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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: нарушение прав заявителя на доступ к данным при экстрадиции

ROBERT WESTBROOK v THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE

судебное решение 2026-11-09 42 974 знаков Персональные данные
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Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-11-10.

Mrs Justice Steyn DBE:

Introduction

1.The claimant has brought Part 8 claims against the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’) and the National Crime Agency (‘NCA’) for compliance orders under s.167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘2018 Act’). He made a data subject access request (‘SAR’) of the CPS on 13 April 2026 and of the NCA on 27 April 2026. Both SARs were made under s.45 of the 2018 Act which forms part of the law enforcement processing regime in Part 3 of the 2018 Act .

2.The claimant contends that the defendants have breached their obligations under s.45 and that the court should exercise its discretion under s.167 to make a compliance order. The defendants resist the making of any such order.

The statutory provisions

3.Part 3 of the 2018 Act governs processing of personal data by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes. Sections 29-31 establish the scope of that regime. Both defendants are competent authorities for the purpose of Part 3: see section 30(1)(a), read with paragraphs 24 and 47 of Schedule 7.

4.The characterisation of processing depends upon its purpose not merely the identity of the controller. Nonetheless, it is common ground that the processing undertaken by the NCA in locating, arresting and bringing the claimant before the extradition court, and by the CPS in prosecuting the extradition proceedings on behalf of the requesting State, falls within the law enforcement framework.

5.Section 45(1) of the 2018 Act provides, so far as relevant, that a data subject is entitled to obtain from the controller “confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her is being processed” and “where that is the case, access to the personal data”.

6.S.45(4) -(7) provide (so far as material):

“(4)

The controller may restrict, wholly or partly, the rights conferred by subsection (1) to the extent that and for so long as the restriction is, having regard to the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of the data subject, a necessary and proportionate measure to(a)

avoid obstructing an official or legal inquiry, investigation or procedure;

(b)

avoid prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties;

…

(e)

protect the rights and freedoms of others.

(5)Where the rights of a data subject under subsection (1) are restricted under subsection (4), wholly or partly, the controller must inform the data subject in writing without undue delay and in any event before the end of the applicable time period (as to which see section 54)(a)

that the rights of the data subject have been restricted, (b)

of the reasons for the restriction, (c)

of the data subject’s right to make a request to the Commission under section 51, (d)

of the data subject’s right to lodge a complaint with the Commission under section 165, and (e)

of the data subject’s right to apply to a court under section 167 .

(6)Subsection (5)(a) and (b) do not apply to the extent that the provision of the information would undermine the purpose of the restriction.

(7)The controller must(a)

record the reasons for a decision to restrict (whether wholly or partly) the rights of a data subject under subsection (1) in reliance on subsection (4), and (b)

if requested to do so by the Commission, make the record available to the Commission.”

(There is now a subsection (5)(ca) but that had not been added to s.45 at the time of these requests and responses.)

7.Section 167 of the 2018 Act provides, so far as material:

“(1)

This section applies if, on an application by a data subject, a court is satisfied that there has been an infringement of the data subject’s rights under the data protection legislation in contravention of that legislation.

(2)A court may make an order for the purposes of securing compliance with the data protection legislation which requires the controller in respect of the processing, or a processor acting on behalf of that controller – (a)

to take steps specified in the order, or (b) to refrain from taking steps specified in the order.

(3)The order may, in relation to each step, specify the time at which, or the period within which, it must be taken.”

8.Section 180 A of the 2018 Act provides, so far as material:

“(1)

This section applies where a court is required to determine whether a data subject is entitled to information by virtue of a right under—

…

(c)

section 45 of this Act (law enforcement processing: right of access by the data subject);

…

(2)The court may require the controller to make available for inspection by the court so much of the information as is available to the controller.

(3)But, unless and until the question in subsection (1) has been determined in the data subject's favour, the court may not require the information to be disclosed to the data subject or the data subject's representatives, whether by discovery (or, in Scotland, recovery) or otherwise.

(4)Where the question in subsection (1) relates to a right under a provision listed in subsection (1)(a), (c) or (d), this section does not confer power on the court to require the controller to carry out a search for information that is more extensive than the reasonable and proportionate search required by that provision.”

