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YIR v YIS, [2026] SGHCF 31
In the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore [2026] SGHCF 31 Divorce (Transferred) No 1100 of 2024 Between YIR … Plaintiff
And
YIS
…
Defendant judgment
[Family Law — Matrimonial assets — Division — Whether an adverse inference should be drawn — Quantification and uplift approaches]
[Family Law — Maintenance — Child]
This judgment is subject to final editorial corrections approved by the court and/or redaction pursuant to the publisher’s duty in compliance with the law, for publication in LawNet and/or the Singapore Law Reports.
YIR v YIS
[2026] SGHCF 31
General Division of the High Court (Family Division) — Divorce (Transferred) No 1100 of 2024
Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J
27 August 2026
16 September 2026 Judgment reserved.
Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi J:
Introduction
1 HCF/DT 1100/2024 (“DT 1100”) was commenced by YIR (“Wife”) on 8 March 2024.
1×
Writ for Divorce.
She is 38 years old this year.
2×
Joint Summary dated 6 February 2026 (“JS”), Section 1 (S/N 1), at p 2.
The defendant is YIS (“Husband”). He is 42 years old this year.
3×
Ibid .
2 Parties were married on 11 June 2016 in Singapore.
4×
Statement of Particulars at para 1(a).
There is one child to the marriage, born in 2016 (“Child”). The Child, now 10 years old,
5×
JS, Section 2 (S/N 2), at p 4.
is a Primary 4 student. Pursuant to a consent order,
6×
FC/ORC 3748/2024.
joint custody of the Child was granted to parties, while sole care and control was granted to the Wife with liberal access to the Husband. 3 Interim judgment was granted on an uncontested basis, by reason of the Husband’s unreasonable behaviour, on 29 April 2024 (“IJ”).
7×
Interim Judgment dated 29 April 2024, at Plaintiff Wife’s Core Bundle (“PCB”) Tab 1.
The marriage thus lasted nearly eight years. The matrimonial home was a condominium at [address redacted] (“Matrimonial Home”). The Wife and the Child moved out of the Matrimonial Home in February 2024.
8×
Plaintiff Wife’s Written Submissions dated 23 December 2025 (“PWS”) at para 17.
The Matrimonial Home, which was purchased and held in the Husband’s sole name, has since been sold by the Husband.
9×
PWS at para 19.
4 The Wife earns approximately $11,000 a month before tax and Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) deductions.
10×
PAM-1 at p 96.
The Husband claims that he is unemployed and that he last earned approximately $6,000 a month, though this is disputed by the Wife.
11×
JS, Section 1 (S/N 1), at p 2.
5 Parties filed a joint summary on 6 February 2026 (“Joint Summary”) setting out their respective positions as at 21 January 2026 on the contested issues in this case. For consistency, I adopt the abbreviations set out in the Joint Summary for the affidavits filed. The following table sets out the affidavits filed by parties and the respective abbreviations:
Plaintiff Wife
Defendant Husband
Affidavit of Assets and Means filed 2 October 2024 (“PAM-1”)
Affidavit of Assets and Means filed 2 October 2024 (“DAM-1”)
Affidavit in support of FC/SUM 200/2025 (Discovery & Interrogatories) (“SUM 200”) filed 27 January 2025 (“PA-1”)
Affidavit in reply to PA-1 filed 25 February 2025 (“DA-1”)
Affidavit in reply to DA-1 filed 18 March 2025 (“PA-2”)
Compliance affidavit filed 13 June 2025 (“DA-2”)
Affidavit in support of FC/SUM 1422/2025 (Riddick Principle) (“SUM 1422”) filed 24 June 2025 (“PRA-1”)
Affidavit in reply to PRA-1 filed 24 June 2025 (“DRA-1”)
2nd Ancillary Matters Affidavit filed 23 July 2025 (“PAM-2”)
2nd Ancillary Matters Affidavit filed 28 July 2025 (“DAM-2”)
Final affidavit in reply to DRA-1 filed 8 August 2025 (“PRA-2”)
Affidavit in support of FC/SUM 1963/2025 (Leave application) (“SUM 1963”) filed 25 August 2025 (“PLA-1”)
Supplemental affidavit for SUM 1963 enclosing revised expert affidavit filed 15 September 2025 (“PLA-2”)
3rd Ancillary Matters Affidavit filed 15 September 2025 (“PAM-3”)
Affidavit of Mr Lin Yun Heng (Wife’s expert witness) filed 8 October 2025 (“LYH-1”)
Supplemental affidavit for FC/SUM 872/2026 (Leave application) (“SUM 872”) filed 16 April 2026 (“DLA-1”)
Further affidavit pursuant to FC/ORC 1996/2026 (“ORC 1996”) filed 10 July 2026 (“DLA-2”)
6 It should be noted that a discovery order was made against the Husband on 9 May 2025 (FC/ORC 1947/2025, the “Discovery Order”), directing him to disclose inter alia
“all financial statements (including but not limited to balance sheets and profit and loss statements) for all companies which he is or was a director and/or shareholder of in the past 3 financial years, in Singapore or worldwide” and “full monthly bank account statements” of the same companies.
12×
S/N 6 and 7 of FC/ORC 1947/2025 (PCB at p 33).
7 In response to the Discovery Order, the Husband filed an affidavit, DA-2. He did disclose some financial statements and bank statements, but for the most part, he has simply asserted that the documents are “not in his possession, custody or power”. The summary of his responses to the Discovery Order can be found in DA-2 at para 7. His various assertions that the documents are not in his possession, custody or power are disputed by the Wife.
8 The contested issues in DT 1100 concern the division of matrimonial assets and maintenance for the Child. I address first the division of matrimonial assets.
Division of matrimonial assets
The applicable law
9 The starting point is s 112(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (“WC”), which empowers the court to divide matrimonial assets in a “just and equitable” fashion, in light of all the relevant circumstances including the non-exhaustive factors set out in s 112(2) WC.
10 Matrimonial assets are identified as at the date of the IJ and valued on the date closest to the Ancillary Matters (“AM”) hearing, except for monies in bank accounts and CPF accounts which are identified and valued as at the date of the IJ:
CVC v CVB
[2023] SGHC(A) 28 at [55].
Summary of parties’ position
11 I summarise in the table below the parties’ respective positions on the value of the matrimonial assets.
Husband
Wife
Joint assets
13×
JS, Section 3(a), at p 5.
NIL
NIL Husband’s assets
14×
JS at p 34.
-$2,372,017.66 $8,039,970.51 Wife’s assets
15×
JS at p 47.
$698,391.00 $125,090.69 Total value -$1,673,626.66 $8,165,061.20
16×
PWS at para 29.
12 It is not disputed that this was a dual-income marriage. As such, the structured approach in ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043 (“ ANJ v ANK ”)
should apply.
17×
PWS at para 26; DWS at para 4.
The Husband contends that the matrimonial assets should be divided in the ratio of 90:10 in his favour.
18×
JS, Section 3(f), at p 67.
The Wife contends that the division should be in the ratio of 48:52 in the Husband’s favour.
19×
PWS at para 22.
Identification and valuation
13 In this section, I deal only with those assets which are shown in the Joint Summary to be disputed. Most of the assets in this case are in fact disputed. For those assets that appear from the Joint Summary to be undisputed, I adopt the position shown in the Joint Summary. I also omit discussing assets which are agreed between parties to be valued at $0.
14 Where it is disputed whether an asset should be included in the matrimonial pool, the burden of proof is that set out by the Court of Appeal in USB v USA
[2020] 2 SLR 588, at [31]:
When a marriage is dissolved, in general all the parties’ assets will be treated as matrimonial assets unless a party is able to prove that any particular asset was either not acquired during the marriage or was acquired through gift or inheritance and is therefore not a matrimonial asset. The party who asserts that an asset is not a matrimonial asset or that only a part of its value should be included in the pool bears the burden of proving this on the balance of probabilities.
Where the very existence of the asset is disputed, it is for the asserting spouse to prove the existence and ownership of the asset.
S/N 1 – Mercedes Benz G350D AMG Line 4Matic
15 The Husband takes the position that this vehicle should not be included in the matrimonial pool because according to him, it is registered in the name of a company (which I will refer to as “ADS VG”) and does not belong to him.
20×
DWS at para 26.
He also claims that as the vehicle is subject to a hire-purchase agreement with a substantial outstanding redemption sum that outstrips the market value of the vehicle, there is no “equity capable of division”.
21×
DWS at paras 27–29.
16 The Wife acknowledges that this vehicle is currently registered to ADS VG, but submits that the value of this vehicle – which she puts at $428,888 – should be added back to the matrimonial pool. The Wife highlights that the vehicle was transferred by the Husband to ADS VG on 24 April 2023 – ie after the marriage started to break down (according to the Wife).
17 I accept the Wife’s submission that notwithstanding the transfer of the vehicle to ADS VG, the value of this vehicle should be added back to the matrimonial pool. As the Wife has pointed out, there is no evidence of ADS VG having given any consideration for the transfer of this vehicle; nor is the vehicle listed as one of the company’s assets in its financial statements. In the meantime, the Husband continues to pay personally for expenses related to the vehicle.
22×
PWS at paras 31–34.
18 As for the value to be ascribed to the vehicle, the Wife has not addressed the Husband’s submission on the outstanding vehicle loan liability. The Wife’s valuation of this vehicle is based on its resale value, without taking into account the outstanding vehicle loan. In my view, it is not correct to ignore the outstanding loan liability when valuing the vehicle. The Husband has tendered evidence that the original loan amount was $264,000.
23×
DA-2 at p 1003.
The latest evidence he provides shows that there is an outstanding liability of $189,004.99.
24×
DLA-1 at paras 32 and 34; DLA-2 at p 8.
Deducting the outstanding loan liability of $189,004.99 from $428,888, I find that the net value of this vehicle should be $239,883.01; and I add this figure to the matrimonial pool. S/N 2 – 100% shareholding in NPL 19 Generally, in respect of the companies in which he holds shares, the Husband accepts that these companies exist but claims that they have no value and that they should be accounted for as a liability instead. This is premised on his assertion that these companies are (a) dormant; or (b) subject to court enforcement proceedings; or (c) exposed to “liabilities” rather than holding positive net value.
25×
DWS at paras 21–25.
20 In respect of his shareholding in this company (which I will refer to as “NPL”), the Husband has previously deposed that his 10,000 shares are worth $10,000 (as at September 2024) in his affidavit (DAM-1).
26×
DAM-1 at para 8 (S/N 1).
In the Joint Summary, however, the Husband now claims that NPL is facing a claim in HC/OC 479/2022 for $1,285,486.61, and that given the ongoing proceedings, “it would be speculative and unsafe to ascribe any positive value to the company at this stage”.
27×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 2) at pp 9–10.
In DLA-1, the Husband appears to take a different position again: he has adduced a settlement agreement between the claimant in HC/OC 479/2022 and NPL, in which it was agreed that NPL is to pay $400,000 to the claimant.
28×
DLA-1 at pp 52–55.
Critically, though, this settlement agreement is dated 7 June 2023, which is more than one year before the Husband filed DAM-1 with the assertion that his 10,000 shares are worth $10,000. Furthermore, the Husband’s assertion in the Joint Summary that NPL is presently still facing a claim is patently false
, since the claim was settled on 7 June 2023, according to the settlement agreement which he himself adduced.
21 The Wife, for her part, has not disputed the Husband’s previous bare assertion in his affidavit (DAM-1) that his shares in NPL are worth $10,000, but argues that an adverse inference should be drawn against him for his failure to comply with the Discovery Order which required him to disclose various documents such as the bank account statements and financial statements of his companies (see [6]–[7] above).
29×
PWS at para 37(a).
22 At the hearing before me, when asked whether there was any objective documentary evidence to support his claim that NPL is no longer operating as a company, the Husband could only point me to a “Declaration Statement” dated 16 May 2025.
30×
NE (27 August 2026), p 25 (line 15) to p 27 (line 20).
This is an unsigned document, albeit purportedly bearing NPL’s company stamp, which simply states that NPL “has never commenced any business operations since its incorporation”.
31×
DA-2 at p 75.
Given that the Husband’s own case in DLA-1 is that NPL faced a claim in HC/OC 479/2022 which was settled by way of NPL paying the claimant $400,000, I do not consider this declaration statement to be credible evidence.
23 In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s proposed approach in respect of the NPL shares: namely, that minimally
, $10,000 should be added to the matrimonial pool to reflect the value which the Husband has admitted in his affidavit, subject to further adverse inferences to be drawn on account of his failure to comply with the order for disclosure of the company’s bank statements and financial statements. I address the Wife’s submission for adverse inference at [141]–[147] below.
S/N 3 – 100% shareholding in AVGMPL
24 In respect of his shareholding in this company (which I will refer to as “AVGMPL”), the Husband has previously deposed in his affidavit (DAM-1) that his 100 shares are worth $100.
32×
DAM-1 at para 8 (S/N 2).
In the Joint Summary, however, the Husband purports to value the AVGMPL shares at $345.12, while claiming that this company – like all the other companies in which he holds shares – is “dormant, loss-making, or subject to liabilities and enforcement exposure”; that there is “[n]o positive realisable value”; and that it is “[n]ot admitted as matrimonial asset”.
33×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 3), at pp 10–12.
The Wife, for her part, adopts the same approach which she proposed for the NPL shares (at [21] above).
25 As with the NPL shares, the Husband has again failed to produce any objective evidence to support his assertion about the lack of any positive value to be attributed to his AVGMPL shares. Subject to adverse inferences being drawn, I accept the Wife’s proposed approach: namely, that minimally
, $345.12 should be added to the matrimonial pool to reflect the value which the Husband is now admitting to in the Joint Summary. I address the Wife’s submission for adverse inference at [141]–[147] below.
S/N 4 – 100% shareholding in FPL
26 Pursuant to the Discovery Order, the Husband disclosed the financial statement of this company (which I will refer to as “FPL”) for the year ending 31 December 2022.
34×
DA-2 at p 5 (S/N 6).
