Background to the appeal 1. This appeal concerns a decision of the Information Commissioner (the “IC”) dated 1 December 2025, reference IC-373945-J1Z0 (the “Decision”). The Decision was in connection with a request for information which was made by Mr John Parker, the appellant in this appeal, to Tendring District Council (“the Council”) concerning the Council’s assessment of large site commitments. The Council informed the IC, by way of background, that Appendix 1 of the Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment (“SHLAA”) contains an assessment of large sites in the district with planning permission (or a committee resolution to grant permission). 2. Mr Parker wrote to the Council on 16 January 2025 and requested information in the following terms: “ The Council document Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment (SHLAA) Appendix 1: Assessment of Large Site Commitments contains processed data for large developments sites up to Oct 2022. Please provide the raw data in spreadsheet form (xlsx) used to prepare the processed data for the following years; 1. 2020 to 2021 2. 2021 to 2022 3. 2022 to 2023 4. 2023 to 2024 For the avoidance of doubt the raw data shall maintain all major developments (10 and over). The raw data shall include at least the planning reference number, planning committee dates, appeal number and any s106 agreements with dates and should maintain all metadata within the file. For the following years not covered in the SHLAA Oct 2022 report please provide the number of new homes delivered under the Housing Delivery Test Measurement (HDT) if that cannot be queried by the raw data. It is expected that I should received [sic] 4off xlsx files as copies of original recorded documents and should not present a burden to the council ”. 3. The Council responded on 13 February 2025, explaining that the data presented in Appendix 1 is not held in a spreadsheet. The Council confirmed that the planning application numbers are in the Appendix 1 and provided links to where the remaining requested information could be found on its website. In relation to the specification of the raw data listed in the paragraph beginning “ for the avoidance of doubt ”, the Council gave the following reply: “The Planning Application numbers for all major housing developments (10 or more dwellings) are already included within the first column of the assessment contained in Appendix 1 of the SHLAA. Details of these planning applications, planning committees dates, appeal numbers (where relevant) and details of s.106 agreements are all in the public domain and available to view on our website via the following link… Please be advised that this information is accessible to you by undertaking a search using the application reference numbers noted within Appendix 1 of the SHLAA on pages 19-32.” 4. With respect to Mr Parker’s expectation that he would receive four Excel xlsx files, the Council told him that, as the requested Excel spreadsheets do not exist, they cannot be provided. However, the Council explained that the information requested has been provided, or is accessible, via the Council’s website. 5. Mr Parker was dissatisfied with that response and requested an internal review on 16 February 2025, stating: “ The grounds are: You have stated that the data is not held in a spreadsheet. Please recheck this statement ”. 6. Following an internal review, the Council wrote to the complainant on 21 March 2025 clarifying its response and citing regulations 6(1) and 6(2)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“EIR”) as the reason for refusal. 7. Mr Parker contacted the IC on 29 March 2025 to complain about the way his request for information had been handled, challenging the Council’s failure to provide the information in the format requested, namely xlsx spreadsheets. He told the IC that the form in which the information has been provided “ does not lend itself to copying and paste [sic] information from a table into a spreadsheet ”. He also complained that the Council had failed to explain, within 20 working days of the request, why it was making the information available in a different form or format to that requested. 8. During the course of the IC’s investigation, the Council confirmed that it holds information in scope of the request, but considered that there is no requirement to provide the information in the way the requester specifies as it is already publicly available and easily accessible in another form or format. 9. On 1 December 2025, the IC issued the Decision Notice. In this, he decided that the Council was entitled to refuse to provide the information under regulation 6(1)(b) of the EIR as the information was already publicly available and easily accessible to Mr Parker in another form or format. In addition, he decided that the Council breached Regulation 6(2) for failing to explain, within 20 working days of receiving the request, why it was not providing the requested information in the manner specified. 