1. This decision relates to an appeal brought by the Appellant p ursuant to section 57 Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA"). It is in respect of a decision notice issued by the Information Commissioner ("the IC") on 4 March 2026 with reference IC-397162-LOG3 ("the DN") that decided that the Appellant's request for information, made on 27 February 2025 to the Chief Constable of Durham Constabulary ("Durham Police"), was vexatious. 2. What follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and our view of the law. It does not seek to provide every step of our reasoning. The absence of a reference to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered. In this decision, any page numbers indicated by their inclusion in brackets refer to pages of the open bundle. 3. When issuing this appeal, the Appellant asked for it to be decided without a hearing and Directions of 22 May 2026 confirmed that all parties had consented to this. Having considered the issues, the evidence provided and rules 32 and 2 The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 the Tribunal was satisfied that it could properly determine the issues without a hearing . Background 4. In this appeal reference is made to the Medomsley Detention Centre, which was a prison for young offenders in Consett near Durham. Medomsley was the subject of a report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and Durham Police investigations. The Appellant says that the report identified a "Systemic culture of physical abuse which became embedded as a practice." In his response the IC referred to a Durham Police apology on its website for its "historic failure to investigate decades of horrifying abuse at Medomsley Detention Centre" and where it also said: - “…The apology comes as the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman publishes a report detailing physical and sexual abuse at Medomsley spanning from the 1960s to 1980s and the institutional failings which contributed to it Chief Constable Rachel Bacon said: “On behalf of Durham Constabulary I wish to publicly offer my sincerest apologies to those victims and their families for those failures. “This report makes for extremely difficult reading. It exposes shameful failings by police at that time: both to recognise that the physical violence meted out by staff at Medomsley amounted to abuse or to adequately investigate allegations by those victims who did have the bravery to come forward ….” 5. Durham Police went on to say that there had been investigations and the launch of Operation Seabrook "the largest and most detailed police enquiry into institutional abuse in UK history." Over 2000 victims came forward and this led to a number of convictions. 6. The Request and other material in this appeal uses various acronyms. Our understanding is that "APP" means Authorised Professional Practice, "SIO" means senior investigating officer and "PIP" means Professionalising Investigations Programme and is a programme developed by the College of Policing. Evidence and matters considered 7. We had a bundle of 111 pages and an email from the Appellant of 14 July 2026. Durham Police was not a party to the appeal. There was no witness evidence. 8. In submissions made by Durham Police to the IC on 17 February 2026 (99-111) pages 105,107,108 and 110 were partly redacted in the bundle. A closed bundle contained an unredacted version of these submissions as allowed by an order made pursuant to rule 14(6) 2009 Rules on 17 July 2026 and confirmed, after fresh consideration, on 31 July 2026. A gist of the redacted material was included at para 3 of the 31 July 2026 order. In dealing with the redacted material the Tribunal kept in mind its continuing duty to ensure fairness regarding it and continued to act in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Browning -v- Information Commissioner [2014] EWCA civ 1050 . The Request to appeal 9. The Request asked as follows (59): - “Under section (1) (1) FOIA please provide me with all the recorded information that you hold regarding the following: (1). When you are investigating and/or if you had to investigate a major investigation into historical child abuse allegation please provide me with all the recorded information that you hold and all background information regarding the guidance that you would adhere to. For example, the college of policing APP’s guidance. Furthermore, please provide me with all the recorded information that you hold with regard to staff training and staff vetting of Staff before they can work on a historical child abuse investigations. For example, all specialist training such as SIO PIP 4. In order to save you time and money you can just provide me with the correct names of the guidance or provide a working link to the information. If you have your own policy please provide me with a copy of it if it is not published on your website. If it is published on your website please provide me with a working link. If you have any further advice and assistance that may be relevant to this request I would appreciate it. If you are unsure about the meaning of this request for all information and background information please review the ICO guidance on their website Furthermore, please provide me with all the information that you hold with regard to staff training and staff vetting before they can work on a historical child abuse investigations. For example, SIO PIP 4, management vetting.” 10. On 4 March 2025 (60) Durham Police asked for clarification of the Request and the Appellant replied, the same day . In the response on 23 April 2025 Durham Police (67): - (a) said that some of the information requested was held; (b) directed the Appellant to a link to the College of Policing "In relation to guidance for major investigations, vetting and higher level PIP training"; (c) refused to disclose other held information based on the exemptions at sections 31,43 and 21 FOIA; (d) said that other information requested was held by the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council but not by Durham Police; and (e) provided some additional information "in order to aid and assist." 