## THE HIGH COURT [2026] IEHC 729 [Record No. 2024/6645P] BETWEEN ## PATRICK MCGREAL PLAINTIFF AND ## SAM (COURTS SERVICE STAFF), COLIN (COURTS SERVICE STAFF), ## KIM DUFFY (COURTS SERVICES MANAGER), GARDA A, GARDA ## SHEEHAN, GARDA C, GAOL GARDA, GARDA SERGEANT, ## COMMISSIONER OF AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA, CHIEF EXECUTIVE ## OFFICER OF THE COURTS SERVICE DEFENDANTS AND ## THE COURTS SERVICE ## NOTICE PARTY ## JUDGMENT (No. 3) of Mr Justice Brian Cregan delivered on the 16th day of October 2026. ## Introduction 1. The motion before this Court is one brought by the Courts Service: (i) for a Litigation Restriction Order (“LRO”) restraining the plaintiff from instituting any further proceedings against the Courts Service, and/or its servants or agents, without first obtaining the leave of the court; (ii) for an order restraining the plaintiff from threatening to arrest, attempting to arrest, and/or purporting to arrest, and/or from falsely imprisoning and/or committing trespass to the person, against any servant or agent of the Courts Service (including but not limited to any solicitor or counsel acting on behalf of the Courts Service). 2. The Courts Service was joined as a notice party to these proceedings on 24th June 2026. 3. The application is grounded upon the affidavit of Ms. Kim Duffy, sworn on 17th April 2026 on behalf of the notice party. Mr. McGreal has sworn a replying affidavit on 16th July 2026, and a supplemental affidavit dated 30th July 2026. Legal submissions have also been filed by both parties. ## Background 4. The background to these proceedings is set out in my first written judgment in this case delivered on 7th July 2025 ([2025] IEHC 425). That judgment dealt with the question of whether stamp duty was payable in respect of two sets of proceedings which had been issued by Mr. McGreal. The first set of proceedings was McGreal v Concannon & Brown (record number 2024/6852P) and the second proceedings (these proceedings) were Mr. McGreal’s case against various members of the Courts Service, the Garda Commissioner and various gardaí. In my first judgment, I held, that in respect of these proceedings, the plaintiff did not have to pay stamp duty. I also set out in detail all the various and improper applications which Mr. McGreal brought in these proceedings. This judgment should therefore be read in conjunction with my first judgment. 5. On 11 March 2026, I gave my second judgment in these proceedings in which I dismissed a number of applications brought by Mr. McGreal and I struck out both sets of proceedings as being an abuse of process. In addition, at paragraph 128 of this judgment, I indicated that I intended to consider making an “Isaac Wunder” order against Mr. McGreal restricting him from instituting further proceedings against the Courts Service without the liberty of the President of the High Court. I requested the Courts Service to prepare such an application and to set out on affidavit all cases which Mr. McGreal has instituted over the last three years. 6. As a result of that request, the Courts Service has prepared this application, which sets out, in great detail, the improper conduct of Mr. McGreal in both sets of proceedings, and his threats to arrest various officials in the Courts Service, various legal representatives of the Courts Service (including solicitors and counsel) and indeed judges. The application to join the Court Service as a notice party to these proceedings. 7. As I indicated in my second judgment, it is clear that the plaintiff should never have sued individual members of the Courts Service including “Sam”, “Colin”, Ms. Kim Duffy, and the chief executive officer of the Courts Service. The Courts Service set out on affidavit that it accepted that it was the correct defendant to these proceedings as it was the employer of all relevant members of staff, and that it was responsible for their actions under the doctrine of vicarious liability. Despite the fact that this was brought to the attention of Mr. McGreal on a number of occasions, Mr. McGreal never moved to join the Courts Service. On 24 June 2026, I made an order joining the Courts Service as a notice party to these proceedings for the purposes of any future applications which might be made and also for the purposes of this application. Despite Mr. McGreal’s submissions on this point, I am satisfied that it was, and is, entirely appropriate, that the Courts Service be joined as a notice party to these proceedings and that it is the proper party to bring this application. Mr McGreal’s behaviour in the Central Office. 8. These proceedings have a somewhat extraordinary procedural history which is set out in Ms. Duffy’s affidavit. The plaintiff attended at the Central Office on 9th October 2024 and 11th October 2024 to issue these proceedings. Officials in the Central Office formed the view that stamp duty had to be paid on these documents. Mr. McGreal disputed this and stated that fees were not required to be paid, pursuant to Statutory Instrument 492/2014. 9. Ms. Duffy states in her affidavit that “Owing to disturbances that arose as a result of this issue, I understand that the plaintiff was escorted from the Central Office on both dates by An Garda Síochána i.e. on 9 October 2024 and 11 October 2024". 10. It appears that following this disagreement, Mr. McGreal took to social media on 12th October 2024 and posted on X the following text message: "Notice of citizens arrest to occur at the Central Office of the High Court Four Courts Dublin on Monday at 10am This Monday at 10am I will be lawfully executing a citizen’s arrest in the Central Office of the High Court Fourt Courts Dublin. The individuals in question are Kim Duffy, Colin (who refused to provide a surname) and another individual named Sam (who also refused to identify himself). These individuals have committed indictable offences and I will have sworn affidavits on my person detailing the crimes they have committed. Witnesses will be present and the gardaí who witnessed the events yesterday will be subpoenaed along with the video evidence. Yesterday these individuals obstructed justice by pulling the shutters down in the Central Office, perverting justice and dishonestly causing loss to me by refusing to adhere to statutory law and process my affidavit. These actions, are in breach of statutory laws, constitute indictable offences and therefore I am lawfully commissioning a citizen’s arrest under the Criminal Law Act 1997. As per this Act, any citizen may arrest another individual they reasonably suspect to be guilty of committing an arrestable offence. If the person does not comply voluntarily reasonable force will be used to bring them into custody. Once arrested I will be delivering these individuals to the garda station and charging them under the relevant order, in accordance with SI 194/2001 District Court (Criminal Justice) Rules 2001. The gardaí are then compelled under section 16 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005 to bring these individuals before the District Court to be formally accused of the crimes committed, as the charges involve indictable offences under Irish law. I will identify the legislation breached and I have the legal authority to proceed with this arrest as outlined by law.” (emphasis added). 11. This was an extraordinary post to put up on social media by Mr. McGreal. It is clear that he does not have the legal authority to arrest officials at the Central Office of the High Court who are going about their daily business engaged in the administration of justice. It was an outrageous, unlawful and inflammatory post, and is at the root of what happened thereafter. One can understand that a litigant might well have a bona fide difference of views with officials in the Central Office about whether stamp duty is payable on certain documents. However, no litigant has behaved in the way that Mr. McGreal has behaved in respect of this matter. 12. I am also satisfied that the post which was published on X is, as Ms. Duffy states in her affidavit, “a deeply concerning post" and I am minded to direct Mr. McGreal to take it down with immediate effect. First, it is obviously defamatory; secondly, it could cause harm to the individuals mentioned if any other party decided to act on it. I will, however, hear submissions from him on this issue before making such an order. 13. Ms. Duffy set out in her affidavit (at para. 8) what happened next: - "I understand that on 14 October 2020 the plaintiff attended at the Central Office in the company of 25–30 people and attempted to gain access to the Central Office. Owing to the risk this group presented to the Courts Service staff, the group was not permitted to gain entry and members of An Garda Síochána again attended". 14. It appears that Mr. McGreal’s post on the social media platform X on 12 October 2024 was taken up by his supporters as a request, or invitation, to attend at the Central Office on 14th October 2024 to support him, and it is clear that a number of Mr. McGreal’s supporters did indeed attend at the Central Office on 14th October 2024. This resulted in the gardaí removing Mr. McGreal from the Central Office and bringing him to Bridewell. 