The Husband claims that the company became “dormant” thereafter and that he does not have the other financial statements in his possession, custody or power. In the Joint Summary, the Husband maintains that the company has been “dormant since 2022”.
35×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 4) at pp 12–13.
27 Relying on the financial statement for the year ending 31 December 2022 of the company (which was disclosed by the Husband), the Wife takes the company’s net assets of $970,085 as the value of the Husband’s 100% shareholding. Additionally, the Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of the Husband’s non-compliance with the Discovery Order.
36×
PWS at para 37(c).
28 I address the Wife’s submission for an adverse inference at [141]–[147] below. For now, I note that the Husband has provided no credible evidence to support his allegation that the company has been “dormant since 2022”. In DLA-1, the Husband adduced a “Declaration Statement” which, like the NPL declaration statement, is an unsigned document (albeit purportedly affixed with FPL’s company stamp).
37×
DLA-1 at p 21.
The Husband also adduced a letter from the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (“IRAS”) approving an application for waiver of filing of FPL’s Income Tax Return with effect from Year of Assessment (“YA”) 2026.
38×
DLA-1 at pp 22–23.
Notably, however, the approval letter from IRAS stated that “[b]ased on the declaration that [FPL] has not carried out any business activities since
31 Dec 2024
, … [IRAS] have approved the application for waiver”. In other words, the Husband declared to IRAS that FPL has been dormant from 31 December 2024
, which is inconsistent with his own case that FPL has been dormant from 31 December 2022
. The Husband thus has no evidence to support his allegation that FPL has been “dormant since 2022”.
29 Further, and in any event, even if the company has become “dormant” (in the sense that it no longer operates actively), that does not explain why a $0 value should be ascribed to the company. In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that FPL (and in turn the Husband’s 100% shareholding in the company) should be valued using the 2022 financial statements. The Husband’s shares are thus valued at $970,085.
S/N 5 – 100% shareholding in ADS VG
30 As explained at [15] above, the Husband’s case is that ADS VG owns the Mercedes Benz G350D; and to this end, he has included the value of the Mercedes Benz G350D as the company’s asset in the Joint Summary. However, he then claims that a negative value should be attributed to his shareholding in ADS VG because according to him, the company faces multiple lawsuits, such that its liabilities outstrip its assets.
39×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 5) at pp 13–15.
In this connection, the Husband has mentioned HC/OC 810/2023 and DC/OC 1547/2025, but provided no evidence otherwise to assist the court. From his affidavits adduced, I can see that, in relation to DC/OC 1547/2025, there is an enforcement order obtained by the claimant on 23 October 2025.
40×
DLA-1 at pp 43–47.
However, the Husband has not provided any further evidence on the status of the case, despite his DLA-1 having been filed six months after the enforcement order was obtained. There is no evidence, for example, of whether ADS VG filed a notice of objection, and similarly no documentary evidence of the attachment of ADS VG’s Maybank account. Likewise, in relation to HC/OC 810/2023, the Husband produced a default judgment which was entered against ADS VG for failing to file a notice of intention to contest.
41×
DLA-1 at pp 48–51.
This default judgment was dated 11 December 2023. Further, even leaving aside the sore lack of details of the status of this suit and even if the Husband’s case were to be accepted, the liability in question was incurred well before the preparation of the company’s statement of financial position as at 31 December 2024. However, the company’s statement of financial position did not include any provision for the alleged liability arising from HC/OC 810/2023, and instead showed the net current assets of the company to be $18,369.
42×
Tab 11 of PCB.
31 In the circumstances, I find that the Husband has not proven the alleged liabilities he attributes to ADS VG. 32 The Wife relies on the company’s statement of financial position as at 31 December 2024 to value the Husband’s 100% shareholding at $18,369.
43×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 5), at p 13; Tab 11 of PCB.
The Husband has argued that to simultaneously include the value of ADS VG and the Mercedes Benz in the matrimonial pool would amount to double counting, because – according to him – the value of the vehicle has already been accounted for in his valuation of his ADS VG shareholding.
44×
DLA-1 at para 33.
I reject the Husband’s argument, as there is simply no factual basis for it: there is no evidence that the value of the Mercedes Benz was included in the ADS VG financial statement disclosed by him.
45×
Tab 11 of PCB.
In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s valuation of the Husband’s ADS VG shareholding at $18,369. S/N 7 – Bank of China multi CCY (account no. ending -9941) 33 The Husband values this bank account at $238.29 based on his account balance on 25 November 2025, while the Wife values it at $227.82 as at 29 April 2024.
46×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 7), at p 17.
I accept the Wife’s valuation, as there is no reason shown for departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ ( ie , 29 April 2024). S/N 8 – CIMB Fastsaver (account no. ending -4265) 34 In the Joint Summary, the Husband has given no input for this item. The Wife values this at $1,028.83 as at 29 April 2024, based on the bank account statement.
47×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 8), at p 17; Tab 13 of PCB.
I accept the Wife’s valuation. S/N 11 – Citibank Citi Wealth First (account no. ending -8824) 35 The Husband values this bank account ("Citi 8824") at $193.47 as at 25 November 2025, but gives no reason to justify departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ.
48×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 11), at p 17.
I therefore accept the Wife’s valuation of $314,599.39 as at 29 April 2024 ( ie , the date of IJ), which is based on the bank account statement.
49×
Tab 16 of PCB.
S/N 15 – Standard Chartered Bonus$aver (account no. ending -3884) 36 The Husband values this bank account at $10.20 as at 25 November 2025, but again gives no reason to justify departing from the default position that monies in bank accounts are valued as at the date of IJ.
50×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 15), at p 18.
Based on the bank account statement, I accept the Wife’s valuation of $113.86 as at 29 April 2024.
51×
Tab 18 of PCB.
S/N 20–25 37 In relation to the items listed at S/N 20 to 25 of the Joint Summary, the Husband denies, in the Joint Summary, owning these items and the Carousell account (@l[redacted])
52×
Tab 19 of PCB.
listing these items, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings.
53×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 20–25), at pp 19–21.
However, these items and the Carousell account (@l[redacted]) were disclosed by the Husband himself in his DAM-1.
54×
DAM-1 at paras 3 and 12.
Therefore, I accept the Wife’s valuation of the following items, which is based on the Husband’s own admission, and I add them to the matrimonial pool:
(a) S/N 20 – Goyard L'Alpin leather backpack: $6,500;
(b) S/N 21 – Bottega Veneta brown medium classic intrecciato briefcase: $1,500;
(c) S/N 22 – Goyard brown pouch: $2,000;
(d) S/N 23 – Christian Louboutin leather clutch bag: $800;
(e) S/N 24 – Fendi monster leather clutch bag: $600; and
(f) S/N 25 – Bottega Veneta wallet: $400.
S/N 26–30
38 S/N 26 to 30 of the Joint Summary are distinguished from S/N 20 to 25, in that S/N 20 to 25 were disclosed by the Husband himself in his affidavit DAM-1, whereas the items listed at S/N 26 to 30 have not been disclosed by the Husband in any of his affidavits. Instead, it is the Wife who brought up the items listed at S/N 26 to 30 of the Joint Summary and who submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband for his failure to disclose these assets. The Wife further submits that pursuant to such an adverse inference, the “quantification approach” in UZN v UZM
[2021] 1 SLR 426 (“
UZN v UZM
”) should be adopted so as to add the values of these assets back into the matrimonial pool.
55×
PWS at para 39.
39 For an adverse inference to be drawn, there must first be a substratum of evidence that establishes a prima facie case against the person against whom the adverse inference is to be drawn; and that person must moreover have had some particular access to the information he is said to be hiding:
UZN v UZM at [18]–[21]. The Court of Appeal explained that the first element relates to a “prima facie case of concealment” (at [19]). The Court of Appeal also explained that where the value of the concealed asset is known or its likely value can be assessed, the quantification approach should be adopted such that the known value of the asset is added back into the matrimonial pool (at [28]–[30]).
S/N 26 – Patek Philippe 5764R
40 In her affidavit PA-1, the Wife asserts that the Husband owns this Patek Philippe 5764R.
56×
PA-1 at para 27(24(b)), at p 28.
The Husband’s response is not that he does not own this watch but that he has disposed of the documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch.
57×
DA-1 at paras 56–59.
The Husband’s evidence is thus left unsatisfactorily vague – and in my view, deliberately so. Given that this watch is indisputably an expensive luxury item, I find it inconceivable that the Husband has retained no documents at all in relation to his possession and disposal of this watch. I therefore accept the Wife’s submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband and that the value of the watch should be added to the matrimonial pool. 41 The Wife relies on the listing on Carousell account (@j[redacted]) to submit that the watch should be valued at $218,800. The Husband denies owning this Carousell account, again claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings.
58×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 26), at p 21.
I do not find his claim believable. As seen from my findings at [37] above, despite alleging that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]), items of value which he has disclosed in his own affidavit DAM-1 have been found listed on another Carousell account (@l[redacted]).
42 In the circumstances, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of showing that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of S/N 26. I also accept her submission that pursuant to the drawing of this adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the value of this item to the matrimonial pool. I add that even if it were assumed that the Carousell account (@j[redacted]) does not belong to the Husband, the Carousell listing is still relevant and useful evidence of the value of the watch. I therefore accept the Wife’s valuation of $218,800 for the Patek Philippe 5764R and add this figure to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 27 – Richard Mille 010
43 As with S/N 26 above, the Wife has asserted in PA-1 that the Husband owns the Richard Mille 010 watch listed at S/N 27.
59×
PA-1 at para 27(24(a)), at p 28.
The Husband’s response is the same – ie , he does not state positively that he does not own this watch but claims instead that he has disposed of the documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch.
60×
DA-1 at paras 56–59.
I repeat the observations I made at [40] above in respect of the Patek Philippe watch. For the same reasons, I find that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband and that the value of this Richard Mille 010 watch should be added to the matrimonial pool. 44 The Wife relies on the listing on Carousell account (@j[redacted]) to submit that the watch should be valued at $215,000.
61×
PWS at para 39 (S/N 2 of the table thereat).
The Husband again denies owning the Carousell account listing this item, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings.
62×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 27), at p 21.
In this connection, I repeat my observation at [41] above; and for the same reasons explained above, I add the value of $215,000 to the matrimonial pool. S/N 28 – Rolex GMT Master 45 The Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that the Husband owns the Rolex GMT Master watch listed at S/N 28, based on a photograph she has adduced, showing him wearing this watch.
63×
Tab 24 of PCB.
In reliance on the listing of this item on Carousell account (@j[redacted]), she submits that the value of $49,000 (as per the listing) should be added to the matrimonial pool.
64×
PWS at para 39 (S/N 3 of the table thereat).
Again, the Husband’s response is that he does not have documents relating to the purchase or sale of this watch.
65×
DA-1 at paras 56–59.
He also denies owning the Carousell account listing this item, claiming that the only Carousell account he has is (@a[redacted]) with $6,020 all-time earnings.
66×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 28), at p 21.
46 Given the photographic evidence adduced by the Wife (which does appear to show the Husband wearing a Rolex GMT Master watch) and in light of the Husband’s unsatisfactorily vague response, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of showing that an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of this item as well. I also accept her submission that pursuant to the drawing of this adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the value of this item to the matrimonial pool. I add that even if it were assumed that the Carousell account (@j[redacted]) does not belong to the Husband, the Carousell listing is still relevant and useful evidence of the value of the watch. The value of $49,000 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 29 – Richard Mille x Rafael Nadal 2015 RM 035
47 As with S/N 28, the Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that the Husband owns the Richard Mille x Rafael Nadal 2015 RM 035 watch listed at S/N 29, based on photographs she has adduced of the Husband displaying this watch in his car.
67×
Tab 25 of PCB.
As with the previous items, the Husband’s response is that he has lost the documentary evidence.
68×
DA-1 at paras 56–59.
The Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in relation to this item, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the value of the item should be added to the matrimonial pool. She relies on the price listed by a second-hand retailer for the same model of the watch to submit that the value of this item should be $619,378.
69×
PWS at para 39 (S/N 4 of the table thereat).
48 Per the same reasoning as that applied to S/N 28, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of establishing that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of the watch listed at S/N 29. The value of $619,378 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool. S/N 30 – LV sling bag 49 Similarly, for the LV sling bag listed at S/N 30, the Wife asserts in her affidavits (PA-1 and PAM-2) that this is owned by the Husband.
70×
PA-1 at para 27(24(e)), at p 28.
She relies on an Instagram post by the Husband to prove his ownership of the item.
71×
Tab 27 of PCB.
Per her submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of this item and that the value of the item should be added to the matrimonial pool pursuant to such an adverse inference, she relies on the price listed by a second-hand retailer for the same model of the bag to submit that the value of this item should be $1,371.
72×
PWS at para 39 (S/N 5 of the table thereat).
50 The Husband repeats his bare assertion that he has lost the documentary evidence.
Per the same reasoning applied in [40] and [41] above, I find that the Wife has discharged her burden of establishing that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of the LV bag listed at S/N 30. The value of $1,371 is accordingly added to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 31 – Goods purchased at luxury shops
51 For S/N 31, the Wife relies on the Husband’s credit card statements to make a submission similar to the submissions made for S/N 26 to 30. In gist, I understand the Wife to be saying that the Husband has failed to disclose the goods purchased at the various luxury stores shown in the credit card statements, that the credit card expenditure amounts represent the value of these luxury goods, and that these amounts should accordingly be added back to the matrimonial pool. The amounts in question are as follows:
73×
PWS at para 40.
(a) $810 spent at Hermes on 3 September 2023;
(b) $585.74 spent at Ginza Six Tokyo on 15 October 2023;
(c) $1,597.98 spent at b.space KL on 20 October 2023;
(d) $219 spent at Chanel on 4 November 2023;
(e) $1,190 spent at Burberry on 4 November 2023;
(f) $4,125 spent at Louis Vuitton on 28 January 2024;
(g) $825 spent at Louis Vuitton on 28 January 2024;
(h) $480 spent at Takashimaya on 29 January 2024;
(i) $2,086.53 spent at Balenciaga on 1 February 2024;
(j) $2,520.52 spent at Prada Malaysia on 24 February 2024;
(i) For this item of expenditure, the Husband claims that he only bought a jacket (currently worth $295) from Prada Malaysia.
