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Федеральный верховный суд Англии и Уэльса: применение правила CPR r 40.9

Gary Jones v Persons Unknown

судебное решение 2026-09-28 109 554 знаков Криптоактивы и блокчейн
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Действующая редакция. Последнее изменение зафиксировано 2026-09-30.

Lord Justice Nugee:

Introduction

1.This appeal from the London Circuit Commercial Court concerns the application of CPR r 40.9. This rule provides as follows:

“40.9

Who may apply to set aside or vary a judgment or order

A person who is not a party but who is directly affected by a judgment or order may apply to have the judgment or order set aside or varied.”

2.The Respondent, Mr Gary Jones (

“Mr Jones”

), brought proceedings seeking to recover Bitcoin of which he had been defrauded. He applied for summary judgment, which was granted by Mr Nigel Cooper KC. Mr Cooper’s Order among other things required the 4 th

Defendant, a Seychelles company called Huobi Global Ltd (

“Huobi”

), to transfer some 98.2 Bitcoin from a particular wallet under its control (

“the tHEL wallet”

) to a wallet nominated by Mr Jones. Huobi transferred 98.2 Bitcoin to the nominated wallet, and then appears to have debited the amount of Bitcoin it had transferred from the account of the Appellant, Kyrrex Ltd (

“Kyrrex”

), which was interested in the tHEL wallet.

3.Kyrrex, who had not been party to the proceedings, applied under CPR r 40.9 to be joined as a defendant and to have Mr Cooper’s Order set aside, Kyrrex’s case being that the Bitcoin which Huobi had transferred to Mr Jones were not in fact Mr Jones’s Bitcoin and that there was no connection between the Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet and the fraud on Mr Jones. This application was dismissed by HHJ Richard Pearce (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) ( “the Judge” ), both on the ground that Kyrrex was not “directly affected” by Mr Cooper’s Order, and that even if it had been he would not have granted the application.

4.Kyrrex appeals to this Court with permission granted by Males LJ. We heard well-argued submissions from Mr Brad Pomfret KC, who appeared with Mr Mark Lorrell and Mr Ian Chai for Kyrrex, and from Mr David McIlroy, who appeared with Mr Clyde Darrell for Mr Jones.

5.For the reasons that follow I prefer the submissions of Mr Pomfret and would allow the appeal.

The facts

6.It is convenient to start with Mr Jones’s pleaded case. This is as follows. In January 2019 he responded to an online advertisement targeting individuals and promising high returns from cryptocurrency investment on a platform called Extick Pro ( “the EP Platform” ). He was led to believe that the EP Platform was a legitimate online cryptocurrency trading exchange, and between January 2019 and January 2020 he invested heavily in Bitcoin, spending nearly £½ million on purchasing Bitcoin which he transferred to the EP Platform. In total he purchased 89.61616088 Bitcoin ( “the 89.6 Bitcoin” ).

7.Mr Jones pleaded that the EP Platform was in fact simply a vehicle for a large-scale cyber fraud committed by unknown fraudsters located overseas. Although Mr Jones’s account on the EP Platform appeared to show large profits from supposed trades, these were entirely fictional. The fraudsters simply stole the Bitcoin. When Mr Jones asked for his money back, he received some minimal amounts (totalling some £3,000) but otherwise nothing else.

8.Mr Jones did not know the identity of the fraudsters, but he had commissioned an expert report which claimed to have identified the tHEL wallet, which was controlled by Huobi, as holding some 489 Bitcoin, and as being used by the fraudsters.

The proceedings

9.On the basis of this Mr Jones issued a claim form on 1 June 2022 in the London Circuit Commercial Court of the High Court. As amended shortly thereafter the claim form named four defendants. The first three were classes of unknown persons, namely (1) “the individuals or companies who obtained access to [Mr Jones’s] accounts between about 22.01.2019 and 10.01.2020 and carried out the transactions on or about the same dates as a result of which the crypto currencies held in those accounts were transferred to other accounts (“Transferred Assets”)” – or in other words the fraudsters; (2) “the individuals or companies who own or control the accounts into which the Transferred Assets were transferred other than purchasers for full value”; and (3) “the individuals or companies who are innocent receivers who have no reasonable grounds for thinking that what has appeared in their account belongs to [Mr Jones]”. It is not clear to me what the thinking was behind adding this third class of defendants as it would appear to be accepted that Mr Jones had no claim against them, and no relief was in the event sought against them. But we heard no argument on the point, and nothing turns on it. The fourth defendant was the only one identified by name and was Huobi.