15. After this happened, on the same day – 14th October 2024 – Ms. Duffy wrote to Mr. McGreal about his conduct, stating: "Members of staff working in this office frequently meet with challenging situations but there is a level of behaviour by users which is totally unacceptable. Your recording of members of staff without their consent and posting of these images and videos on social media platforms amounts to such conduct. Upon 11 October 2024, you posted on your social media platforms material ahead of your attendance at the High Court on 14 October 2024 that you intended to arrest named individuals and escort them into custody. Following your recent posts online as to how you intended to conduct yourself it was necessary to request An Garda Síochána, to remain a presence in and around the Central Office for the safety of all users. As well as being a service provider the Courts Service is an employer and as such it owes a duty of care both at common law and at statute to all of its employees.… Your behaviour and the manner in which you continue to conduct yourself and your business in person in the Central Office is quite simply unacceptable. It is putting the safety and welfare of staff and other users at substantial risk”. 16. The letter goes on to say that if Mr. McGreal wished to lodge documents at the “drop box” or by way of post, the Central Office would facilitate the filing of his documents in the usual way 17. On 16 October 2024, Mr. McGreal sent an email to a number of parties including Ms. Duffy (and the office of the CEO of the Courts Service and the office of the Chief Justice). This email states: - "Dear Ms Duffy, I am reaching out with the intention of finding an amicable solution to the situation that unfolded a few days ago at the Central Office. I understand that sometimes circumstances can escalate unexpectedly and I would like to express my willingness to resolve this matter in a respectful and constructive manner. My hope is that we can restore things to the way they were previously allowing me to continue accessing the Central Office as a member of the public. I am well mannered and amicable and my aim is simply to resume my legal matters in a peaceful way”. 18. This email from Mr. McGreal is fairly typical of the way he has conducted himself in this litigation. On occasion, he appears to be entirely reasonable and, as he says, well-mannered and amicable. On other occasions, however, he crosses over the bounds of what is acceptable behaviour for any litigant dealing with a judge, his legal opponents, or indeed officials in the Central Office and behaves in an entirely disruptive and unacceptable manner. 19. On 14 October 2024, Mr. McGreal made an ex parte application to me seeking liberty to issue two plenary summonses in two sets of proceedings, including these proceedings. As it was an ex parte application, I was not made fully aware of the background row which had occurred in the Central Office. In any event, as it appeared to me that there was a bona fide difference of opinion as to whether stamp duty was payable in respect of both these sets of proceedings, I allowed Mr. McGreal to issue the plenary summons in both sets of proceedings, without payment of the stamp duty, but the order also recited that “and it appearing that the intended proceedings raise an issue pursuant to Article 40.4 of the Constitution and do not attract fees at this point in time (subject to the right of the intended defendants to reply at a later stage).” In other words, I was of the view that this issue might be contested at a later date and the order provided for that, given that it was an ex parte application. 20. The within proceedings were duly commenced on 13 November 2024 by way of a plenary summons which was served on the defendants. The claim in this set of proceedings is set out at para 19 of my first judgment. In summary, the plaintiff’s claim is that the Courts Service defendants breached his constitutional rights, denied him access to the courts, and that the Garda defendants unlawfully arrested him. ## Mr McGreal’s conduct of these proceedings – the dispute over appearances 21. What then should have happened was that the defendants to these proceedings would have entered appearances in the normal way. Indeed, the defendants did enter appearances. This should have been uncontroversial. Instead Mr. McGreal created an extraordinary song and dance about the entry of appearances. It was not just that he objected to the appearances; he objected to the fact that counsel even appeared on behalf of the defendants to argue the case that their appearances had been lawfully and validly entered. Mr. McGreal became quite heated on these issues and made numerous applications to strike out the appearances. 22. I need hardly add that the entry of an appearance is usually an uncontroversial procedural step taken by a defendant to indicate to the plaintiff that the proceedings would be defended, and by whom, if there is a solicitor on record. I have never before seen any case in which a plaintiff has created such rowdy scenes over the entry of an appearance. 23. The proper course of action for Mr. McGreal to have taken was to make whatever objection he wished to the entry of the appearance, I would then rule on it, and if Mr. McGreal was unhappy with that ruling, he could appeal to the Court of Appeal. Instead what happened was that Mr. McGreal objected to the entry of the appearances, on the grounds that they were late; I then extended the time for the appearances, to allow the late entry of appearances – as is common in such cases. Mr. McGreal vehemently objected to this order and brought numerous and repeated ex parte applications to the court to strike out the appearances and/or to get me to set aside my decision. All were refused. In addition, he appealed any orders I made, in respect of appearances, to the Court of Appeal. All these appeals were dismissed. 24. Ms. Duffy sets out in her affidavit the procedural history of these proceedings. Given that this sets out in extensive detail the extraordinary abuse of process which the plaintiff has engaged in respect of these proceedings, and given that this is at the heart of this application, I set out below relevant paragraphs of Ms. Duffy's affidavit. She takes up the narrative after appearances had been entered and states: - 17. “On 21 January 2025 the Plaintiff was granted liberty to issue and serve motion papers in which the principal relief sought was an order setting the proceedings down for trial as he contended that no appearance had been entered by any of the Defendants within the time prescribed under the RSC. 18. On the return date of the Plaintiff's motion seeking to set the matter down for trial on 4 February 2025, an application for an extension of time was sought on behalf of the Courts Service Defendants and acceded to in circumstances where an appearance had been entered on behalf of the Courts Service Defendants on 18 December 2024. 20. The Plaintiff sought to return to Court the following day, 5 February 2025 in respect of this matter but was informed by the court registrar that the matter had been adjourned to 19 February 2025. 21. On 10 February 2025 at 17.28 the Plaintiff emailed the solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants indicating an intention to make an ex parte application before this Honourable Court the following day seeking inter alia to strike out the appearance entered on behalf of the Courts Service Defendants. 22. At 17.45 on 10 February 2025 the Plaintiff emailed chancery@courts.ie requesting that his ex parte docket be listed the following day before this Honourable Court, ie 11 February 2025. In this email, the Plaintiff set out the issues he sought to ventilate before the Court the following morning including the validity of the appearance entered on behalf of the Courts Service Defendants and what he deemed to be a "fundamentally flawed" order made by this Honourable Court on 4 February 2025. 23. I am aware that the Plaintiff appeared in court on 11 February 2025 and addressed this Honourable Court in respect of his concerns in respect of the orders extending time to enter an appearance made by this Honourable Court on 4 February 2025. The Plaintiff also sought to challenge the validity of the appearance entered on behalf of the Courts Service Defendants on foot of the ex parte docket he furnished me with by email on 10 February 2025 at 21.10. The Court heard submission from the parties, this matter was adjourned to 19 February 2025. 24. On 12 February 2025, the Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in respect of the orders made extending time on 4 February 2025. On 13 February 2025, the Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal in respect of the Order extending time for the entry of appearances. 25. The appeal of the orders extending time [was] ultimately withdrawn by the Plaintiff during the course of a directions hearing. The Supreme Court declined to grant leave to appeal in respect of this matter. 26. On 19 February 2025, the Court declined to set aside the order made extending time for the entry of appearances on foot of the Plaintiff's ex parte docket of 11 February 2025 and awarded costs to the Defendants. 27. The Plaintiff appealed against the order for costs to the Court of Appeal. A copy of the notice of appeal and the Respondent's Notice are contained at tab 9 of the booklet. The appeal was dismissed following the Plaintiff's failure to comply with an unless order requiring him to lodge submissions and books of appeal.” 25. It is clear that Mr. McGreal sought repeatedly to re-litigate matters which had already been decided by the court and simply refused to accept the decisions of the court. 