11. The Appellant asked for a review. This resulted in Durham Police changing its stance and relying instead on section 14(1) FOIA. The Appellant complained to the IC as follows (91): - "I would ask you to investigate if this public body handled this lawful request in accordance with the current FOIA legislation, the FOIA code of practice, ICO decision notices regarding the exemption the public body finally applied, and any FTT rulings regarding the exemption that was finally applied. Please also investigate if this public body complied with sections:1(1) and 1(2);10; 17And 14" 12. On 4 March 2026 the DN was issued in which the IC recorded his decision that Durham Police were entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA about which, on 6 March 2026, this appeal was commenced. The outcome sought was for the Tribunal to: - "1. Allow the appeal and set aside the decision notice 2.substitute the decision that Durham police are not entitled to rely on section 14 to refuse the request. 3.Require Durham Police to comply with section 1(1) and provide all the recorded information that it does hold." 13. In the later Reply the Appellant added an alternative outcome (56) that, if the Tribunal were to decide that the Request was vexatious a recommendation is made that Durham Police provide advice and assistance on how the Request could be narrowed to reduce the burden to "an acceptable level". 14. The Appellant set out six reasons for the Appeal in the GRC1 which were that: - (a) the IC applied an incorrect legal test and failed to recognise the high threshold for section 14(1); (b) the IC failed to give adequate weight to the serious purpose and substantial public interest in the requested information; (c) the IC failed to require sufficient evidence from Durham Police when assessing burden; (d) the IC "erred in his assessment of motive and failed to consider that legitimate requests may make multiple requests on matters of genuine concern"; ( e ) the IC "erred in failing to recognise that the requests seeks information central to accountability and transparency regarding systemic institutional child abuse."; and (f) the IC's approach to harassment and distress was "speculative and unsupported by evidence." 15. These were dealt with more fully in the supporting Grounds and its enclosures. The IC responded on 7 April 2026, and the Appellant then Replied. The Appellant also made submissions by email of 14 July 2026. FOIA 16. FOIA provides that any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing if that information is held (section 1(1) (a) FOIA) and if it is held to be provided with that information (section 1 (1) (b) FOIA). This obligation is subject to section 14 FOIA which provides that: - "(1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious. (2) Where a public authority has previously complied with a request for information which was made by any person, it is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or substantially similar request from that person unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request. " 17. The Court of Appeal in Dransfield-v- (1) Information Commissioner and (2) Devon County Council and Craven -v-(1) The Information Commissioner and (2) The Department for Energy and Climate Change [2015] EWCA Civ 454 at [68] held that: - "...the starting point is that vexatiousness primarily involves making a request which has no reasonable foundation, that is, no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester, or to the public or any section of the public. Parliament has chosen a strong word which therefore means that the hurdle of satisfying it is a high one, and that is consistent with the constitutional nature of the right. The decision maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious." 18. In The Information Commissioner v Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC) the Upper Tribunal ("UT") agreed at [27] that "vexatious” connotes “manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of a formal procedure." The UT decision in Dransfield provides guidance on the approach to section 14(1) FOIA. Four broad issues were identified namely (1) the burden on the public authority and its staff (2) the motive of the requester (3) the value or serious purpose of the request and (4) any harassment or distress of or to the public authority. 19. These questions are non-exhaustive and illustrative, and the UT also said at [28] “It is important to remember that Parliament has expressly declined to define the term “vexatious”. Thus the observations that follow should not be taken as imposing any prescriptive and all encompassing definition upon an inherently flexible concept which can take many different forms” and at [82] that “There is no magic formula – all the circumstances need to be considered in reaching what is ultimately a value judgement as to whether the request in issue is vexatious in the sense of being a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA”. Role of the Tribunal 20. The Tribunal's role in an appeal by section 57 FOIA is set out in section 58 FOIA which provides that: - (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. 21. This appeal is a full rehearing on the merits and in Peter Wilson -v- The Information Commissioner [2022] UKFTT 0149 the First-tier Tribunal ("FtT") said at [30] (with which we agree): - "...the Tribunal’s statutory role is to consider whether there is an error of law or inappropriate exercise of discretion in the Decision Notice. The Tribunal may not allow an appeal simply because it disagrees with the Information Commissioner’s Decision. It is also not the Tribunal’s role to conduct a procedural review of the Information Commissioner’s decision making process or to correct the drafting of the Decision Notice.” 22. In Forstater v Information Commissioner and others [2023] UKUT 303 (AAC) the UT at [40] agreed that "(2) the “ordinary presumption” is that it is for an appellant to prove their case...(3) however, the concept of the burden of proof is of secondary importance in tribunal proceedings which involve a full merits review, since to apply strict burdens of proof may prevent the tribunal from properly discharging its responsibility to decide the facts for itself and/or exercise any discretion afresh..." Issues 23. The primary issue for the Tribunal was to determine whether the Request was vexatious. In considering the issue we reviewed the four non- exhaustive Dransfield tests while maintaining a holistic approach. We also considered the section 16 FOIA question. 