10.In his Particulars of Claim Mr Jones pleaded the fraud and that he had been deceived by the 1 st

Defendant who had stolen his property; and that the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants would be unjustly enriched if permitted to retain the stolen property. As against Huobi he pleaded that it had control of a wallet or wallets containing his property or its traceable division and thereby held the property as an equitable constructive trustee for his benefit. The relief claimed was the return of “his” 89.6 Bitcoin by means of an order for delivery up (ie a claim for specific relief in the form of delivery up of Bitcoin said to belong to Mr Jones), or in the alternative damages, or restitution, and interest under

s. 35

A of the Senior Courts Act 1981

.

11.There followed a series of interlocutory applications by Mr Jones, none of them attended by anyone else. On 28 June 2022, HHJ Pelling QC granted permission to serve the proceedings out of the jurisdiction on the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants and Huobi, and ordered Huobi to provide both evidence by affidavit and disclosure of documents giving details of the tHEL wallet, the credit said to have been received by Huobi of the 89.6 Bitcoin, and other related information. On the same day HHJ Pelling granted a freezing injunction against the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants in the sum of £1.75m, and a proprietary freezing injunction against the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants and Huobi which froze the tHEL wallet up to £1.75m. On the return day of 22 July 2022 Mr Simon Birt QC continued the freezing injunctions to trial.

12.Unsurprisingly the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants, who have not been identified, did not engage with the proceedings. And Huobi also seems to have simply ignored the proceedings at that stage and did not disclose any documents or provide any information in compliance with the order.

Summary judgment application

13.Mr Jones then applied for summary judgment under CPR Part 24. His application was supported by a report from a cyber investigation consultancy called CiRO Global Risks LLP ( “CiRO” ). We have not in fact seen this report, but Mr Jones’s pleaded case was that two reports dated 10 December 2020 and 5 April 2022 had been commissioned from CiRO, and that their conclusions included one expressed as follows (where BTC refers to Bitcoin):

“[the tHEL wallet] held 489.71693660 BTC has been identified as being used by the scammers, and traced into the wallet on the Huobi exchange.”

(Something seems to have gone wrong with the grammar but the sense is clear enough).

14.The summary judgment application was heard by Mr Nigel Cooper QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) on 5 September 2022. Again only Mr Jones was represented (not by his current counsel). Mr Cooper gave an unreserved judgment the same day, at [2022] EWHC 2543 (Comm) .

15.In his judgment he referred to the evidence before him on behalf of Mr Jones and said that he accepted it in the absence of any contrary evidence (at [5]). So far as the CiRO report is concerned he said as follows:

“10

… The CiRO expert report of 5 April 2022 provides evidence of a wallet connected to the fraud, which is associated with the Huobi exchange and which as at 1 April 2022 contained 488.71693660 Bitcoin [this should perhaps be 48 9 .71…]. A report provided to me today highlights that that quantity of Bitcoin has in fact decreased, notwithstanding the proprietary freezing order previously made.

11The claimant has available to him the wallet deposit address with the Huobi Exchange. I do not propose to repeat the whole address in this judgment but will simply adopt the claimant’s definition and call it the “tHEL wallet.” As at 20 July 2022 I understand that the tHEL wallet held a balance of 14,986 Bitcoin, which was apparently equivalent to US $345,148,228. I am informed by Mr Maguire [counsel for Mr Jones] that the Bitcoin held in that wallet can only be Bitcoin which has been transferred to the wallet by individuals connected with the fraud on the claimant.”

16.At [15] he summarised Mr Jones’s claim against Huobi as follows:

“15

… Likewise as against [Huobi] the claimant submits that he had [an] equitable proprietary claim in relation to the Bitcoin which were ultimately transferred in whole or in segments from the fake website account into the wallet on the Huobi electronic trading platform.”

17.Having dealt with the claim against the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants, Mr Cooper considered the claim against Huobi at [21] as follows:

“21

I am also satisfied that [Huobi] does sit in the position of a constructive trustee as against the claimant, because it is [Huobi] who is the controller of the wallet into which the Bitcoin was apparently paid. There is no evidence that either [Huobi] nor any other party has any proprietary interest in respect of the claimant’s Bitcoin. Accordingly I am satisfied that the claims made by the claimant against [Huobi] as constructive trustee for the return of his Bitcoin should also succeed.”