26. Moreover, as I stated in paragraphs 54 – 60 of my first judgment delivered on 7th July 2025: “54. Mr. Hiney in his affidavit sworn on 17th February, 2025 at para. 14 states as follows: “I say further that in a post on the social media site known as X, published at 10.12 pm later that same evening [i.e. on 4th February 2025] the plaintiff (whose name and photograph appear above the post) described as ‘corruption’ the proceedings of that morning before this honourable court criticising the second defendant for the entry of her appearance ‘where she is personally accused of criminal wrongdoing’ and further criticising the second defendant for having entered an appearance on behalf of the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana in the aforementioned proceedings bearing record number 2024/6654”. “55. In this post on X Mr. McGreal states: “Today the sheer level of corruption on display in the High Court would make you sick. The court allowed Maria Brown, Chief State Solicitor to enter an appearance on behalf of herself in case where she is a person accused of criminal wrongdoing. Not only that Mason Hayes and Curran LLP – a limited liability Partnership – was permitted to enter an appearance for four of the other defendants despite no identifiable solicitor being named on record.” Towards the end of the post on X, Mr. McGreal states: “This is what corruption looks like. State employees using public resources to defend public servants in criminal matters. A High Court judge disregarding statutory rules enacted under Article 15 of the Constitution. 56. By email on Saturday 8th February, 2025, the plaintiff indicated he intended to appear before the Court again on Tuesday 11th February, 2025 stating that my order of February 4th 2025 was made without jurisdiction. 57. Mr. McGreal sent a similar email to the CSSO on Monday 10th February, 2025 and again on the morning of Tuesday, 11th February, 2025. Threat to arrest High Court judge. 58. On 11th February, 2025 Mr. McGreal sent an email to the Central Office for the attention of the Chancery registrars stating as follows: “Dear Chancery, I write to formally notify you that I will engage directly with the judge pursuant to Article 34.1, Article 35.2, Article 40.1 and Article 40.3 of the Constitution of Ireland. As of this correspondence, I will no longer exchange any information or details with your office and will be disengaging from further communications. Should the judge fail to adhere to the rules today, I will formally request that a member of An Garda Siochana place him under arrest for violations of statutory law. Yours sincerely, Patrick McGreal. 59. I should add that, in my view, the threat by Mr. McGreal to put a serving judge of the High Court under arrest simply because he disagrees with such a judge’s interpretation of procedural law, in circumstances where he has recourse to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and indeed where he has filed appeals to the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, is nothing short of disgraceful. It is not only a gross over-reaction to the procedural issues at stake in the proceedings, it is a clear attempt to intimidate a sitting High Court judge hearing his case. It is manifestly an abuse of process. 60. I should also add that Mr. McGreal has form in this regard. It appears that he attempted to arrest the District Court judge in Mullingar on 26th November, 2024 and as a result, he himself was arrested by the Gardaí and put into prison for a few hours. I am aware of this because Mr. McGreal made a separate ex parte application to me on 27th March 2025, in the matter of intended proceedings between Mr. McGreal and the Garda Commissioner, for an order that his intended proceedings were proceedings under Article 40.4 and therefore exempt from court fees. Having considered the draft plenary summons in those proceedings, I acceded to that application on 27th March, 2025.” 27. I am minded to make an order that this post of 4th February 2025 also should be taken down immediately by Mr. McGreal for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it is defamatory; secondly, because it amounts to deliberate disinformation and/or misinformation about the true nature of what occurred; thirdly, because it amounts to a contempt of court (i.e. scandalising the court) and interferes with the administration of justice. However, I will give Mr. McGreal an opportunity to make submissions on this issue. 28. I also stated in the same judgment at paras 72-85 as follows: The hearing of 21st May 2025 72. When the matter was listed before me on 21st May, I expected to be told that the parties were ready to proceed with the application to consider whether court fees were to be paid and to give it a hearing date. Instead Mr. McGreal issued two more ex parte applications seeking to set aside my order of 26th March, 2025 – as being ultra vires – and to uphold my order of 14th October, 2025 without hearing the other side. Indeed Mr. McGreal engaged in a long and disputatious complaint about every aspect of the case so far. At a certain stage, he simply continued to speak over both counsel and indeed the court. On numerous occasions I asked Mr. McGreal to be quiet to allow the other parties to be heard - and indeed to allow me to be heard. However he persisted in his haranguing and constant interruptions of counsel for the defendants and of the court. It was not possible to properly conduct the hearing before the court. So I rose for five minutes to allow Mr. McGreal to consider his position and to allow him to calm down. 73. When I resumed however, Mr. McGreal continued to harangue the Court and counsel for the defendants insisting that their appearances before the Court were unlawful. In the circumstances, it was impossible for me to proceed with this hearing any further. I indicated on a number of occasions to Mr. McGreal that if he persisted in this course of action, that I would strike out not only the motions but both sets of proceedings as an abuse of process. However this did not seem to deter him. Eventually I had to abandon the hearing and to indicate to both parties that as it was impossible to continue the hearing because of Mr. McGreal’s conduct, I adjourned the matter for two days, until Friday when I hoped that calm would prevail. This was Mr. McGreal’s third abuse of process. The hearing on 28th May 2025 77. On 27th May, 2025 Mr. McGreal emailed two more ex parte applications to the Chancery registrar and stated that he intended to make these applications before me on the following day. Mr. McGreal duly made these applications before me on 28th May, 2025. 78. These ex parte applications related to matters already decided by me. One of these applications was to apply for an order striking out the phrase “subject to the right of the intended defendants to reply at a later stage” from my order of 14th October 2024 on the grounds of ultra vires. He also sought an order striking out the defendant’s legal submissions. 79. I had read both ex parte dockets and grounding affidavits in respect of them before the Court sat at 11am on Wednesday 28th May, 2025. I indicated this to Mr. McGreal. Despite this Mr. McGreal insisted on reading out his ex parte dockets and affidavits, as some of his supporters were in court. I indicated to him that that was a complete waste of court time as I had read all the relevant papers. I did however permit him to read out, in full, one of his ex parte applications. 80. In discussion with Mr. McGreal, I indicated to him that, in my view, all of the matters which he was raising in his two ex parte applications were, in substance, legal submissions in respect of the application as to whether court fees were payable in respect of both sets of proceedings. I indicated to him that it seemed to me that, as such, these ex parte applications were misconceived and not properly brought. I indicated that I would not be granting the orders sought. Mr. McGreal then resumed his practice of constantly interrupting and haranguing the Court in respect of a number of matters. Again I indicated to Mr. McGreal that I would not countenance this sort of conduct and I rose for a few minutes. 81. Mr. McGreal then asked how I could decide the matter without seeing his sworn affidavit. I accepted this point but I indicated that I had read his unsworn affidavit and I asked him (a) whether his sworn affidavit differed in any material respect from his unsworn affidavit and/or (b) to hand in a copy of the sworn affidavit to the Court so that I could read it. 82. However Mr. McGreal then engaged in further obstructive tactics in (a) refusing to answer the question as to whether there was any material difference between his sworn and unsworn affidavit, despite numerous requests by me to him to do so and (b) refusing point blank to hand in the sworn affidavit to read despite my numerous requests to do so. I indicated again to Mr. McGreal that I regarded this as a further abuse of process and that if he continued in this vein, I would regard his conduct as an abuse of process. 83. I then indicated to Mr. McGreal that I wished to give an ex tempore decision on this application but I was unable to do so because he constantly interrupted me. At that point I indicated to Mr. McGreal that I was going to call a Garda to the Court to have him removed as he was preventing me from giving my ex tempore decision. I rose for a few moments to allow for a Garda to be called. 