have agreed for the use actually made of the Claimants’ Images.

51.I have accepted the Claimants’ evidence that the Claimants’ Images formed part of a body of work which cost, at a reasonable apportionment, £15,875 plus VAT to create. The infringement concerned twenty images used on the Defendant’s website, first in development and then when it went live, for a period of time which, doing the best I can, appears to be from the end of April until 3 July for the majority of the images and end of April until 22 July for the remainder, or about 9 weeks and about 12 weeks.

52.The Claimants submit that the Defendant’s evidence that it was expanding into composite fencing put it in direct competition with the First Claimant, whose trade premises is only about 17 miles away from the Defendant; that use of the Claimants’ Images allowed it to get its competing business up and running within only a couple of months (again, on the Defendant’s evidence); and that if the Claimants had commissioned the Claimants’ Images at the date of the infringements at a time when Mr Robinson’s hourly rate had increased, the cost of producing the Claimants’ Images would have been higher than the actual cost of creation, at around £19,050 plus VAT.

53.The Claimants submit that the hypothetical licensor in the Claimants’ shoes would have demanded a significant sum to allow a nascent competitor to use its Claimants’ Images on its website to sell competing products, and the Defendant would have had no choice but to pay it if it had not commissioned CGI images of those fencing elements, as I have found. It seeks an award of compensatory damages at 50% of the cost of the creation of the Claimants’ Images, had they been created at the date of the infringement, or alternatively 50% of the cost of actual creation as apportioned by Mr Robinson.

54.The Defendant submits that the Court should take account of the cost of the Defendant’s CGI Images commissioned by it, at around $3 per image for, what it submits the Court should infer was a licence in perpetuity to use on the Defendant’s website and other materials. The Defendant further submits that Mr Robinson’s split is for costs in creating and then assigning all the intellectual property rights in the Claimants’ Images, and were not limited to a licence for a very temporary use on a website. Accordingly it submits that a notional licence for the actual use made by the Defendant would be a tiny fraction of the sum invoiced, such that the measure of damages should be very modest indeed. The Defendant submits it is appropriate for the Court to have in mind the level of awards made in the IPEC Small Claims Track, and submits that any award should be a few thousand pounds at most.

55.In my judgment a fee of 50% of the cost of creation of the Claimants’ Images, even at the lower sum contended for of £15,875 plus VAT, is too high for a temporary, non-exclusive licence to use them in the manner and for the period for which the Defendant used them. Conversely, the Defendant’s reliance on the much lower cost of the Defendant’s CGI Images at $3 per image is of limited assistance, because there is no reliable evidence as to the nature, quality or licence terms of those images.

56.In my judgment, if the parties had been negotiating in the commercial context using their respective bargaining positions, the Defendant’s position would have included the possibility of a non-infringing alternative, namely delaying the launch of the new range until its own images were ready and taking no licence at all. The Claimants’ position would have included the commercial sensitivity of licensing professionally produced marketing images to a nearby direct competitor.

57.Taking into account the 9 – 12 week duration of use on a non-exclusive basis, the number of the Claimants’ Images, the non-exclusive nature of the hypothetical licence, the commercial sensitivity of licensing commercial images of this nature to a nearby competitor and the value to the Defendant of launching its fencing pages without delay, I consider that the likely result of that negotiation would have been a licence fee of £4,000 . This is set doing the best I can in the absence of reliable market comparators and is a little more than 25% of the actual cost of creation of the Claimants’ Images, or around £200 for each of the 20 images. I do not consider the Claimants would have agreed a price lower than this to a local and direct competitor, and I consider that this is the highest level that the Defendant would have agreed to pay as a commercial decision to preserve the launch date of its new fencing line. Above this it would likely have declined and delayed the launch.

58.I am satisfied that this is a fair assessment of the value of the wrongful use to the Defendant on the evidence before me.

Should additional damages be awarded pursuant to s97(2) CDPA and/or Regulation 3 of the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc) Regulations 2006 and if so, what quantum?

59.I next consider additional damages under s.97(2) CDPA. This provides:

“(2)

The court may in an action for infringement of copyright having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to – a)

the flagrancy of the infringement, and b)

any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement, award such additional damages as the justice of the case may require.”

60.The Claimants rely on alleged flagrancy and the Defendant’s conduct. Flagrancy implies scandalous conduct or deceit, including deliberate or calculated infringement per Ravenscroft v Herbert [1980] RPC 193 , and a “ couldn’t care less ” attitude has been held to be sufficient ( Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Healthcare Trust v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] RPC 49 ) . Again, there is no dispute between the parties on the law.

61.I am satisfied that this is a case of flagrant infringement. The Defendant accepted that the Web Developer was acting as its agent in creating the fencing pages on the Defendant’s Website. I have rejected the Defendant’s case that the Claimants’ Images were genuine placeholders which were left in accidentally when the pages went live. I have found that the Claimants’ Website was likely brought to the Web Developer’s attention by the Defendant’s employee(s), and that the Web Developer likely used the Claimants’ Images because there were no Defendant CGI Images for those fencing elements. I have also found that the Defendant, through its employee(s) and its admitted agent the Web Developer knew or had reason to believe that copyright subsisted in the Claimants’ Images. Given those findings, I do not consider that the infringement can have been innocent, accidental or merely careless. I find that the Web Developer deliberately used the Claimants’ Images for the Defendant’s commercial website knowing or having reason to believe that copyright subsisted in them, whether or not he subjectively appreciated the full legal consequences of doing so. In so doing, the Web Developer at the very least, demonstrated a “couldn’t care less” attitude to the Claimants’ rights of copyright in the Claimants’ Images.

