1. These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaint against Creditlink Account Recovery Solutions Limited (“CRS”) regarding processing of his personal data and responding to his Data Subject Access Request (“DSAR”). The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on [date] and was dealt with under reference IC-500190-Y6Y7. 2. On 27 May 2026 the IC’s case officer wrote to the Applicant. The case officer explained that the complaint had been considered in accordance with the IC’s published framework, and having considered the material provided, the IC had decided not to conduct a further investigation into the complaint. However, a record of the complaint would be kept for information purposes. The case officer also informed the Applicant of the available options, including the ability to request a review of the outcome and the ability to issue court proceedings. 3. On 21 July 2026, the IC sent a further response to the Applicant advising that, having carefully reviewed all the information provided, the IC’s decision remained the same. It informed the Applicant that the IC had decided no further action was required at that time. It explained that the information provided did not indicate that further regulatory action was necessary at that stage or that there was a level of data protection risk that would justify further investigation. The IC informed the Applicant that although it would not be taking further action, it had recorded the concerns raised. The IC advised the Applicant of his options including taking his case to court and complaining to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). The Application 4. The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC3 dated 30 June 2026. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows: “ I would like the Tribunal to order the Commissioner to take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint .”. 5. In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated that a DSAR was made to a private company for processing his data without his explicit consent and he had complained to the IC. He stated that that, in particular, the IC: a. Failed to investigate the subject matter of the complaint under section 165(5) (a) DPA 2018; b. Failed to issue an Information Notice pursuant to section 142 of DPA 2018; c. Failed to issue an Assessment Notice pursuant to section 146 of DPA 2018; d. Failed to issue an Enforcement Notice pursuant to section 149 of DPA 2018; and e. Allowed the company in question to ignore its own Data Sharing Code of Practice. 6. The Applicant concluded “ I believe the Commissioner is failing to perform its duties as a supervisory body ”. The strike-out application 7. The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 22 July 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”). 8. The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 16 to 20. In summary, these were as follows: a. The IC accepts that his initial response to the Applicant’s complaint did not explain the reasons why the IC was taking no further action in respect of the Applicant’s complaint. However, the IC has since provided the Applicant with reasons for his decision in correspondence dated 21 July 2026. b. Further, the Applicant in section 5 of the Notice of Application states that in addition to his assertion that the IC had failed to properly investigate the complaint, the Applicant also sought the imposition of a number of regulatory notices under sections 142, 146, and 149 of the DPA18. However, this not permissible in respect of the present application, as the remedy afforded by section 166 of the DPA18, is confined to procedural issues concerning the IC’s handling of the complaint only. The only means to challenge such regulatory notices, if issued by the IC, would be a full merits appeal in accordance with section 162 of the DPA18. No such notice has been issued in this case, and therefore no statutory right of appeal. Nor can the Tribunal make any such order directing the Commissioner to issue notices, given the limits of the remedy provided under section 166 of the DPA18. c. Further, the Applicant’s reference to the Data Sharing Code of Practice is not relevant to the issues that the Tribunal has to consider for the purposes of the present application, given that this issue, as with the other matters raised by the Applicant, concern the substance of the IC’s decision, which the Tribunal cannot examine in respect of the present application, where an outcome, with full reasons for the IC’s decision, have now been provided. If the Applicant wishes to challenge the substance of the IC’s decision as suggested in the Notice of Application, this must be pursued by an application for judicial review in the Administrative Court (see Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) at [136]). d. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section 166(2) DPA18. 9. On 10 August 2026 I directed that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 25 August 2026 under Rule 8(4). 10. The Applicant provided a response to the strike-out application on 18 August 2026, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows: a. The IC had failed in its responsibilities in several different ways that warrant consideration: b. Despite the Applicant’s formal complaint, the IC did not take appropriate steps to investigate or initiate action against the company. This lack of action constitutes a failure to uphold the IC’s enforcement duties. c. The IC is obliged to investigate complaints concerning breaches of data protection rights. The IC did not initiate any appropriate investigation into the Applicant’s complaint or assess the private company’s actions. He stated “ This neglect undermines the ICO’s statutory duty to protect individuals’ data protection rights .” d. By failing to take action against the private company for failing to comply with the Applicant’s DSAR, the IC has not fulfilled its role as the regulatory authority responsible for enforcing compliance with data protection laws. e. The Applicant concluded by stating “I respectfully request that the tribunal considers the ICO’s inaction as a significant failure in their responsibilities and highlights a lack of support for individuals seeking to enforce their data protection rights. I believe that the circumstances warrant a full and fair examination of the case rather than a strike-out of my application .” Legal framework 11. Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: “Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.” 12. The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. 13. Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that: “(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c)inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.” 14. In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - " …It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals." 15. Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327 , paragraph 57 - " The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination... ”. 16. Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) – “ For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint .” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ). 17. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “ The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.” (paragraph 33). 18. The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) , noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I n considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.” 19. Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “ However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.” Discussion and conclusions 20. I have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing, noting that the Applicant stated in his form GRC3 that he wished the matter to be dealt with without a hearing “ as I believe this would save resources and the fact my DSAR was ignored shows disregard for GDPR and DPA 2018 ”. 21. While I recognise that the fair determination of this case is very important to the Applicant, I do not consider it an appropriate proportionate use of resources to require an oral hearing to determine the issue of strike-out. I note also that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing. 22. Turning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 27 May 2026 and a further response after review on 21 July 2026. 23. I am satisfied that, when taken together, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law. 24. It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint. In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken. 25. The Applicant criticises the IC for not having issued Information, Assessment or Enforcement Notices. The Tribunal has no power under section 166 to direct the IC to issue such notices. Its powers are limited to ordering the IC to progress its handling of the Applicant’s complaint. 26. The outcome sought by the Applicant is also, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision. In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also consider that that orders for compliance from a data controller need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought. 27. Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcomes sought by the Applicant are not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant. 28. The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.