Pulse · Documents · United Kingdom · Courts of England and Wales

Jonathan Kennaugh v The Commissioners for HMRC

court decision 2026-10-19 14 457 characters Personal data
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Current version. Last change recorded on 2026-10-21.

Introduction

1.This appeal concerns an application by The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) to strike out the Appellant’s appeal.

2.HMRC seeks strike out on two grounds. First, HMRC contends that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to any aspect of the appeal and that the appeal must therefore be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Tribunal Rules”). Secondly, and in the alternative, HMRC contends that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and should be struck out pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c) of the Tribunal Rules.

3.The appeal arises from a simple assessment issued pursuant to section 28 H of the Taxes Management Act 1970 in respect of the tax year ended 5 April 2024. HMRC’s case is that the Appellant does not dispute either the validity of the assessment or the correctness of the amount assessed but instead advances complaints concerning HMRC’s conduct, administration and handling of his affairs. HMRC contends that such matters fall outside the Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction.

Relevant law

4.Rule 8(2) of the Tribunal Rules provides, so far as material:

“The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal:

(a)

does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and (b)

does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.”

5.Rule 8(3)(c) provides that the Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if:

“the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.”

6.Rule 8(4) provides that the Tribunal may not strike out proceedings under Rule 8(2) or Rule 8(3)(c) without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out.

7.The appeal concerns a simple assessment issued pursuant to section 28 H of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”). Rights of appeal against such an assessment are conferred by sections 31 and 49D TMA. The powers of the Tribunal on such an appeal are contained in section 50 TMA.

8.Section 50(6)(c) TMA provides that if the Tribunal decides that an appellant has been overcharged by an assessment, the assessment shall be reduced accordingly but otherwise shall stand good. Section 50(7)(c) provides that if the Tribunal decides that the appellant has been undercharged, the assessment shall be increased accordingly.

9.It is well established that the jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal is derived exclusively from statute. The Tribunal possesses no inherent jurisdiction and may exercise only those powers conferred by Parliament.

10.In Aspin v Estill (Inspector of Taxes)

[1987] STC 723 (“ Aspin ”) the taxpayer contended that although the relevant tax was legally due, he had relied upon incorrect advice given by the Inland Revenue and that it was unfair to enforce the resulting liability. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument. Nicholls LJ explained the distinction in the following terms:

“What he is saying is that, because of some further facts, it would be oppressive to enforce that liability. That is a matter in respect of which, if the facts are as alleged by Mr Aspin, the remedy provided is by way of judicial review.”

11.In the same case, the Master of the Rolls held that the function of the tax appeal body was to determine whether the assessment had been correctly made in accordance with the taxing statutes and not to exercise any form of judicial review jurisdiction. He concluded that if the taxpayer had any remedy arising from the alleged incorrect advice, “ it must lie in the judicial review route ”.

12.The limits of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction were subsequently considered by the Upper Tribunal in HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Hok Ltd

[2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) (“ Hok ”). The Upper Tribunal emphasised that the Tribunal is a creature of statute and that its jurisdiction is derived wholly from statute. It held that the Tribunal has no general power to override statutory liabilities or to supervise HMRC’s conduct on grounds of fairness.

13.The Upper Tribunal concluded that the Tribunal does not possess:

“a power to override a statute or supervise HMRC’s conduct.”

14.The reasoning in Hok was subsequently endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme v Revenue and Customs Commissioners

[2015] EWCA Civ 713 (“ BT Pension Scheme ”). The Court held that the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the First-tier Tribunal does not extend to what are, in substance, public law challenges concerning fairness of treatment. It stated:

“The statutory jurisdiction conferred upon the FtT ... is in our view to be read as exclusive and the closure notice appeals ... do not extend to what are essentially parallel common law challenges to the fairness of the treatment afforded to the taxpayer.”

15.As regards Rule 8(3)(c), the applicable principles were summarised by the Upper Tribunal in First De Sales Ltd Partnership v The Commissioners for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

[2018] UKUT 396 (TCC) . The question is whether the appellant’s case has a realistic, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success. The case must carry some degree of conviction and be more than merely arguable. The Tribunal must not conduct a mini-trial but is not required to accept assertions at face value, particularly where contradicted by contemporaneous documents. Consideration should be given both to the evidence currently available and to the evidence reasonably expected to be available at a hearing. A final determination should not be made where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a fuller investigation of the facts may materially affect the outcome.

16.Where a strike-out application raises a jurisdictional issue, the Tribunal must determine whether jurisdiction exists. The question is one of law and cannot be avoided by concluding merely that there is an arguable case on jurisdiction.

Background

17.On 3 November 2024, HMRC issued a Simple Assessment under section 28 H of the TMA in the amount of £5,831.22 for the tax year ended 5 April 2024. The assessment followed HMRC’s reconciliation of the Appellant’s PAYE records for that year. HMRC considered that insufficient tax had been collected through PAYE and that the resulting underpayment should be recovered by way of a Simple Assessment.

18.The underpayment arose from events occurring during the 2023/24 tax year. HMRC’s position is that the Appellant received a tax refund through PAYE after an incorrect amount of previous pay and tax was reported to a new employer. HMRC subsequently corrected the tax code. However, by that stage a refund had already been made and sufficient tax was not thereafter deducted to eliminate the resulting shortfall. HMRC concluded that the correct amount of tax due for the year exceeded the tax collected through PAYE by £5,831.22.

