Что изменилось
Gillian McGivern v MBR Acres Limited & Ors · редакция 1 → 2 · зафиксировано 2026-10-03 01:29 · +66 −42 строк
… 237 строк без изменений …
Lord Justice Jeremy Baker:
was not referred to in the subsequent case of
Starkey v Railway Executive
[1951] 2 All ER 902, (“
[1951] 2 All ER 902
, (“
… 21 строк без изменений …
Starkey
”), this court allowed an appeal by a successful legally assisted plaintiff against the decision of the trial judge to limit the recovery of costs against the unsuccessful defendant to the plaintiff’s contribution to the legal aid fund which was nil.
Neither of these cases appear to have been referred to in
Blatcher v Heaysman
[1960] 1 WLR 663, (“
[1960] 1 WLR 663
, (“
… 127 строк без изменений …
Blatcher
”), in which this court again allowed an appeal against the decision of Stable J who had refused to order two legally aided defendants to pay any costs to the successful legally aided plaintiffs arising out of an action for damages for misrepresentation.
These provisions and related regulations were considered by this court in
Willis v Redbridge Health Authority
[1996] 1 WLR 1228, (“
[1996] 1 WLR 1228
, (“
… 103 строк без изменений …
Willis
”), which concerned an appeal against an order for the payment of costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis against a defendant in favour of a legally assisted plaintiff.
The effect of these new and amended regulations were considered by this court in
Brawley v Marczynski
… 441 строк без изменений …
[2003] 1 WLR 813
(“
It was because of this provision that, following
Hammerton v Hammerton
[2007] 2 FLR 1133 in which Moses LJ held that committal proceedings for breach of an injunction involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Blake J held in
[2007] 2 FLR 1133
in which Moses LJ held that committal proceedings for breach of an injunction involve the determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Blake J held in
… 11 строк без изменений …
Bunning
that an individual who is faced with committal proceedings for breach of an injunction is a “
Although in
The All England Lawn Tennis Club (Championships) Ltd v McKay
[2019] EWHC 3065 (QB), Chamberlain J considered that one aspect of Blake J’s judgment had been wrongly decided, namely the identification of the “relevant authority” responsible for determining eligibility for the purposes of
[2019] EWHC 3065 (QB)
, Chamberlain J considered that one aspect of Blake J’s judgment had been wrongly decided, namely the identification of the “relevant authority” responsible for determining eligibility for the purposes of
… 307 строк без изменений …
section 16
of
had been followed by Garnham J. in
Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan & others
[2018] EWHC 2581 (QB) and Costs Judge Leonard in
[2018] EWHC 2581 (QB)
and Costs Judge Leonard in
… 104 строк без изменений …
Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan & others
[2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), and determined that for the purposes of Part 1 of
The judge noted the observations made both by the Supreme Court in
In re appeals by Governing Body of JFS and others
… 177 строк без изменений …
[2009] UKSC 1
(“
of the LA Act 1988, it is apparent that the court gave detailed consideration to the indemnity principle, and concluded that notwithstanding those provisions, the court was not enabled to order the payment of costs to be taxed on an indemnity basis against a defendant in favour of a legally aided plaintiff (see
Kadhim v The Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent
[2001] QB 955).
[2001] QB 955
).
… 9 строк без изменений …
136.
, (see
Young v Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited
[1944] KB 718).
[1944] KB 718
).
… 160 строк без изменений …
137.
Surrey
v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust
[2018] EWCA
Civ 451,
[2018] EWCA Civ 451
,
… 12 строк без изменений …
[2018] 1 WLR 5831
, as “
For the purpose of the following analysis it is important to distinguish between two different aspects of the operation of the indemnity principle.
First
, it precludes recovery of costs for which someone other than the successful party is liable (“the different person impact”).
, it precludes recovery of costs for which someone other than the successful party is liable (“the different person aspect”).
