2. This is an application made pursuant to section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA 2018"). 3. By directions made by Judge Harris on 27 August 2026, the Tribunal directed the Applicant to state whether, in light of the Commissioner's supplementary response, he wished to withdraw his application or whether he continued to pursue it. The Applicant was also given an opportunity to provide any further submissions in response to the Respondent's strike-out application. 4. The Applicant has now responded. He confirms that he does not oppose the Respondent relying upon its supplementary response. More significantly, he accepts that the specific relief sought through this application, namely an outcome from the Commissioner in relation to complaint reference IC-503070-H5G4, has now been provided by the Commissioner's letter dated 14 August 2026. 5. The Applicant nevertheless asks the Tribunal to record that the outcome was issued on 14 August 2026, rather than on 14 July 2026 as incorrectly stated in one paragraph of the Respondent's supplementary response. Subject to that observation being recorded, the Applicant does not object to the matter being determined without a further hearing. Legal Framework 6. The powers of this Tribunal in determining an application under section 166 are limited to those set out in section 166(2) DPA 2018. In order to exercise those powers, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the Commissioner has failed to progress a complaint made under section 165 DPA 2018. The jurisdiction to make an order is therefore confined to circumstances falling within section 166(1) . 7. On an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to determine the merits of the underlying complaint to the Commissioner or the correctness of any outcome provided by the Commissioner. That was confirmed by the Upper Tribunal in Killock & Veale & others v Information Commissioner [2021] UKUT 299 (AAC) . 8. Further, once an outcome has been provided in response to a complaint, the Tribunal has no power retrospectively to direct the Commissioner to take further steps in relation to that complaint or to require the Commissioner to reach a different outcome. Any challenge to the lawfulness of the Commissioner's decision-making process or to the rationality of the outcome lies, if at all, by way of judicial review in the High Court rather than before this Tribunal. That follows from Killock & Veale and R (Delo) v Information Commissioner and Wise Payments Limited [2022] EWHC 3046 (Admin) , upheld by the Court of Appeal at [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 . 9. As the Upper Tribunal explained in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA): 10. "The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate 'steps to respond' and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given... It will do so in the context of securing the progress of the complaint in question." Conclusion 11. The position is now straightforward. The Applicant has expressly accepted that the Commissioner has provided the outcome which he sought through this section 166 application. 12. I accept the Applicant's submission that the outcome letter was dated 14 August 2026 and not 14 July 2026. To the extent that the Respondent's supplementary response refers to 14 July 2026, that appears to be an error. However, that factual correction does not affect the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 13. The complaint has now been progressed and an outcome has been communicated to the Applicant. The relief available under section 166 is concerned with securing progress of a complaint. Once that outcome has been provided, the Tribunal's jurisdiction under section 166 is exhausted. 14. The Tribunal is not empowered to make findings about whether the Commissioner complied with the statutory time limit, nor can it grant declaratory relief in relation to any delay. Equally, the Tribunal cannot review the adequacy, correctness or lawfulness of the outcome that has now been provided. 15. In those circumstances, there is no longer any remedy which this Tribunal is capable of granting under section 166 DPA 2018. The appeal has therefore become academic and falls outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 16. The Commissioner's outcome letter deprives the Tribunal of jurisdiction under section 166 DPA 2018. Accordingly, the application must be struck out pursuant to rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 because the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in relation to the matter now before it. Signed: Judge Mornington Date: 2 October 2026