10. The IC also noted that he was aware that, during the course of his correspondence with the Council about their request for information, Mr Parker made a further request for information. He stated at paragraph 16 of the Decision Notice that the Council’s handling of that further request did not form part of his investigation. Abbreviations used in this decision “the Council” means Tendring District Council, the public authority in this appeal “the Decision” and the “Decision Notice” mean the IC’s decision dated 1 December 2025 reference IC-373945-J1Z0 “EIR” means the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. All references to regulations are references to these Regulations unless otherwise specified “FOIA” means the Freedom of Information Act 2000 . “IC” means the Information Commissioner, the Respondent “ Section 106 ” means section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 . “SHLAA” means Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment “UT” means the Upper Tribunal, Administrative Appeals Chamber Procedural matters concerning the hearing 11. The Tribunal considered a bundle of documents prepared by the Respondent (463 pages). The Tribunal had the benefit of a skeleton argument from Mr Parker. The Appeal 12. Mr Parker appealed the Decision to the Tribunal on 8 December 2025. In his form GRC1 he gave the following grounds for appeal: “1. Misinterpretation of Request: The Commissioner incorrectly treated my request for the original Microsoft Word documents (4 documents) as a new request, despite it being a clarification of my original request for raw data in a usable spreadsheet format. 2. Breach of Regulation 6(1)(a): The Council failed to provide the requested information in the specified format (xlsx), despite the data being held in a Microsoft Word documents with a table format compatible with Excel. The Council’s claim that providing the data in the requested format was impractical is unsubstantiated. 3. Breach of Regulation 6(1)(b): The Council provided a general link to one year's data (2024) in PDF format, which does not meet my requirements for querying and filtering. The PDF format is not a suitable alternative to the requested database format, and the information is not easily accessible as claimed. 4. Breach of Regulation 6(2): The Council failed to provide a timely explanation for its refusal to provide the data in the requested format, only addressing the issue during the internal review. 5. Violation of Aarhus Convention Rights: The Council and Commissioner’s actions violate Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(3) of the Aarhus Convention, which require public authorities to provide environmental information in accessible formats and electronic databases. 6. Inadequate Verification by the Commissioner: The Commissioner failed to adequately verify the Council’s claims regarding the accessibility of the information and did not ensure compliance with the principles of accessibility and transparency under the EIR and Aarhus Convention. I request the Tribunal to overturn the Commissioner’s decision, order the Council to provide the requested data in the original Microsoft Word format with metadata, and ensure compliance with legal obligations under the EIR and Aarhus Convention .” 13. Mr Parker amplified these points further in his grounds of appeal. 14. On Ground 1, in summary he explained that following his original request, he had made a further request refining it for the original Microsoft Word document (the “Word request”). He argues that the IC was wrong to accept the Council’s assertion that the Word request was a new request and should have treated it as part of the previous request. He alleges the IC was biased toward the Council in this part of its decision and had provided no reasoning in the Decision Notice for why it treated the Word request as a new request. 15. On Ground 2, Mr Parker explained that having the Word documents would have enabled him to copy and paste the data into his own spreadsheet for analysis. He says that the Council admitted that the data was compiled in a Word format but refused to provide it based on concerns about formatting errors, which he states are irrelevant and do not justify withholding the information. He challenges the Council’s claim that raw data is not held in a spreadsheet format. 16. On Ground 3, he submits that the Council’s reliance on section 6(1)(b) is unreasonable because the PDF format does not meet his requirements to query or filter the data and is not a suitable alternative to the requested format. He states that the links provided by the Council did not lead to the specific information requested. 17. On Ground 4, he lists a number of previous breaches by the Council, including the breach of EIR Regulation 6(2) set out in the Decision Notice, which he says demonstrate a pattern of systemic issues in the Council’s handling of information requests. 18. On Ground 5, he states that the Council has violated his rights under the Aarhus Convention because it was required to provide environmental information in the form requested unless it is publicly available in an easily accessible other form and require to ensure that environmental information was progressively made available in electronic databases that are easily accessible to the public. He asserts that the Council’s failure to provide the data in a database format undermines this principle. He refers to examples of similar requests made to other public authorities who appeared to have no difficulty in complying. 