24. We have not sought to reach conclusions about the Appellant's challenges to the way in which the IC reached the conclusions in the DN because any alleged deficiencies in the IC's investigation do not themselves provide a ground for allowing the appeal. The Tribunal conducts a full merits review and determines for itself whether the DN is correct. It is not the Tribunal's function to carry out a procedural review of the investigation. Burden 25. Durham Police's position was that it had taken 33 hours to get to the stage of the internal review and that it might be able to locate and retrieve in-scope information within 18 hours but it could not "assess its suitability for release under FOI without a very significant investment of resources." This was because the requested information related to many months of training courses and is contained in video and thousands of pages, held in various different formats and all of it would need to be reviewed and redacted or refused in reliance on a number of exceptions such as: - (a) those that deal with national security and law enforcement because without careful assessment and redaction disclosure "would provide invaluable intelligence to individuals wishing to modify their own criminal or organised crime gang behaviours to minimise the possibility of being detected, to circumvent law enforcement and also to impact and circumvent child and vulnerable adults protection strategies, to disrupt investigative activities and to exploit any perceived gaps in training"; (b) those that ensure compliance with the data protection principles because some case studies are " highly sensitive in nature" and it would be necessary to ensure that " no individual could be identified from this material"; (c) those that protect the commercial interests of 3rd party training providers who would need to be consulted; and (d) those that seek to prevent disclosure endangering the health and safety of any individual. 26. Durham Police told the IC that it has a finite resource which needs to be able to provide " top quality and timely protective and supportive core policing purpose services to members of the public, to partner agencies, to other police forces and also to the national security agencies" and the Request would be " excessive, disproportionate and unjustified" because, it would: - "disrupt the ability of all these core and front line operational policing business areas to maintain their activities in – 1. meeting legislative compliance and also national and local service level compliance and legislative deadlines and 2. delivering critical law enforcement and safeguarding etc training functions to all Force officers and staff" "...greatly impact upon officer/staff training and the Force’s core statutory law enforcement and statutory safeguarding workstreams. For the Unit this would inevitably lead to a catastrophic impact on legislative performance from which the Force would struggle to recover." and after redaction and the application of exemptions little of value would be left to disclose. 27. Durham Police estimated that as well as video the amount of in-scope material would amount to "hundreds if not thousands of pages of documentation" (86) and in its submission to the IC (103) said "Thousands of pages of documentation are held in either Word, Excel or PowerPoint are captured, as is video and other footage utilised as training tools" 28. The time said to be needed to respond to the Request is estimated by Durham Police at: - (a) over 100 hours of work of Durham Police employees’ time; (b) plus, time for consultation with several senior police officers; and (c) time for a review by senior officers and "the Unit’s FOIA decision maker" 29. The IC in the DN says that: - "The scope of the complainant’s request is broad and encompasses a significant volume of recorded information. Durham Constabulary has explained how much time and resources would be required and it is clear to the Commissioner that the time and resources these would take to process would impose a significant burden on it. This burden would noticeably divert Durham Constabulary away from carrying out other highly important functions." 30. The Appellant case (including as seen in the 14 July 2026 email) is that: - (a) the test is not whether there is some burden, but whether the burden is manifestly unjustifiable or grossly oppressive in all the circumstances; (b) the IC's view on burden was reached without proper scrutiny and the IC failed to establish whether less burdensome alternatives existed; (c) Durham Police's position has an internal inconsistency that undermines the burden argument because they say that "responding would require reviewing "thousands of pages" and involve "33 hours of Unit staff work time" at internal review stage but also say that it "may be possible to locate and retrieve the information within 18 hours"; (d) Durham Police is a large public authority with a dedicated FOI team and substantial resources for whom 33 hours "cannot reasonably be characterised as "grossly oppressive" even if "you have only allocated a small number of officers to handle requests"; (e) the 100 plus hours estimate does not have adequate detail or evidence and " appears to assume a line-by-line review of every page without any attempt at sampling or automated redaction tools"; (f) "... the information is held electronically and in standard formats (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, video). They haven’t explained why a focused, risk-based redaction approach wouldn’t drastically reduce the time."; (g) the existence of a large amount of potentially exempt material does not "automatically make a request vexatious." In such a situation the relevant public authority is to "consider whether it can reasonably locate and extract non-exempt information or refuse under specific substantive exemptions if necessary" and not issue a blanket refusal to avoid having to do that task; and (h) the Request seeks " existing policy and training documents that should be readily identifiable" . 31. The Appellant's conclusion is that: - "The Constabulary has failed to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the effort required would be so grossly disproportionate as to be vexatious. In any event, the proper course for large volumes of sensitive material is to engage with the requester to narrow the request under section 16, or to apply specific substantive exemptions to clearly defined subsets, not to refuse the entire request under section 14(1)." 