18.Effect was given to his judgment by an Order dated 6 September 2022. This recited that the Court adopted an exchange rate of one Bitcoin to £17,194.11. By paragraph 1 of the substantive order summary judgment was given against the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants for deceit and unjust enrichment, and against Huobi for holding the 89.6 Bitcoin as constructive trustee.

19.Paragraphs 2 and 3 provided for delivery up of the 89.6 Bitcoin as follows:

“2

The [tHEL wallet], under the control of [Huobi] has been used to store fraudulently obtained Bitcoin including those belonging to the Claimant. Accordingly the First, Second and Fourth Defendants are hereby required to deliver up/restore to the Claimant 89.61616088 Bitcoin, being that which was transferred out of the Claimant’s control by the First and/or Second Defendant, within 14 days of this Order [by 4pm on 20 September 2022] to a wallet address nominated by the Claimant …

3There be an Order for delivery up against the First Defendant and Second Defendant and the Fourth Defendant and an order that the sum of 89.61616088 Bitcoin … are transferred from [the tHEL wallet] by the First, Second and Fourth Defendants to the nominated Wallet, within 14 days of this Order [by 4pm on 20 September 2022].”

20.Paragraph 4 extended both the freezing injunction and the proprietary freezing injunction until safe receipt of the 89.6 Bitcoin into the nominated wallet.

21.Paragraphs 8 and 9 provided for costs, as follows:

“8

The First and Second Defendants shall pay the Claimant’s costs of and occasioned by this claim, summarily assessed in the sum of £148,000 sterling.

9Payment of the costs summarily assessed in the sum of £148,000 sterling shall be undertaken by the First, Second and Fourth Defendants transferring 8.63532665 Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet to the nominated Wallet by 4pm on 20 September 2022.”

Two comments can be made on this: (i) under paragraph 8 the costs order was only made against the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants but the effect of paragraph 9 was to require discharge of the costs order by Huobi from the tHEL wallet as well; and (ii) it is unusual, to say the least, for an order to be made requiring a monetary liability (such as a liability for costs) to be discharged in Bitcoin. I will come back to these points below.

Compliance with Mr Cooper’s Order

22.Although it had taken no part in the proceedings, Huobi did comply with Mr Cooper’s Order. On 9 September 2022, having received the Order, it “locked” 98.25148740 Bitcoin ( “the 98.2 Bitcoin” ) in Kyrrex’s user account in the tHEL wallet. (The 98.2 Bitcoin was evidently intended to represent the sum of the 89.6 Bitcoin payable under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Mr Cooper’s Order and the 8.6 odd Bitcoin payable under paragraph 9 of his Order in respect of costs, even though the total appears to be very slightly inaccurate). I explain in more detail below what the evidence is as to the relationship between Kyrrex and Huobi, and the nature of Kyrrex’s interest in the tHEL wallet, but for present purposes it is sufficient to note that Kyrrex had placed Bitcoin with Huobi which was allocated to the tHEL wallet and credited to Kyrrex’s account.

23.Kyrrex was notified that the 98.2 Bitcoin had been locked. It asked Huobi for an explanation. On 19 September 2022 Huobi sent Kyrrex a copy of Mr Cooper’s Order. Kyrrex protested but Huobi indicated that it intended to comply with the Order by 27 September. On that day Huobi transferred 98.2 Bitcoin to Mr Jones’s nominated wallet. This was not actually from the tHEL wallet but from another wallet under its control, referred to as the “RwrmV” wallet. But Huobi then appears to have reimbursed itself by deducting the 98.2 Bitcoin from Kyrrex’s account in the tHEL wallet. That transfer was treated by both Huobi and Mr Jones as discharging the order made against Huobi for delivery up of the Bitcoin “belonging” to Mr Jones and which had been transferred out of his control.

24.Kyrrex then spent some time trying to obtain Court documents from Mr Jones’s solicitors. They were initially reluctant to provide the documents voluntarily and on 15 December 2022 Kyrrex issued an application for permission to access the documents, which ultimately led to a consent order on 15 March 2023 providing for disclosure to Kyrrex of the key documents and evidence that had led to Mr Cooper’s Order.