Background: the extradition proceedings

9.The claimant is the subject of extradition proceedings arising from a request by the United States of America. The National Extradition Unit of the NCA has responsibility for locating and arresting persons sought under extradition arrangements. The claimant was arrested by the NCA on 26 September 2024 and brought before Westminster Magistrates’ Court the same day. He was remanded in custody, then released on bail about five months later.

10.The extradition hearing took place in Westminster Magistrates’ Court over three days, from 3-5 November 2025, before District Judge Snow. The claimant was represented in the extradition proceedings by leading and junior Counsel, instructed by his solicitors. In respect of requested persons arrested in England and Wales, extradition proceedings are conducted by the Serious Economic, Organised Crime and International Directorate (‘SEOCID’) of the CPS, on behalf of the requesting State. The District Judge handed down his reserved judgment on 14 January 2026, in light of which, on 25 February 2026, the Secretary of State ordered the claimant’s extradition on charges of unauthorised computer access. He was discharged from extradition on counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, alleging wire fraud and securities fraud, following a concession by the requesting State that they were not extradition offences.

11.The claimant’s application for permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Sir Peter Lane, by an order dated 26 August 2026. The claimant has renewed his application for permission to appeal to an oral hearing, which is listed on 12 November 2026. The claimant explained that his contention in the extradition appeal, based on new evidence, is that the District Judge was misled regarding the healthcare provision. He submits that something has gone wrong in the extradition proceedings, and that that is relevant to the exercise of my discretion under s.167 of the 2018 Act

. However, the merits of the extradition appeal are not a matter for me to determine in these proceedings. Indeed, I do not have the material on which it would be possible to form a view.

The CPS SARs and responses

12.The claimant first sent a SAR to the CPS on 30 January 2026 (‘the first CPS SAR’, which was given reference “105.26” by the CPS). In the first CPS SAR the claimant stated that the USA had provided four responses to requests for further information during the extradition proceedings. The claimant sought the questions which the UK asked of the requesting State which had prompted those responses (i.e. the requests for further information (‘RFFI’)). The claimant indicated that he had already received one of the RFFIs, namely that dated 26 November 2025, to which the U.S. Department of Justice responded on 9 December 2025.

13.The CPS responded to the first CPS SAR on 25 February 2026, providing the requested information save that some information was withheld pursuant to s.45(4) (b) and (e). The response informed Mr Westbrook that if he was “unhappy with the response and decisions, [he was] entitled to the following”, setting out section 45(5) in full (see paragraph ‎6 above), and that, alternatively, he could contact the Information Commissioner’s Office, for which the CPS provided contact details.

14.On 25 February 2026, the claimant raised a query about one of the documents with which he had been provided, in view of its odd formatting. Then on 16 March 2026 he raised a further query as to whether the RFFI to which the USA responded on 22 October 2025 had been overlooked.

15.The CPS responded to the first of those queries in a letter dated 17 April 2026, explaining that, in error, they had supplied him with a draft version of one of the RFFIs and enclosing a copy of the final document. The CPS had earlier, on 7 April 2026, responded to the second query, explaining that there were no RFFI questions to which that response from the USA corresponded. Separately, on 29 April 2026, in the context of the extradition proceedings, Kate Leonard wrote to the claimant’s solicitors explaining that one of the RFFIs had included a written advice, not merely stand-alone questions, and so exemptions had been applied in respect of the advice. The questions had been extracted and provided. Ms Leonard continued:

“The reason that there are no questions for some of the answers is that some of the questions were posed during the course of a telephone conference with the USA authorities and were never supplied in writing. This has all been explained to your client on more than one occasion.

Your client has also requested details of ex parte applications. It has been explained to him that there haven’t been any. As you know such applications are extremely rare. In fact, I can’t remember the last time I dealt with one, many years ago certainly.”

16.The claimant makes no complaint about the response to the first CPS SAR.

17.The claimant made a second request of the CPS on 13 April 2026 in which he sought “all the documents sent from the CPS to the English Court as part of this extradition case on behalf of the US as requesting state”. He elaborated that he sought all documents sent to any UK court in respect of his extradition case, regardless of whether they had already been served on his lawyers, save that he excluded from his request seven specified documents that he had already received.