32. Our starting point when considering "burden" was the Request as clarified. It asked for (emphasis added) " all the recorded information" held in a number of areas. This is therefore a very wide request. Durham Police asked for clarity of the phrase: - "staff training and staff vetting before they can work on a historical child abuse investigation"? Are you asking if an operational officer is required to achieve qualification/attendance in specific training or vetting standards, in addition to those for other police investigations, in order to undertake "historical child abuse investigations" 33. The Appellant's answer was (emphasis added) (62): - " Sure, the college of policing and numerous other public authorities have guidelines in place regarding police stafff working on child abuse investigations. This relates to PIP specialist training regarding interviewing suspects and victims, specialist training regarding the recovery of historical documents etc.This relates to all police staff from the top down to the bottom up . The college of policing also have guidelines in place regarding the systems that you record information on, the class of the operation, the budget of the operation, staff level for investigating the operation and a standard. For example, gold standard. Your SIO should also maintain a policy log providing ratational regarding decision made by them during the operation. I seek all the recorded information that you hold regarding all these matters ." 34. In our view this clarification further widened the scope and breadth of the Request but despite this Durham Police's position was that it might be able to locate and retrieve in-scope information within 18 hours. 35. "18 hours" is a reference to section 12 FOIA which states: - (1) Section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the authority estimates that the cost of complying with the request would exceed the appropriate limit. (2) Subsection (1) does not exempt the public authority from its obligation to comply with paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost of complying with that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit. (3) In subsections (1) and (2) “the appropriate limit” means such amount as may be prescribed, and different amounts may be prescribed in relation to different cases . 36. The Freedom of Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations 2004 provides that: - (a) the limit for Durham Police is £450 calculated at £25 an hour (b) only those tasks set out in reg 4(3) can be included but (and relevant to this case) as the IC's non-binding guidance advises "you cannot include the time taken, or likely to be taken, in considering whether any exemptions apply. You also can’t take account of the time likely to be taken in removing any information which you decide is exempt (often referred to as ‘redacting’ the exempt information)." 37. It is possible that, if it had been available, Durham Police would have relied on section 12 FOIA but being unable to do so have used the limit as a benchmark to assess burden. In our view if a request exceeds the limit set out in section 12 that does not automatically mean it is vexatious due to burden. In our consideration we therefore treated reference to "18 hours" as useful background information but not a deciding feature. 38. The 33 hours referred to by Durham Police was not directly relevant to the issue of whether the Request was burdensome because it was not an estimate of how long it would take to disclose the in-scope information requested but was the Durham Police position on how long it had taken them to deal with the Request up to the point of the internal review. Accordingly, we did not accept the Appellant's argument that the Durham Police position was internally inconsistent because the 18 hours referred to and the 33 hours referred to involved different processes. We also did not accept the Appellant's submissions about 33 hours not being grossly oppressive because this related to the work done to get to the internal review and the time estimate to provide disclosure of the information requested was said to be in excess of 100 hours. 39. Durham Police's position was that to locate information requested did not pose an excessive burdensome challenge but to prepare it for disclosure to the world did due to the volume of material involved and the need to review and redact it where needed for the various reasons cited. The Appellant's challenge to this assertion relates to the absence of adequate evidence provided and Durham Police's plan to carry out a line-by-line review rather than by sampling the material and/or the use of automation. 40. Understandably we were not provided with a closed bundle containing a printout of all the training material. There was also no witness statement in which we were told the exact total number of pages. However, despite the Appellant's submissions in the 14 July 2026 note about evidence of the burden, we were satisfied from the breadth of the Request itself and: - (a) the length of the training to which the material requested relates; (b) the subject matter and seriousness of training courses involved; (c) the number of courses; and (d) a review of the available links contained, for example, in Durham Police's submission to the IC (103) that the volume of in-scope information would be very substantial. 41. We are also satisfied, in particular because of the subject matter of some parts of the training courses, that sampling the material and/or relying on automation and/or adopting some sort of "risk based approach" would not be an adequate substitute to watching all video materials carefully and a careful line by line review of all the material and to be sure that no information was disclosed that should not be disclosed which, for example in relevant case studies, could be special category data subject to Article 9 UKGDPR. 42. In our view the need to check a very substantial amount of material and if necessary, apply redactions and/or consider the need for exemptions to be able to respond to a very broad request would be likely to take in excess of the 100 hours as claimed by Durham Police. 