74×
DA-2 at p 995.
The Wife disagrees that this was the only item bought and points out that the Husband has failed to adduce any evidence of his alleged purchase ( eg , receipt/invoice). In any case, she does not accept his purported valuation of the jacket, since it would translate into an unexplained and substantial drop of 88% in value.
75×
PWS at para 41.
(k) $363.68 spent at Balmain on 14 March 2024; and (l) $1,003.35 spent at Marni on 11 May 2024. 52 In the Joint Summary, the Husband appears to be claiming that all these items were purchased as “holiday gifts” for his mother (“Mdm Chen”).
76×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 31), at p 25.
Once again, however, this is a bare assertion by the Husband; he has not identified any affidavit evidence which substantiates this assertion.
53 In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that based on the credit card statements, it would appear the Husband has more luxury goods than those he has disclosed in his affidavits;
ie, there is a prima facie case of concealment by the Husband. I accept the Wife’s submission that a sum of $15,806.80 – being the aggregate of the expenditure items listed at [51(a)-(l)] above – should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 32 – Laguna Country Club membership
54 For S/N 32, the Wife has highlighted that the Laguna Country Club Membership was not disclosed by the Husband as a matrimonial asset, but was instead included in his list of expenses in DAM-1
77×
DAM-1 at para 13.
. The Wife relies on an email sent to the Husband by the Country Club to value the membership at $120,000.
78×
PWS at para 42.
This email was sent by a membership executive of Laguna Country Club, apparently in response to a query from the Husband as to the “indicative market price” for “re-sales” of club memberships.
79×
Tab 30 of PCB.
55 For his part, the Husband claims in the Joint Summary that this club membership has been cancelled due to his non-payment of the membership fees.
80×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 32), at p 25.
However, this is again a bare assertion: he has not adduced any objective evidence ( eg , correspondence from the club) of the cancellation of this club membership. On the contrary, as the Wife has noted, the Laguna Country Club Membership was included by him in his list of expenses in DAM-1 – which inclusion implies that the membership was still active, at least as at the date when DAM-1 was filed on 2 October 2024. In other words, as at the date of the IJ, the club membership was still part of the Husband’s assets. 56 In addition, I note that the Wife followed up on the Husband’s disclosure of this club membership (albeit in his list of expenses) by requesting more details.
81×
PA-1 at para 27(22), at p 26.
In his reply affidavit DA-1 (filed on 25 February 2025), the Husband does not actually depose that the club membership has been cancelled, nor does he deny owning (or having owned) the club membership: he simply states that it is “open to the [Wife] to attempt to obtain the latest transacted prices and/or reach out to any brokers to retrieve the value of these country club memberships”.
82×
DA-1 at para 49.
57 Given the position adopted by the Husband on affidavit, I accept the Wife’s submission that the Laguna Country Club Membership formed part of the Husband’s assets as at the date of the IJ, and that it should be included in the matrimonial pool. I also accept that the email from the Country Club’s membership executive supports the Wife’s valuation of the membership at $120,000.
S/N 33 – Husband’s cryptocurrency
58 On the Wife’s case, S/N 33 accounts for almost 50% of the total value of the Husband’s assets, which in turn account for more than 98% of the entire matrimonial pool. In other words, S/N 33 makes up approximately 47% of the entire matrimonial pool.
59 The Wife’s case is that the Husband derives his main source of income from trading in cryptocurrency and Non-Fungible Tokens (“NFT”).
83×
PWS at para 43.
The Wife hired an expert, one Mr Lin Yun Heng (“Mr Lin”), to trace the Husband’s NFTs and cryptocurrency transactions.
84×
PWS at paras 48–51.
In gist, Mr Lin’s finding was that there was cumulative inflow of US$3,801,681 from the wallets he investigated (which allegedly belonged to the Husband) into a single Binance account. The Wife submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of his non-disclosure of this asset, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the sum of US$3,801,681 – less the sum of US$805,386.40 used to purchase the NFTs – should be added to the matrimonial pool.
85×
PWS at paras 52–57.
60 For the purposes of the hearing before me, the Husband has denied that he presently has any cryptocurrency capable of realisation.
86×
DWS at paras 17–19.
He has reiterated the claims he made in the Joint Summary
87×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 33), at p 26.
about his cryptocurrency wallet having been hacked. To support his narrative, the Husband points to evidence of his having sought police assistance and legal advice to recover the (allegedly) stolen NFTs. 61 As the Wife has observed, however, the Husband’s response does not address the case she puts forward vis-à-vis S/N 33. From the evidence that the Husband himself has pointed to, his story of “an unauthorised transfer” in fact relates to an incident which allegedly occurred in December 2020 .
88×
DLA-1 at paras 12–15; Police Report at DLA-1 at p 15; Solicitors’ letter at DLA-1 at p 19.
So far as I can glean from the letters from his solicitors and the police report he has cited,
89×
DLA-1 at pp 13–20.
his case is that he and one Cheng Haijiang had transferred cryptocurrency into a wallet for investment purposes. One Huang Yilong, who had access to the wallet and who was tasked to manage the investment, had – without consent from the Husband and/or Cheng Haijiang – transferred the cryptocurrency out of the wallet (ending with -EFB02). Per the Wife’s case, however, S/N 33 relates to the Husband’s Binance account (ending with -5997F) and his three wallets ( viz , the “Purchase Wallet”, “HODL/Hardware Wallet” and “Sale Wallet” referred to in LYH-1
90×
LYH-1 at p 22.
), which he used to trade NFTs and other cryptocurrencies from August 2021 to November 2024 .
91×
LYH-1 at pp 33–39; see also LYH-1 at p 107.
In other words, the Wife’s case is that the Husband failed to disclose his cryptocurrency and NFT holdings in the Binance account and the three wallets. The alleged hacking incident in December 2020 is of no relevance to the present proceedings.
62 As I alluded to earlier, the Wife’s case on the Husband’s ownership of the Binance account and the three wallets is premised on the evidence of her expert witness Mr Lin. In gist:
(a) The Wife first referred five distinct NFTs to Mr Lin. The Wife’s evidence is that the Husband had posted these NFTs on his social media and that these NFTs must therefore belong to the Husband.
92×
PWS at para 54.
This is borne out by the evidence of Mr Lin, who has stated that NFTs are unique digital assets which represent ownership of a specific item or content:
93×
Mr Lin’s report at para 6 (LYH-1 at p 19).
as NFTs are unique ( eg , one of the NFTs alleged to belong to the Husband has a unique code of “MAYC #5016”), the Husband’s social media posts show that he owns these NFTs.
94×
Mr Lin’s report at para 73 (LYH-1 at p 40).
(b) Tracing these five NFTs, Mr Lin found that they interacted with three primary wallets.
95×
Mr Lin’s report at para 15 (LYH-1 at p 22).
Mr Lin further found two other NFTs that interacted with these three wallets.
96×
Mr Lin’s report at para 17 (LYH-1 at p 23).
These wallets are:
(i) The Purchase Wallet: Used to acquire NFTs or tokens (usually funds are deposited into this wallet).
(ii) HODL/Hardware Wallet: A secure cold-storage wallet used to store assets long-term. "HODL" is slang for "Hold On for Dear Life".
(iii) Sale Wallet: Wallet used to list and sell NFTs, typically on platforms like Blur or OpenSea.
(c) Because the Husband owns the NFTs (as evidenced from his social media posts), and because these NFTs interacted with the three wallets, Mr Lin inferred that these three wallets belong to the Husband.
(d) That the three wallets belong to the Husband is also borne out by the fact that these wallets used the same unique Binance Deposit address:
ie
, cryptocurrencies or NFTs from these three wallets were all transferred to the same Binance account, presumably for sale for cash.
97×
Mr Lin’s report at paras 69 and 73 (LYH-1 at pp 39–40).
Mr Lin thus inferred that the Husband also owns the said Binance account (ending with -5997F). (e) Mr Lin found that there was a cumulative inflow of US$3,801,681 from the three wallets into the Binance account.
98×
Mr Lin’s report, Exhibit W, paras 1–2 (LYH-1 at p 111).
Mr Lin explained that “a cumulative inflow can be understood as the total sum of funds or assets that have been transferred into a specific account or wallet over a given period, derived from multiple transactions”.
99×
Mr Lin’s report, Exhibit W, para 6 (LYH-1 at p 116).
(f) Mr Lin further explained the significance of this cumulative inflow of funds from the three wallets into the Binance account:
100×
Mr Lin’s report, Exhibit W, paras 9–10 (LYH-1 at p 117).
9. In the context of [the Husband’s] wallets, the $3,801,681 cumulative inflow signifies the total amount transferred from his three wallets to his Binance account via the "Binance Deposit," wallet address, without necessarily reflecting the liquidation value or present market worth of those assets.
10. Please note that this figure is the cumulative inflow and does not necessarily reflect the price at which these assets were liquidated. Also, it includes transfer flows beyond the scope of the 7 NFTs, and can mostly be inferred from how much transfer volume the wallets have been moving into Binance.
63 It should be noted that in the affidavit (PA-1) which she filed in support of her application against the Husband for discovery and interrogatories, the Wife requested the Husband to provide inter alia information relating to the said five NFTs.
101×
PA-1 at para 27(25), at p 28.
In responding to the request specifically relating to the NFTs in his reply affidavit (DA-1), the Husband appeared to admit ownership of these NFTs, stating that “these digital assets were sold at a loss”, that he had “no documentary evidence of [his] selling them”, and that “any attempt to try and retrieve such evidence would be futile”.
102×
DA-1 at paras 60–61.
Regrettably, having implicitly admitted his ownership of the NFTs, the Husband then attempted to prevaricate by adding that the Wife had no proof either of his purchase of these NFTs or of his username being “J[redacted]” (the username allegedly used by him on platforms such as OpenSea, which is a “major NFT marketplace”).
103×
DA-1 at para 62.
In my view, this attempt at prevarication did not detract from the implicit admission of ownership contained in his statement about having sold the NFTs at a loss. In this connection, it should be pointed out that his statement about having sold the NFTs at a loss was actually corroborated by the evidence of the purchase price and sale price of these NFTs in Mr Lin’s report: these appeared to show that the NFTs were generally sold at a loss.
104×
LYH-1 at pp 33–38.
64 In light of the above evidence, I am satisfied that the Wife has established at least a substratum of evidence showing that the Husband has – by virtue of the cumulative inflows noted by Mr Lin – an amount of US$3,801,681 in his Binance account which he has failed to disclose. The Husband’s argument about the Wife having no “proof” either of his purchase of these NFTs or of his username being “J[redacted]” does not assist him, since the Wife only needs to show a prima facie case for an adverse inference to be drawn ( UZN v UZM at [18(a)]). Nor does the Husband’s present argument about his accounts having been “hacked” assist him, since (as I noted above) the evidence shows that the “hacking” incident occurred in December 2020, whereas S/N 33 relates to cryptocurrency and NFT transactions in the Husband’s three wallets and his Binance account in the period between April 2021 and November 2024. As for his remarks at the hearing about the alleged inadequacy of Mr Lin’s qualifications,
105×
NE (27 August 2026), p 34 (lines 7–13).
these were entirely unsupported by any evidence: he did not, for example, seek to adduce any expert evidence of his own.
65 In so far as the Wife has proposed that the value to be attributed to S/N 33 should be the sum of US$3,801,681 less the US$805,386.40 used to purchase the NFTs, I note that Mr Lin’s evidence was that no definitive conclusions could be drawn as to what must have happened to the cumulative inflow into the Binance account. Mr Lin also very fairly pointed out that in deriving the figure of US$3,801,681, he had used the values of those cryptocurrencies at the time of the transfer into the Binance account;
ie
, there was a possibility that this figure might not accurately reflect the values at which the assets were eventually liquidated. These caveats notwithstanding, the relevant threshold is whether the value assessed is “unreasonable” and it is for the Husband to convince the court that it is:
UZN v UZM at [28(a)]. He has made no attempt to do so. I therefore accept the Wife’s submissions and add the sum of S$3,865,220.03 into the matrimonial pool.
Per the Wife’s case, the sum of S$3,865,220.03 is obtained by deducting US$805,386.40 from the cumulative inflow figure of US$3,801,681
106×
PWS at para 57.
and then applying an exchange rate of US$1:S$1.29.
107×
JS, Section 3, at p 4.
S/N 34 – Debts owed to Husband from FPL
66 Next, in respect of S/N 34, it is trite that debts owing to a spouse as at the date of interim judgment constitute matrimonial assets. As Woo Bih Li JC (as he then was) observed in Leong Mei Chuan v David Chan Teck Hock
[2001] SGHC 80 (at [123]), if debts owed to a spouse are not included in the matrimonial pool, “a spouse will be encouraged to lend monies to various persons when the marriage is floundering, and then claim that such debts should not be treated as part of matrimonial assets”.
67 The loan documents between FPL and the Husband show that $41,000 was lent by the Husband to FPL.
108×
Tab 33 of PCB.
The Wife contends that the entire sum should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
109×
PWS at para 61 (S/N 1 of the table thereat).
In response, the Husband’s position appears to be that this amount should be excluded from the matrimonial pool because FPL has (according to him) been dormant since November 2022 and there is no realistic likelihood of getting back this loan.
110×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 34), at p 27.
In support of his allegation that FPL has been “dormant” since November 2022 , the Husband has adduced IRAS’ letter approving an application for waiver of filing of FPL’s Income Tax Return with effect from YA 2026.
111×
DLA-2 at p 5.
As explained at [28] above, this document does not support the Husband’s allegation that FPL was already “dormant” as at November 2022.
A fortiori, the document does not support his allegation that there was no realistic chance of the debt being repaid as at the date of the IJ.