18.The Information Access Team raised the second CPS SAR internally with SEOCID who responded on 16 April 2026, confirming “there are no further disclosable documents that have not already been served on his instructing solicitor”.

19.In the letter of 17 April 2026 to which I have referred, as well as responding to the claimant’s queries in respect of the first CPS SAR, the CPS addressed the claimant’s second CPS SAR. The CPS stated:

“Please note that, in relation to your most recent Right of Access request (ref.322.26), any documents received after the date of your previous Right of Access request (ref.105.26) were considered in line with the exemptions set out in the Act . Accordingly, no further documents can be disclosed to you under the Data Protection Act.

I can confirm that you have been provided with all personal data to which you are entitled under the Data Protection Act up to within your Right of Access request ref 105.26. [sic]”

20.The letter of 17 April 2026 informed the claimant that if he was unhappy with the response and decisions he was entitled to contact the Information Commissioner’s Office, again providing the ICO’s contact details. The letter did not reiterate that he was entitled to take each of the steps set out in s.45(5)

(including, in particular, applying to the court under s.167

), as the CPS had informed him in the response to the first CPS SAR. The matters and exemptions relied on to withhold data were specified in a document attached to the 17 April 2026 which indicated that information which was not Mr Westbrook’s personal data was withheld and that the exemptions in s.45(4)

(b) and (e) had been applied.

The NCA SAR and response

21.In his SAR directed to the NCA on 27 April 2026 (‘the NCA SAR’) the claimant requested:

“All NCA/Police documents made available to the judges at WMC (or any court) in relation to this matter between September 2024 and January 2026.”

His request made clear that “this matter” was a reference to the extradition proceedings in which he was the requested party.

22.The NCA responded to the NCA SAR on 28 May 2026. The NCA provided the claimant with two documents, namely a copy of a photograph of his passport and a photograph of himself. The NCA’s response stated that it had relied on s.45(4) (a) to restrict access to some of the personal data it held which fell within his request.

23.The NCA’s response noted: “you will not be informed of any exemptions or restrictions relied upon if to do so would undermine their application.” This appeared to suggest that the NCA might be relying on s.45(6) of the 2018 Act . However, the NCA has not, in fact, relied on s.45(6) in this case.

24.The NCA’s response informed the claimant of his right to make a complaint or request an internal review by writing to the NCA’s Statutory Disclosure Team, and of his rights under s.45(5) (c), (d) and (e).

25.As I shall explain further, without prejudice to its contention that the exemption in s.45(4) (a) applied, the NCA has subsequently provided the data which it had withheld, all of which it states had already been provided to the claimant (or his representatives) in the extradition proceedings.

History of the proceedings

26.The claim against the CPS was issued on 21 July 2026 and formally served on 24 August 2026. The claim against the NCA was issued on 19 August 2026 and formally served on 23 September 2026. The defendants filed acknowledgments of service each indicating their intention to contest the claim.

27.The CPS filed and served the first witness statement of Rakesh Dhanak, a solicitor of the Government Legal Department, dated 4 September 2026.

28.The NCA filed and served the first witness statement of Rosemary Deane, a lawyer in the NCA, dated 7 October 2026 which addressed service of the claim and sought until 21 October 2026 to file evidence.

29.Following a hearing on 7 October 2026, Master Dagnall gave directions with a view to the claims being listed for hearing before a High Court Judge prior to the renewed application for permission in the extradition proceedings. His directions included a requirement that the defendants file and serve witness evidence by 19 October 2026:

“which shall include a statement (even in only general terms without identifying any documents) as to whether any material has been provided by them to any court (including in particular the Westminster Magistrates Court) in relation to any matter involving the Claimant which material has not been provided to the Claimant (or his legal representatives in such litigation)”.

30.The claimant has emphasised that he is concerned as to whether any material was provided to the court determining his extradition proceedings which has not been disclosed to him (whether directly or via his legal representatives). Master Dagnall’s order was directed to that concern and the claimant indicated that if he had received clear assurances that that had not occurred, he would have brought these claims to an end.

31.In compliance with Master Dagnall’s order, the CPS filed a second witness statement of Mr Dhanak, dated 16 October 2026, and the NCA filed statements made by Andrew Kelly, Senior Manager of the National Extradition Unit at the NCA and Kirsty Fletcher, a Senior Officer within the Statutory Disclosure Team at the NCA.