43. In considering this question we agreed with the IC's non- binding g uidance that what might be classed as burdensome may vary depending on the size and resources of the public authority concerned while also noting that in Cabinet Office v Information Commissioner and Ashton [2018] UKUT 208 (AAC) at [50] the UT rejected the Cabinet Office's argument that section 14(1) FOIA entitled a public authority to refuse to comply with a request for information on the general basis that it is struggling to meet a large number of obligations with limited resources because “the same is true for the majority of public authorities, and recognition of any such entitlement would deprive the right to information under section 1 FOIA of much of its effectiveness.” 44. In relation to this appeal, we noted the concern raised by Durham Police about the impact on other important tasks if it had to respond fully to the Request. We accept that those other tasks are important for a police force to be able to deliver alongside its statutory obligations to respond to FOIA requests. While we have no reason to doubt that Durham Police are concerned about having to divert valuable resources on to dealing with the Request, this, on its own, does not in this case make the Request vexatious but it does form part of the overall factual background, we had regard to, when carrying out a holistic review of the Request. 45. Our conclusion, on the question of burden alone, is that the breadth of the Request together with the submissions we have accepted on the amount of material involved, the need to check it all carefully before disclosing it to the world and the likely time it would take to do so could (subject to all other aspects discussed below and a holistic consideration) be said to be an excessive burden. Previous course of dealing 46. In Dransfield the UT said “29...the present or future burden on the public authority may be inextricably linked with the previous course of dealings. Thus the context and history of the particular request, in terms of the previous course of dealings between the individual requester and the public authority in question, must be considered in assessing whether it is properly to be characterised as vexatious” 47. In its submissions given by Durham Police to the IC on 17 February 2026 they said "To date, in total, the Force has received seven FOIA requests from Mr Armstrong since June 2024" and referred to two complaints to the IC from other cases with references IC-334982- N6K3 and IC – 390059 – T5Y2. 48. In the DN the IC said that "24. To date [4 March 2026] , in total, Durham Constabulary has received seven FOIA requests from the complainant since June 2024." 49. In his Grounds the Appellant said, "The Appellant has made seven FOIA requests since June 2024 [paragraph 24]—this does not constitute an oppressive number over an 18-month period." 50. Then in his Response to the appeal the IC referred to 3 prior requests being: - (a) a request dated 10 June 2024 about Operation Seabrook which was refused by section 12 FOIA and was the subject of a complaint to the IC and decision notice IC-334982-N6K3; (b) a request dated 19 December 2024 by which the Appellant asked Durham Police a number of questions about whether they had a Non-Recent Abuse Investigation Team; and (c) a request dated 25 February 2025 (2 days before the Request) by which the Appellant asked Durham Police: - "1. If a victim of historical child abuse wanted to report a crime to your police force what would be the correct procedure to follow. Please provide me with all your force policies and procedures and all other background information regarding this. 2. If a victim of historical child abuse wanted to report a crime to your police force that alleged that a member of your police force was present when the abuse occurred then what would be the correct product to follow. Please provide me with all your force policies and procedures and all other background information that you hold regarding this. Please also provide the rationale if the information provided above is different to the information provided here. 3. If a victim of historical child abuse wanted to know how a allegation(s) would be recorded under the current legislation, for example misconduct in a public office, please provide me with what section or sub- section of the current legislation such a allegation would be recorded Please provide me with all your force policies and procedures and all other background nformation that you hold regarding this. [sic]…” 51. Durham Police also say for example that: - (a) three requests have gone on to be the subject of a complaint to the IC; (b) the requests "have all been vague, broad and lacking in definition"; (c) the Appellant tends to ask for "all" information in respect of a vast subject area, without focus or seemingly any real clarity as to what in formation exactly is being sought."; (d) requests are "obtuse and ambiguous"; (e) Durham Police despite its limited resources have gone to great time and lengths "across internal liaison with many differing Commands and operational staff at both medium and senior level"; and (f) "the applicant’s repeated and consistent practice of automatically submitting a request for FOIA Internal Review as soon as the original FOIA response is issued, followed often by an immediate submission to the ICO as soon as the IR response is sent to him, appears to be a matter of repeated practice and is placing undue strain on those finite Force resources." 52. In the Reply the Appellant refers to 4 relevant requests in total (54) and that: - (a) the IC's view is on the pattern of requests is "speculation, not evidence"; (b) no "improper pattern or campaign" has been identified; (c) the requests relate to " the Constabulary's handling of historical child abuse investigations"; (d) while a request may result from a response the IC's non-binding guidance states that "This pattern of request making can often be adopted by journalists pursuing various leads in order to build up a complete picture of a particular event"; and (e) the requests are a "structured, proportionate, and legitimate approach to obtaining information about a matter of profound public concern" 53. In the 14 July 2026 note the Appellant refers to 7 requests in 18 months and concludes with the submission that: - " The Appellant’s request history is modest and entirely consistent with a citizen pursuing a legitimate interest in historical child abuse investigations. Exercising the statutory rights to internal review and complaint to the Commissioner is not evidence of vexatiousness; it is the mechanism Parliament provided. The Constabulary’s subjective feeling that the Appellant is “never satisfied” cannot, without more, turn a valid request into a vexatious one. The Tribunal should look to the objective effect of this request, not the Constabulary’s perception of the Appellant’s character." 