84. When I came back into the courtroom, I asked Mr. McGreal to allow me to give my ex tempore decision on his two applications but he persisted in interrupting me on the approach which I was taking to these applications. I asked the Garda to remove him but as it appeared that Mr. McGreal was then beginning to argue with the Garda, I indicated that, in order to avoid a further confrontation, and escalation of the situation, as I could not give my ex tempore decision in court, I would give it at a later date. I rose from the court unable to deliver my ex tempore decision in the manner which I had wanted to do, and intended to do. (emphasis added). 85. I regard this as wholly unacceptable conduct and as a fourth abuse of process by Mr. McGreal. Mr McGreal’s attempts to remove the defendants’ legal representations. 29. In addition to contesting whether the defendants had a right to enter an appearance, Mr. McGreal also repeatedly sought to challenge the entitlement of the Courts Service defendants to be legally represented by a firm of solicitors – Mason Hayes & Curran – which had been retained by the Courts Service. All of the applications which Mr. McGreal brought against Mason Hayes & Curran can only be described as an abuse of process and utterly without merit. He has repeatedly claimed that Mason Hayes & Curran engaged in criminal behaviour when there is not a scintilla of evidence to justify this allegation. As far as this Court is concerned, Mason Hayes & Curran, in the conduct of this case, acted entirely properly and in accordance with the usual duties and obligations of solicitors acting on behalf of the defendants despite the provocations of Mr. McGreal. 30. The Plaintiff appeared before the Court on 19 March 2025 and sought relief on foot of yet another ex parte docket. The first three reliefs were concerned with the legal representation of the defendants and sought: “1. An Order removing the State-sponsored legal representation currently provided to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd named Defendants on the basis that: (i) Their alleged actions fall outside the scope of their statutory duties. (ii) The State has no legal basis under Article 11 of the Constitution to fund their defence. 2. An Order declaring that public funds shall not be used to defend individuals accused of acting outside their statutory functions. 3. An Order directing Mason, Hayes & Curran LLP to cease representing the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd named Defendants, as they are private individuals defending allegations of personal wrongdoing.” 31. This application was just the first of numerous, repeated attempts by Mr. McGreal to prevent the Defendants from obtaining legal representation and/or to obtain an order that the Defendants’ legal representatives should cease to act. I considered all of these applications in my second judgment on 11 March 2026 and dismissed them all as without merit. I also struck out the proceedings as an abuse of process. Eight further intended actions. 32. On 21 July 2025, the plaintiff left seven plenary summonses in the drop box outside the Central Office. In response to the Plaintiff, on the same day, the Central Office informed the Plaintiff that it appeared that stamp duty was payable and consequently the plenary summonses could not issue until the duty was paid, unless directed otherwise by the Court. 33. The plaintiff then sought to issue an eighth plenary summons against the Courts Service, in which he sought an order directing the Courts Service to issue these seven plenary summonses as well as a number of declaratory reliefs. 34. When this matter was next before the Court on 23 October 2025, the plaintiff indicated that he did not wish to proceed with these matters and they were struck out. ## Mr McGreal’s repeated threats to arrest officials from the Courts Service and legal representatives acting for the Courts Service 35. It is another notable feature of the improper conduct of this litigation by Mr. McGreal that he has flooded the defendants and/or their legal advisers and/or the Chancery Registrars with numerous emails and letters about these – and other proceedings. Many of these emails are threats to arrest various persons. 36. As Ms. Duffy states in her affidavit: “A further notable feature of the manner in which the Plaintiff conducted himself in these proceedings relates to his prolific and inappropriate correspondence with the solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants in respect of his interlocutory applications. I am aware that the Plaintiff made extremely serious allegations by email to and about the solicitors on record as well as the parties named in the proceedings. By way of example only, I wish to refer to the following communications: 1. By email dated 8 February 2025, the Plaintiff mailed the Chancery registrar and copied the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service accusing the legal representatives and the Court of committing criminal offences. 2. By email dated 11 February 2025, the Plaintiff mailed the Chancery registrar and copied the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service accusing the legal representatives and the Court of committing criminal offences. He stated inter alia: "Furthermore, I intend to request that An Garda Siochana accompany me into the courtroom, as the actions of the defendants' solicitors and barristers in appearing before the Court amounted to an offence against the administration of justice, contrary to the Rules of the Superior Courts and Section 27C of the Criminal Justice (Corruption Offences) Act 2018. 3. By email dated 20 February 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 18 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened to apply for a criminal summons in respect of me. 4. By email dated 25 February 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 19 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened to apply for a criminal summons in respect of me. 5. By email dated 25 February 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 20 of the booklet, the Plaintiff alleged the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants had acted in contempt of court. 6. Email dated 28 March 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 21 in which the Plaintiff wrote to the CEO, the solicitor and barrister on record for the Courts Service Defendants indicating inter alia that if the Respondent's Notice was not withdrawn he would refer the matter to An Garda Siochana, the Law Society, the Bar Council and the LSRA. 7. By further email dated 31 March 2025, the Plaintiff wrote again to the solicitor on record for the Courts Service alleging breaches of a variety of legislative provisions arising from inter alia the entry of an appearance by the firm of solicitors in these proceedings. The Plaintiff threatened to institute both civil and criminal proceedings against this office, amongst others in this email. A copy of this email is contained at tab 22 of the booklet. 8. By further email dated 1 April 2025 the Plaintiff again took issue with the legal representation afforded to the Courts Service in these proceedings. A copy of this email is contained at tab 23 of the booklet. 9. By correspondence dated 2 April 2025, the solicitor on record for the Courts Service Defendants responded to the Plaintiffs emails dated 28 March, 31 March and 1 April and noted that the Courts Service is entitled to be legally represented in the proceedings and that it is entitled to represent them. A copy of this email is contained at tab 24 of the booklet. 10. By email dated 14 April 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 25 of the booklet, the Plaintiff wrote to the legal representatives for the Courts Service threatening to make complaints pursuant to the Solicitors Act 1954 as well as possible criminal complaints. 11. By email dated 29 May 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 26 of the booklet, the Plaintiff wrote to the legal representatives for the Courts Service stating inter alia: "l assert that you are not acting under lawful instructions, and if you proceed to present yourselves as authorised legal representatives without establishing your legal foundation, you may be arrested without warrant under Irish law.” 12. By email dated 5 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 27 of the booklet, the Plaintiff notified the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service of his intention to "initiate criminal proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, pursuant to Article 34 of the Constitution of Ireland, against named individuals involved in this matter." He continued: "l will seek to have certain individuals tried by jury on criminal charges, in accordance with Article 38 of the Constitution, to ensure accountability and justice. " 13. By email dated 9 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 28 of the booklet, the Plaintiff again threatened the issue of a criminal summons against the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants. 14. By email dated 16 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 29 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened to issue a criminal summons against the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants. 15. By email dated 20 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 30 of the booklet, the Plaintiff notified the Chancery registrar that he had instituted criminal proceedings against the solicitors on record for the Defendants. 