32.Master Dagnall’s order referred the claims to a High Court Judge with a suggestion (but not a requirement) that they be listed for hearing within the week commencing 26 October 2026. Following further correspondence with the parties, Collins Rice J made an order on 22 October 2026, pursuant to which the trial was listed before me on 3 November 2026.

The claim against the CPS

The claim form

33.In the claim form the claimant seeks a compliance order under s.167 of the 2018 Act requiring the CPS to comply with his SAR of 13 April 2026. His pleaded case is as follows:

“The data access request concerns materials the CPS has sent to courts (principally Westminster Magistrates’ Court) in the UK in the course of the Claimant’s extradition case – a category the CPS has not addressed in either its letter of the 17 April 2026 or its email of the 22 May 2026.

The Claimant is concerned he is not in possession of the complete set of materials which the CPS, acting for the US, has sent to court. His requests for any assurance to the contrary have been repeatedly ignored by the CPS, increasing the degree of his concern, although the CPS has confirmed that no ex-parte hearings or public interest disclosure immunity has been sought.”

34.The order the claimant sought in the claim form is in these terms:

“The Claimant’s right of access to this category of data (materials sent to court) is affirmed in the absence of any prior PII application.

The CPS is ordered to, within 7 days, provide the Claimant with a copy of all materials sent to court during his extradition case, apart from the items the Claimant carved out of the 13 April 2026 request. The order includes any materials sent indirectly or by third parties.

The CPS should communicate to the court that it does not object to the Claimant reviewing the court files directly, including physical ones, to verify he has complete access to those materials before the court in his case.”

35.In his submissions, the claimant has sought an order that the data he seeks should be provided to the court pursuant to s.180 A of the 2018 Act , for the court to consider whether withholding it was in breach of data protection legislation.

The evidence

36.The claimant has made three witness statements in the CPS claim, dated 28 May, 8 September and 22 October 2026. In his first statement, the claimant asserted that it was “becoming increasingly apparent that I have not received all of the material which the CPS has sent to court during the course of my extradition case”. He contended that as there is “no CPIA-style disclosure obligation” in extradition proceedings, “the CPS can in theory send materials to court for information or background without those materials being served on the Requested Person, provided they are neither strictly relied upon nor referred to in open court”. He suggested that, in circumstances where his witness, Mr Paw, was not required to give oral evidence, and so his testimony was unchallenged, “the US may have raised their objections to this statement in private, which would be possible if those objections were not relied upon when making their own positive case”.

37.The principal reason the claimant relied on for asserting that materials had been sent to court and not provided to him or his lawyers in the extradition proceedings was the “conspicuous absence of any assurance to the contrary”.

38.The claimant has raised his concern in the extradition proceedings. On 13 April 2026 he wrote to the court, “I’ve formed a firm view that the judgement in that matter is informed, in part, by CPS materials which were not served on myself or my lawyers”. He asked whether District Judge Snow would facilitate “disclosure of the missing materials” or suggest how he might “challenge any restrictions which the CPS may have been able to apply”. Mr Westbrook was provided with District Judge Snow’s clear response, dated 20 April 2026, in which he said:

“I only dealt with this case on the basis of the materials that had been served on all parties.”

39.On 24 July 2026, he made a written application in the extradition proceedings under rule 5.9 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for “information about their case including information contained in materials kept by the court officer for the purposes of that case”. The application, drafted by the claimant’s leading and junior counsel in the extradition proceedings, indicated that Mr Westbrook was concerned “to ensure that there is no material on the court file that has not been provided to him”. The application recognised that “the court file may be voluminous and it is unnecessary for Mr Westbrook to receive again material he has already been provided with”; and so indicated that his solicitors would liaise directly with court staff to provide a full set of the materials Mr Westbrook had already received. District Judge Callaway acceded to the application, making a direction on 4 August 2026. The Team Leader for International Jurisdiction at HMCTS confirmed to the claimant’s solicitor on 26 August 2026 that the “court have disclosed all documents as per DJ Callaway’s direction on 4 th August 2026”.