68 In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that the entire debt amount of $41,000 should be added back into the matrimonial pool. For the avoidance of doubt, it appears to me that the Wife made an error in the Joint Summary in that the sums for S/N 34 and 35 were swapped around. This is inconsequential, though, as the documentary evidence puts it beyond doubt that the debt owed from FPL was $41,000.
S/N 35 – Debts owed to Husband from ADS VG
69 For S/N 35, the loan documents between the Husband and ADS VG show that $183,000 was lent by the Husband to ADS VG. The Wife contends that the entire sum should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
70 Again, as with S/N 34, the Husband appears to be suggesting that there is no realistic likelihood of this debt being repaid because ADS VG has “ceased operation due to several law suit”.
112×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 35), at p 27.
First, I repeat my findings at [30] above in relation to the lawsuits referred to by the Husband. In gist, I do not find that the Husband has proven these liabilities. Second, the document he purports to rely on to prove that ADS VG is currently dormant is the IRAS’ letter approving waiver of filing of Income Tax Returns for ADS VG which expressly states that it is “based on the declaration that the company has not carried out any business activities since 1 January 2025”;
ie
, after the date of the IJ. In other words, as with S/N 34, so too for S/N 35 there is no evidence to substantiate the Husband’s allegation that there was no realistic chance of the debt being repaid by ADS VG as at the date of the IJ. As such, I do not accept the Husband’s bare assertion; and I agree with the Wife that the entire debt amount of $183,000 should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
S/N 36 – Debts owed to Husband from MLPL
71 For S/N 36, the Wife submits that two withdrawals (on 9 and 31 January 2024) totalling $18,000 were made from the Husband’s account Citi 8824 to a company which I shall refer to as “MLPL”; and that this amount should be added back into the matrimonial pool.
113×
PWS at para 61 (S/N 3 of the table thereat).
72 The Husband has no real explanation for the transfer of $18,000 to MLPL. His response in the Joint Summary – that “Company reimburse the funds as salary to husband in order to transfer back the share to the Duhui. And Husband stopped working for company from 1st Nov 2025”
114×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 36), at pp 27–28.
– is incoherent, entirely irrelevant to the withdrawals made in January 2024, and in any event unsupported by any objective documentary evidence.
73 In the circumstances, I find that regardless of whether the transfer of $18,000 to MLPL is to be treated as a debt owing from MLPL to the Husband or as a sum dissipated by him, the amount should be added back to the matrimonial pool.
S/N 37 – Debts owed to Husband from Kelvin
74 The Wife notes that in his compliance affidavit of 13 June 2025 (DA-2), the Husband himself listed Kelvin as one of his debtors and deposed that Kelvin owed him a sum of $80,000.
115×
PWS at para 61 (S/N 4 of the table thereat); see DA-2 at p 20.
As such, she submits that this sum should be added to the matrimonial pool. 75 In the Joint Summary, the Husband now claims – for the first time – that Kelvin has been unreachable since April 2024.
116×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 37), at p 28.
However, he has not deposed to this on affidavit, nor has he adduced any evidence of any attempts to contact Kelvin. In the “remarks” column, the Husband also asserts that of this $80,000, only a sum of RM76,500 is outstanding. However, the Husband provides no documentary evidence for this. I therefore reject his claim and find that the debt of $80,000 should be included in the matrimonial pool. S/N 38 – Debts owed to Husband from Malaysian debtor 76 In his compliance affidavit of 13 June 2025 (DA-2), in response to the question of the nature of the debt which the Husband hired “ALBB Consultancy Sdn Bhd” to collect and the amount of debt outstanding, the Husband simply asserted that “balance amount is RM76,500 before deducting 40% of commission”.
117×
DA-2 at p 20.
It should be highlighted that it was in this same paragraph in DA-2 that the Husband deposed to a sum of $80,000 having been lent to Kelvin. Notwithstanding that the same figure RM76,500 appears to be relied on for both Kelvin and the alleged Malaysian debtor, it appears to me that on the face of the Husband’s affidavit, there is – apart from Kelvin - an additional unknown Malaysian debtor. Unfortunately, to make matters even more confusing, the Husband now states in the Joint Summary that “ALBB” was used to collect debt from one “Kevin” and that “so far collected back $14,525.32”. The reference to “Kevin” appears to be a reference to S/N 37, but in his affidavit evidence, the Husband does not depose to any relationship between
Kelvin and this unknown Malaysian debtor. I was therefore left with the Husband’s evidence in DA-2 which appears to allege two different debts; one of $80,000 owing from Kelvin and one of RM76,500 owing from an unknown Malaysian debtor.
77 I note, in addition, that the sum of $14,525.32 referenced by the Husband as the sum “collected back” is also the exact sum that the Wife seeks
118×
PWS at para 61 (S/N 5 of the table thereat).
to add back into the matrimonial pool as the outstanding debt owed to the Husband. While parties have not explained how this sum was arrived at, I surmise that it was derived by converting RM76,500 to the Singapore dollar equivalent and then deducting from it the 40% commission alleged by the Husband to be due to the debt collector. The Husband’s concurrent reference to this sum of money being “collected back” and RM76,500 “not yet collect back” is therefore simply incoherent. 78 The Husband’s inconsistent and incoherent explanation aside, the bottom line is that the Husband does not dispute that a balance sum of RM76,500 is still owed to him which is to be collected by ALBB Consultancy Sdn Bhd.
119×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 38), at p 28.
In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s submission that a sum of S$14,525.32 should be added back to the matrimonial pool. S/N 39 – Transfers to Emi 79 For S/N 39, the Wife has pointed out that the Husband made 16 transfers of funds totalling $17,388 to one “Emi” between 8 January 2024 and 11 April 2024.
120×
PWS at para 62(a); Tab 36 of PCB.
The Husband claims that these transfers were for various “expenses” such as “skin care”, “hair care”, “supplements”, “perfume”, and “tennis lesson”.
121×
DA-2 at pp 12–15.
80 The Wife’s case is that these payments to “Emi” form part of an attempt by the Husband to dissipate his assets by transferring funds to a friend. She relies on the following reasoning and evidence for this submission. First, she notes that it is “extremely strange” that the payments to “Emi” for all these disparate “expenses” are always in round figures. Second, her evidence is that she has never met anyone called “Emi”, nor has the Husband previously mentioned this person to her. Third, she also asserts that the Husband has in any event never used the products listed in the invoices he purports to rely on.
122×
PWS at para 63.
81 In this connection, I note that the Husband has failed to give any coherent explanation as to who exactly “Emi” is and how “Emi” came to provide him with such a wide range of disparate products and services (“skin care”, “hair care”, “supplements”, “perfume”, “tennis lesson”, etc ). Moreover, while the Husband alleged in his affidavit DA-2 that the payments to “Emi” were for various expenses (for which he purported to produce invoices),
123×
DA-2 at pp 12–15 he has now claimed in the Joint Summary that these payments represented his repayments of a loan taken from Emi.
124×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 39), at p 28.
The internal inconsistency in the Husband’s own narrative speaks volumes as to his lack of credibility. 82 In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s submission that the transfers to “Emi” represented dissipation of assets by the Husband, and that the sum of $17,388 should be added back to the matrimonial pool. S/N 40 – Transfers to Husband’s mother 83 For S/N 40, it is not disputed that the Husband made four transfers totalling $440,000 to his mother, Mdm Chen, in the period between 26 April 2024 and 29 April 2024.
125×
Tab 37 of PCB.
In the Joint Summary, the Husband claims that these transfers were made in repayment of loans totalling $759,650 which Mdm Chen had extended to both parties during the marriage.
126×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 40), at p 29.
84 For her part, the Wife contends that this was another attempt by the Husband to dissipate assets,
127×
PWS at paras 65–66.
as the fund transfers to Mdm Chen were made in the month after the commencement of divorce proceedings by the Wife, and the Husband has adduced no evidence of the actual loan amounts extended to either party. The Wife also submits that the alleged repayments to Mdm Chen exceed the alleged amount borrowed, noting that in his affidavit DAM-1, the Husband had previously alleged that Mdm Chen lent parties $314,304 while exhibiting loan documents which appeared to show a total loan amount of only $244,904.53.
85 I understand the Wife’s case on dissipation to be based on the dicta of the court in TNL v TNK
[2017] 1 SLR 609 (“
TNL v TNK
”)
at [24]:
… [T]he issue is how the court should deal with substantial sums expended by one spouse during the period: (a)
in which divorce proceedings are imminent
; or (b)
after interim judgment but before the ancillaries are concluded
. We are of the view that if, during these periods, and whether by way of gift or otherwise, one spouse expends a substantial sum
, this sum must be returned to the asset pool if the other spouse is considered to have at least a putative interest in it and has not agreed, either expressly or impliedly, to the expenditure either before it was incurred or at any subsequent time. Furthermore, this remains the case regardless of whether: (a) the expenditure was a deliberate attempt to dissipate matrimonial assets; or (b) the expenditure was for the benefit of the children or other relatives. The spouse who makes such a payment must be prepared to bear it personally and in full. In the absence of consent, he or she cannot expect the other spouse to share in it. What constitutes a substantial sum is, of course, a question of fact and we do not propose to lay down a hard and fast rule in this regard, except to emphasise that it is not intended to include daily, run-of-the-mill expenses. [emphasis added]
(referred to as “ TNL dicta” for convenience)
86 The above dicta in TNL should be read in the light of the remarks by the Court of Appeal in UZN v UZM.
In that case, the Court of Appeal elaborated on the TNL dicta (at [65]), explaining that – Although the label of “dissipation” is commonly used to describe dispositions intended to put assets out of reach of the other spouse, a dissipation falling within the TNL dicta is not necessarily a culpable act. It may also not involve a non-disclosure. Instead, this category may be seen to encompass a disposition of matrimonial assets during the relevant period when one spouse has failed to obtain the other’s consent, even for “innocent” reasons
. [emphasis added]
87 Giving the example of a mother who used a sum of $35,000 (which would have constituted part of the matrimonial pool) to pay for the child’s school fees in an overseas institution, the Court noted that the mother’s reason for such expenditure – if true – “would not be a ‘wrongful dissipation’ intended to put assets out of reach of the other party”, but that the sum should nevertheless be returned to the matrimonial pool if the payment was made without the father’s consent (at [64]). Another example may be seen in WNR v WNQ
[2023] SGHCF 43: in that case, the court cited the TNL dicta in finding that the husband had not provided evidence of the wife’s consent to a substantial withdrawal from his CPF account and that the sum should accordingly be returned to the matrimonial pool (at [12]).
88 In the present case, the transfers to Mdm Chen were made after the commencement of divorce proceedings but before the grant of IJ. The
TNL dicta apply. Save for a somewhat incoherent bare assertion (“it was agreed that if the Matrimonial Home was sold, my mother will recover all the monies she spent on the Matrimonial Home, my family (which includes the [Wife], my daughter and me) and our household expenses”), the Husband has not adduced any evidence of the Wife’s consent to the alleged loan repayments to Mdm Chen,.
128×
DAM-2 at para 106.
In the circumstances, and irrespective of the Husband’s alleged intention, I find that the sum of $440,000 should be returned to the matrimonial pool, per the TNL dicta. S/N 41 – Transfers to Chia Hwee Kiat 89 S/N 41 concerns a transfer of $49,717 by the Husband to one Chia Hwee Kiat (“Chia”) on 29 April 2024.
129×
Tab 38 of PCB.
In the Joint Summary, the Husband claims that this transfer was in repayment of a debt which he owed Chia.
130×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 41), at p 30.
90 The Wife submits, on the other hand, that this transfer represents yet another dissipation of assets by the Husband. The transfer was made on the very day that IJ was granted. According to the Wife, she does not know who Chia is, nor has the Husband ever mentioned this loan to her during their marriage.
131×
PWS at para 64.
91 Given that the Husband has failed to adduce any evidence of the Wife’s consent to this alleged loan repayment to Chia, I find that the amount of $49,717 should be added back to the matrimonial pool, per the TNL dicta. S/N 42 – HSBC Credit Card liability 92 For S/N 42, the Husband argues for his HSBC credit card liability to be taken into account in the determination of the matrimonial pool (presumably as a deduction). According to him, this liability is “ordinary, unsecured debts incurred for living expenses and subsistence, not for asset accumulation”,
132×
DWS at para 31.
and that this “genuine financial obligation” materially affects his ability to pay maintenance.
133×
DWS at para 32.
At the same time, he has claimed that his HSBC credit card liability stands at $17,721.96 as at 21 December 2025.
134×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 42), at p 30.
93 There are two problems with this. First, the only affidavits filed by the Husband since 21 December 2025 are DLA-1 and DLA-2. There is no documentary evidence of the Husband’s HSBC credit card liability in either of these affidavits. Further and in any event, the Husband has failed to explain why liabilities arising after the IJ date ought to be considered when the default position is for assets (including liabilities) to be identified as at the IJ date. 94 In the circumstances, I agree with the Wife that this item should be disregarded in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
135×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 42), at p 30.
S/N 43 – Trust Bank liability 95 For S/N 43, the Husband repeats his argument that this liability is “ordinary, unsecured debts incurred for living expenses and subsistence, not for asset accumulation”,
136×
DWS at para 31.
and that this “genuine financial obligation” materially affects his ability to pay maintenance.
137×
DWS at para 32.
He claims that his personal liability vis-à-vis Trust Bank is $55,233.78 as at 25 December 2025.
138×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 43), at p 30.
Again, as with S/N 42, he has produced no documentary evidence to substantiate this claim; and he has also not explained why liabilities arising after the IJ date ought to be considered when the default position is for assets (including liabilities) to be identified as at the IJ date. I therefore agree with the Wife that this item should be disregarded in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
S/N 44 – ADS VG’s liability
96 For S/N 44, the Husband claims that ADS VG has a liability of $363,905.38. As a preliminary point, as I explained at [30]–[32] above, ADS VG’s financial statements ending 31 December 2024 do not reflect this liability and instead show the net current assets of the company to be $18,369.
139×
Tab 11 of PCB.