19. On Ground 6, Mr Parker says that the IC accepted the Council’s claim that the information was publicly accessible having conducted his own sampling but without verifying with Mr Parker whether he was in fact able to retrieve it. He says he was able to find the SHLAA for 2024, but not previous years. The Council provided a link to its website, not a link to the specific documents requested. 20. Mr Parker stated that the outcome he sought from the appeal was: “1 Overturn the Commissioner’s decision and find that the Council breached Regulation 6(1)(a) and Regulation 6(1)(b) of the EIR by refusing to provide the information in the requested format. 2 Order the Council to disclose the original 4 Microsoft Word documents containing the data in table format, including its metadata, for the requested years (2020-2024) as they existed on the date of the published report. 3 Ensure Compliance with Legal Obligations 4 Address Inadequate Verification by the Commissioner 5 Transparency in the Investigation Process: I request that the Tribunal require the Information Commissioner to disclose all correspondence exchanged with TDC 6 Recognition of Rights Violation: I request that the Tribunal recognize the violation of my rights under the Aarhus Convention” The IC’s response to the Appeal 21. The IC responded to the appeal in a response dated 24 December 2025 submitting that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given in the Decision Notice and Response. 22. In relation to the scope of the request (Ground 1), the IC noted that the original request specifically refers to Appendix 1 of the SHLAA dated October 2022 and the “ processed data ” within it, asking for the raw data in relation to the processed data in spreadsheet form. This information was, he understood, entered directly into the Appendix 1 table, so the “ raw data ” was the information used to compile that table. 23. The Appellant’s subsequent request, contained in the request for internal review dated 16 February 2026, was “ Please provide the original Microsoft Word for Microsoft 365 document maintaining its metadata for each of the 4 years 2020-2024 ”. The IC maintains that this was a separate request and was in relation to the entire SHLAA document. The document on the Council’s website was the SHLAA document in its entirety, so the request was clearly to obtain a Word version of the document which was published in PDF format and distinct from the original request for “ raw data ”. 24. In relation to Regulation 6(1)(b) (Ground 3), the IC noted the Council had explained that the analysis undertaken by Council officers was typed directly into the Word Annex, which is then published in a PDF “ to ensure formatting errors do not occur when opening on different systems ”. The Council had also explained that the raw data comprised planning application documents, committee responses and associated cases, that can be accessed through the Council’s website and Public Access planning portal. The IC contends that this means the information is “publicly available ” and sufficiently easily accessible to satisfy Regulation 6(1)(b). 25. In relation to Regulation 6(1)(a) (Ground 2), the IC contended that, having found the Council was entitled to rely on Regulation 6(1)(b), it was not necessary for him to go on and consider reliance on Regulation 6(1)(a). It noted that the Appellant had incorrectly stated that the requirement is to provide information “ unless it is not reasonably practicable to do ”, which is not the test set out in that regulation. The IC contends that publication of the SHLAA in PDF format is a readily recognisable and reasonable/appropriate format. The data was entered into Appendix 1 from otherwise publicly available information. 26. In relation to Regulation 6(2) (Ground 4), the IC noted that as it had found a breach of this in the Decision Notice, there was no error of law which can validly be appealed. 27. In relation to the Aarhus Convention (Ground 5), the IC asserted that this does not assist the Appellant, based on the Upper Tribunal’s finding in the case of Craddock v Information Commissioner [2024] UKUT 320 (AAC) paragraph 32 which stated: “32. It follows that there is no ambiguity in the meaning of regulation 6(1)(b). As such, it is not appropriate to cast the interpretative net any wider. Mr Craddock’s learned submissions made extensive reference to both the Convention and the Directive, but neither instrument stipulates the precise form or format by which a public authority may or indeed must make environmental information ‘publicly available’ for the purposes of regulation 6(1)(b). Article 4(1)(b)(ii) of the Convention requires public authorities to make information available ‘in the form requested unless … the information is already publicly available in another form’ (and so, incidentally, imposes no test of ease of accessibility). In turn, article 3(4)(i)(a) of the Directive requires public authorities to make requested information available in a specified format unless ‘it is already publicly available in another form or format … which is easily accessible by applicants’. The international instruments provide no greater specificity...” 