40.In his first statement, in addition to addressing service of the claim form, Mr Dhanak stated that the request made on 13 April 2026 “has been responded to in full”, referencing the letter of 17 April 2026, and that “the Claimant has been provided with all documents in the possession of the Defendant”. In addition, the CPS asserted that the correct forum for any specific disclosure request was within the extradition proceedings.

41.In his second statement, Mr Dhanak explained that while the provisions concerning disclosure in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 do not apply to extradition proceedings,

“the CPS is still bound by an implied duty of candour to disclose any material in its possession that might assist or undermine an application for extradition.

In relation to the Claimant’s claim, the Defendant confirms that disclosure of all relevant material has been made throughout the course of the extradition proceedings.”

42.Mr Dhanak referred to the response from the CPS’s Extradition Unit (see paragraph ‎18 above) and he stated:

“For the avoidance of doubt the Defendant confirms that all relevant documents under the category(ies) referred to in the Claimant’s second subject access request were provided to the Claimant via his legal representatives in the extradition proceedings. Therefore, even if they were not provided to him for a second time pursuant to the 13 April subject access request by the IAT team, they had been provided to the Claimant previously by the extradition team.”

Decision on the claim against the CPS

43.The power to make a compliance order arises only if a court is satisfied that there has been an infringement of the data subject’s rights. The claim focuses on alleged breach of the claimant’s right of access to his personal data under s.45(1) of the 2018 Act .

44.In his submissions, the claimant has also alleged that the CPS infringed s.45(5)

by not informing him, in the response to the second CPS SAR, of the restrictions applied or of his right to apply to court under s.167

. The contention that he was not informed of the restrictions overlooked the attachment supplied with the letter of 17 April 2026 in which the two restrictions relied on were identified. It is true that the letter does not provide the information required by s.45(5)

(e) and it ought to have done so. However, that is no part of the pleaded case. In any event, no steps are required to be taken to correct the omission. The claimant was already aware of his right to apply under s.167

, having been informed of it in earlier correspondence, and he has exercised it. The omission caused no prejudice, and an order requiring the CPS to provide that information now would serve no useful purpose.

45.The first key question is whether, when providing no data in response to the second CPS SAR, the CPS breached the claimant’s right of access.

46.The first reason for withholding some of the material sought is that it was not personal data. The claimant’s request sought documents whereas the proper target of a SAR is information:

Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd

[2017] EWCA Civ 121

, Lewison LJ, [86], [93]. It seems inevitable that some of the material provided by the CPS to the court during the extradition proceedings would not be the claimant’s personal data. For example, any authorities which may have been supplied to the court would not become his personal data simply because they were relied on in his case. Nonetheless, it is likely that much of the information contained within the documents sought by the claimant would be his personal data. So this, as the CPS recognise, is only a partial answer.

47.The CPS’s reliance on the exemption in s.45(4) (e) (which is engaged where it is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others) can also only be a partial answer. It would be likely to permit some redaction of documents, for example, to protect third party personal data. But it cannot justify the wholesale withholding of all the requested personal data.

48.The key exemption relied on by the CPS is s.45(4)

(b). In my judgement, the blanket application of this exemption to the material sought by the claimant cannot be justified. It is difficult to see how providing the claimant with information which has already been disclosed to him in the extradition proceedings, following the conclusion of the extradition hearing (albeit there is an ongoing appeal), would risk “prejudicing the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties”, such as to make withholding the data a necessary and proportionate measure.

49.The CPS has not undertaken an item-by-item analysis in reaching this conclusion. Rather, it relies on the fact that there is an alternative route through which the claimant was able to obtain, and has obtained, all of the data he seeks. I do not accept that is sufficient to establish that any of the exemptions relied on automatically apply to all the data falling within the scope of the second CPS SAR. Such an approach would be inconsistent with Ittihadieh in which the Court of Appeal held, at [86], that the making of a SAR for a collateral purpose such as to obtain documents for the purposes of litigation does not invalidate the SAR or relieve the data controller from his obligations in relation to it, if that person also wishes to achieve one or more of the purposes of the Directive. The court observed that, “there is now a considerable body of domestic case law which recognises that it is no objection to a SAR that it is made in connection with actual or contemplated litigation” ([86]); and “there is a sufficient safety net in the form of the EU doctrine of ‘abuse of rights’” ([88]).