The Husband exhibited in his affidavit DLA-1 a number of court documents, but these were for an enforcement order by the claimant in DC/OC 1547/2025 for a sum of $176,878.99 and for a default judgement in HC/OC 810/2023 for a sum of US$370,000 – which figures did not correspond to the amount of $363,905.38 stated in the Joint Summary. In any event, even if one assumes for the sake of argument that this liability of $363,905.38 exists, it would be the company’s liability: the Husband has not explained why it should be treated as his personal liability for the purposes of determining the matrimonial pool. I therefore disregard this alleged liability in determining the matrimonial pool.
S/N 45 – NPL’s liability
97 For the same reason given in the preceding paragraph, I reject the Husband’s argument that NPL’s liability should be accounted for in the determination of the matrimonial pool.
S/N 46 – The Husband’s alleged personal liabilities to third parties
98 For S/N 46, the Husband has listed in the Joint Summary a number of third parties whom he claims he took loans from. Oddly, although the Husband claims
140×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 46), at p 32.
that the outstanding liability is $464,795, his own figures show an aggregate loan amount of $360,000, out of which (on his own case) he has repaid $85,205. No explanation has been provided for this discrepancy. 99 Further and in any event, I reject the Husband’s claim about his personal liabilities to third parties. The position he has taken in the Joint Summary is inconsistent with his own affidavit evidence, and no explanation has been provided for the inconsistencies. In his first affidavit of assets and means filed on 2 October 2024 (DAM-1), the Husband deposed that he had no liabilities.
141×
DAM-1 at paras A4 (at p 3) and 17 (at p 12).
He then changed his position and deposed in his subsequent affidavit DAM-2 (filed on 28 July 2025) that he owed Mdm Chen substantial sums of money.
142×
DAM-2 at paras 102–108.
Despite ostensibly having clarified his position on his liabilities in DAM-2, he made no mention of loans taken from other third parties. The first mention of these alleged loans was in the affidavit DLA-1, which was filed on 16 April 2026 . No explanation was provided as to why these alleged loans were not disclosed earlier; and a good number of them appear to have been incurred after the date of IJ.
143×
DLA-1 at para 39.
In addition, although the Husband purported to exhibit certain “loan agreements” in DLA-1, the documentation was incomplete: there was no documentary evidence for several of the loans – including a substantial loan of $200,000 allegedly taken from one “Chen XingPing”; and the Husband did not point to his bank account statements to show when the alleged loan monies were actually paid to him.
100 For the reasons stated above, I decline to take the alleged personal liabilities listed in S/N 46 into account in determining the matrimonial pool.
S/N 47 – Matrimonial Home
101 S/N 47 relates to the Matrimonial Home. As I noted earlier at [3], the Matrimonial Home has been sold by the Husband. What he purports to do in S/N 47 is to account for an amount of $453,953 which he claims is owed to Mdm Chen for repayment of a “personal loan”.
102 The Husband has inserted some numbers and calculations at S/N 47 in the Joint Summary, but has not elaborated on how these numbers and calculations are to be understood.
144×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 47), at p 33.
In any event, his evidence on the amount owed to Mdm Chen is riddled with inconsistencies. For S/N 47, he appears to be claiming that there is an outstanding loan of $453,953 – despite having allegedly paid Mdm Chen the “balance sale proceeds” of $755,083.07 following the sale of the Matrimonial Home. Elsewhere in the Joint Summary, he appears to claim that there is an outstanding liability of $759,650 owed to Mdm Chen.
145×
JS, Section 3(b) (S/N 40), at p 29.
In his second affidavit of assets and means filed on 2 December 2025 (DAM-2), the Husband claimed that he owed Mdm Chen an amount of $529,650, and that he and the Wife also jointly owed Mdm Chen a separate amount of $314,303.
146×
DAM-2 at para 108.
In his affidavit DLA-1 filed on 16 April 2026, the Husband now appears to claim that he owes Mdm Chen a total amount of $459,650.
147×
DLA-1 at para 39, under the column listing the loans taken from “Chen Rxxx Yxxx”.
103 In light of the above inconsistencies and the absence of any explanation for them, I find that the Husband has failed to adduce any credible evidence of the amount allegedly owed to Mdm Chen. As such, I decline to deduct the alleged amount of $453,953 from the Husband’s assets. S/N 54 – CIMB Fixed Deposit (account no. ending -0201) 104 For S/N 54, the Husband makes a bare assertion in the Joint Summary that this account should be valued at $100,000 because according to him, Mdm Chen had lent the Wife $100,000 to put into this fixed deposit account.
148×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 54), at p 36.
There being no evidence at all to substantiate the Husband’s assertion, I reject his suggested valuation, and instead, adopt the Wife’s valuation of $10,363.54, which is based on the bank account statement as at 7 September 2024. S/N 55 – The Wife’s CPF Ordinary Account 105 The Husband has left this item blank in the Joint Summary.
149×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 55), at p 36.
For the avoidance of doubt, I accept the Wife’s figure of $154,919.74 which is based on her CPF account statements as at 29 April 2024, less the amounts already accrued in her CPF account before marriage.
150×
Tab 45 and 46 of PCB, pp 210–219.
S/N 59 – Purple Audemars Piguet watch (26319OR) 106 The Husband alleges that the Wife owns this Audemars Piguet watch, which the Wife denies. As the Husband has not adduced any evidence to show that this watch exists and is owned by the Wife, I decline to include this item as one of the Wife’s assets. S/N 60 – Cartier watch 107 The Husband asserts that this Cartier watch was purchased by the Wife during the marriage. The Wife does not dispute that she owns this watch, but claims that it was gifted to her by her mother before the marriage.
151×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 60), at pp 38–39.
108 As I noted earlier, parties’ assets are treated as matrimonial assets, unless otherwise proven (see [14] above). The burden is thus on the Wife to prove that this watch is not a matrimonial asset. She has not adduced any evidence to discharge this burden. As such, I agree with the Husband that the value of this watch should be added to the matrimonial pool. The Wife has also not adduced evidence to refute his valuation of the watch ($12,800). I therefore accept the valuation of $12,800.
S/N 61 – Chanel watch
109 The Husband alleges that the Wife owns this Chanel watch, which the Wife denies. As the Husband has not adduced any evidence to show that this watch exists and is owned by the Wife, I decline to include this item as one of the Wife’s assets.
S/N 62 – Chanel bag
110 The Husband asserts that this bag was purchased by the Wife during the marriage. The Wife does not dispute owning this bag but claims that it should not be considered a matrimonial asset because she bought it before the marriage.
152×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 62), at pp 39–40.
However, she has not adduced any evidence to support her position. As such, I accept the Husband’s submission that this item should be included as a matrimonial asset. The Wife has also not adduced evidence to refute his valuation of the bag ($5,199). I therefore accept the figure of $5,199.
S/N 63 and 64 – Celine bags
111 For S/N 63 and 64, the Husband’s position per the Joint Summary is that these two Celine bags were purchased by him for the Wife during overseas trips. However, he has not deposed to this in his affidavit evidence, nor has he identified any evidence capable of supporting his assertion.
153×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 63–64), at pp 40–42.
The Wife denies owning these items.
154×
Ibid .
There is thus no factual basis for concluding that these two bags are matrimonial assets. S/N 65 to 67 – Hermes bags 112 For S/N 65 to 67, the Husband has asserted in his affidavit DAM-2 that the Wife owns three Hermes handbags; and in support of his assertion, he has adduced photographs of the Wife carrying some of these bags while on overseas trips.
155×
DAM-2 at para 6(a); DAM-2 at pp 52–54.
The Wife admits the existence of these bags and the fact that she carried them on overseas trips, but claims that they belong to her younger sister and that she merely borrowed them for her trips.
156×
PAM-3 at para 6(a). See also JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 65–67), at pp 42–46.
She has not, however, adduced any evidence to show that the bags were borrowed from her sister.
113 In the circumstances, I find that the Wife has not discharged her burden of proving that these three bags are not matrimonial assets. I therefore include the value of these bags in the matrimonial pool; and in the absence of any evidence from the Wife to refute the Husband’s valuation of these bags, I accept the figures he has put forward ($37,027; $24,820; $9,888).
S/N 68 – Hermes Picotin bag
114 S/N 68 refers to a Hermes Picotin bag which the Husband alleges to be owned by the Wife. The Wife, on the other hand, denies owning this bag.
157×
JS, Section 3(c) (S/N 68), at pp 46–47.
The Husband has not produced any evidence to support his allegation; and this allegation is, moreover, inconsistent with his own assertion in DAM-2 that the Wife owns three Hermes bags (as set out at S/N 65 to 67 of the Joint Summary).
158×
DAM-2 at para 6(a).
In the circumstances, there is no factual basis for me to conclude that such a bag exists or that it is a matrimonial asset. S/N 69 – Property in Australia 115 While the Husband has not included this item as one of the Wife’s assets in the Joint Summary, he has submitted for an “adverse inference” to be drawn against the Wife in respect of this item and for a sum of A$160,000 to A$180,000 to be added to the matrimonial pool.
159×
JS, Section 3(e) (S/N 1), at p 61.
Although the Husband has not used the specific terminology seen in cases such as UZN v UZM, I understand him to be contending that the Wife failed to disclose this property as one of her assets, that an adverse inference should be drawn against her for such (alleged) non-disclosure, and that pursuant to such adverse inference, the quantification approach should be adopted so as to add the (alleged) value of the property back to the matrimonial pool.
116 In support of his submission for an “adverse inference”, the Husband relies on text messages (including voice messages) which – according to him – show the Wife speaking about renting out a property in Australia.
160×
DAM-2 at pp 56–57.
Regrettably, these texts and voice messages are in Mandarin; and he has not produced any certified translation by a qualified, independent translator. For her part, the Wife has explained that she was helping a friend to look for a managing agent who could help rent out apartment units in Melbourne, Australia.
161×
PAM-3 at para 19.
The Wife has also adduced evidence of property ownership searches conducted in Australia by her Australian lawyers to show that she does not own any property in any Australian state or territory.
162×
PAM-3 at pp 198–215.
In this connection, I note that during the hearing before me, the Husband contended that the Wife could have acquired property in Australia under another name – but again, he has not adduced any evidence to support such a contention. In any event, the Wife did disclose that she had a previous name, and the Australian property ownership searches adduced by her include searches against this previous name.
163×
PAM-3 at pp 198–215.
117 Having regard to the state of the evidence, I do not see any basis for drawing an adverse inference against the Wife in respect of S/N 69. S/N 70 – Wife’s property in Singapore 118 For S/N 70, the Husband has also not included this (alleged) property as one of the Wife’s assets in the Joint Summary, but he similarly argues for an “adverse inference” to be drawn against the Wife and for a sum of $950,000 to be added to the matrimonial pool.
164×
JS, Section 3(e) (S/N 2), at p 61.
According to the Husband, his mother Mdm Chen lent $66,000 to the Wife for the latter to purchase her parents’ property at [address redacted] (“Bukit Batok HDB”). He claims that the Wife has a “share” in her parents’ Bukit Batok HDB flat and that she has not repaid the loan she got from Mdm Chen.
165×
JS, Section 3(e) (S/N 2), at p 61.
119 I reject the Husband’s submissions in respect of S/N 70. First, he has adduced no evidence of the alleged loan from Mdm Chen to the Wife. Second, even assuming for the sake of argument that there was such a loan, any failure by the Wife to repay Mdm Chen is a matter between the two women – and not a matter for these matrimonial proceedings between the Husband and the Wife. 120 As for the Husband’s assertion that the Wife has a “share” of her parents’ Bukit Batok HDB flat, the Wife has explained in her response to the Husband’s request for interrogatories
166×
DAM-2 at pp 42–43 (Plaintiff’s Notice in Response to Defendant’s 1st Request for Interrogatories dated 25 November 2024, at S/N 5).
that her name was added to the Bukit Batok HDB flat on 2 August 2010 – before the marriage – because her parents needed to refinance the property to obtain liquidity for her father’s business. The Wife’s evidence is that her name has since been removed on 7 March 2020 as she was named as an essential occupier of the Matrimonial Home (an executive condominium), and she was not allowed to own an HDB flat while also being named as an essential occupier of an executive condominium. In her response to the request for interrogatories, she has further explained that she made no financial contribution to the Bukit Batok HDB flat and received no monies when her name was removed.
121 In the circumstances, I find that the Husband has failed to show that an adverse inference ought to be drawn for S/N 70.
Conclusion on the identification and valuation of the matrimonial pool
122 Having regard to the findings I have set out above on the disputed items in the Joint Summary, I conclude that the matrimonial assets in this case have a total value of $8,065,790.21. The table annexed to this judgment as Annex 1 sets out my valuation in respect of each alleged matrimonial asset. To summarise, the total value of $8,065,790.21 comprises:
(a) $7,850,965.52 of the Husband’s assets; and
(b) $214,824.69 of the Wife’s assets.
Division ratio
123 I next address the appropriate ratio for the division of the matrimonial assets.
124 It is not disputed that the structured approach in ANJ v ANK should apply in the present case. The first step of the structured approach calls for the court to “ascribe a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions relative to that of the other party, having regard to the amount of financial contribution each party has made towards the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets”:
ANJ v ANK at [22].
Direct financial contributions
125 In respect of parties’ direct financial contributions, although the Wife’s case is that the total value of the matrimonial pool is approximately $8.1m, she takes the position that parties’ direct financial contributions (“DFC”) should be assessed only in respect of an amount of approximately $800,000 of matrimonial assets.
167×
JS at p 60.
The Wife submits that the bulk of the matrimonial assets should be excluded from the DFC calculation because it is made up of sums included pursuant to an adverse inference against the Husband, and he should therefore not be entitled to credit for such sums in the computation of the contribution ratios.
168×
PWS at para 76.
The Wife also submits that the assets in each party’s name should be credited solely as that party’s DFC.
169×
JS, Section 3(d), at pp 48–60.
Based on the $800,000 worth of matrimonial assets, the Wife submits that the ratio of DFC should be 84:16 in favour of the Husband.
170×
PWS at para 75.
126 The Husband’s submissions are not helpful, as he has simply attributed 100% of the matrimonial assets to his DFC without explaining why this should be so.