28. On ground 6, in response to the Appellant’s submissions about his own searches, the IC noted that the Council had recommended him to search using the planning references within the SHLAA for full details. The Council had also explicitly confirmed that section 106 agreements were available on its website. Appellant’s Reply to the IC’s response 29. Mr Parker replied to the IC’s response on 5 January 2026. He clarified that the appeal was now centred only on the Council’s failure to comply with the initial request for raw data in Excel spreadsheet format, and that he did not seek to rely on the Word request. 30. In summary, he raised the following points: a. His request was for information he had assumed the Council produced from raw database information because it is common practice for public authorities to do so. It was reasonable to infer that the raw data used to create the SHLAA was stored in the Council’s planning databases. The Council’s statement that data was not held in a spreadsheet was disingenuous, contradictory and misleading, because the information was in part stored in its internal planning database system (Uniform) which could have been exported as an Excel spreadsheet. b. The information from which the Council compiled Annex 1 “ is unlikely to be an exact match for the processed information published in the SHLAA pdf’s .” c. The Council’s claim that section 106 agreements are available on the planning portal may be technically true, but they are not easily accessible. This directly impacted public ability to engage in the planning process effectively on at least one occasion. Such information should be easily accessible and in a reusable format. It appears that the Council commissioned the Exacom database specifically to monitor section 106 obligations and when they have been discharged. As this database holds raw data, containing specific monitoring and enforcement fields, it is neither publicly available nor reasonably accessible and it would have been reasonably practicable to export it to Excel, the “unless” part of section 6 (1) is not engaged. d. He challenged the Council’s claim that fulfilling the request would require 34 hours of work, citing the fact that other councils have been able to comply with similar requests. e. He argued that the Council and the IC have confused information in a specific document with information stored on a database. Because the information in the SHLAA pdf is not an exact copy of the raw data held in the Council’s Uniform and Exacom databases, Craddock does not apply. f. Under Regulation 6(1) and the case of Innes v Information Commissioner [2014] EWCA Civ 1086 , which the Appellant says confirms that “ form or format ” includes software types (eg xlsx) and that this duty is mandatory unless the authority can prove an exception, the Appellant is entitled to express a preference for that data to be provided in a reusable software format. Exporting that information from a structured database to a spreadsheet is “ reasonably practicable ” and “ does not constitute the creation of new information, but rather the fulfilment of a mandatory format preference via an export from information held in a structured database .” The question is not whether the spreadsheet already exists but whether it is reasonably practicable to produce it from the recorded information held. g. The IC erred in law by treating the processed SHLAA information as the “ information held”; under Regulation 2 environmental information exists in any material form. Raw data including metadata and monitoring fields are not publicly available, so the Council cannot say these are “ already accessible ”. The Council’s submissions in the Appeal 31. The Council elected not to join the appeal. However, the Tribunal directed it on 16 June 2026 to provide submissions as to the public accessibility of the information requested by the Appellant, the format of any information held by it and any other submissions it considered to be relevant to the appeal. The Council wrote to the Tribunal with its submissions on 3 July 2026. In summary, it made the following points: a. To recreate all the information that is readily accessible into the format that the Appellant would prefer would, at a conservative estimate, require 34 hours of dedicated officer time. b. The data in the Appendix 1 table has been compiled over a number of years from application documents relating to the 51 sites within the SHLAA tables, each of which had a number of applications and, within those, a significant number of documents associated with it. The information is not held in a spreadsheet. c. Any public interest in the information being created and provided in spreadsheet format is outweighed by the disproportionate diversion of officer resources which would be required to recreate information already available by other means. d. The Appellant has not previously raised any accessibility concerns regarding access to PDF documents or the use of the Council’s Public Access. Accordingly, the Council had no reason to anticipate that the publicly available information, and the formats in which it is published, would be considered unreasonable. 