16. By email dated 20 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 31 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened to issue a criminal summons if he did not receive a response to his query concerning the names of any person involved in the filing of certain affidavits. 17. By further email dated 20 June 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 32 of the booklet, the Plaintiff made an unfounded allegation of criminal misconduct against the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants and again threatened to issue a criminal summons. 18. By email dated 13 September 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 33 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened the issue of a criminal summons against the solicitor from the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants. 19. By email dated 30 September 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 34 of the booklet, the Plaintiff threatened to issue contempt proceedings against the solicitor from the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants. 20. By email dated 1 October 2025 the Plaintiff wrote to the Chancery Registrar indicating his intention to issue a motion for attachment and committal "directing that the Defendants, be lodged in prison until they purge their contempt by fully complying with the Order. " The Plaintiff's allegation of contempt arose from the fact that solicitors on record for Defendants had sworn affidavits on behalf of the Defendants rather than the Defendants themselves. A copy of this email is contained at tab 35 the booklet. 21. By email dated 17 October 2025 the Plaintiff emailed the Chancery Registrar copying several parties including the Courts Service Defendants' solicitors and the office of the CEO of the Courts Service alleging criminal conduct against the firm of solicitors on record for the Courts Service. A copy of this email is contained at tab 36 the booklet. 69. I say that this is a sample of the persistent and inappropriate correspondence sent by the Plaintiff in the case. 70. Further, I say that the Plaintiff has threatened to arrest me on the social media platform X as evidence by the post contained in tab 1 of the booklet and referred to above. 71. The Plaintiff has also posted on X on or around 12 October 2024 a screenshot of what appears to be a form used in criminal proceedings purporting to charge me with offences, the content of which is redacted. A copy of this post is contained at tab 37 of the booklet. 72. The Plaintiff also sought to institute a private prosecution against the solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants and sought to prosecute the firm for three alleged breaches of the Solicitors Act 1954, as amended, arising from the firm's entry of an appearance in the civil proceedings. 73. The Plaintiff sought to argue that one of the issues he sought to raise in the civil proceedings, namely the legitimacy of an LLP entering an appearance as opposed to an individual named solicitor, amounted to breaches of the Solicitors Acts. A copy of the document purporting to be a summons that was served on the solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants is contained at tab 38 of the booklet. 74. The matter was returnable before the District Court on 21 July 2025. I say and understand that this matter was ultimately dismissed by the District Court on 30 October 2025 as a summons issued pursuant to the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 must be issued by a Judge and the document that the Plaintiff sought to rely on had been issued by a Peace Commissioner. 75. I understand that the Plaintiff sought to judicially review the decision of the District Court dismissing the intended private prosecution (2026/97 JR). I understand that the ex parte application that was listed for the purposes of leave application on 2 March 2026 was refused on the basis that the Court wished to have sight of the DAR from the District Court and this had not been put before the Court. In addition, I understand that the title to the intended proceedings required amendment. 37. This is an appalling litany of abusive correspondence from Mr. McGreal and shows that he is absolutely intent on abusing the processes of the court on a systematic basis. The threats against employees of the Courts Service and its legal advisers are completely without justification and are, and must be seen to be, attempts to intimidate them as they go about their lawful duties. As such, it is a clear interference with the administration of justice. 38. I am also minded to direct Mr. McGreal to immediately take down the posts referred to at paras 70 and 71. They are clearly defamatory and could cause harm to Ms. Duffy from persons who might read Mr. McGreal’s appalling posts and seek like him, to take the law into their own hands. Again however I will hear Mr. McGreal on this issue before making any such order. The attempted arrest of a solicitor in the Court of Appeal. 39. Another egregious example of Mr. McGreal’s misconduct occurred on 5 December 2025 when he physically acted out his threats. As Ms. Duffy states: 76. During the course of a case management hearing in the Court of Appeal on 5 December 2025, I am aware that the Plaintiff attempted to affect a citizen's arrest on the solicitor from the CSSO's office who was acting on the direction of the Chief State Solicitor on behalf of the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana in these proceedings. [sic] 77. I understand that the Plaintiff was subsequently arrested and charged with offences arising from this incident. 78. The Plaintiff has also made threats to arrest the solicitors and barristers on record for the Defendants in the within proceedings. In this connection by email of 29 May 2025, a copy of which is contained at tab 26 of the booklet, the Plaintiff wrote to the legal representatives for the Courts Service Defendants stating inter alia: "I assert that you are not acting under lawful instructions, and if you proceed to present yourselves as authorised legal representatives without establishing your legal foundation, you may be arrested without warrant under Irish law. 40. It is clear that Mr. McGreal must be restrained from carrying out any further activities of this nature before he acts any further on his ridiculous and absurd allegations of criminal action. ## RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES ## Jurisdiction 41. It is clear that this Court has the jurisdiction to grant a Litigation Restriction Order of its own motion. At paragraph 3 of his decision in M v. M [2026] IESC 2 Collins J., in the Supreme Court, affirmed this, noting: "The protection of the public interest — in the finality of litigation and the proper use of limited court resources — is an important element of the Isaac Wunder jurisdiction and serves to explain why Issaac Wunder orders may be made by a court of its own motion: Houston v Doyle [2020] IECA 289, 64 & 69. " 42. The jurisdiction of the Court to make a Litigation Restriction Order is also recognised in paragraph 9 of the President of the High Court’s Practice Direction on Isaac Wunder/Litigation Restriction Orders: Procedures and Related Matters (HC135). ## The applicable principles 43. In McMahon v. VW Law & Co LLP [2007] IEHC 51, MacMenamin J. set out the features justifying the imposition of a Litigation Restriction Order, at paragraph 21 of his judgment as follows: "Among features identified by Ó Caoimh J. in Riordan v. Ireland (No. 5) [2001] 4 I.R. 463 as justifying such an order, or militating against the vacating of such an order already granted are: - 1. The habitual or persistent institution of vexatious or frivolous proceedings against parties to earlier proceedings. 2. The earlier history of the matter, including whether proceedings have been brought without any reasonable ground, or have been brought habitually and persistently without reasonable ground. 3. The bringing up of actions to determine an issue already determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, when it is obvious that such action cannot succeed, and where such action would lead to no possible good or where no reasonable person could expect to obtain relief. 4. The initiation of an action for an improper purpose including the oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for the purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights. 