50.The CPS seek to distinguish Ittihadieh on the basis that it concerned collateral use in civil proceedings, in which there is a disclosure regime. Whereas in extradition proceedings the rules of civil or criminal disclosure do not apply, and disclosure is given pursuant to the duty of candour and requirement of procedural fairness: R (USA) v Bow Street Magistrates Court [2006] EWHC 2256 (Admin)

[2007] 1 WLR 1157

, [90]-[93]. However, I am not persuaded that differences between the disclosure regimes applicable to the underlying proceedings provide a relevant distinction. The authorities Lewison LJ cited in support of the conclusion that it is no objection to a SAR that it is made in connection with actual or contemplated litigation included

Kololo v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

[2015] EWHC 600 (QB)

, [2015] 1 WLR 3702

, in which SARs were made “in connection with proposed judicial review proceedings” ([7]), in which information and documents are also provided pursuant to the duty of candour.

51.I conclude that, notwithstanding the claimant’s receipt of the material in the extradition proceedings, the CPS’s blanket refusal of access in response to the second CPS SAR was not justified by the restrictions on which it relied. Having found an infringement, I turn to whether a compliance order should nevertheless be refused in the exercise of the court’s discretion.

52.A key question is whether all the information the claimant seeks from the CPS has already been disclosed to him in the extradition proceedings. I find that the claimant’s belief that the CPS has put material before the court in the extradition proceedings which has not been served on him (or his solicitors) is sincere but baseless. I reject his contention that District Judge Snow’s response to his query is ambiguous. The claimant suggested that the District Judge may have meant that while there were documents before him that were not served on Mr Westbrook, the District Judge ignored them, or perhaps that they “factored into his wider decision-making”. Both interpretations are wholly unrealistic and misconceived.

53.District Judge Snow, who determined the request for extradition, has himself made clear that all the materials put before him in the course of the extradition proceedings had been made available to both parties. That is consistent with the CPS’s repeated confirmation that no part of the extradition proceedings was ex parte (that is, without notice to Mr Westbrook). Contrary to the claimant’s belief, without taking the exceptional course of making a without notice application, neither the CPS nor the requesting State could put material before the court without serving it on him. There is no loophole, such as the claimant asserted, enabling material to be put before the court but not disclosed to the other party, without making a without notice application, provided it is not “strictly relied on” in making a “positive case”.

54.The claimant’s first and second CPS SARs asked for different data. I agree with him that the response to his second CPS SAR reads as though the IAT misunderstood his request and took it to be a temporal continuation of his first SAR. Nevertheless, the response accurately conveyed the position of the extradition team (who had understood the request), that the CPS had already disclosed everything which it was lawfully obliged to disclose.

55.Mr Dhanak’s evidence confirms the position. I do not accept that in using words such as “relevant” he was qualifying the firm assurance he has given. To qualify the position in such an opaque way, in response to Master Dagnall’s direction, would be to mislead the court. There is no basis for any contention that that is what he has done, and every reason to believe he has not done so. Counsel for the CPS has also confirmed, on instructions, in written and oral submissions, that everything that was sent to the court by the CPS in the extradition proceedings was also served on the claimant through his instructed solicitors.

56.In Ittihadieh Lewison LJ addressed the approach to the discretion to make a compliance order and, although he was addressing earlier data protection legislation, the same principles apply under the 2018 Act . The points I draw that are material to the exercise of the discretion in this case are these:

i)

The court must exercise the discretion in furtherance of the purpose for which it is conferred ([105]).

ii)

As the discretion only arises if the court is satisfied that the data controller has failed to comply with its obligations, the starting point for the exercise of the discretion is that there has been a breach of duty. That must have a significant bearing on the way in which the court exercises its discretion ([105]). Ordinarily, in the absence of a good reason not to, the discretion to enforce will be exercised in favour of a claimant who has made a valid SAR ([106]).

iii)

In exercising the discretion the court must have regard to the general principle of proportionality, ensuring a fair balance between the rights and interests in question ([107]-108]).

iv)

In striking that balance there are many factors that the court may take into account. The court identified a number of factors at [110].