32. The Council’s position is that the information requested is publicly available, albeit not in the specific format preferred by the Appellant. The Council considers that it has satisfied the requirement to make information available and accessible. Legal Framework 33. “Environmental Information” is defined in Reg 2(1) EIR as any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on: a. “the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements; b. factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment referred to in (a); c. measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements;…” d. reports on the implementation of environmental legislation; e. cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures and activities referred to in (c); and f. the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment referred to in (a) or, through those elements, by any of the matters referred to in (b) and (c);” 34. Regulation 6(1) EIR is concerned with the form and format in which the information is requested and provides: “Where an applicant requests that the information be made available in a particular form or format, a public authority shall make it so available, unless— (a) it is reasonable for it to make the information available in another form or format; or (b) the information is already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant in another form or format .” The Role of the Tribunal 35. The Tribunal’s remit in appeals under the EIR is governed by section 58 FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the IC is in accordance with the law or, where the IC’s decision involved exercising discretion, he should have exercised it differently. If we are satisfied that the IC’s decision notice is in error of law or involves an inappropriate exercise of discretion then we will allow the appeal and may substitute a decision notice for that of the IC. The Tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the IC and may make different findings of fact from the IC. Evidence and submissions 36. We heard evidence and submissions from Mr Parker in the hearing. 37. In his skeleton argument and at the hearing, Mr Parker made the following additional points: a. He argued that the “ building block ” information is held by the Council in an internal planning database called Uniform. The Council also has a database specifically for monitoring section 106 obligations which integrated with Uniform, but neither database is open for public inspection. He argues that a simple Structured Query Language query on these databases would take minutes to extract information and provide this in an Excel xlsx file. He states “ Not having the building block information in a document spreadsheet at the time of the request is not relevant; the information is held in a database which can be used to extract the building blocks to an xlsx file .” He further disputes the Council’s submission that it would take hours not minutes to extract that information and states that the spreadsheet created from that extraction is not new information. He concludes that “ because Uniform/Exacom holds this data electronically in indexable rows and columns, the Council possesses the native capability to export these fields to an Excel sheet in minutes ”, pointing to how another public authority has been able to do this. b. He argued that an alternative format cannot be used under Regulation 6(1)(b) if the alternative format degrades the data and strips it of its analytical utility. 38. He requested that the Tribunal make an order under Rule 15 requiring the Council to provide the list of Uniform/Exacom database headings and a statement regarding the ability for the extraction of information from that database to xlsx format from the Council in the interests of justice. He explains that this would independently verify that the software possesses automated export functions. He says that the Council’s claim of an administrative burden is legally unsustainable under Regulation 4(4)(a). a. He referred to another appeal he made on different grounds where the Upper Tribunal has granted permission to appeal. We note that this has not yet been determined by the Upper Tribunal, so it would be inappropriate for us to rely on the Appellant’s submissions in that connection as representing the current law. b. He relied on the case of Innes v Information Commissioner & Another [2014] EWCA Civ 1086 , in which he says that Mr Innes asked for information about examinations provided in an Excel xlsx file and the public authority provided this in a pdf format. The CA found that Mr Innes was entitled to receive the information in an Excel file under section 11 FOIA. c. He pointed to the IC’s guidance which he says explicitly confirms that using standard electronic tools to search, filter, or query a database does not constitute the creation of "new" information but is the extraction of information already held. d. He invited the Tribunal to find, based on Appendix 2 to his Grounds of Appeal setting out the searches he conducted to find the information, that the information is not reasonably accessible. e. He argued that the Decision Notice was wrong to conclude that a static PDF report or a series of historic planning links on a public website is a valid alternative format. He states “ A format cannot be considered 'accessible' if the process of putting it into that format actively degrades the information and strips it of its public utility. When the Appellant attempted to copy and paste the published SHLAA tables into Excel, the formatting collapsed entirely—the headings disconnected from the rows, and the columns collapsed .” This did not allow him to filter or query the data. He also argues that the public website “ contains only historical planning records up to the point