5. The rolling forward of issues into a subsequent action and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings. 6. A failure on the part of a person instituting legal proceedings to pay the costs of successful proceedings in the context of unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions. " 44. I am satisfied that all of these criteria have been fulfilled in the present case. 45. In Kearney v. Bank of Scotland [2020] IECA 92, Whelan J. restated the principles to be considered when granting a Litigation Restriction Order as follows: "132. Isaac Wunder orders now form part of the panoply of the courts' inherent powers to regulate their own process. In light of the constitutional protection of the right of access to the courts, such orders should be deployed sparingly and only be made where a clear case has been made out that demonstrates the necessity of the making of the orders in the circumstances: i. Regard can be had by the court to the history of litigation between the parties or other parties connected with them in relation to common issues. ii. Regard can be had also to the nature of allegations advanced and in particular where scurrilous or outrageous statements are asserted including fraud against a party to litigation or their legal representatives or other professionals connected with the other party to the litigation. iii. The court ought to be satisfied that there are good grounds for believing that there will be further proceedings instituted by a claimant before an Isaac Wunder type order restraining the prosecution of litigation or the institution of fresh litigation is made. iv. Regard may be had to the issue of costs and the conduct of the litigant in question with regard to the payment and discharge of costs orders incurred up to the date of the making of the order by defendants and indeed by past defendants in applications connected with the issues the subject matter of the litigation. v. The balancing exercise between the competing rights of the parties is to be carried out with due regard to the constitutional rights of a litigant and in general no legitimate claim brought by a plaintiff ought to be precluded from being heard and determined in a court of competent jurisdiction save in exceptional circumstances. vi. It is not the function of the courts to protect a litigant from his own insatiable appetite for litigation and an Isaac Wunder type order is intended to operate preferably as an early stage compulsory filter, necessitated by the interests of the common good and the need to ensure that limited court resources are available to those who require same most and not dissipated and for the purposes of saving money and time for all parties and for the court vii. Such orders should provide a delimitation on access to the court only to the extent necessitated in the interests of the common good. viii. Regard should be had to the fact that the right of access to the courts to determine a genuine and serious dispute about the existence of a right or interest, subject to limitations clearly defined in the jurisprudence and by statute, is constitutionally protected, was enshrined in clause 40 of Magna Carta of 1215 and is incorporated into the European Convention on Human Rights by article 6, to which the courts have regard in the administration of justice in this jurisdiction since the coming into operation of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. ix. The courts should be vigilant in regard to making such orders in circumstances where a litigant is unrepresented and may not be in a position to properly articulate his interests in maintaining access to the courts. Where possible the litigant ought to be forewarned of an intended application for an Isaac Wunder type order. In the instant case it is noteworthy that the trial judge afforded the appellant the option of giving an undertaking to refrain from taking further proceedings which he declined. x. Any power which a court may have to prevent, restrain or delimit a party from commencing or pursuing legal proceedings must be regarded as exceptional. xi. An Isaac Wunder order may have serious implications for the party against whom it is made. It potentially stigmatises such a litigant by branding her or him as, in effect, "vexatious" and this may present a risk of inherent bias in the event that a fresh application is made for leave to institute proceedings in respect of the subject matter of the order or to set aside a stay granted in litigation. xii. Where a strike out order can be made or an order dismissing litigation whether as an abuse of process or pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court or pursuant to the provisions of O. 19, r. 28, same is to be preferred and a clear and compelling case must be identified as to why, in addition, an Isaac Wunder type order is necessitated by the party seeking it. " 46. It is notable that in M v. M, Dunne J. in the Supreme Court stated, at paragraph 79 of her judgment, that the factors outlined in Kearney should not be treated as a “form of checklist, each step of which have to be complied with before an order could be made". Dunne J. further emphasised the requirement for an analysis of the proportionality and necessity of a litigation restriction order at paragraph 194 of her judgment: "194 An Isaac Wunder order is one of the many inherent powers of the courts which can be employed, in exceptional circumstances, to prevent abuse of the judicial process. In light of the constitutional protection of the right of access to the courts, such orders are not an absolute bar to litigation, but operate as a filtering mechanism to restrain the repeated initiation of vexatious or unmeritorious proceedings. As the authorities make clear an Isaac Wunder order will only be made where it is considered proportionate and necessary to do so, and the safeguard of a right of appeal will generally be available to the affected party”. (emphasis added.) ## Application of the principles 47. I have considered the principles set out by Whelan J. in Kearney and by the Supreme Court in M v. M and I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case to make an LRO. I am also satisfied that an LRO is proportionate and necessary in this case. 48. It is clear from the above recital of facts that the appalling and indefensible manner in which Mr. McGreal has pursued these proceedings justifies the making of an LRO. 49. It is also clear that the nature of Mr. McGreal’s unfounded allegations and threats against the Defendants and other legal representatives justifies the making of an LRO. 50. In Towey v. The Government of Ireland [2022] IEHC 559 Dignam J. had regard to Kearney and placed particular emphasis on the nature of the allegations made by the plaintiff in the proceedings when granting the litigation restriction order sought. He commented at paragraph 57: "57 In addition to the claims against the judges, the plaintiffs make claims which can only be described as outrageous against the legal representatives of various parties. The right to and ability to avail of legal representation is a corner-stone of any system based on the rule of law. The right and ability to access expert, independent advocates ensures protection for the interests and rights of the individual in all areas of their lives and is essential to the administration of justice. Obstacles to effective advocacy are inimical to the interests of justice and to the rule of law. (emphasis added.) 51. It is clear that throughout these proceedings, the Plaintiff has made repeated outrageous and unjustified allegations about the various defendants as well as about their legal representatives. 52. I am satisfied that these are matters which weigh heavily in favour of granting an LRO. 53. The unique position of the Courts Service is also relevant to this application. As Ms. Duffy states in her affidavit at para. 82-84: 82. The Courts Service has a statutory duty inter alia to manage the courts. In the course of discharging its statutory duties, the Courts Service deals with the institution of proceedings, and the administration of court files during the currency of proceedings. The Courts Service is required by law to interact with any person who wishes to, for example, institute legal proceedings in the State, including the Plaintiff. The Courts Service is therefore particularly and specifically exposed to further unmeritorious litigation in the future, and cannot choose to simply not engage with the Plaintiff in order to attenuate the risk that he will institute more frivolous and vexatious proceedings against it in the future. 83. The Plaintiff appears to be a frequent and determined litigant, by reference to his involvement as a plaintiff or moving party in numerous other proceedings. Copies of the relevant records in this regard are behind tab 39 of the booklet. It appears from these that the Plaintiff has instituted 30 sets of proceedings before the High Court. Of those proceedings 6 sets of proceedings have been instituted against the Courts Service and/or its employees. 84. Given the manner in which the Plaintiff instituted and prosecuted these proceedings, and his frequent involvement to date in many other cases which have come before the High Court, I say and believe that it is reasonable for the Courts Service to seek protection against him commencing further litigation against the Courts Service or its staff in the future arising from their dealings with him. Crucially, neither the Courts Service nor its staff can simply opt not to deal with the Plaintiff in light of the public character of the Courts Service's important role in the administration of justice. (emphasis added.) 54. I am satisfied that the unique position of the Courts Service is a factor to be considered in the exercise of my discretion in this case, in favour of the making of an LRO. ## Order restraining the Plaintiff from threatening to arrest or attempting to arrest any employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service. 55. A particularly disturbing feature of this case has been the repeated threats that Mr. McGreal has made to arrest the defendants and their legal representatives. In addition, Mr. McGreal has sought to issue criminal summonses against various parties. He has also, in one case, attempted to arrest a solicitor acting for the defendants in the Court of Appeal. This is shocking and indefensible behaviour. 