… 6 строк без изменений …
Second
, it precludes recovery of any greater amount than they are liable for (“the different amount aspect”). (There is a third potential situation, namely where the successful party is on the face of it liable to their solicitors, but the liability is vitiated by illegality: this has some relevance to the second strand of the argument – see para. 174 below.)
and, shortly afterwards, by this Court in
Starkey v Railway Executive
[1951] 2 All ER 902: the Court in
[1951] 2 All ER 902
: the Court in
… 23 строк без изменений …
Starkey
was apparently unaware of the decision in
(b) of
the 1949 Act
required the court when exercising its costs discretion to ignore the fact that a party was legally aided – a requirement sometimes referred to as “the statutory fiction”. It thus disapplies the indemnity principle at least as regards the different person impact. The same conclusion was reached by this Court in
required the court when exercising its costs discretion to ignore the fact that a party was legally aided – a requirement sometimes referred to as “the statutory fiction”. It thus disapplies the indemnity principle at least as regards the different person aspect. The same conclusion was reached by this Court in
… 7 строк без изменений …
Blatcher
, which Jeremy Baker LJ summarises at paras. 33-35 above.
,
ex p. Heshmati
(
unrep. 4.11.97).
(unrep. 4.11.97).
… 13 строк без изменений …
Provisions equivalent to
, and now
section 30 (1)
(b) of LASPO. They remain the basis on which the different person impact of the indemnity principle is disapplied in legal aid cases.
(b) of LASPO. They remain the basis on which the different person aspect of the indemnity principle is disapplied in legal aid cases.
153.
There is a distinct question about whether the statutory fiction also requires the disapplication of the different amount impact of the indemnity principle. It could be argued that the logic of
There is a distinct question about whether the statutory fiction also requires the disapplication of the different amount aspect of the indemnity principle. It could be argued that the logic of
… 18 строк без изменений …
section 1 (7)
(b) and its successors is that the Court should disregard not only the fact that the assisted person’s lawyers have been paid by the legal aid fund but also the fact that they were paid at legal aid rates, with the result that the costs discretion should be exercised on the basis that they had been paid at private client rates, albeit subject to
in
Willis v Redbridge Health Authority
[1996] 1 WLR 1228. At that point the governing statute was
[1996] 1 WLR 1228
. At that point the governing statute was
… 9 строк без изменений …
the 1988 Act
, under which there was no differential between legal aid and private client rates; but the issue nevertheless arose because an order for indemnity costs had been made in favour of the legally-aided plaintiff. It was held that she could not recover more than standard costs. The determinative reasoning does not leap from the page, but it seems clear that the essential elements are:
The Court does not refer to the indemnity principle
eo nomine,
but element (a) in that reasoning is evidently an application of it in its different amount impact. (Indeed that was expressly acknowledged by Longmore LJ at para. 17 of his judgment in the case of
but element (a) in that reasoning is evidently an application of it in its different amount aspect. (Indeed that was expressly acknowledged by Longmore LJ at para. 17 of his judgment in the case of
… 30 строк без изменений …
Brawley
, which I consider in the following paragraphs.)
“Where a certificate has been issued in connection with any proceedings, the assisted person’s solicitor or counsel shall not receive or be party to the making of any payment for work done in those proceedings during the currency of that certificate (whether within the scope of the certificate or otherwise) except such payments as may be made out of the fund.”
That is a straightforward statement of the other payments rule (which at that stage appeared
That is a straightforward statement of the other payments rule (which at that stage appeared in
section 31 (3)
of
the 1988 Act
.
).
… 32 строк без изменений …
157.
is that, although the statutory fiction required by (what was then)
section 31 (1)
(b) disapplies the different person impact of the indemnity principle, it does not disapply the different amount impact. What in effect it does is to treat the Board’s liability to pay the assisted person’s lawyers as a liability of the party themselves, with the result that only the amount of that liability is recoverable. Mr Underwood, while not accepting that
(b) disapplies the different person aspect of the indemnity principle, it does not disapply the different amount aspect. What in effect it does is to treat the Board’s liability to pay the assisted person’s lawyers as a liability of the party themselves, with the result that only the amount of that liability is recoverable. Mr Underwood, while not accepting that
… 47 строк без изменений …
Willis
was binding on us, described this effect as a form of subrogation, and the label is not inapt.