171×
JS, Section 3(d), at p 60.
127 As a matter of principle, it is true that in UZN v UZM
, the Court of Appeal held that where an additional sum had been included in the matrimonial pool by virtue of an adverse inference against the Husband rather than by disclosure by him, the Husband was “not entitled to credit for it in the computation of the contribution ratio” (at [57]). It must be highlighted, however, that UZN v UZM makes it clear that this principle applies only to sums which are added to the matrimonial pool as a result of an adverse inference, and not to every single item in respect of which a party may have provided incomplete or inconsistent evidence or belated disclosure.
128 As such, in computing the contribution ratios, I have excluded only those sums that were added to the matrimonial pool by virtue of an adverse inference against the Husband – as opposed to every item in respect of which he provided incomplete or inconsistent evidence or belated disclosure (which is what the Wife appears to have done). The table annexed to this judgment as Annex 2 shows that following this approach, I arrive at a figure of $2,866,389.69 for the Husband’s DFC, versus a figure of $214,824.69 for the Wife’s DFC. In general, I have attributed 100% of parties’ sole assets as their respective DFC. In respect of DFC, therefore, I arrive at a ratio of 93:7 in the Husband’s favour.
Indirect contributions
129 The next step of the structured approach is to “ascribe a second ratio to represent each party’s indirect contribution to the well-being of the family relative to the other”:
ANJ v ANK at [22].
130 The Wife has argued that for parties’ indirect contributions, the ratio should be 60:40 in her favour.
172×
PWS at paras 77 and 99.
In respect of indirect financial contributions, she contends that she contributed a higher percentage of the family’s day-to-day expenses than the Husband did,
173×
PWS at paras 78–81.
because despite the Husband earning significantly more than her, he spent a lot of money financing his own lavish lifestyle.
174×
PWS at para 78.
In respect of indirect non-financial contributions, the Wife’s position is that she was the Child’s primary caregiver, whereas the Husband has been an absentee father;
175×
PWS at paras 82–91.
and that she was also the homemaker who took care of household chores and who gave instructions to the domestic helper, whereas the Husband gave no assistance at home.
176×
PWS at paras 92–94.
Further, according to the Wife, she was a supportive spouse and a dutiful daughter-in-law, whereas the Husband grew distant from her over time and essentially lived his life as though he were a bachelor.
177×
PWS at paras 95–98.
131 For his part, the Husband has stated in the Joint Summary that the ratio for parties’ indirect contributions should be assessed at 90:10 in his favour.
178×
JS, Section 3(f), at p 67.
Unfortunately, he has not explained in his written submissions how he arrived at this figure, although in his affidavits DAM-1
179×
DAM-1 at para 19.
and DAM-2
180×
DAM-2 at paras 21–27, 45–48, 61, 63, 65, 67–96.
, he has set out his purported involvement as a “hands-on” father and his rebuttals to the Wife’s evidence on indirect contributions.
132 In assessing parties’ indirect contributions, I bear in mind the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in ANJ v ANK (at [24]):
In relation to indirect contributions, the problem with ascertaining the extent of the parties’ contributions with precision is further compounded. In the nature of things, for the court to ascribe a ratio in respect of the non-financial or indirect financial contributions of the parties, the court is clearly not indulging in any mathematical calculation because often there is very little concrete evidence to be relied upon. Contributions in the form of parenting, homemaking and husbandry, by their very nature, are incapable of being reduced into monetary terms. No mathematical formula or analytical tool is capable of capturing or accommodating the diverse and myriad set of factual scenarios that may present themselves to court as to how the parties may have chosen to divide among themselves duties and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. It is in making this determination that what is known as the broad brush approach would have to come into play. What values to give to the indirect contributions of the parties is necessarily a matter of impression and judgment of the court
.
In most homes, even in a home where both the spouses are working full time, in the absence of concrete evidence it is more likely than not that ordinarily the wife will be the party who renders greater indirect contributions
. That said, even in a home where the wife is a full-time homemaker, it would be an exceptional home where the husband renders no indirect contribution at all. What values to attribute to each spouse in relation to indirect contributions would be a matter of assessment for the court and in that regard broad strokes would have to be the order of the day. In seeking to arrive at a ratio that represents both parties’ comparative indirect contribution towards the family, the court must, in the final analysis, exercise sound discretion along with a keen emphasis on all the relevant facts of each case.
[emphasis added]
133 In this case, despite the various allegations made by the Husband in his affidavits, I find that the Wife has adduced considerably more – and more credible – evidence of her involvement in caring for the Child and the household. For example, she has adduced objective documentary evidence of her payment of various expenses related to the Child, the domestic helper and household utilities. Taking a broad-brush approach to the evidence, I accept the Wife’s submission for a ratio of 60:40 in her favour as being appropriate and fair.
Average ratio
134 The final step of the structured approach involves using “each party’s respective direct and indirect percentage contributions [to derive] each party’s average percentage contribution to the family”:
ANJ v ANK at [22].
135 I accept the Wife’s submission that parties’ direct and indirect contributions should be given equal weight. Following from this, the average ratio of the DFC (93:7) and indirect contributions (40:60) would be 66.5:33.5 in the Husband’s favour.
Adverse inference against the Husband: my findings
136 The structured approach in ANJ v ANK does not detract from the court’s power to draw adverse inference against either party:
ANJ v ANK at [29]. I have already set out the test for the drawing of an adverse inference at [39] above.
137 The Wife contends that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Husband in respect of various assets which he has failed to disclose and whose value is unknown or unquantifiable.
Per the Wife’s case, such an adverse inference should lead to her being awarded a 10% uplift in her share of the matrimonial assets.
Per the Wife’s case, an adverse inference should be drawn in respect of the following categories of non-disclosure by the Husband:
(a) the Husband’s land and properties in China;
(b) the Husband’s companies in Singapore;
(c) the Husband’s companies overseas; and
(d) the Husband’s Trust Bank account.
(1) Husband’s land and properties in China
138 In respect of the Husband’s land and properties in China, the Wife asserts that these properties were purchased before the marriage, but that they were not fully paid up before the marriage, and that the Husband continued financing the mortgages for these properties during the marriage. The Wife has cited text messages exchanged between herself and the Husband on 25 August 2021, to support her assertion that these properties exist: according to her, the context for these text messages is that the Husband and his parents needed to sell these properties after losing a lawsuit.
181×
PWS at paras 103–105; Tab 75 of PCB.
139 In my view, the text messages cited by the Wife are actually ambiguous, as the remarks about “you all lose the lawsuit” make no reference to properties in China. Even taking the Wife’s case at its highest, the property or properties in China would have been sold about two and a half years prior to the commencement of divorce proceedings, for the purpose of satisfying a judgment debt.
140 In the circumstances, I find that the Wife has not shown that as at the IJ date, the Husband had failed to disclose his properties in China and/or the proceeds from the sale of such properties.
(2) Husband’s companies in Singapore
141 In respect of the Husband’s various companies in Singapore, the Wife refers to the Discovery Order, in which the Husband was ordered inter alia to provide all financial statements and bank account statements for all companies of which he “is or was a director and/or shareholder of in the past 3 financial years”.
182×
Tab 9 of PCB, at p 38.
In his compliance affidavit filed on 13 June 2025 (DA-2), the Husband merely repeated his claim that most of the companies were “dormant” and that he did not have the documents in his custody, possession or power.
183×
DA-2 at pp 5–6.
In her written submissions, the Wife highlights the following matters. First, in respect of NPL, the Husband has not provided any documents save for a letter bearing the company stamp which states that the company never commenced business and that it is dormant.
184×
Tab 76 of PCB.
The Wife points out that this letter is unsigned, and that there is no evidence as to the identity of the person who wrote this letter.
185×
PWS at para 106(a).
142 Second, in respect of AVGMPL, the Husband has not provided any documents.
186×
PWS at para 106(b).
143 Third, in respect of FPL, the Husband only provided the financial statement for the year ending 31 December 2022 while reiterating his claim about the company being dormant. The Wife disputes his claim, noting that FPL has maintained an active website and continued to participate in various activities such as a yearly marketing event called “Crown Asia”. The Wife contends that the Husband plainly omitted to disclose the later financial statements of the company as they would likely show that the company’s value increased in the subsequent years after the easing of Covid-19 restrictions.
187×
PWS at para 106(c).
144 Fourth, in respect of a company which I will refer to as “NSPL”, the Husband has again provided no documents, save for a letter bearing the company stamp which states that the company never commenced business and is dormant.
188×
Tab 78 of PCB.
The Wife points out that this letter is unsigned and that there is no evidence as to who wrote it.
189×
PWS at para 106(d).
145 Fifth, in respect of a company which I will refer to as “APL”, the Husband has only provided the bank statements for the company’s Maybank FlexiBiz account from October 2023 to June 2024 and November 2024 to 31 January 2025.
190×
DA-2 at pp 218–221.
The Wife submits that the Husband has failed to show any reason why he cannot provide the remaining bank account statements for APL.
191×
PWS at para 106(e).
146 Sixth, in respect of MLPL, the Husband has only provided the bank statements for the company’s CIMB account from November 2023 to September 2024, while making a bare assertion that these are all the documents that he had. Further, although MLPL’s registration date is 22 August 2022, the Husband claims that the company only started in 2024.
192×
Tab 79 of PCB.
The Wife disputes the Husband’s claims, pointing out that MLPL in fact filed financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2021 .
193×
Tab 80 of PCB.
Further, the Wife contends that MLPL appears to own an office in Hong Kong and that the Husband is likely involved in the business of the company’s Hong Kong arm.
194×
PWS at paras 106(f)–106(g).
147 On the basis of the evidence before me, I agree with the Wife that the Husband has been highly evasive and selective in the disclosure of financial information for his Singapore companies. Even in respect of the small handful of documents produced, there has been no explanation at all from the Husband as to the numerous gaps and anomalies in these documents:
eg, he has failed to explain why the letters provided in respect of NPL and NSPL are unsigned and has offered no clue as to the identity of the writer(s) of these letters. In the circumstances, I accept the Wife’s submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of these companies.
(3) Husband’s overseas companies
148 The Husband did not disclose any documents for these companies. This, according to the Wife, is a clear breach of the Discovery Order because the Husband has the following companies.
195×
PWS at paras 107–110.
First, the Husband has at least one company in China. The Wife relies on a photo in which the Husband is shown holding a China company registration certificate dated 20 October 2015.
196×
Tab 49 of PCB.
More recently, on 21 February 2025, the Husband received an award from Forbes China for Innovative Entrepreneur 2025 – an award given to entrepreneurs in China who have displayed significant success in their business.
197×
Tab 48 of PCB.
149 Second, the Husband has a 40% shareholding in a company in Malaysia which I will refer to as “AVGTSB”.
198×
Tab 50 of PCB.
Although the Husband claims that the company was dormant and that it has been shut down, the Wife points out that this is a bare assertion as he has not provided any supporting documents. He has also not explained what happened to his 40% shareholding in this company if indeed it was shut down. 150 Third, in addition to the companies in China and Malaysia, the Wife alleges that the Husband owns companies in Myanmar. She relies on a TikTok post on 21 January 2025, which stated that the Husband was participating in an investment in KK Park in Miaowadi, Myanmar.
199×
Tab 51 of PCB.
The Husband, for his part, claims that the TikTok post is “potentially defamatory in nature” and that he has made a police report
200×
DA-1 at paras 13–14.
– although I note that in the police report exhibited in his affidavit DA-1, the Husband simply complains of his “personal information being posted” online and shared on the messaging app Telegram.
201×
DA-1 at p 40.
151 Having regard to the evidence adduced, I accept the Wife’s submission that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Husband in respect of the companies in China and Malaysia. In respect of the alleged company (or companies) in Myanmar, however, I note that the TikTok video in question apparently came about on a date after the IJ. In any event, I find the video to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case that the Husband owns such companies. I therefore decline to draw an adverse inference in respect of the alleged Myanmar company (or companies).
(4) Husband’s Trust Bank account
152 In respect of the Husband’s Trust Bank account, the Wife explains that the Husband has never disclosed the existence of such a bank account and that the first time he referred to this item was in the Joint Summary, where he purported to value this account at $7.29. However, he has provided no documentary evidence relating to this account and no bank account statements.
202×
PWS at para 111.
This is not entirely accurate. The Husband had, in fact, made reference to a Trust Bank account in his DA-2.
203×
DA-2 at p 11.
153 The Husband’s case is that legal fees were paid using the Trust Bank account. Regrettably, despite the requirement to disclose “bank account statements” evidencing such payments, the Husband has only disclosed screenshots of the specific payments from his Trust Bank account to his solicitors.
204×
DA-2 at pp 925, 927–929.
Furthermore, the screenshots disclosed by the Husband show that a not insignificant amount of about $27,000 was transferred out of the Trust Bank account.
154 Given the evidence before me, I accept the Wife’s submission that the Husband has concealed the amounts held in the Trust Bank account and that an adverse inference should be drawn against him for this item.
Adverse inference against the Husband: the appropriate uplift
155 In
UZN v UZM at [28], it was explained that there were two approaches to give effect to an adverse inference: (a) the “quantification approach”; and (b) the “uplift approach”. In
XNE v XNF
[2026] SGHCF 7 at [50], I summarised when each approach should be employed to give effect to an adverse inference, but I also observed that our courts have, in some cases, employed both the “quantification approach” and the “uplift approach” cumulatively. This cumulative approach may be appropriate where there is a real possibility that the non-disclosing spouse had concealed assets exceeding the known sum. This was the approach taken by the courts in, for example, WRX v WRY
[2024] 1 SLR 851, WZF v WZG
[2025] 3 SLR 1219 and XPA v XPB
[2025] SGHCF 57.
156 In this case, notwithstanding that the “quantification approach” has been employed (for example in relation to the Husband’s cryptocurrency at S/N 33), as explained at [138]–[154] above, I find that the Husband has deliberately concealed information regarding (a) his companies in Singapore; (b) his companies in Malaysia and China; and (c) his Trust Bank account; and that as a result of his concealment, there is no evidence to make a finding on the value of these concealed assets. I therefore find that the “uplift approach” should be used here to give effect to the adverse inferences drawn in respect of these items.