54. We were not satisfied, on the evidence, that we had been presented with a clear enough picture of the number, dates, pattern, duration and breadth of all the prior requests upon which Durham Police rely or importantly for example how they had concluded. The 3 for which there was some more evidence were dated 10 June 2024, 19 December 2024 and 25 February 2025 just before the Request itself. These alone are not a very large number but they do contain within them requests for all the policies, all your force policies and procedures and all othe r background information which is indicative of these requests also being very broad. 55. In the absence of further evidence to assist us the prior requests and their breadth were not, on their own, persuasive evidence of the Request being vexatious but they were a factor we considered when assessing whether the Request was vexatious. Requests to other public authorities 56. In the submission made by Durham Police to the IC we saw references to other UK police forces having had "similar issues with this FOIA applicant" and previous decision notices involving Cleveland Police. This suggests that Durham Police were focused on the requester as much as the Request when assessing the Request. In any event there is very little evidence of the number, pattern, duration and breadth of these other requests or how their existence is said to add weight in favour of the Request being vexatious in this appeal. Therefore, while we accept that other requests had been made to others, we did not factor this into our consideration of the issue in this appeal. Motive 57. When assessing FOIA requests the motive of the requester is usually irrelevant however the UT in Dransfield said: - “34...the motive of the requester may well be a relevant and indeed significant factor in assessing whether the request itself is vexatious. The FOIA mantra is that the Act is both “motive blind” and “applicant blind”.., the proper application of section 14 cannot side-step the question of the underlying rationale or justification for the request..” 58. In its submission to the IC (109) Durham Police say that because the Appellant demonstrates: - "an unwillingness to consider explanations already provided in previous FOIA responses and to consider these when formulating or submitting further requests which feature significant elements of repetition" they have been led to believe that requests "may be submitted with the objective of disrupting and confusing, rather than with a genuine intention to obtain information." 59. Durham Police also referred to "... fishing’ information requests..." 60. The IC in the DN says that "The Commissioner accepts that this appears to be done in order to cause disruption to resources rather than with any serious purpose or value" 61. The Appellant in the Grounds (27/28) says that "The request seeks information about how police investigate historic child abuse and the training/vetting of staff conducting such investigations. Following the publication of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman's report into Medomsley Detention Centre" and that the motivation is "...plainly to obtain information about police investigations into historic child abuse—a matter of profound personal and public importance given the Medomsley revelations" and that "The information requested goes directly to the heart of how Durham Constabulary now ensures such catastrophic failures do not recur." 62. In the email of 14 July 2026, he also says, " There is no evidence that the request was made to cause disruption; rather, it seeks meaningful information that goes to the heart of police competence in safeguarding cases." 63. Having considered the above and what was said in the closed material we are not satisfied that the motive is a described by the IC and Durham Police and we accept that the Appellant's motives were to obtain the information requested. Value/serious purpose 64. The UT in Dransfield said: - "38. Third, and usually bound up to some degree with the question of the requester’s motive, is the inherent value of the request. Does the request have a value or serious purpose in terms of the objective public interest in the information sought?...a lack of apparent objective value cannot alone provide a basis for refusal under section 14, unless there are other factors present which raise the question of vexatiousness. In any case, given that the legislative policy is one of openness, public authorities should be wary of jumping to conclusions about there being a lack of any value or serious purpose behind a request simply because it is not immediately self-evident." 65. In its submission to the IC, Durham Police indicated that in their view "The value and purpose of this part of the request does not justify the significant encumbrance and impact on the Unit's and the wider Force's Day to day business activities." 66. In his response the IC said that he "...recognises that, at the time of the request, there was some serious purpose/value in the requested information being made publicly available but is of the view that other factors in the section 14 assessment and, in particular, the burden of compliance outweigh the same." 67. The Appellant referred to the establishment of Youth Custody Safeguarding Panel and said that the Request sought information " directly relevant to this safeguarding objective" and that the information requested is " fundamental to public understanding of whether lessons have been learned and whether current practices are adequate." 68. In the Grounds (53) he said that the information requested: - "...goes to the very heart of public accountability for policing. The victims of Medomsley Detention Centre – over 2,000 of whom came forward to Operation Seabrook –and the wider public have a legitimate interest in understanding how such investigations are conducted, what training is provided to officers, and what vetting procedures are in place." 