56. It is also clear that the behaviour of the Plaintiff, in issuing threats and ultimately attempting an actual arrest, is an escalating course of conduct. In the circumstances, it is necessary to make an order restraining Mr. McGreal from making further threats and, most importantly, restraining him from making any attempt to effect arrests in the future. 57. Both parties are agreed that, in an application for this injunctive relief, (i.e. an application for the granting of a quia timet injunction on a perpetual basis), the test is that enunciated by Geoghegan J. in Szabo v. Esat Digifone Ltd. [1998] 2 ILRM. 102, namely that it is necessary to show that there is a "proven substantial risk of danger". 58. I am satisfied, given the persistent nature of the threats made by the Plaintiff and the fact that he has acted on these threats - both by issuing a criminal summons against the solicitors on record for the Courts Service Defendants and attempting to arrest a solicitor in court – that the threshold of "proven substantial risk of danger” has been met. 59. I have considered the legal submissions of Mr. McGreal on each of the issues and I am satisfied that they are without merit. 60. Mr. McGreal seeks to contest, for example, the injunction sought (to restrain Mr. McGreal from arresting or purporting to arrest any person) by submitting that it contains no limitations to court buildings or to any place at all. That is correct. The Court’s order is directed to ensure that Mr. McGreal does not seek to threaten to arrest or purport to arrest, or seek to arrest any employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service, including any legal representative, in any place within this jurisdiction. It cannot be done in the environs of court buildings, or at their place of work, or any other place within the State. 61. The circumstances set out by section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1997, which Mr. McGreal relies on as justification for his citizen’s arrests, are of no application on the facts of these civil proceedings. If Mr. McGreal has any bona fide belief that a servant or agent of the Courts Service is committing a criminal offence, he can bring that to the attention of the Gardaí and let them investigate the matter. It is his flagrant abuse of this statutory provision (which in certain exceptional circumstances permits a citizen's arrest) which has led to his behaviour, and to the Courts Service seeking this injunction against him: his allegations, that their actions in entering appearances, or allowing for the filing of appearances, amount to criminal offences is quite simply absurd. Mr. McGreal has no grounds, or no reasonable grounds, for his belief that any of the servants or agents (including legal representatives of the Courts Service), have engaged in criminal offences. 62. Mr. McGreal has also sought to argue that false imprisonment and trespass to the person are wrongs against an individual person rather than a body corporate. He then seeks to argue that no official of the Courts Service or no solicitor has applied to the court in their own name for any relief. He seems to argue that, if such an order is made at all, it should be made upon the application of an identified person asserting it. I do not accept that submission. The application is made on behalf of the Courts Service in respect of any of its employees, its servants or agents, including its legal representatives. The Courts Service clearly has a right and an interest in making such an application on their behalf. 63. Mr. McGreal sought to argue that an order which might be enforced by attachment and committal must be certain and, therefore, as the Courts Service employs many hundreds of people throughout the State, and as the plaintiff is acquainted with fewer than 20 of them, that the plaintiff would not be in a position to know whether he is complying with, or in breach of, the order. In my view, this submission is without merit. If Mr. McGreal attempts to arrest, or purports to arrest, a person who is an employee, or servant or agent of the Courts Service, he will be in breach of this order. If he is purporting to arrest an individual, the onus will be on him to ensure that such person is not an employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service. 64. Mr. McGreal sought to rely on a decision I made in McGreal v Minister for Justice, Home Affairs and Migration & ors [2025] IEHC 597, in which I refused to open a habeas corpus inquiry under Article 40.4.2, which he brought, in respect of an entire category of persons, all of whose identities were unknown. However, the facts of that case are a long way removed from the facts of this case. First, the application in that case by Mr. McGreal was an application for habeas corpus requesting the court to open an inquiry into the legality of an entire category of persons all of whose identities were unknown. I refused that application for reasons set out in that judgment. However, if Mr. McGreal breaches this injunction by arresting or threatening to arrest a person that he knows, or ought to know, or can with reasonable enquiry ascertain, is an employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service, then he will be in breach of this court order and will face the consequences of such a breach. 65. Mr. McGreal also sought to argue that any injunction to restrain a false imprisonment or a trespass to the person is already an offence under section 15 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. He argues, therefore, that such a person already enjoys the full protection of the law, both civil and criminal. That may well be so, but it has not stopped Mr. McGreal from threatening to arrest or seeking to effect an arrest of such persons and the purpose of this injunction is to restrain Mr. McGreal from taking such actions. 66. I am satisfied that the orders made are necessary and proportionate to the mischief caused by Mr. McGreal and the harm which might be suffered by any of the relevant persons. 67. Mr. McGreal offered to give undertakings not to arrest certain persons in his legal submissions, but as these undertakings were hedged about with all sorts of restrictions and qualifications, I believe that it is more appropriate that the court should grant the injunctions sought. In my view, there will be greater certainty for all parties in respect of the orders made, rather than the undertakings offered by Mr. McGreal. 68. Moreover, in my experience of dealing with Mr. McGreal, he often seems to derive from court decisions the exact opposite principle of what that court decided. There can be no room for ambiguity in the case of a court order which, if breached, could result in an application for attachment and committal. Having considered his offer to give an undertaking, I am not satisfied that it meets the requirements of this case and I have decided that a court order is more appropriate. 69. I will therefore make an order restraining Mr. McGreal from threatening to arrest, attempting to arrest, purporting to arrest, and/or from falsely imprisoning or committing trespass to the person of any employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service, including any of its legal representatives. ## General Comments 70. Unfortunately, Mr. McGreal seems to believe that he has a right to take the law into his own hands, to engage in private prosecutions and to make citizen’s arrests of officials and/or solicitors going about their lawful duty in the environs of the Four Courts. He does not. I do not know where he has got his inspiration for this shocking campaign of abuse against the Courts Service, the gardaí and members of the legal profession (including judges), but it is entirely baseless and without merit. Perhaps Mr. McGreal wishes to make a name for himself. Perhaps he wishes to create a following for himself on social media. Perhaps he wants to drum up business for himself. Whatever the reason, his behaviour is indefensible and completely unacceptable. 71. Mr. McGreal has been given a fair hearing in respect of every single application which he has brought. He has however abused the processes of the court for far too long. He has absolutely no right to threaten to arrest, or to try to effect a citizen’s arrest on, any of the individuals as he has sought to do. I set out in my second judgment (at paras 117-120), the criteria for a citizen’s arrest set out in the relevant legislation and the fact that these criteria have not even been remotely fulfilled in the circumstances of this case. 72. That being so, Mr. McGreal’s campaign is simply an abuse of process and an attempt to disrupt the administration of justice, both in the Central Office and in the Four Courts. 