57.The starting point is important and I bear it fully in mind. Nonetheless, in my judgement this is a case in which I should exercise the discretion to make no compliance order in the claim brought against the CPS.

58.First, there is a more appropriate route to obtaining the requested information, namely, in the extradition proceedings ( Ittihadieh , [110]). The CPS has a duty of candour in the extradition proceedings. Any application for disclosure of documents which are alleged to have been filed with the court but not served on the requested party, in breach of procedural fairness, ought to be made in the extradition proceedings. The sensitive nature of extradition proceedings, which involve liaison with foreign States, adds weight to the public interest in information being sought through the appropriate route by a requested party.

59.Secondly, and crucially, all documents filed with the court in the extradition proceedings have been served on the claimant. There is nothing more to be disclosed. The claimant’s concern that there may be something missing, although sincere, is without foundation. There is nothing to be gained by making a compliance order. In practice, there has been no prejudice to his data rights. He has access to all his personal data within the category of documents he requested in the second CPS SAR. Requiring the CPS to undertake an item-by-item analysis of all the documents filed with the court in the extradition proceedings, in order to determine which parts are personal data and the extent to which any exemptions apply, would be a disproportionate use of public resources, without any practical benefit to the claimant.

60.Thirdly, it is of some relevance that the claimant’s real quest is for documents not personal data, with the aim of assisting him in the extradition proceedings ( Ittihadieh , [110]).

61.I agree with Ms Kaushik that, if I were against the CPS on the exercise of discretion, it would be appropriate to direct the CPS to undertake the exercise again of considering and responding to the second CPS SAR, rather than order the CPS at this stage to provide all documents filed in the extradition proceedings to this court. However, for the reasons I have given, I am in no doubt that this is a case in which I should refuse to make an order pursuant to s.167(2) and inspection would serve no useful purpose.

The claim against the NCA

The claim

62.The claimant also seeks a compliance order under s.167 of the 2018 Act against the NCA, requiring them to comply with his SAR of 27 April 2026. His pleaded case alleges that the response was out of time, and in breach of his right of access to his personal data as the sole exemption relied on, s.45(4) (a), could not apply on a blanket basis to all the documents sought.

63.As in the CPS case, he sought an order that the data he seeks should be provided to the court pursuant to s.180 A of the 2018 Act , for the court to consider whether withholding it was in breach of data protection legislation.

Time for compliance

64.The time for compliance with a SAR made under s.45(1) is within one month of the “relevant time” which is defined in s.54(3) of the 2018 Act . Section 54(3) (b) and (c) are not said to have applied. The relevant time was therefore the NCA’s receipt of the SAR on 27 April 2026, and the one-month period expired on 27 May 2026. The NCA responded on 28 May 2026. The NCA had not sought to rely on the provision enabling it to extend time: s.54 (3A). Consequently, the response was one day late. The short delay is trivial. It is unnecessary to make any compliance order to address it.

The right of access

65.The NCA disclosed two photographs in response to the NCA SAR. Those were not documents that the Westminster Magistrates’ Court found on its file. Counsel for the NCA, Mr Chiy, stated that the NCA does not suggest those photographs had been sent to the court. So, it appears that the personal data provided with the response to the NCA SAR was not, in fact, responsive to the claimant’s request. Nevertheless, the claim is focused on the data withheld, not that which was (erroneously) provided.

66.As Mr Kelly has explained, the NCA has a role in locating and arresting requested persons and then bringing them before Westminster Magistrates’ Court as soon as practicable. After the requested person’s initial appearance, the NCA ordinarily has no further role in the judicial proceedings. If extradition is ordered, the NCA facilitates removal of the requested person.

67.In this case, the NCA arrested the claimant on 26 September 2024 and brought him before Westminster Magistrates’ Court the same day. Mr Kelly stated:

“The court was provided with documents relating to the arrest and remand of the applicant in advance of his appearance. These consisted of an application for remand, printouts from the Police National Computer, the document to input details onto the Police National Computer and a copy of the Provisional Arrest Certificate under Section 73 of the Extradition Act 2003 . No other documents were provided to the court.”

68.Ms Fletcher has explained that “the information reviewed by the SDT included an email that the NEU sent to Westminster Magistrates’ Court following the arrest of the Applicant”. She has identified precisely the same documents as Mr Kelly as having been attached to that email.