or
Starkey
, which depended straightforwardly on the fact that the statutory fiction required the fact that the successful party was legally aided should be ignored: that being so, it was irrelevant whether or not they had paid a contribution or whether they had made a recovery against which the charge could be exercised. (Of course, not all persons paid any contribution, and in not every case would the assisted person recover or preserve any asset against which the charge could be exercised.) It is true that in
, which depended straightforwardly on the point that the statutory fiction required that the fact that the successful party was legally aided be ignored: that being so, it was irrelevant whether or not they had paid a contribution or whether they had made a recovery against which the charge could be exercised. (Of course, not all persons paid any contribution, and in not every case would the assisted person recover or preserve any asset against which the charge could be exercised.) It is true that in
… 7 строк без изменений …
Willis
Aldous LJ does treat the statutory charge as relevant: see the passage quoted by Jeremy Baker LJ at para. 45 above. But I do not think that this gives rise to any inconsistency between his reasoning and that in
It follows that in my view we are bound by
Willis
to hold that, unless the indemnity principle is disapplied, its effect is to prevent a successful legally-aided party from recovering costs in excess of the amount that (now) the LAA is obliged to pay their lawyers.
to hold that, unless the indemnity principle is disapplied, its effect is to prevent a successful legally-aided party from recovering costs in excess of the amount that the LAA is obliged to pay their lawyers.
… 42 строк без изменений …
163.
However, we are here concerned with criminal legal aid, and it is common ground that the criminal legal aid regulations contain no provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3). This is, as I have said, the basis on which Sweeting J and Costs Judge Whalan, following Costs Judge Leonard in
Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan
[2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), held that the Appellant could not recover.
[2022] EWHC B8 (Costs), held that the Appellant could not recover at more than legal aid rates.
… 25 строк без изменений …
166.
payment authorised by the Lord Chancellor to be taken.”
The subsection is rather oddly drafted, but in substance it comprises, in subparagraph (a), a prohibition on the receipt of payment otherwise than under the legal aid scheme, but subject, by subparagraph (b), to a proviso disapplying the prohibition where such receipt is authorised by the Lord Chancellor. That is broadly equivalent to the earlier formulations of the other payments rule, albeit differently structured.
The subsection is rather oddly drafted, but in substance it comprises, in subparagraph (a), a prohibition on the taking of payment otherwise than under the legal aid scheme, but subject, by subparagraph (b), to a proviso disapplying the prohibition where such taking is authorised by the Lord Chancellor. That is broadly equivalent to the earlier formulations of the other payments rule, albeit differently structured.
… 36 строк без изменений …
168.
Mr Mallalieu’s initial response to this strand of the case appears at paras. 90-97 of his skeleton argument. Para. 97 summarises his submission as being that an agreement “intended to provide for ‘topping up’ … would be contrary to public policy, contrary to
s.28
, contrary to the express terms of Regulation 9 [and would be unlawful”. (“Regulation 9” is a reference to regulation 9 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Criminal Regulations”).)
, contrary to the express terms of Regulation 9 and would be unlawful”. (“Regulation 9” is a reference to regulation 9 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 (“the 2013 Criminal Regulations”).)
… 1 строк без изменений …
173.
Before considering those points it is convenient to address a potential objection to Mr Underwood’s case which Mr Mallalieu did not advance but which I think needs to be considered. That objection is that because it was fundamental to the agreement that the Appellant would never herself be under any obligation to pay anything (“we will not seek to recover against you more than is paid by the other side”) she was subject to no liability against which the paying party could be required to indemnify her. However, there seems to be a consensus that such an objection would be ill-founded. In his skeleton argument Mr Mallalieu not only did not advance it but positively asserted that “the client’s liability [under a CFA lite] … is not destroyed, but very much exists” (see para. 93). I am not in fact sure that the authority which he cited in support of that proposition (
Gavin Edmondson Solicitors Ltd v Haven Insurance Company Ltd
[2018] UKSC 21,
[2018] UKSC 21
,
… 1 строк без изменений …
[2018] 1 WLR 2052
) is addressed to this point; but nevertheless
Friston on Costs
I owe this reference to Mr Cohen’s unused skeleton argument below (
see n.
I owe this reference to Mr Cohen’s unused skeleton argument below (see n.
… 15 строк без изменений …
2
above).
[
1999] EWCA
Civ 3036,
[2001] QB 570, but the difference did not relate to the application of the indemnity principle.
1999] EWCA Civ 3036,
[2001] QB 570
, but the difference did not relate to the application of the indemnity principle.
