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Wave Digital Assets, LLC v. United States · редакция 1 → 2 · зафиксировано 2026-09-17 03:02 · +3 −3 lines

# In the United States Court of Federal Claims
Intervenor-Defendant.
Shane J. McCall, with Nicole D. Pottroff, John L. Holtz and Gregory P. Weber, Koprince McCall Pottroff LLC, Lawrence, KS, for Plaintiff. Elinor J. Kim,Trial Attorney,Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, William J. Grimaldi, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, with C. Joseph Carroll, Senior Associate General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. Francis E. Purcell, Jr., with Joseph R. Berger and Amaiya Johnson, Thompson Hine LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Defendant.
Shane J. McCall, with Nicole D. Pottroff, John L. Holtz and Gregory P. Weber, Koprince McCall Pottroff LLC, Lawrence, KS, for Plaintiff. Elinor J. Kim, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, William J. Grimaldi, Assistant Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, with C. Joseph Carroll, Senior Associate General Counsel, U.S. Marshals Service, Washington, D.C., for Defendant. Francis E. Purcell, Jr., with Joseph R. Berger and Amaiya Johnson, Thompson Hine LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Defendant.
## MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court previously denied Wave’s challenge to the United States Marshals Service’s (“USMS”) award of a cryptocurrency contract to CMDSS. (See Opinion at 2, ECF No. 65); Wave Digital Assets, LLC v. United States, 181 Fed. Cl. 605 (2026). The Court found that the separate, post-award criminal allegations lodged against CMDSS’s employee John Daghita involved matters of contract administration that were outside the Court’s bid-protest jurisdiction. (Id. at 6–7 n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., 50 F.3d 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1995))). As its primary grounds for reconsideration, Wave asks this Court to look behind the curtain, arguing that the person CMDSS identified as its Project Manager— —was not actually the person running the contract to store and liquidate cryptocurrency seized by the USMS. (Pl.’s Mot. at 1). In further support, Wave also asks the Court to consider a proposed teaming agreement that never materialized, an arrangement Wave now characterizes as evidence that CMDSS misled the USMS during the award process. (Id. at 4). In Wave’s view, the failure of that prospective partnership shows that CMDSS duped the agency into selecting its proposal. (Id.). The Court declines relief on either ground, despite the now-obvious flawed award decision which ultimately led to the alleged theft of millions in seized cryptocurrency from the USMS.
“The burden on the moving party is high and a motion for reconsideration [pursuant to RCFC 59] is not intended merely to give an unhappy litigant an additional opportunity to persuade the court to accept its arguments.” Multiservice Joint Venture, LLC v. United States, 374 F. App’x 963, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The decision to grant a motion for reconsideration rests within the trial court’s discretion and requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify such relief. Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Generally, reconsideration is permitted for one of three reasons: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the emergence of previously unavailable evidence; or (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice. Seventh Dimension, LLC v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 110, 115 (quoting Parsons ex rel. Linmar Prop. Mgmt. Tr. v. United States, 174 F. App’x 561, 563 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). When a request for reconsideration is premised on manifest injustice, the movant must show an injustice so clear and compelling that it is virtually indisputable. Englewood Terrace L.P. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 720, 725 (2009); accordRobinson v. United States, No. 10-397C, 2012 WL 676442, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2012) (describing manifest injustice as “injustice that is apparent almost to the point of being indisputable”). Wave identifies no intervening change in controlling law. It must therefore show either that previously unavailable evidence has now emerged or that reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Parsons, 174 F. App’x at 563. Wave establishes neither.
“The burden on the moving party is high and a motion for reconsideration [pursuant to RCFC 59] is not intended merely to give an unhappy litigant an additional opportunity to persuade the court to accept its arguments.” Multiservice Joint Venture, LLC v. United States, 374 F. App’x 963, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The decision to grant a motion for reconsideration rests within the trial court’s discretion and requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify such relief. Yuba Nat. Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Generally, reconsideration is permitted for one of three reasons: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the emergence of previously unavailable evidence; or (3) the need to prevent manifest injustice. Seventh Dimension, LLC v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 110, 115 (quoting Parsons ex rel. Linmar Prop. Mgmt. Tr. v. United States, 174 F. App’x 561, 563 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). When a request for reconsideration is premised on manifest injustice, the movant must show an injustice so clear and compelling that it is virtually indisputable. Englewood Terrace L.P. v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 720, 725 (2009); accord Robinson v. United States, No. 10-397C, 2012 WL 676442, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2012) (describing manifest injustice as “injustice that is apparent almost to the point of being indisputable”). Wave identifies no intervening change in controlling law. It must therefore show either that previously unavailable evidence has now emerged or that reconsideration is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Parsons, 174 F. App’x at 563. Wave establishes neither.
Wave offers three bait‑and‑switch‑styled theories in support of reconsideration.1 (Pl.’s Mot. at 5–10). The first two arguments are related; Wave contends that CMDSS misrepresented its intended key personnel and planned to rely on individuals who did not meet the Performance Work Statement’s qualification requirements. (Id. at 5–8 (“CMDSS Engaged in a ‘Bait-and- Switch’ that Defrauded the Government”), 8–9 (“CMDSS’ Planned Utilization of John Daghita Violated the [Performance Work Statement]”)). Wave asserts that CMDSS proposed as Project Manager but installed , John Daghita, immediately after award, even though Johnlacked the required degree and experienceand . (Id. at 5). Wave further contends that the Record shows John acted as project lead and served as the USMS point of contact despite not meeting the Performance Work Statement’s qualifications and later being arrested for allegedly stealing federal cryptocurrency assets. (Id. at 6–8).
Wave offers three bait‑and‑switch‑styled theories in support of reconsideration.1 (Pl.’s Mot. at 5–10). The first two arguments are related; Wave contends that CMDSS misrepresented its intended key personnel and planned to rely on individuals who did not meet the Performance Work Statement’s qualification requirements. (Id. at 5–8 (“CMDSS Engaged in a ‘Bait-and- Switch’ that Defrauded the Government”), 8–9 (“CMDSS’ Planned Utilization of John Daghita Violated the [Performance Work Statement]”)). Wave asserts that CMDSS proposed as Project Manager but installed , John Daghita, immediately after award, even though John lacked the required degree and experience and . (Id. at 5). Wave further contends that the Record shows John acted as project lead and served as the USMS point of contact despite not meeting the Performance Work Statement’s qualifications and later being arrested for allegedly stealing federal cryptocurrency assets. (Id. at 6–8).
To support this theory, Wave relies on a previously sealed affidavit from a criminal case in the Eastern District of Virginia that was not part of the Administrative Record when the Court issued its prior Opinion.2 (Id. at 2). That affidavit describes John Daghita as “the project lead for handling the virtual currency assets received from USMS” and as the person who handled USMS wallet-security communications. (Id. at 3). According to Wave, CMDSS hired John Daghita as a “Cryptocurrency Subject Matter Expert” in January 2025, three months after the October 2024 award, and he was thereafter responsible for the very process the Project Manager was assigned to oversee: receiving USMS’s cryptocurrency, storing it, and directing its liquidation. (Id.). Therein lies the rub. Even by Wave’s reckoning, John Daghita’s involvement began during performance rather than prior to performance. That distinction is dispositive.
s/ David A. Tapp DAVID A. TAPP, Judge