69.Those documents were withheld pursuant to s.45(4)

(a) of the 2018 Act

. However, on 2 November 2026, the NCA, while maintaining that its reliance on that exemption had been lawful, provided the claimant with copies of the four documents identified by Mr Kelly and Ms Fletcher as having been sent by the NEU to Westminster Magistrates’ Court (exhibits 7, 5, 6 and 1 to the letter). In addition, the NCA provided the claimant with two further documents, namely (i) a two-page document described as “Part 2 Provisional Warrant – Codes of Practice” (which appears to be a standard document provided to a requested person on arrest, and contains no personal data of the claimant) (exhibits 2-3); and (ii) an MG11 witness statement of PC Mark Mullery dated 26 September 2024 (exhibit 4). The NCA’s letter stated that the documents had previously been disclosed to him or his legal representatives during the extradition proceedings.

70.The NCA maintains, and the claimant disputes, that the original decision to apply the exemption in s.45(4) (a) was lawful and justified. It is unnecessary to determine that issue given that the NCA no longer relies on any exemption.

71.The NCA submits that the court should not exercise its discretion to make a compliance order in circumstances where no data responsive to the request remains withheld. There would be no purpose to be served by such an order given that the claimant has been provided with all the personal data held by the NCA which falls within the NCA SAR.

72.The claimant contends that I cannot be satisfied that the NCA has disclosed all the personal data responsive to his request. First, Ms Fletcher said that the information reviewed by the NCA’s Statutory Disclosure Team “included” the email and four identified attachments. The use of the word “included” indicates there are more documents. Secondly, the claimant contends that Mr Kelly’s statement that no other documents were provided to the court is contradicted by the subsequent provision to him on 2 November of PC Mullery’s statement. Thirdly, the claimant has produced a copy of a further MG11 witness statement made by DS Alex Snigorski on 22 October 2024 which has been disclosed to him in the extradition proceedings. The claimant contends that the NCA has failed to disclose this statement.

73.I have reached the clear conclusion that I should refuse to exercise my discretion to make a compliance order pursuant to s.167 of the 2018 Act

. First, even if I were persuaded that the NCA may hold some material that has been provided to the court in the extradition proceedings, but not provided to the claimant pursuant to his SAR, as I have explained when dealing with the claim against the CPS, all such material has been disclosed to him in the extradition proceedings. The reasons I have given at paragraphs ‎57-‎60 above for refusing to make a compliance order against the CPS apply equally to the claim against the NCA.

74.Secondly, I reject the claimant’s contention that there is any real doubt that he has been provided with all the documents held by the NCA that are responsive to the NCA SAR. Ms Fletcher’s evidence may well indicate that a wider pool of documents than the four attachments to the NEU’s email to the court was reviewed. At the very least the pool included the photographs which were provided. But it does not follow from the review of a wider pool that any other personal data of the claimant which is responsive to his request is held by the NCA.

75.The NCA’s provision of PC Mullery’s statement to the claimant shows that the NCA’s evidence, while accurate in describing all the documents that the NCA provided to the court, omitted to mention a document it held which was provided to the court by a third party. It is a regrettable omission but not so weighty as to persuade me to reject the NCA’s assurance that it has now provided the claimant with all the personal data he requested. The fact that DS Snigorski’s statement was not provided to the claimant by the NCA would only demonstrate that the NCA has not provided all data responsive to the request if it were established, on the balance of probabilities, that the NCA holds that statement. That has not been established. There is no good reason to assume the NCA must hold a copy, not least given that DS Snigorski’s statement post-dated the NCA’s involvement in the claimant’s extradition case by nearly a month.

76.Finally, I note that Ms Fletcher has candidly acknowledged that the NCA’s original decision did not record any reason for applying an exemption, as required by s.45(7) of the 2018 Act . However, the NCA subsequently undertook an internal review of its own volition which upheld the decision, at which stage reasons for the review decision were noted. The subsequent recording of reasons does not alter the fact that the original decision failed to comply with s.45(7) . It does, however, mean that no order to secure compliance with that recording obligation is now required.

Conclusion

77.For the reasons I have given, the claims are dismissed.

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