… 6 строк без изменений …
174.
Merrick v The Law Society
[2007] EWHC 2997 (Admin)
. That was an appeal against a finding by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal that the appellant had taken money on account of costs from his legally-aided client in breach of regulation 64 of the 1989 Regulations. At para. 54 of his judgment, with which Thomas LJ agreed), Gross J said (in the context of the gravity of the breach):
. That was an appeal against a finding by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal that the appellant had taken money on account of costs from his legally-aided client in breach of regulation 64 of the 1989 Regulations. At para. 54 of his judgment, with which Thomas LJ agreed, Gross J said (in the context of the gravity of the breach):
… 5 строк без изменений …
“[The Appellant] … was here in breach of the fundamental rule … that solicitors, acting for legally aided clients, are not entitled to look to that client for payment. That is not a complex matter; it is basic; it is also of the first importance to the reputation of the profession in its handling of legal aid work.”
176.
The question thus resolves itself into whether there is any statutory provision which prohibits a client who is in receipt of legal aid and/or their lawyers from entering into a CFA lite with a view to enabling the client to obtain an order for costs against the other party at private client rates if the claim succeeds. The only such provisions relied on by Mr Mallalieu are those which enact the other payment rule, namely
The question thus resolves itself into whether there is any statutory provision which prohibits a client who is in receipt of legal aid and/or their lawyers from entering into a CFA lite with a view to enabling the client to obtain an order for costs against the other party at private client rates if the claim succeeds. The only such provisions relied on by Mr Mallalieu are those which enact the other payments rule, namely
… 55 строк без изменений …
sections 23 (1)
and 28 (2) of LASPO.
Surrey
v Barnet and Chase Farm Hospitals NHS Trust
[2018] EWCA Civ 451,
[2018] 1 WLR 5831, Lewison LJ referred to the two sections as together rendering “topping up” unlawful (I should say that what he was referring to as “topping-up” was a situation where the client themselves had to pay the shortfall between legal aid and private client rates). However, the two provisions are not identically structured and the only safe course is to consider each separately in accordance with its own terms.
[2018] EWCA Civ 451
,
[2018] 1 WLR 5831
, Lewison LJ referred to the two sections as together rendering “topping up” unlawful (I should say that what he was referring to as “topping-up” was a situation where the client themselves had to pay the shortfall between legal aid and private client rates). However, the two provisions are not identically structured and the only safe course is to consider each separately in accordance with its own terms.
… 3 строк без изменений …
178.
required to make a payment in connection with the provision of the services”. The straightforward answer is that she is
not
required to make any such payment: it is fundamental to the agreement that the payment to the solicitors which it is intended to achieve will only come in the form of a payment of costs from the other party. But it is not quite as simple as that. It could be said that the legal basis on which the costs order would necessarily have been made was that she was under a liability to pay her lawyers at private client rates, otherwise there would be nothing against which she was entitled to be indemnified – see the discussion at para. 173 above; and that accordingly should be regarded as being “required” to make such a payment, albeit that the requirement would never crystallise into an actual payment.
required to make any such payment: it is fundamental to the agreement that the payment to the solicitors which it is intended to achieve will only come in the form of a payment of costs from the other party. But it is not quite as simple as that. It could be said that the legal basis on which the costs order would necessarily have been made was that she was under a liability to pay her lawyers at private client rates, otherwise there would be nothing against which she was entitled to be indemnified – see the discussion at para. 173 above; and that accordingly she should be regarded as being “required” to make such a payment, albeit that the requirement would never crystallise into an actual payment.
… 1 строк без изменений …
179.
