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United States v. Elizabeth Hernandez · редакция 1 → 2 · зафиксировано 2026-09-17 03:47 · +4 −4 lines

## FOR PUBLICATION
The government then asked if, instead, it could introduce only Hernandez’s admission to writing the statement and stipulate that Hernandez testified that she wrote the statement at the direction of her attorney. Hernandez agreed. She also requested that the government specify that she now had new attorneys.
But then the government changed course again and agreed to introduce the entire hearing transcript. The court pushed back on this, stressing that Hernandez was “willing to meet [the government] halfway.” Doc. 148 at 14.The government retracted its agreement to introduce the transcript and said that it would introduce Hernandez’s testimony that she wrote the statement at the direction of a prior attorney. Hernandez agreed. The government then introduced Hernandez’s written statement and read Hernandez’s relevant hearing testimony.
But then the government changed course again and agreed to introduce the entire hearing transcript. The court pushed back on this, stressing that Hernandez was “willing to meet [the government] halfway.” Doc. 148 at 14. The government retracted its agreement to introduce the transcript and said that it would introduce Hernandez’s testimony that she wrote the statement at the direction of a prior attorney. Hernandez agreed. The government then introduced Hernandez’s written statement and read Hernandez’s relevant hearing testimony.
Opinion of the Court 24-10047
Later, near the end of the six-day trial, the court discussed closing arguments. The government asked for an hour, and Hernandez’s counsel asked for “an hour for each day” of trial. Doc. 149 at 55–56.Instead, the court allotted the government forty minutes and Hernandez thirty minutes. No one objected.
Later, near the end of the six-day trial, the court discussed closing arguments. The government asked for an hour, and Hernandez’s counsel asked for “an hour for each day” of trial. Doc. 149 at 55–56. Instead, the court allotted the government forty minutes and Hernandez thirty minutes. No one objected.
The government proceeded to give its initial closing. Then, after the government had concluded, Hernandez’s counsel argued for thirty minutes before the court cut her off. Hernandez asked for ten more minutes, arguing to the court that the government had gone over its time. The court refused, and the government proceeded to give its rebuttal.
We start with Hernandez’s challenge to the way that the court allotted time for closing arguments. She argues primarily that the district court abused its discretion in granting the government more time for closing arguments than it granted her. We agree. Nevertheless, we determine that this error was harmless.
Let’s begin with some basics. District courts have discretion to decide how much time to set aside for closing argument and how to allocate that argument time among the parties. United States v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2019); Hodge v. United States, 271 F.2d 52, 52 (5th Cir. 1959). That said, district courts must ensure that they treat the parties fairly. SeeBonilla v. Yamaha, 955 F.2d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 1992); Alston v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1965).
Let’s begin with some basics. District courts have discretion to decide how much time to set aside for closing argument and how to allocate that argument time among the parties. United States v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2019); Hodge v. United States, 271 F.2d 52, 52 (5th Cir. 1959). That said, district courts must ensure that they treat the parties fairly. See Bonilla v. Yamaha, 955 F.2d 150, 155 (1st Cir. 1992); Alston v. West, 340 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 1965).
24-10047 Opinion of the Court
I write separately to address Elizabeth Hernandez’s argument that the district court reversibly erred in awarding her thirty minutes of closing-argument time instead of the forty minutes it gave to the government. I agree with the majority opinion that there was no reversible error.
The defendant’s closing-argument right flows from the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. SeeHerring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856–65 (1975). The right, we and the Supreme Court have explained, has two requirements. First, a district court may not “deny absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation at all,” because “a total denial of the opportunity for final argument . . . is a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his defense.” Id. at 859, 863. The defendant must therefore have some opportunity to give a closing argument to the fact finder, “no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding judge.” Id. at 858. Second,the opportunity to address the fact finder must be long enough for the defendant “to make all legally tenable arguments that are supported by the facts of the case.” United States v. Simmons, 122 F.4th 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2019)); see alsoUnited States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 1982) (same). That’s it.
The defendant’s closing-argument right flows from the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856–65 (1975). The right, we and the Supreme Court have explained, has two requirements. First, a district court may not “deny absolutely the opportunity for any closing summation at all,” because “a total denial of the opportunity for final argument . . . is a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his defense.” Id. at 859, 863. The defendant must therefore have some opportunity to give a closing argument to the fact finder, “no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding judge.” Id. at 858. Second, the opportunity to address the fact finder must be long enough for the defendant “to make all legally tenable arguments that are supported by the facts of the case.” United States v. Simmons, 122 F.4th 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948, 954 (11th Cir. 2019)); see also United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 1982) (same). That’s it.
“In all . . . respects,” outside of these two requirements, the district court has “broad discretion” in constraining the defendant’s argument, including “in controlling the duration and limiting the
Here, as the majority opinion explains, both closing-argument requirements were met in this case. Hernandez had the opportunity to give a closing summation to the jury, and she had enough time for the legally colorable arguments she wanted to make. Beyond these two requirements, the district court was within its discretion to limit the duration of Hernandez’s closing remarks. For that reason, I too would affirm.