it is approved; it completely lacks the live, dynamic compliance tracking data that the Appellant requested ”. f. He referred to “ the commissioner’s withdrawal of its paras 45 &46 [A12] claim that the information was easily accessible ”. g. He submitted that the Decision Notice “ is unlawful because the Commissioner took the Council's technical claims at face value (rubberstamp), completely failed to verify the accessibility of the portal, and misdirected himself into believing that a flat, column-collapsed PDF is a legally valid alternative to a structured data file by the misuse of a lower tribunal authority ”. h. He contended that the case of Craddock can be distinguished from the current case, because the Appellant asked for the raw information in xlsx format; the pdf is not the same as information held within the Uniform database. i. He argued that the Tribunal should place little weight on the Council’s submissions because it is not present to be cross examined on it. j. He argued that the Council is withholding the information requested because “ they know that a flat PDF prevents analysis ” and that disclosure of the live database tracking information from Uniform/Exacom “ will immediately expose that the current management has spent years failing to monitor or enforce legally binding developer obligations across the entire district .” He says the public interest in this is “ absolute ”. k. He disputed the IC’s position that the Aarhus Convention is not relevant. He states that in Innes the Court of Appeal found that he was entitled to the information in that format under Regulation 6. l. He stated that appeal is based on the argument that the IC made a factual error in conflating information with the SHLAA Document and as the oversight regulator failed to properly investigate the Council’s claim that the information was easily available on the Council’s webpages. m. When asked specifically about the Council’s assertion (OB 366) that the information being requested is compiled from various sources and not just databases, Mr Parker said that he expected any documents should be documented and published in the planning portal. He expected that information to be in the Council’s databases. n. When asked about the Innes case relating to FOIA rather than EIR, he said that he considered the position should be more stringent under EIR. Issues 39. As a preliminary point, we found that Ground 4 was not valid, because the IC found that there was a breach of Regulation 6(2) in the Decision Notice. The Appellant may not therefore appeal against this point, on which he succeeded in his complaint to the IC. The Appellant confirmed at the hearing that he no longer pursued this ground. 40. We find that Ground 1 is no longer pursued by the Appellant, as he no longer seeks to rely on the Word request and he confirmed this at the hearing. 41. The key issues for the Tribunal to determine are therefore: a. Was the IC correct to find that the requested information was already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant in another form or format, such that the Council was entitled to rely on regulation 6(1)(b) EIR (Ground 3); and / or b. Was the IC correct to find that it was reasonable for the Council to make the requested information available in another form or format, such that the Council was entitled to rely on regulation 6(1)(a) EIR (Grounds 2, 5 and 6). Discussion and conclusions Preliminary points 42. The Appellant raised in his skeleton and submissions a preliminary point which is that he submits the Tribunal must explain why it has refused the Appellant’s request for the Council and IC to be cross examined to explain the conflict in arguments about the ease of accessibility, the claim that it would take 34 hours to extract the information and the ability of the Council to extract information from its databases. We note that the Council declined to participate in the proceedings and that neither the Council nor the IC relied on the evidence of witnesses, so cross-examination would not have been permitted in any event had they attended the hearing. We note the Tribunal is entitled to consider all the evidence before it and it is a matter for the Tribunal to decide for itself what weight it should place on any particular evidence or submissions. 43. The Appellant also stated that he was seeking an order from the Tribunal under Rule 15 that the Council should be ordered to provide a list of Uniform/Exacom database headings and a statement regarding the ability for the extraction of information from that database to xlsx format. We explained at the hearing that Rule 15 is a procedural rule of the Tribunal which enables it to make certain directions as part of case management, alongside its powers in Rule 5. An order under Rule 15 is not a statutory remedy which the Tribunal can order under the EIR at the conclusion of an appeal and we do not consider it would be appropriate or proportionate to use this power to circumvent the usual process for requesting information from a public authority under the EIR. Scope of the request 44. We note that there is a long history of correspondence between the Appellant and the Council in relation to planning matters. We are concerned in this instance with the specific request dated 16 January 2025, not with other requests or appeals currently before this or other Tribunals, or with wider disputes between the parties. 