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Lichfield v. Kubler · редакция 1 → 2 · зафиксировано 2026-09-17 03:59 · +7 −7 lines

PUBLISH
48:42. She and two friends then perform an off-key version of Blondie’s “One
Way or Another” while Lichfield looks on bemused.2Id. at 48:55. On appeal,
Way or Another” while Lichfield looks on bemused.2 Id. at 48:55. On appeal,
Lichfield contends that Kubler’s statement about abusing children, conning
The closest Kubler ever gets to this point is a non-specific reference to “crimes.”
See infra. And the primary and motivating event that gave rise to the series, seeHogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, was not a death within a facility but instead
See infra. And the primary and motivating event that gave rise to the series, see Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, was not a death within a facility but instead
Kubler’s reckoning with her adolescent experience at Ivy Ridge.
The totality of the first challenged segment consists of a passing visual juxtaposition and the use of an idiomatic expression. Any reasonable viewer would understand that if Kubler had meant to accuse Lichfield of involvement in a teen’s death, she would say more and say it explicitly at some point in the series. Thus, in this context, no reasonable viewer could accept the phrase “seems to get away with murder” at face value, cf.Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, but would instead understand it to be “exaggerated rhetoric intended to spark the debate,” CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 301 (4th Cir.
The totality of the first challenged segment consists of a passing visual juxtaposition and the use of an idiomatic expression. Any reasonable viewer would understand that if Kubler had meant to accuse Lichfield of involvement in a teen’s death, she would say more and say it explicitly at some point in the series. Thus, in this context, no reasonable viewer could accept the phrase “seems to get away with murder” at face value, cf. Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106, but would instead understand it to be “exaggerated rhetoric intended to spark the debate,” CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 301 (4th Cir.
2008), about accountability for leaders in the troubled-teen industry. The first challenged segment is not defamatory as a matter of law.
First Amendment will prohibit liability even if the publisher “failed to include additional facts which might have cast plaintiff in a more favorable or balanced light” or decided “to omit facts that may place the plaintiff under less harsh public scrutiny.” Id. (quotations omitted). And a court will look past “minor inaccuracies” to find a statement substantially true “so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting’” of the challenged statement “can be justified.” Masson v.
New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–17 (1991)(quotation omitted). On the other side of the coin, a statement is materially false only if it “produces ‘a different effect on the mind of the [viewer] from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’” Schwartz v. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, 215
New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516–17 (1991) (quotation omitted). On the other side of the coin, a statement is materially false only if it “produces ‘a different effect on the mind of the [viewer] from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.’” Schwartz v. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, 215
F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517).
Just as a state legislature may not require newspapers to publish the responses of political candidates to unfavorable stories, Miami Herald Pub. Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), a private plaintiff is not entitled to the publication of every fact that might cast him “in a more favorable or balanced light,” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108(quotation omitted). So long as there is no statement of material falsehood – implied or otherwise – the director, editor, and producer must be free to exercise their collective editorial discretion.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), a private plaintiff is not entitled to the publication of every fact that might cast him “in a more favorable or balanced light,” Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108 (quotation omitted). So long as there is no statement of material falsehood – implied or otherwise – the director, editor, and producer must be free to exercise their collective editorial discretion.
Here, the “substance,” “gist,” and “sting” of the challenged statement “can be justified.” Masson, 501 U.S. at 516–17. In other words, Lichfield has not shown this speech contained material falsehood. And without material falsity, there has been no defamation. Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1108. The district court correctly found that the purported omission cannot render the truth of this segment defamatory. We agree that the second challenged segment is also not susceptible to defamatory meaning as a matter of law.
475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986), thus exempting from liability statements made by media defendants on matters of public concern that constitute only “rhetorical
6 This non-exhaustive list of factors bears some resemblance to the factors relevant to determining whether a statement’s context renders it non-defamatory despite its literal words. Cf.Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (citing Dobbs at § 526 (2d ed. 2014)). The partial overlap makes sense: there, the inquiry is whether, in context, a statement is defamatory and “convey[s] a false representation of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the inquiry is whether the statement is a privileged opinion rather than a factual assertion. We recognize, as a general matter, that opinions privileged by the Utah Constitution might also (though not always) independently fail to constitute defamation in the first instance because they convey no objectively verifiable fact.
6 This non-exhaustive list of factors bears some resemblance to the factors relevant to determining whether a statement’s context renders it non-defamatory despite its literal words. Cf. Hogan, 762 F.3d at 1106 (citing Dobbs at § 526 (2d ed. 2014)). The partial overlap makes sense: there, the inquiry is whether, in context, a statement is defamatory and “convey[s] a false representation of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the inquiry is whether the statement is a privileged opinion rather than a factual assertion. We recognize, as a general matter, that opinions privileged by the Utah Constitution might also (though not always) independently fail to constitute defamation in the first instance because they convey no objectively verifiable fact.
hyperbole,” Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970). And statements that may not “‘reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual” are protected. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (alteration adopted) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 8 (5th ed. 2016). These broader definitions surely capture conduct that would fall outside the scope of criminal statutes. So, we will need to reference more than just the literal words that are challenged. Here, again, context is critical.
Turning back briefly to our hypothetical criminal proceeding, we would say that the “full context” of a prosecutor’s statement would incorporate the “common usage” of the words in that setting to mean that the prosecutor referred to a violation of Utah’s criminal law. SeeWest, 872 P.2d at 1018. And such a statement would be “capable of being objectively verified,” presumably by a jury or other factfinder responsible for adjudicating guilt. See id. But when looking to the “full context” of Kubler’s statement and the “broader setting in which [it] appears,” West, 872 P.2d at 1018, we reach a different conclusion.
Turning back briefly to our hypothetical criminal proceeding, we would say that the “full context” of a prosecutor’s statement would incorporate the “common usage” of the words in that setting to mean that the prosecutor referred to a violation of Utah’s criminal law. See West, 872 P.2d at 1018. And such a statement would be “capable of being objectively verified,” presumably by a jury or other factfinder responsible for adjudicating guilt. See id. But when looking to the “full context” of Kubler’s statement and the “broader setting in which [it] appears,” West, 872 P.2d at 1018, we reach a different conclusion.
To begin with, Kubler is not a prosecutor, and she did not speak in the context of a criminal hearing. She spoke, instead, in a narrative dubbed over top of video showing people drinking, dancing, and singing karaoke. Shortly after the challenged segment, Kubler, speaking to the camera from a front porch, underlines her lack of legal training. During this monologue she concedes that she does not know if a law enforcement agency will investigate
AFFIRMED.