62.The Defendant submits that evidence that the Defendant commissioned substantial numbers of its own CGI images, that the infringement was limited in duration, and that the Claimants’ Images were removed promptly from the Defendant’s website when they were notified of alleged infringement by the Claimants are pointers away from deceit or deliberate or calculated infringement, but the Defendant is fixed with the acts and knowledge of its admitted agent acting within the scope of the agency. In my judgment, the Web Developer’s acts and knowledge are sufficient to fix the Defendant with flagrancy for the purposes of section 97(2) (a) CDPA.

63.I also find that the Defendant obtained a benefit by reason of the infringement. The use of the Claimants’ Images likely enabled the Defendant to populate and launch the fencing pages, and so its new fencing business in direct local competition with the Claimants, without waiting for its own equivalent images to be commissioned and created. This is, in my judgment, a benefit falling within

section 97(2)

(b) CDPA. I have heard the Defendant’s submission that there was no pecuniary advantage in excess of damages otherwise payable, and that its sales were limited and generated by customer relations/sales approaches rather than the Claimants’ Images, but the relevant benefit under

section 97(2)

(b) CDPA is not limited to proven additional sales or profit. In my judgment, use of the Claimants’ Images allowed it to present and launch a competing business more quickly than it otherwise could have done.

64.I am also concerned by aspects of the Defendant’s conduct, as I have set out in this judgment, in particular its unsatisfactory disclosure and failure to put witness evidence before the Court which would have assisted it, as well as its failure to offer undertakings until the eve of the CMC.

65.I am not persuaded that this case is properly characterised as moral prejudice for the purposes of Regulation 3 of the Enforcement Regulations as the Claimants submit it is, as distinct from commercial harm/benefit which I have found under section 97(2) (b).

66.Standing back, and for these reasons, the justice of the case requires a modest award of additional damages under section 97(2) CDPA, in my judgment, for the reasons I have identified above. The Claimants seek 3-4 times ordinary damages but that includes its submission that this is a case of moral prejudice, which I reject. The prompt removal by the Defendant of the images after notification and relatively short period of live use also mitigate the amount of the award, albeit they do not displace the finding of flagrancy or the benefit obtained. The failure to give undertakings is not of itself any evidence of ongoing intention to infringe, but forms part of the post-notification conduct of the Defendant relevant to the justice of the case. No real explanation has been provided as to why undertakings were only offered the day before the CMC.

67.Taking those matters into account, and seeking to avoid any double recovery for the compensatory licence fee already awarded, I assess additional damages at £3,000 to reflect those matters. The award is not higher, as the Claimants seek, because of the short period of live use of the images, the prompt removal of them, that there are no proven additional sales/profit of the Defendant, and my rejection of the Claimants’ case of moral prejudice. In setting it at this level, I am also careful not to compensate the same damage twice.

E.

COSTS

Assessment of costs of the liability phase

68.The table below sets out the incurred costs for each stage, along with the stage cap, the amount claimed with the cap applied, and the location in the bundle of the stage schedule.

Stage

Incurred

Cap

Claimed

Stage Schedule

Particulars of claim

£5,031.00

£9,000.00

£5,031.00

[A17, p.69-72]

Application (Nov 2025)

£615.00

£650.00

£615.00

[A17, p.74-78]

Defence

£515.00

£8,000.00

£515.00

[A17, p.79-83]

Reply

£1,177.50

£3,500.00

£1,177.50

[A17, p.84-88]

CMC£7,175.50

£6,000.00

£6,646.00

[A17, p.89-93]

Total

£13,984.50

69.The reason the claimed amount for the CMC stage is £6,646 rather than the £6,000 cap is that the CMC costs included £646 in respect of court fees which, pursuant to CPR rule 46.21(5)(a), are recoverable in addition to the stage caps.

70.The Claimants submit that the costs are reasonable and proportionate and should be allowed in full, save that they accept on hearing the Defendant’s submission that there is £280 in the Particulars of Claim phase and £560 in the CMC phase which should not be there, as they relate to the drafting of an assignment and a settlement agreement respectively. However taking £560 out of the CMC phase still does not bring the costs below the cap, and they seek only the cap plus court fees.

71.The Defendant questions generally the solicitors’ costs which it submits shows too extensive grade A fee earner involvement, given the counsel’s fees. It submits they should have been pushed down to a solicitor at the £250 per hour level, rather than the £400 per hour Grade A level. It does not challenge counsel’s fees or court fees.

72.I have considered the Defendant’s submissions but consider that the costs incurred show that the use of Mr Catterall, the Grade A fee earner, was cost-effective and proportionate. As such it was reasonable. I will assess the costs as claimed save that the particulars of claim phase reduces to £4751 once the agreed £280 is deducted, and this reduces the overall assessment to £13,704.50.

F.

SUMMARY

73.Accordingly, there will be judgment for the Claimants in the total sum of £7,000 together with interest pursuant to section 35 A of the Senior Courts Act 1981 from the date of infringement to judgment, the precise calculation to be embodied in the order.

74.There will be an order for the Defendant to pay the Claimants’ costs of the liability stage of the proceedings summarily assessed at £13,704.50 .

75.Both these sums are to be paid by 4pm on a date 14 days after handing down the judgment.

76.The Claimants are entitled to their costs of the inquiry. I will hear submissions after handing down in relation to the appropriate costs order and any summary assessment.

ANNEX A

Перевод на русский: GigaChat-2, 14.10.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.