45. We find as a matter of fact that the request was made under the EIR, because it comprised environmental information within the scope of Regulation 2. We find the request was for the raw data used to prepare the processed data set out in the tables comprised in Appendix 1 (Assessment of Large Site Commitments) of the SLAA for the years from 2020 to 2024. The Appellant specified a number of particular aspects of the raw data which he expected to be included. We find the Appellant wished this information to be provided in spreadsheet form (xlsx). 46. We find that the Appellant did not, as he suggested, on this occasion, request “disclosure of live database tracking information from Uniform/Exacom ”. This is because these databases were not mentioned in the request, or in the follow-up requests for review. The initial request mentioned metadata, but this can be produced when any document is created; it does not only apply to databases. Had the Appellant wished to make a request for the headings or other information from the databases, he could have made a separate request specifying this. 47. We found that on balance of probabilities the Council was correct to state that the information requested was not held in spreadsheets but compiled from a number of sources including Uniform/Public Access, correspondence with developers and the Council’s own site visits into an appraisal within the SHLAA document itself. There was no evidence to contradict this, despite Mr Parker’s assertion that it must all be held in a database or spreadsheet. 48. We find that the reason why the Council refused the request was, under Regulation 6(1)(b) that the information was already publicly available and easily accessible in another form or format. 49. Regulation 6(1) EIR requires that where an applicant requests information be made available in a particular form or format, the public authority shall make it so available, unless one of two conditions applies. We therefore find that the IC was correct to state that the duty to make the information available in the preferred format is not absolute. 50. The two conditions are either that it is reasonable for the authority to make the information available in another form or format or that the information is already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant in another format. There is no requirement for both conditions to be met. 51. The Appellant relied on the case of Innes in his oral and written submissions to the Tribunal to support his argument that he was entitled to request the information in xlsx form rather than pdf. We note that Innes was a case which concerned the provisions of section 11 of FOIA. These differ significantly from the provisions of Regulation 6, in that they provide that where the applicant expresses a preference for communication by certain means, the public authority shall, so far as reasonably practicable give effect to that preference. Such preferences may include the provision of copies of the information in permanent form or another form acceptable to the applicant, the provision of a digest or summary, or an opportunity to inspect a record containing the information. 52. In Innes , the Court of Appeal considered the difference between “format” and “form” and held in paragraph 38 that “ The starting-point is that it seems to me a natural use of English to describe the software format in which a copy (or digest) of the requested information is provided as an aspect of its “form”. ... Once it is accepted that an applicant can require provision of information in electronic form it seems to me only a small step to hold that he can also choose the format in which that electronic information is provided: the one naturally follows from the other. It is worth considering the case of information which will be embodied in text (i.e. rather than numbers): it would in such a case be rather unusual for an applicant to say “can I have it in e-format ?” rather than, say, “can I have it as a Word document ?”. It is true that a software format such as Excel is more than simply a means of presenting information: it enables the recipient of the information, if he or she himself has the appropriate software and licence, to do things with it. “ 53. It went on to say at paragraph 40: “ If an authority is asked to provide information in a software format in which it is not already held (or into which it cannot readily be converted 2 ) it would be entitled to seek to rely on the reasonable practicability qualification; I doubt if it was part of the purpose of the Act to oblige authorities to input information into a spreadsheet when it does not already exist in that form (though that was not of course the case here). The authority could likewise invoke the reasonable practicability qualification if the provision of information in the way sought would be inconsistent with the licence governing its use of particular software .” 