69. In the Reply the Appellant said (53) "The Request sought information about the largest and most detailed police inquiry into institutional abuse in UK history – Operation Seabrook. The Constabulary itself has publicly acknowledged the "shameful failings" of the past and has committed to transparency...The public interest in understanding how this investigation was conducted is compelling." 70. In the email of 14 July 2026, the Appellant also said for example: - "T he Constabulary has released some links to published College material, but that is generic, not the local training content. The public interest lies in knowing what Durham Constabulary specifically delivers, as it is their officers who investigate cases locally. The Tribunal should consider that the public interest in this information is heightened by the background of historical child abuse scandals, institutional failings, and the need for public confidence in the current investigative process...The training of officers investigating historical child abuse goes to the core of whether justice can be achieved for victims. National accreditation frameworks do not provide transparency into the actual content, quality, or local adaptation of training." 71. Bearing in mind the background to the Request we agree with the IC that the Request had value and serious purpose over and above the desirability of transparency and openness generally. We however also took account of the submission from Durham Police, which we accepted, that once the in-scope material had been redacted and/or withheld the value of what would be disclosed would be much reduced. Harassment and distress 72. The UT in Dransfield said: - "39...vexatiousness may be evidenced by obsessive conduct that harasses or distresses staff, uses intemperate language, makes wide-ranging and unsubstantiated allegations of criminal behaviour or is in any other respects extremely offensive (e.g. the use of racist language)" 73. The IC in the DN (9) said that: - "there is no evidence of unacceptable language, behaviour or inappropriate tone within the requests or in any of the correspondence he has seen. However, this does not mean that the number and pattern of requests will not been interpreted or felt by those named and targeted as harassing and distressing. It is those consequences that must be taken into account here whether intentional or not." Durham Constabulary has not stated whether its staff have felt this way about the complainant’s requests. However the Commissioner considers that the number and pattern of requests may cause distress to staff who have to take on the burden of responding to these over and above their core functions, which would be likely to cause them to feel under pressure" 74. On the evidence (including in the closed bundle) and in the absence of any witness evidence from Durham Police we do not accept this assertion which lacks specificity and appears to be based on assumptions reached on behalf of Durham Police. This is because: - (a) while we accept it would not always be available or needed in fact in this case the IC's view was not based on any actual evidence of harassing or distressing words by or conduct of the Appellant; (b) the IC accepts in the DN that " 35...there is no evidence of unacceptable language, behaviour or inappropriate tone within the requests or in any of the correspondence he has seen" (c) it was not referred to by Durham Police when in correspondence with the Appellant; (d) it was not referred to by Durham Police in the submissions to the IC which were focused primarily on the burden of the Request(s) and motive; (e) there is no evidence that anyone has actually been harassed and/or distressed and the IC in the DN confirmed that "Durham Constabulary has not stated whether its staff have felt this way about the complainant’s requests." (f) in the DN the IC says "35...However, this does not mean that the number and pattern of requests will not been interpreted or felt by those named and targeted as harassing and distressing. It is those consequences that must be taken into account here whether intentional or not" but we do not know who is meant by " those named and targeted." (g) we saw nothing written by the Appellant, presented in the bundle, that could be described as harassing or otherwise giving cause for concern; and (h) the IC says that while no one has made the specific allegation he " 36...considers that the number and pattern of requests may cause distress to staff who have to take on the burden of responding to these over and above their core functions, which would be likely to cause them to feel under pressure" but in fact responding to FOIA requests appears to be one of the relevant teams' core functions not least as it is a statutory obligation to do so. Holistic overview and summary 75. We reviewed the submissions made and the evidence in accordance with the tests set out in Dransfield and holistically. The Request itself does in our view represent a very significant burden for Durham Police due to the amount of material involved and the need (which we accept) for it to be checked prior to it being disclosed to the world. Added to this we accept that it came after a number of other requests which included requests for very broad categories of information. 76. We accept that the motive of the Appellant was to obtain the information requested because of the Appellant's particular concerns articulated by him in all his submissions. In light of the background to the Request, we also accept that it has potential value on an important subject. However, in our view, that value would be significantly eroded, prior to disclosure, by Durham Police's obligation to carry out a line by line check of all the in-scope material to enable redactions to be made and exemptions applied to ensure, for example, that no personal data, commercial information, information that would be likely to prejudice law enforcement or any information that might harm any person's health and safety was released. 77. The decision of the UT in Ashton at [27] was particularly relevant to this appeal. where it said: - “In some cases, the burden of complying with the request will be sufficient, in itself, to justify characterising that request as vexatious, and such a conclusion is not precluded if there is a clear public interest in the information requested. Rather, the public interest in the subject matter of a request is a consideration that itself needs to be balanced against the resource implications of the request, and any other relevant factors, in a holistic determination of whether a request is vexatious.” 