19.On 14 July 2025, the Appellant contacted HMRC and indicated that he intended to submit an appeal in writing. HMRC treated that communication as a query and responded on 15 July 2025. The Appellant’s written appeal was received by HMRC on 21 July 2025.

20.By letter dated 15 September 2025, received by HMRC on 19 September 2025, the Appellant requested a review. HMRC subsequently issued a view of the matter letter on 17 October 2025. The review period commenced on that date. The review was later extended by agreement until 6 February 2026.

21.On 4 February 2026 HMRC issued its review conclusion. HMRC upheld the Simple Assessment in full. HMRC concluded that the assessment had been validly issued under section 28 H TMA and that the assessed amount represented tax which had not been collected through PAYE. HMRC also stated that the refusal of Extra-Statutory Concession A19 was not an appealable matter and fell outside the scope of the review.

22.In the course of the review the Appellant raised a number of additional concerns regarding HMRC’s handling of his affairs. These included allegations of administrative errors over a number of years, complaints handling failures, financial hardship, emotional distress and a request for disclosure of personal data held by HMRC. HMRC stated that those matters fell outside the scope of the review of the Simple Assessment. HMRC referred the Appellant’s request for personal data to its Information Rights Unit.

23.Following the review conclusion, the Appellant notified his appeal to the Tribunal. In his Notice of Appeal and subsequent correspondence he contends, amongst other matters, that HMRC made repeated administrative errors, provided incorrect information, failed properly to deal with his complaints, mishandled his subject access request and failed to comply with applicable data protection requirements. He further states that HMRC’s actions caused him financial and emotional distress and that it is unfair for him now to be required to pay the amount assessed.

Discussion

24.The issue raised by HMRC’s application is whether the grounds advanced by the Appellant fall within the Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction on an appeal against a Simple Assessment. It is not necessary for present purposes to determine the Appellant’s complaints concerning HMRC’s administration of his tax affairs.

25.In determining that question I have considered the Notice of Appeal together with the Appellant’s subsequent correspondence. Read fairly and as a whole, the Appellant’s case is that HMRC made repeated errors in the administration of his tax affairs over a number of years, provided incorrect information, mishandled aspects of his case, failed properly to deal with his complaints and subject access request and caused him financial and emotional distress. He maintains that it is unfair that he should now be required to pay the amount assessed.

26.What is notably absent, however, is any challenge to the correctness of the Simple Assessment itself. The Appellant does not contend that HMRC has overstated his income for the year ended 5 April 2024. He does not challenge the allowances or reliefs taken into account. He does not identify any arithmetic error in the calculation of the tax due. Nor does he dispute HMRC’s central conclusion that insufficient tax was collected through PAYE during the relevant tax year.

27.The distinction is important. The authorities establish that an appeal against an assessment concerns the correctness of the assessment under the taxing statutes. The Tribunal’s task is to determine whether the assessed amount is the amount properly due as a matter of law.

28.In Aspin the taxpayer accepted that the tax was legally due but contended that it would be unfair or oppressive to enforce the liability because he had relied upon incorrect advice provided by the Inland Revenue. The Court of Appeal held that such matters did not fall within the statutory appellate jurisdiction. The taxpayer’s complaint was not that the liability was wrong in law but that there were other circumstances which made it unfair to enforce. The Court held that any remedy in respect of such matters lay, if at all, elsewhere.

29.The same distinction underlies the subsequent authorities. In Hok , the Upper Tribunal confirmed that this Tribunal does not possess a general supervisory jurisdiction over HMRC and has no power to override statutory liabilities because HMRC is said to have acted unfairly. In BT Pension Scheme the Court of Appeal likewise emphasised that the statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not extend to what are, in substance, public law challenges concerning the fairness of HMRC’s conduct.

30.Applying those principles, I conclude that the matters advanced by the Appellant fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Complaints concerning administrative errors, complaint handling, delay, subject access requests, alleged data protection breaches, hardship and emotional distress do not bear upon the correctness of the Simple Assessment. None of those matters, whether individually or collectively, would permit the Tribunal to reduce or discharge a liability otherwise due under the taxing legislation.

31.The Appellant’s case is, in substance, that HMRC’s conduct has been such that it is unfair for HMRC now to seek payment of the assessed amount. That is not an issue which this Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine on an appeal against a Simple Assessment.

32.I therefore conclude that none of the grounds advanced by the Appellant falls within the Tribunal’s statutory jurisdiction. It follows that the condition in Rule 8(2)(a) is satisfied. In those circumstances the Tribunal has no discretion. The appeal must be struck out.

33.In light of that conclusion it is unnecessary to deal separately and at length with HMRC’s alternative application under Rule 8(3)(c). However, had it been necessary to do so, I would likewise have concluded that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. The grounds advanced by the Appellant are directed to matters which fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and are therefore incapable of resulting in the Simple Assessment being reduced or set aside. The same conclusion would follow under Rule 8(3)(c).

Decision

34.For the reasons set out above, I conclude that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to the grounds advanced by the Appellant in support of his appeal.

35.Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Rules, the appeal is struck out.

36.In light of that conclusion it is unnecessary to determine HMRC’s alternative application under Rule 8(3)(c).

Right to apply for permission to appeal

37.This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date: 19 th OCTOBER 2026