I believe that the straightforward reading is correct. I do not believe that
section 23 (1)
is intended to proscribe a “requirement” to pay which it is agreed will never result in actual payment by the client out of their own funds, as opposed to by the losing party. In my view the natural reading of the statutory language puts the emphasis on the actual making of the payment. The reference to the client being “required” to pay simply connotes that the payment is as a result of a (perceived) obligation. It is not intended to proscribe a prior agreement, or in any event one which will never lead to an actual payment. That reading also reflects the obvious policy behind the provision, which is to prevent clients being required to dip into their own pockets for services which they are receiving under the legal aid scheme. A CFA lite does not contravene that policy because the only pocket from which the payment at private client rates comes is that of the other party. A situation where a legally-aided party can recover costs from a third party at private client rates is entirely in accordance with public policy: see para. 164 above. As for the fact that the client’s entitlement to costs against the third party depends on their being treated as subject to a genuine liability to pay does not mean that the same assumption has to be made in the context of
is intended to proscribe a “requirement” to pay which it is agreed will never result in actual payment by the client out of their own funds, as opposed to by the losing party. In my view the natural reading of the statutory language puts the emphasis on the actual making of the payment. The reference to the client being “required” to pay simply connotes that the payment is as a result of a (perceived) obligation. It is not intended to proscribe a prior agreement, or in any event one which will never lead to an actual payment. That reading also reflects the obvious policy behind the provision, which is to prevent clients being required to dip into their own pockets for services which they are receiving under the legal aid scheme. A CFA lite does not contravene that policy because the only pocket from which the payment at private client rates comes is that of the other party. A situation where a legally-aided party can recover costs from a third party at private client rates is entirely in accordance with public policy: see para. 164 above. As for the fact that the client’s entitlement to costs against the third party depends on their being treated as subject to a genuine liability to pay, it does not follow that the same assumption has to be made in the context of
… 17 строк без изменений …
section 23 (1)
.
I have considered whether it is an objection to this construction of
sections 23 (1)
and 28 (2) of LASPO that it is inconsistent with the basis of both regulation 107B (3) of the (amended) 1989 Regulations and regulation 21 (3) of the 2013 Regulations, both of which proceed on the basis that, in order to permit costs orders in favour of legally-aided parties at more than legal aid rates, it is necessary to disapply both the indemnity principle and the other payments rule. I do not believe that that is the case. It is true that the effect of my reasoning is that the same result can now be achieved by the use of a CFA lite. But CFA lites were not available in 1994, when regulation 107B (3) was made. I do not know whether any thought was given to their availability in 2013, when regulation 107B (3) was replaced by regulation 21 (3). But even if it was, there would have been no point in abandoning the by then well-understood mechanism made available by regulation 107B (3) and requiring legal aid solicitors to require their clients to enter into CFA lites in order to preserve the possibility of recovery under a costs order. It is only because, almost certainly by oversight, no provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3) has been included in the regulations governing criminal legal aid that the CFA lite route has had to be resorted to.
and 28 (2) of LASPO that it is inconsistent with the basis of both regulation 107B (3) of the (amended) 1989 Regulations and regulation 21 (3) of the 2013 Regulations, both of which proceed on the basis that, in order to permit costs orders in favour of legally-aided parties at more than legal aid rates, it is necessary to disapply both the indemnity principle and the other payments rule. I do not believe that that is the case. It is true that the effect of my reasoning is that the same result can now be achieved by the use of a CFA lite. But CFA lites were not available in 1994, when regulation 107B (3) was made. I do not know whether any thought was given to their availability in 2013, when regulation 107B (3) was replaced by regulation 21 (3). But even if it was, there would have been no point in abandoning the by then well-understood mechanism made available by regulation 107B (3) so that legal aid solicitors would have to require their clients to enter into CFA lites in order to preserve the possibility of recovery under a costs order. It is only because, almost certainly by oversight, no provision equivalent to regulation 21 (3) has been included in the regulations governing criminal legal aid that the CFA lite route has had to be resorted to.
… 39 строк без изменений …
183.
Judge Leonard referred to regulation 9 of the 2013 Criminal Legal Aid Regulations as if they applied to High Court proceedings. Mr Underwood pointed out that this was an error; but it did not vitiate
Judge Leonard’s
reasoning on the indemnity
principle issue
reasoning on the indemnity principle issue
… 20 строк без изменений …
Lord Justice Bean (Vice President, Court of Appeal, Civil Division)
Yet, in the present state of the law, if Mr Mallalieu’s arguments were to prevail, Nicklin J would have been spitting into the wind. When the experienced costs judge came to assess what was payable, he held that Ms McGivern’s solicitors could recover only £20,673.34 (including VAT) for their successful defence of the unwarranted contempt charge, a small fraction of what they were claiming. For the reasons given by Sir Nicholas Underhill I agree that the CFA-lite operates to prevent that unsatisfactory outcome.