78. We also had regard to the section 45 Code which says: - "7.12 In some cases, responding to the request is so burdensome for the public authority in terms of resources and time that the request can be refused under section 14(1). This is likely to apply in cases where it would create a very significant burden for the public authority to: ● prepare the information for publication; ● redact the information for disclosure; ● consult third parties; ● apply exemptions. 7.13 It is not possible to use section 12 (cost limit) to refuse a request based on the above factors. In these cases, public authorities may want to instead consider using section 14 to refuse to respond to the request based on the burden that responding to the request would create. 7.14 Public authorities should avoid using section 14 for burdensome requests unnecessarily. On this basis they should always consider whether section 12 applies in the first instance. For example, if a public authority considers that locating and extracting the information in scope would exceed the cost limit, section 12 is likely to be most appropriate. However, if, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 7.12 to 7.13 above, section 12 cannot apply they should consider refusing the request using section 14(1). 7.15 An example of when this may happen may include the burden of redacting multiple entries on a large database as, although it may be possible to locate the database easily, redacting relevant entries (if there are thousands of entries) may create an unsustainable burden for the authority. " 79. In our view, holistically and remembering the important right provided by FOIA, the burden of complying with the Request despite the potential value, does make the Request vexatious. Section 16 FOIA 80. Section 16 FOIA provides: - (1) It shall be the duty of a public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to make, or have made, requests for information to it. (2) Any public authority which, in relation to the provision of advice or assistance in any case, conforms with the code of practice under section 45 is to be taken to comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to that case. 81. This duty extends only so far as it is reasonable to expect the public authority do so. 82. In the Appellant's reply to the IC's response reference is made to section 16 FOIA as follows (55) " The Decision Notice does not address whether the Constabulary complied with its section 16 duty. The Constabulary did not offer any meaningful advice on how the Request could be narrowed or refined to reduce the burden." 83. The IC's non-binding guidance refers to circumstances in which this duty arises including pertinently "...when the request, read objectively, is ambiguous and requires clarification as to the information sought. In this case, you should contact the applicant to ask for more details to help you identify and locate the information they want." We are satisfied that at the point of the initial response Durham Police complied with its duty because it sought a clarification of the Request and when responding provided additional information "In order to aid and assist, and in the spirit of the Act ." (70) . 84. The IC's guidance also says "...when the request would exceed the appropriate limit beyond which you would not be required to provide the information. In this instance, you should provide the applicant or prospective applicant with advice and assistance to help them reframe the request in a way that would bring it within the appropriate limit." This is a reference to section 12 FOIA which was not deployed as the tasks of checking and redacting that were of concern would not have been included in the calculation. 85. In considering the extent of a public authority's duty by section 16 FOIA, where it had concluded a Request was vexatious, we were assisted by the IC's guidance which says " The code of practice issued by the Cabinet Office under section 45 states that when refusing a request under s14(1), a public authority is not required to explain why the request is vexatious, but comments that a public authority may wish to do so as part of its duty under section 16. Therefore, although you are not legally obliged to provide advice and assistance where a request is vexatious, you may choose to do so and should aim to be as helpful as is practical." 86. In the Reply the Appellant referred to EA/2022/0260 which is the FtT decision in Darragh O’Sullivan v The Information Commissioner [2023] UKFTT 216 (GRC) which he said (55) " confirmed that when a public authority refuses a request under section 14(1) on grounds of oppressive burden, it should offer advice and assistance to the requester." 87. In O’Sullivan the request had been refused by HSE on the basis of section 14(1) FOIA because it would place a grossly oppressive burden on HSE. The IC agreed but also decided that HSE had breached section 16 FOIA by failing to provide adequate advice and assistance to the Appellant but required no steps to be taken as a result. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal even though it decided at [38] that " ...HSE breached section 16 FOIA by failing to provide adequate advice and assistance to the Appellant. The Appellant made suggestions to narrow the Request and reduce the burden. It seems likely that some of the Appellant’s suggestions could helpfully have been used to narrow the Request, thereby avoiding the need for the Commissioner’s investigation and this appeal..." 88. This decision is not binding on us, but we agree with it. In our view it would have been helpful if Durham Police, when relying on section 14 FOIA essentially due to the time cost burden of dealing with the Request, had engaged with the Appellant to see if the Request could be reduced to a level that meant it was no longer considered vexatious. We cannot know whether such dialogue would have resulted in there being any changes. However, just as in O'Sullivan, we are satisfied that the absence of any such dialogue does not mean the Request was therefore not vexatious. Decision 89. As set out above, in our view, the Request was vexatious and accordingly the DN was in accordance with the law. The appeal is dismissed. Signed Judge Heald Date: 5 October 2026