157 Taking into account my findings as to the aggregate value of the matrimonial pool, I find it just and equitable to award the Wife a 7% uplift on her share of matrimonial assets. This works out to an amount of slightly over $560,000.
Final ratio
158 Taking into account the 7% uplift awarded to the Wife, I conclude that a just and equitable division ratio of the matrimonial assets is 59.5:40.5 in favour of the Husband. This means that the Husband is entitled to 59.5% of $8,065,790.21 which is $4,799,145.17, and the Wife is entitled to 40.5% which is $3,266,645.04. After deducting the amount of $214,824.69 already being held by the Wife as her own assets, a transfer of $3,051,820.35 is to be made by the Husband to the Wife from his own assets.
Orders to give effect to the division
159 As there are no jointly owned assets, a straightforward transfer of cash of $3,051,820.35 should be effected by the Husband to the Wife. The Wife has proposed a period of six months for the Husband to effect the transfer.
205×
PWS at para 144(a).
I find this proposal reasonable and therefore order that the Husband is to transfer cash of $3,051,820.35 within six months from the date of this judgment. No spousal maintenance ordered 160 The Wife has not asked for spousal maintenance, although she has submitted that the court ought to take into account “parties’ income and financial inequality … when considering parties’ respective shares of the division of assets”.
206×
PWS at para 119.
In any event, having regard to the amount due to her in the division of matrimonial assets, I am of the view that an award for spousal maintenance is not warranted in this case. Child maintenance Summary of parties’ position 161 Lastly, I address the issue of maintenance for the Child. 162 The Wife has put forward a list of monthly expenses for the Child which totals $12,297.27.
207×
PWS at para 124.
According to the Wife, the Husband’s monthly income should be pegged at the level which it was before divorce proceedings commenced, in order to account for his having artificially lowered his income after the commencement of divorce proceedings.
208×
PWS at paras 126–130.
Following from this proposition, the Wife computes the ratio of her income to the Husband’s income as 24:76 ( ie, $8,075.84:$25,240.23).
209×
PWS at para 131.
Applying this ratio to the figure of $12,297.27 which she put forward as the aggregate of the Child’s monthly expenses, the Wife argues that the Husband’s share of monthly child expenses should be $9,345.92.
210×
PWS at para 136.
163 Additionally, the Wife asks for child maintenance to be backdated to February 2024 (the month in which the Wife and the Child moved out of the Matrimonial Home).
211×
PWS at para 137.
The Wife has indicated that she did not apply for interim maintenance earlier because she wanted to save time and costs.
212×
PWS at para 140(a).
She acknowledges that the Husband has been contributing $2,000 to $2,500 per month to the Child’s expenses since June 2023. As such, she asks for the sum of $7,095.92 to be paid as backdated maintenance from February 2024 to the date of the order.
213×
PWS at paras 141–143.
164 For his part, the Husband accepts his responsibility to maintain the Child,
214×
DWS at para 33.
but contends that “maintenance should reflect the reasonable needs of the child and the actual ability of the paying party, and must not operate punitively”.
215×
DWS at paras 7, and 36–37.
His stated position is that the Child’s monthly expenses should be capped at $1,785,
216×
JS, Section 4(b), at p 81.
but he has offered to pay $2,000 per month with any additional expenses to be reimbursed subject to review of the relevant invoice.
217×
JS, Section 4(a), at p 67; See also DAM-1 at para 21(a).
At the hearing before me, the Husband asserted that he is presently paying $3,000 a month in child maintenance to the Wife.
218×
NE (27 August 2026), p 36 (lines 21–25).
However, the Wife has adduced evidence, in her PAM-1, of the transfers from the Husband in the period of February 2024 to August 2024, and these transfers ranged from $2,010 to $2,450.
219×
PAM-1 at para 45; see also PAM-1 at pp 353–359.
In his DAM-2, when responding to the Wife’s PAM-1, the Husband did not dispute that he had been contributing between $2,000 and $2,500 per month; he only disputed the Wife’s calculation of the Child’s reasonable expenses.
220×
DAM-2 at paras 44–51.
As such, I accept the Wife’s evidence that the Husband has been contributing between $2,000 and $2,500 per month, and I reject the Husband’s belated assertion that he has been contributing $3,000 per month.
The legal principles
165 In assessing child maintenance, I first set out the relevant legal principles.
166 Section 127(1) WC provides that the court can order a parent to pay maintenance for the benefit of his or her child when granting a judgment of divorce. Section 127(2) provides that the provisions of Part 8 and 9 apply with the necessary modifications. Section 69 WC falls within Part 8; and s 69(4) WC sets out the factors which the court is to have regard to in ordering child maintenance:
(4) The court, when ordering maintenance for a wife, an incapacitated husband or a child under this section, is to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the following matters:
(a) the financial needs of the wife, incapacitated husband or child
;
(b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the wife, incapacitated husband or child;
(c) any physical or mental disability of the wife, incapacitated husband or child;
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e) the contributions made by each of the parties to the marriage to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;
(f) the standard of living enjoyed
—
…
(iii)
by the child before a parent neglected or refused to provide reasonable maintenance for the child
;
(g) in the case of a child, the manner in which the child was being, and in which the parties to the marriage expected the child to be, educated or trained; and
(h) the conduct of each of the parties to the marriage, if the conduct is such that it would in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it.
[emphasis added]
167 I note that one of the predominant themes of the Wife’s submissions on child maintenance is that the Husband should be expected to maintain the Child at the same standard of living which she enjoyed prior to the divorce of her parents. This was apparent, for example, from her counsel’s response during the hearing when I queried the basis on which the Wife was seeking a monthly sum of nearly $4,000 for “holidays / travel”: counsel’s response was that this figure was a monthly average “based on the historical standard of living”, whereby the two parties and the Child “would take about three trips a year, business class, and stay at five-star hotels”.
221×
NE (27 August 2026), p 22 (lines 12–15).
168 With respect, the Wife’s understanding of what the law provides in respect of child maintenance is incorrect. As may be seen from s 69(4) WC, the standard of living enjoyed by the Child is a consideration that the court will have regard to – but it is only one consideration. The overarching inquiry is what is “reasonable”, and our courts have consistently held that this is an objective inquiry which is not simply tied to the parents’ wealth or their ability to indulge their children in “luxuries”. Wealthy parents may indulge their children beyond their reasonable needs, but the court is only concerned with what a child in the circumstances reasonably needs. As Choo Han Teck J explained in WOS v WOT
[2023] SGHCF 36 (“
WOS v WOT
”) (at [50]):
…(A) child’s reasonable needs are not determined solely by the financial capabilities of its parents.
The focus of the enquiry should be on whether the expense itself is needed for each child. Although wealthy parents may indulge their children beyond what they reasonably need, they can expend the largesse at their pleasure. The court is only concerned with what a child in the circumstances reasonably needs.
In this connection, the full expenses of a tertiary education at an overseas institution are not reasonable expenses that parents should be mandated to pay for — simply on the basis that they can afford it. Instead, they are luxury expenses that parents can choose to indulge their children in. A much more reasonable expense is the costs related to tertiary education at a local university or a portion thereof. Furthermore, there is no reason why children who wish to pursue an overseas education cannot take on some responsibility for their decision, for instance by either off-setting some of their unnecessary expenses, obtaining scholarships, grants, and student loans, or contributing to their own expenses by working part-time. Children should not simply expect their parents to provide for every desire. [emphasis added]
169 Specifically in relation to the “previous standard of living” enjoyed by a child of the marriage, the fact that parties paid for items during the marriage does not automatically render such expenses reasonable expenses for the purposes of determining maintenance: see
WBU v WBT
[2023] SGHCF 3. At [9]–[10] of the judgment, Debbie Ong JAD held that:
9 Maintenance is ordered to provide for the reasonable needs of the child, having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case: see s 69(4) of the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed) (the “Charter”).
The mere fact that the parties have been paying for certain items during the marriage does not automatically render such expenses reasonable expenses for the purposes of determining maintenance.
Instead, parties should show how their projected expenditure for the child’s expenses is reasonable having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the child’s standard of living and the parents’ financial means and resources. Further, the changed circumstances following the marital breakdown of the parents’ relationship are relevant as the breakdown of a household invariably has an impact on the family’s financial needs and resources.
10 It follows that in seeking to quantify the child’s reasonable expenses, parties should avoid an overly mathematical approach where receipts are adduced to prove every single item of expenditure. This is not to say that no evidence is ever required to support proposals for what is sought as reasonable maintenance; it depends on the type of expenses sought, and of course, on the facts of each case.
While receipts are useful as an indication of the child’s accustomed standard of living, they are not necessarily conclusive of what the child’s reasonable expenses are.
It may be helpful for parties to apply their minds to drawing up what can be described as a ‘budget’, whereby broad categories of the child’s estimated needs are identified, and a corresponding reasonable sum is proposed for each category …
[emphasis added]
170 The point, therefore, is that even if a child is “accustomed” to flying on business class and staying in five-star hotels on holiday or eating out in high-end restaurants every weekend, and even if such expenses have previously been paid for by one or both of the parents during the marriage, it does not mean that these are reasonable expenses for the purposes of determining child maintenance.
The Child’s reasonable monthly expenses and each party’s share thereof
171 Applying the above principles to the present case, I find the Wife’s estimate of $12,300 in monthly expenses for the Child to be objectively extravagant and unrealistic, considering that the Child is presently a Primary 4 student in a local school. The Wife’s own case is that she is earning a net amount of about $8,000 per month, and that the Husband currently contributes monthly sums ranging from $2,000 to $2,500 for the Child’s expenses. On her own case, in other words, she would not be able to afford the Child’s monthly expenses, much less her own expenses. A number of the individual items of expense in her list also do not constitute reasonable expenses for a ten-year-old child in the present circumstances – for example
, the item of nearly $4,000 per month for “holidays / travel”. As another example, the provision for the expense of maintaining a private car for the Child’s travel within Singapore is – objectively – a luxury, even if the Wife contemplates that the car will not be exclusively used for the Child. I note too that the Child’s school bus fees are already included as a separate item in the list of monthly expenses.
172 On the other hand, the Husband’s estimate of $1,785 is premised on requiring the Wife to move in with her parents so as to “average out” certain costs by dint of there being more persons within the household. I do not find it reasonable for the Husband to require the Wife to “economise” by moving in with her parents. Indeed, this suggestion is wholly self-serving, considering that he himself evidently saw no need to downsize his own accommodation from the current lease at OUE Twin Peaks, even after the grant of IJ made it clear that the Wife and Child were not moving into that condominium with him.
173 I have set out in the table at Annex 3 the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses. Where an item of expense is disallowed, the reason is stated in the column titled “Reasons”.
Per my findings in the table at Annex 3, the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses total $5,609.37.
174 As to the share which each party should bear of the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses, the Wife is correct to point out that the courts have generally considered parties’ income as a relevant factor in ordering child maintenance: see, eg
, WBU v WBT
[2023] SGHCF 3 at [41]–[43], ANJ v ANK at [43] and XHG v XHH
[2025] SGHCF 2. Again, however, this is only one of the factors to be considered: s 69(4)(b) WC. The starting point is that both parents are under a joint and equal duty to maintain their children: s 68 WC.
175 In this connection, I note that there are cases where – notwithstanding parties’ disparate earning capacities – the courts have ordered both parents to bear an equal share of the child’s maintenance because there is nothing to show that one of the parents was unable to contribute equally: see, for example, TBC v TBD
[2015] SGHC 130 at [27] and BNH v BNI
[2013] SGHC 283 at [37]. Much depends on the specific facts of each case.
176 In the present case, 50% of the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses will come to $2,804.69 (rounded to the nearest cent). The Wife’s net monthly income in YA 2024 is $8,075.84.
222×
PWS at para 125.
Furthermore, it must be recalled that even though the Husband has been found to be considerably wealthier than the Wife, this financial inequality is addressed by the fact that the Wife is receiving 40.5% of the matrimonial pool, with the Husband having to transfer $3,051,820.35 to the Wife within the next six months. I am of the view that there is no reason why the Wife will be unable to contribute equally to the Child’s maintenance.
177 For the reasons given above, I find that each party should bear 50% of the Child’s reasonable monthly expenses of $5,609.37; and I order the Husband to pay $2,804.69 in child maintenance to the Wife every month. He is to pay this monthly amount on the first day of each month by crediting it to the bank account specified by the Wife (details of the bank account are to be provided by the Wife’s counsel to the Husband).
178 As for the backdating of the child maintenance order, I agree with the Wife that this should be backdated to February 2024 and that the backdating should take into account the fact that the Husband has been providing, on average, $2,250 in monthly child maintenance. Accordingly, a lump sum of $17,750.08 (($2,804.69 - $2,250) x 32 months) should be paid by the Husband to the Wife. This is to be made within 14 days from the date of this judgment. For the avoidance of doubt, this backdated child maintenance includes the month of September 2026. The Husband will thus start paying monthly child maintenance (as determined in the preceding paragraph) from October 2026 onwards.
Costs
179 Given the nature of proceedings for ancillary matters in divorce suits, I am of the view that it is fair for each party to bear his or her own costs of these proceedings. While it is true that the Husband largely failed to comply with the Discovery Order and sought to conceal various assets, this has been addressed by the drawing of adverse inferences against him which led to certain sums being added to the matrimonial pool (where the value of the undisclosed assets was quantifiable) and by the further award of a 7% uplift to the Wife. It is also true that some delay was caused by the Husband applying for leave to file a further affidavit and also having to file various versions of his affidavits in order to comply with the court’s directions. The question, however, is whether his conduct vis-à-vis the filing of affidavits was unreasonable. Considering that the Husband was self-represented at the time of filing DLA-1 and DLA-2, I have decided to give him the benefit of the doubt on this occasion.