54. However, we considered that in this instance that although the Appellant was entitled under Regulation 6(1) to specify that he wanted the information in a particular form or format, the Court of Appeal’s findings in Innes did not specify that the public authority would be obliged to provide it in that format under the EIR. The Upper Tribunal in Innes briefly considered the application of the EIR before concluding that it did not assist. The scope for a public authority to refuse provision of information in a particular format is different under EIR, in that there is no reasonable practicability threshold. Instead, to resist a request the authority must demonstrate either that it is already available and accessible or that it is not reasonable to provide it in the format requested. We therefore turn to consider the refusal of the request and whether either of the conditions in Regulation 6(1) is met. Was the IC correct to find that the requested information was already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant in another form or format, such that the Council was entitled to rely on regulation 6(1)(b) EIR? 55. It appears to be in dispute that the information requested was publicly available through the Council’s website and planning portal. In the hearing, Mr Parker took the Tribunal to the SHLAA annex 1 documents (pages B114, 194, 276) which he said he had downloaded from the Council’s website. He argued that because the later Annex 1s did not contain reference to the relevant planning applications or related documents, this meant that those documents were no longer available, through the portal or otherwise. 56. Against this, we weighed the Council’s response to the IC as to what was held. At page B366 it stated that the planning reference numbers were publicly available in the SHLAA document that the Council referenced. Mr Parker referred to a planning reference number from 2016 which he said did not appear on the SHLAA documents referred to in the request, so it appeared to us that he understood how to extract the planning reference numbers from the SHLAA. We also heard from Mr Parker in the hearing that he had downloaded earlier versions of the SHLAA appendix from the Council’s website, so he would have had access to the relevant references. The Council stated that the planning committee dates, appeal numbers and section 106 agreements were all available via the Public Access planning portal. 57. The Appellant also contends that the information was not “ easily accessible” , relying on the searches he needed to make to find the information set out in Appendix 2 of his Grounds of Appeal. 58. We find that the Council, when responding to the Appellant’s request, gave the following specific instructions as to how the requested material could be accessed through the public portal: “ The Planning Application numbers for all major housing developments (10 or more dwellings) are already included within the first column of the assessment contained in Appendix 1 of the SHLAA. Details of these planning applications, planning committees dates, appeal numbers (where relevant) and details of s.106 agreements are all in the public domain and available to view on our website via the following link… Please be advised that this information is accessible to you by undertaking a search using the application reference numbers noted within Appendix 1 of the SHLAA on pages 19-32.” 59. It is clear from the Appellant’s Appendix 2 statement that before following these instructions, he used a number of different searches, for example “ section 106 agreements ”. Steps 5 to 8 then broadly followed the Council’s instructions to search under the planning reference numbers identified in the SHLAA appendix. We find that the information which the Appellant sought was publicly available because it could be accessed through following the Council’s instructions on the Public Access portal, a public website. We find that it is easily accessible, because when those instructions are followed it is straightforward to access the information required. 60. The Appellant stated in his skeleton argument that the IC had withdrawn its reliance on paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Decision Notice, which stated that the IC had followed the links provided by the Council and was satisfied that the complainant was able to access the information that is publicly available, because in paragraph 26 of his response to the appeal, the IC stated that he had nothing to add to his consideration of the Council’s submissions set out in the Decision Notice. He also pointed to paragraph 34 of the Response, where the IC had invited the Tribunal to seek submissions from the Council. We disagreed with the Appellant’s interpretation of these paragraphs, because we have been unable to locate in the bundle any clear and unequivocal communication from the IC stating that he no longer intends to rely on these paragraphs in his Decision Notice and the Appellant was unable to direct us to any. Simply saying that the IC has nothing to add does not mean that he withdraws his previous reasoning for the decision; in our view it simply indicates that there is nothing further to add to his previous reasoning. 61. We find that the IC’s decision that the Council was entitled to rely on Regulation 6(1)(b) because the information was already publicly available and accessible to the Appellant in another form or format was in accordance with the law. 62. As we have found that section 6(1)(b) applies, there is no need for us to go on to consider whether Regulation 6(1)(a) also applies or the other grounds raised by Mr Parker. 63. The appeal is therefore dismissed.