73. It is also of note that every single time Mr. McGreal is in court, a member of the Garda Síochána has to be in court, in case his behaviour becomes unduly disruptive. This is entirely unacceptable and must be brought to an end. 74. Moreover, as Mr. McGreal shows no signs of stopping his abusive campaign, I am considering extending the LRO to restrain him from making any complaints to the LSRA and/or the Law Society and/or the Bar Council or any other professional disciplinary body, in respect of any actions of Mason Hayes & Curran or counsel acting for the Defendants and Notice Party. Mr. McGreal has made threats to do so in his emails and they are manifestly unfounded. Such complaints, however, would involve the parties having to spend time and money to have these claims dismissed, which would be a manifest injustice to such legal representatives. I will hear Mr. McGreal and the Notice Party on this before considering this matter further. ## Posts on Social Media 75. I am also concerned about Mr. McGreal’s posts on social media directed against members of the Courts Service and/or other legal representatives. Many of these posts are sinister, threatening and intimidatory. They make unfounded allegations; they cause comments to be made which are abusive and unjustified in respect of members of the Courts Service. The Courts will not allow persons such as Mr. McGreal continue with his abusive and intimidating campaign online against officials in the Courts Service. 76. I will therefore request the Courts Service to identify posts by Mr. McGreal on social media which they believe should be taken down by him. I will also afford Mr. McGreal an opportunity to be heard on this issue before considering whether to make such an order. AI images of court hearings. 77. I am also concerned about other conduct by Mr. McGreal in the course of these proceedings. In particular, Mr. McGreal has posted on social media AIgenerated images of what purports to be a reproduction or photograph of these court hearings. 78. The issue of AI-generated images of court hearings being posted online on social media is not an issue which the courts have had to deal with in the past. It does seem to me, however, that such false images posted on social media interfere with the administration of justice in that they purport to show to the world an entirely false and deliberately false – impression, that the image on social media is what in fact happened in court. This, in my view, is damaging to the proper administration of justice. 79. Order 123 of the Rules of the Superior Courts restricts and regulates the recording of court proceedings by persons other than the Courts Service. Taking photographs or recordings by video or mobile phone of court proceedings are also strictly prohibited (except where permission to do so has been given by the President of the High Court.) It is clear that no person may make a recording of proceedings before a court by means of any electronic device without seeking the permission of the judge hearing the proceedings. 80. In addition to Order 123 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, there is also a Practice Direction (HC80) on the use of cameras and electronic devices in court. Whilst this Practice Direction applies to the use in court of a camera or an electronic device, and may not be directly applicable to an AI-generated image created after court, it is nevertheless of some relevance in any consideration of these issues. It is clear, both from the Practice Direction and the Rules, that the courts are vigilant to ensure that no photographs, video recordings or tape recordings are made of court proceedings without the consent of the court. This is to ensure that no false images or false representations of what happened in court are allowed to be transmitted without the approval of the judge who has conduct of the proceedings. All of this is to ensure the proper administration of justice. 81. In addition to this Practice Direction, a Practice Direction on the Responsible Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in Court Documents (HC142) was issued by the President of the High Court on 29 July 2026 and came into effect on 1 September 2026. This Practice Direction is directed to all court users, including litigants in person. The Practice Direction recognises the potential benefits of generative AI in litigation, but emphasises that its use must be responsible and must not compromise the integrity of court proceedings. 82. Paragraph 7 of this Practice Direction provides: "Any use of gen AI tools must be appropriate and undertaken responsibly and with due care so as not to adversely affect the integrity of court processes and the proper administration of justice." 83. Paragraph 8 provides: "The use of gen AI tools does not diminish or alter any obligation owed to the court by parties, legal practitioners, witnesses, experts or any other person involved in proceedings." 84. Paragraph 10 provides that: "Known risks and limitations associated with gen AI tools (as of the date of this Practice Direction) include: (a) Content inaccuracy: gen AI tools may produce responses and material that appear plausible but are false or misleading and the output may also be affected by the terms of prompts. They may generate fabricated, manipulated or 'deepfake' material, fictitious cases, legislative provisions, academic references or other authorities (known as 'hallucinations')." 85. Paragraph 19 provides that: "Particular care must be taken to ensure that all exhibits, images, recordings and other evidential materials are authentic and as represented. Fabricated, manipulated or 'deepfake' material must never be used or presented to the court." (emphasis added). 86. Paragraph 20 provides: "Failure to comply strictly with these requirements may mislead the court and other parties, cause delay and waste costs, adversely affect the integrity of the proceedings and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice." 87. Paragraph 37 provides: "The court may take into account any misuse of gen AI tools when exercising case management powers or determining costs in accordance with law." 88. It is clear that Mr. McGreal has generated “deepfake” images of court proceedings in a number of social media posts. Even if the use by Mr. McGreal of AI to generate “deepfake” images of court proceedings is not covered by the Rules of the Superior Courts or either of the above Practice Directions, I am satisfied that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction, of its own motion, to ensure that no false images or “deepfake” images of court proceedings or court personnel will be permitted. Such photographs or “deepfakes” present an entirely false and misleading impression to the public at large and, in my view, affect the integrity of court proceedings and can affect public confidence in the administration of justice. There is a reason why the courts are careful to ensure that there are no recordings or photographs of court proceedings. This is to ensure the integrity of court proceedings and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The principles which lie behind the rules prohibiting the recording of court proceedings or the taking of photographs in court should also apply to cover AI productions, or "deepfakes" of images which purport to be images of court proceedings or court personnel when that is not the case. They can be used by disruptive actors such as Mr. McGreal to affect the integrity of proceedings and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. 89. In the circumstances, I am minded to direct Mr. McGreal to take down certain videos which he has posted to social media which create deepfakes of court proceedings. However, I will hear him on these matters before I make any final orders. ## Conclusion 90. As I said in my second judgment, all of these actions by Mr. McGreal amount to a significant attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. They are attempts to physically intimidate or harass persons who are engaged in the administration of justice – whether they be officials in the Central Office, solicitors or counsel acting for parties, or judges. It is deliberate and intentional. It seems that Mr. McGreal is engaged in a wholly unjustified crusade against the legal system and its personnel or else he is seeking attention for himself and some of his political campaigns. Mr. McGreal is, of course, free to campaign for all of his political beliefs – including the abolition of stamp duty on court documents – but he is not allowed to interfere with the administration of justice and/or to threaten court officials, solicitors, counsel, or judges. 91. In conclusion, therefore: (1) I will make an order, pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, restraining the plaintiff from instituting any further proceedings against the Courts Service, its servants or agents (including its legal representatives), without first obtaining the leave of the President of the High Court or some other judge of the High Court nominated by him; (2) I will further order that, if such proceedings are initiated by the plaintiff against the Courts Service, without the leave of the Court, in breach of this order, the Courts Service is not required to enter appearances or to take any steps in relation to these proceedings; such proceedings are to be treated as void and of no effect; (3) I will also make an order restraining the plaintiff from threatening to arrest, attempting to arrest and/or purporting to arrest and/or from falsely imprisoning and/or committing trespass to the person against any employee, servant or agent of the Courts Service (including but not limited to any solicitor or counsel acting on behalf of the Courts Service); 92. I would emphasise that the LRO will not prevent Mr. McGreal from instituting a genuine case which he might have in the future, provided that he has the consent of the President of the High Court. It will, however, prevent him from issuing malicious and vexatious proceedings against the Courts Service or any of its legal representatives.