Conclusion
180 To sum up, I make the following orders:
(a) The matrimonial assets are valued at a total of $8,065,790.21;
(b) The matrimonial assets are to be divided 59.5:40.5 in the Husband’s favour. To give effect to the division, the Husband is to pay the Wife the total sum of $3,051,820.35 within six months from the date of this judgment;
(c) No spousal maintenance is ordered for the Wife;
(d) The Husband is to pay the Wife $2,804.69 for monthly child maintenance by crediting this amount to the bank account specified by the Wife on the first day of every month;
(e) The Husband is to pay the Wife $17,750.08 as backdated child maintenance within 14 days from the date of this judgment; and
(f) Each party is to bear his or her own costs of these proceedings.
[Note: At the hearing on 16 September 2026 for the issuance of this written judgment to parties, the Husband failed to attend and did not respond to attempts by court staff to contact him. The Husband did not notify the Court beforehand of any reason for not being able to attend the hearing. At the hearing, the Court granted the application by the Wife’s counsel for an order that with regard to payment by the Husband of the Wife’s share of matrimonial assets, instead of this being paid in a lump sum within 6 months, her share be paid instead in monthly instalments of $500,000, such instalments to be paid on the 16th of each month starting 16 October 2026, with the final instalment of $551,820.35 to be paid on 16 March 2027.]
Mavis Chionh Sze Chyi
Judge of the High Court
Thian Wen Yi and Ee Zhi Ming Justin (Harry Elias Partnership LLP) for the plaintiff;
The defendant in person.
Annex 1: Table of matrimonial assets
223×
Assets which are agreed by parties to be $0 are omitted.
S/N
Description
Finding
1Mercedes Benz G350D AMG Line 4Matic
$239,883.01
2100% shareholding in NPL (10,000 out of 10,000 shares)
$10,000.00
3100% shareholding in AVGMPL (100 out of 100 shares)
$345.12
4100% shareholding in FPL (1,000,000 out of 1,000,000 shares)
$970,085.00
5100% shareholding in ADS VG (FPL holds 70,000 out of 70,000 shares)
$18,369.00
650% shareholding in APL (500 out of 1,000 shares)
$6,540.57
7Bank of China multi CCY (account no. ending -9941)
$227.82
8CIMB Fastsaver (account no. ending -4265)
$1,028.83
11Citibank Citi Wealth First (account no. ending -8824)
("Citi 8824")
$314,599.39
15Standard Chartered Bonus$aver (account no. ending -3884)
$113.86
16Trust Bank (account no. ending –6315)
$7.29
17CPF Ordinary Account
$203,749.19
18CPF Special Account
$67,509.42
19CPF Medisave Account
$58,500.87
20Goyard L'Alpin leather backpack
$6,500.00
21Bottega Veneta brown medium classic intrecciato briefcase
$1,500.00
22Goyard brown pouch
$2,000.00
23Christian Louboutin leather clutch bag
$800.00
24Fendi monster leather clutch bag
$600.00
25Bottega Veneta wallet
$400.00
26Patek Philippe 5764R
$218,800.00
27Richard Mille 010
$215,000.00
28Rolex GMT Master
$49,000.00
29Richard Mille x Rafael Nadal 2015 RM 035
$619,378.00
30LV sling bag
$1,371.00
31Spending at luxury shops such as Hermes, LV, Balenciaga, Chanel etc from 3 September 2023 to IJ date (29 April 2024)
$15,806.80
32Laguna Country Club membership
$120,000.00
33Cumulative amount transferred into Husband's 3 cryptocurrency wallets from 29 April 2021 to June 2023
$3,865,220.03
34Debt owed to Husband from FPL
$41,000.00
35Debt owed to Husband from ADS VG
$183,000.00
36Debt owed to the Husband from MLPL
$18,000.00
37Debt owed to the Husband from Kelvin
$80,000.00
38Debt owed to the Husband from Malaysian debtor
$14,525.32
39Transfers to Emi
$17,388.00
40Transfers to Husband's mother
$440,000.00
41Transfers to Chia Heww Kiat
$49,717.00
42HSBC credit card liability
$0.00
43Trust Bank liability
$0.00
44ADS VG’s liability
$0.00
45NPL’s liability
$0.00
46Personal liabilities to 3rd parties
$0.00
47Matrimonial Home
$0.00
Value of Husband’s assets:
$7,850,965.52
48Mazda3 Hatchback
$56,800.00
49OCBC Premier Easisave (account no. ending -5001)
$0.78
51Standard Chartered E$aver (account no. ending -7457)
$4,025.64
52Maybank Savings (account no. ending -0461)
$752.00
53CIMB Fastsaver (account no. ending -2809)
$1.01
54CIMB Fixed Deposit account 023000980201
$10,363.54
55CPF Ordinary Account
$154,919.74
56CPF Special Account
$42,876.94
57CPF Medisave Account
$31,040.04
58Amount owed to Husband's mother, Mdm Chen
-$175,689.00
59Purple Audemars Piguet watch (26319OR)
$0.00
60Cartier watch
$12,800.00
61Chanel watch
$0.00
62Chanel bag
$5,199.00
63Celine bag
$0.00
64Celine bag
$0.00
65Hermes Kelly bag
$37,027.00
66Hermes Constance bag
$24,820.00
67Hermes Lindy mini
$9,888.00
68Hermes Picotin bag
$0.00
69Property in Australia
$0.00
70Bukit Batok HDB
$0.00
Value of Wife’s assets:
$214,824.69
Total value of matrimonial pool:
$8,065,790.21
Annex 2: Table of parties’ direct financial contributions
S/N
Finding as per Annex 1
Husband’s contribution
Wife’s contribution
Reasons
Husband’s assets
1$239,883.01
$239,883.01
$0.00
This sum was not included by way of adverse inference, but was included pursuant to a finding that the vehicle is beneficially owned by the Husband rather than the company as he asserts.
2$10,000.00
$10,000.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
3$345.12
$345.12
$0.00
Agreed sum
4$970,085.00
$970,085.00
$0.00
This sum was included pursuant to the Husband’s disclosure (albeit belatedly) of the financial statements in DA-1.
5$18,369.00
$18,369.00
$0.00
As per S/N 4, this sum was included based on the company's financial statements disclosed by the Husband.
6$6,540.57
$6,540.57
$0.00
This sum was included by agreement based on the Husband's valuation.
7$227.82
$227.82
$0.00
Agreed sum
8$1,028.83
$1,028.83
$0.00
Agreed sum
11$314,599.39
$314,599.39
$0.00
Agreed sum
15$113.86
$113.86
$0.00
Agreed sum
16$7.29
$7.29
$0.00
The value here is included by way of agreement based on the Husband's own valuation. An uplift was separately accounted for on account of the Husband’s failure to disclose the bank statements.
17$203,749.19
$203,749.19
$0.00
Agreed sum
18$67,509.42
$67,509.42
$0.00
Agreed sum
19$58,500.87
$58,500.87
$0.00
Agreed sum
20$6,500.00
$6,500.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
21$1,500.00
$1,500.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
22$2,000.00
$2,000.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
23$800.00
$800.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
24$600.00
$600.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
25$400.00
$400.00
$0.00
Agreed sum
26$218,800.00
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
27$215,000.00
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
28$49,000.00
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
29$619,378.00
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
30$1,371.00
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
31$15,806.80
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
32$120,000.00
$120,000.00
$0.00
Husband's own implicit admission that he owns the asset. Not included by way of adverse inference.
33$3,865,220.03
$0.00
$0.00
Adverse inference drawn.
34$41,000.00
$41,000.00
$0.00
Debts were based on the Husband's own disclosure. Husband's case was that these debts were not recoverable, but that was disbelieved. The sum was not included by way of an adverse inference.
35$183,000.00
$183,000.00
$0.00
36$18,000.00
$18,000.00
$0.00
37$80,000.00
$80,000.00
$0.00
38$14,525.32
$14,525.32
$0.00
39$17,388.00
$17,388.00
$0.00
Added into the matrimonial pool by way of dissipation, rather than by adverse inference
40$440,000.00
$440,000.00
$0.00
41$49,717.00
$49,717.00
$0.00
42$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
43$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
44$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
45$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
46$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
47$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
Wife’s assets
48$56,800.00
$0.00
$56,800.00
Husband's bare assertion that he contributed $70,000 to the purchase of this vehicle is rejected.
49$0.78
$0.00
$0.78
Husband appears to agree as it is left blank in the Joint Summary.
51$4,025.64
$0.00
$4,025.64
52$752.00
$0.00
$752.00
53$1.01
$0.00
$1.01
54$10,363.54
$0.00
$10,363.54
55$154,919.74
$0.00
$154,919.74
56$42,876.94
$0.00
$42,876.94
57$31,040.04
$0.00
$31,040.04
58-$175,689.00
$0.00
-$175,689.00
Husband’s bare (and unexplained) assertion for this to be attributed to him is rejected.
59$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
60$12,800.00
$0.00
$12,800.00
This sum was included because the Wife failed to discharge her burden of proof that this was a gift and should be excluded.
61$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
62$5,199.00
$0.00
$5,199.00
This sum was included because the Wife failed to discharge her burden of proof that this was a pre-marriage asset.
63$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
64$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
65$37,027.00
$0.00
$37,027.00
This sum was included because the Wife failed to discharge her burden of proof that this belongs to her sister.
66$24,820.00
$0.00
$24,820.00
67$9,888.00
$0.00
$9,888.00
68$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
69$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
70$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
Not included in matrimonial pool.
Total DFC:
$2,866,389.69
$214,824.69
Annex 3: Table of Child’s monthly expenses
S/N
Description
Finding
Reasons
Child’s share of Wife’s household expenses
1Rent
$1,650.00
See reason at [172] of judgment.
2Marketing and groceries
$450.00
See reason at [172] of judgment.
3Eating out
$100.00
Reduced amount to account for the overlap with S/N 2 and 27
4Purchases from pharmacy / chinese medicine shop
$0.00
Provision in S/N 25 for monthly medical expenses and S/N 27 for, inter alia, vitamins
5Wi-Fi
$0.00
An expense that would have been incurred by the Wife regardless of whether the Child stays with the Wife. See
WLE v WLF
[2023] SGHCF 14 at [18].
6Netflix & Disney+
$0.00
Luxury item which either parent is free to provide if he/she wishes
7Utilities
$117.70
See reason at [172] of judgment.
8Maintenance of aircon
$0.00
An expense that would have been incurred by the Wife regardless of whether the Child stays with the Wife. See
WLE v WLF
[2023] SGHCF 14 at [18].
Child’s share of Wife’s car expenses
9–16Various expenses, eg
, petrol, road tax, insurance, etc
$0.00
Luxury item. See reason at [171] of judgment.
Child’s share of Wife’s domestic helper expenses
17Salary
$475.00
See reason at [172] of judgment.
18Levy
$30.00
See reason at [172] of judgment.
19Medical
$9.00
De minimis difference
20Return air ticket
$9.00
De minimis difference
21MOL checkup
$5.00
De minimis difference
22Agency fees
$105.00
De minimis difference
Child’s personal expenses
23School fees
$20.00
Agreed sum.
24School bus
$412.00
Supplemental CCA bus service requested by the Wife is reasonable.
25Medical
$33.00
De minimis difference
26Dental
$28.00
De minimis difference
27Food, toiletries, vitamins
$200.00
Food is already accounted for above under S/N 2 and 3. Allowance is separately accounted for below at S/N 44. The Wife has not provided any basis to ask for $1,100 per month.
28Clothes and shoes
$50.00
$600 a year is a reasonable amount for a ten-year-old child; and to account for the overlap with S/N 37 for Chinese New Year clothes, S/N 41 for school uniforms and S/N 42 for school shoes
29Hair cut (2 times per month)
$20.00
$20 is a reasonable sum for a ten-year-old's monthly haircut; no reason provided as to the need for two haircuts every month
30Toys/books
$50.00
$600 a year is a reasonable sum for a ten-year-old child. Each parent is free to indulge the Child further if he/she wishes.
31Birthday cake
$0.00
Luxury item; each parent is free to decide how he/she wishes to celebrate the Child's birthday and to pay for the chosen celebrations accordingly
32Birthday gift
$0.00
33Birthday party
$0.00
34Mobile phone and watch
$23.00
The Wife's own adduced evidence (PAM-1 at pp 295-303) shows a monthly bill of $23.
35Outings
$50.00
$600 a year is sufficient for trips to the Zoo and other palces of interest for a ten-year-old child
36Holidays / travel
$0.00
Luxury item; each parent is free to provide the Child with holidays of their choice and to pay for these accordingly.
37Chinese New Year clothes
$20.00
De minimis difference
38Insurance premiums
$66.67
Wife's figure as her primary caregiver
39Private tuition
$1,365.00
Based on Wife's valuation and evidence adduced
40Art class
$225.00
Based on Wife's evidence of payment, the amount fluctuates. $225 is the mid-point of parties' position and is somewhat in line with the averages of the fluctuating sums adduced by the Wife
41School uniform
$6.00
De minimis difference
42School shoes
$10.00
De minimis difference
43Watch line subscription
$0.00
No evidence from the Wife as to what this item is and why it is a reasonable expense for the child
44Allowance
$80.00
Husband's estimate of $40 for 20 weekdays a month is equivalent to $2 a day. That is hardly reasonable.
Child’s total reasonable monthly expenses:
$5,609.37
Перевод на русский: GigaChat-3-Ultra, 17.09.2026. Машинный перевод, вычитывается редакцией.
Реквизиты
| Страна | Сингапур |
| Орган | Суды Сингапура |
| Вид | судебное решение |
| Язык | en |
| Дата документа | 2026-09-16 |
| Объём | 132 534 знаков |
| Редакций | 1 |
| Впервые увидели | 2026-09-17 |
| Проверен | 2026-09-18 02:47 |
| citation | [2026] SGHCF 31 |
| case_no | HCF/DT 1100/2024 |
| catchwords | ['Family Law — Maintenance — Child', 'Family Law — Matrimonial assets — Division — Whether an adverse inference should be drawn — Quantification and uplift approaches'] |
| organ | Суды Сингапура |
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