25.Having considered the documents and decided on legal advice to challenge the position, Kyrrex set about obtaining its own expert evidence, from Mr Simon Davison of AnotherDay. I give more details of Mr Davison’s evidence below but in essence his conclusion, expressed in a report dated 17 October 2024, was that none of the Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet could be identified as the Bitcoin stolen from Mr Jones.

26.By then Huobi had (in October 2023) been struck off the Seychelles Register of International Companies for failure to maintain a registered agent.

Kyrrex’s application

27.Armed with Mr Davison’s report, Kyrrex issued an application under CPR r 40.9 in November 2024 to set aside Mr Cooper’s Order.

28.Kyrrex’s application was heard by the Judge on 10 June 2025. He gave an impressive unreserved judgment, which covers a large number of issues in a clear and well-structured fashion, the same day at [2025] EWHC 1823 (Comm) ( “the Judgment” ).

29.He first set out the background to the fraud on Mr Jones by reference to Mr Cooper’s judgment. Having quoted paragraphs 10 and 11 from that judgment (set out at paragraph 15 above), he noted at [7] two important points, namely:

“First, the judgment was wrong to attribute any cryptocurrency from Mr Jones having arrived in the tHEL wallet and, second, as Mr Lorrell [counsel for Kyrrex] points out, the final sentence of paragraph 11 of the judgment that I have just read out saying that the Bitcoin held in the tHEL wallet can only be Bitcoin transferred to the wallet by individuals connected with the fraud is not only incorrect but is not in fact consistent with the expert evidence from CiRO that Mr Jones had obtained by the time of that hearing.”

30.He then referred to the proceedings brought by Mr Jones culminating in Mr Cooper’s Order. He noted again at [18] that:

“The case brought by Kyrrex starts by asserting, as is now entirely accepted, that the application that Mr Jones brought had wrongly identified his Bitcoin as having been paid into the tHEL wallet.”

31.He then gave an explanation of Bitcoin and what the evidence showed as to the relationship between Kyrrex and Huobi, and the use of the tHEL wallet. Again I will come back to this in more detail below. Then, after referring to the notes on CPR r 40.9 in Civil Procedure (The White Book) he said at [26]:

“The test to be applied on an application under CPR 40.9 is clearly set out within the terms of the rule itself: first, that a person who is “directly affected by a judgment or order” may apply and, second, that they may apply to have the judgment or order set aside or varied. Thus the person applying has to show that they are directly affected by the order and the court has to consider in the exercise of its discretion, perhaps better called its judgment, whether or not an order ought to be made.”

32.He then referred in some detail to the submissions from both parties on these two issues, and gave his conclusions at [48ff]. He first addressed the question of delay, which he had accepted as being relevant to the exercise of discretion. He said that it was not a case of “gross delay” but that Kyrrex “could and should properly have pursued matters more quickly” (at [48]). Moreover the delay was likely to be of significance because he accepted the argument that the demise of Huobi and the passage of time generally would significantly affect Mr Jones’s ability to get any relief from any other source (at [49]).

33.He then referred to two other suggested matters which he was less convinced were of significance, namely (i) the fact that Mr Cooper had been, albeit innocently, misled; and (ii) the obstacles or alleged obstacles that Mr Jones had put in the way of the efficient despatch of the litigation (at [50]-[51]).

34.He then gave his conclusions as follows (at [52]):

“The real issues here, involve looking, apart from the delay issue, at the question of standing and at the question of the merits of the case. In my judgment, the words “directly affected” are a clear pointer to the court to avoid setting aside judgments which only indirectly affect another party. This case demonstrates quite vividly how judgments may affect other parties but in my judgment the effect here is a classic example of an indirect effect. I say that because it is quite clear on the evidence that Huobi did not need to access any Bitcoin that belonged to Kyrrex or its clients in order to satisfy this judgment. Moreover, on the merits issues that arise in the case, whilst I have every sympathy with Kyrrex who are entirely innocent losers, I see some considerable difficulties in the manner in which the case is advanced in a way that would justify the setting aside of the order. I have referred to what I see as the difficulties in treating Huobi as a custodian in order to bring a claim against them. I do not reject those difficulties out of hand but this would plainly be a problematic claim in which the merits are far from clear cut. In those circumstances, my finding on Kyrrex Limited not being directly affected is a bar to the application succeeding and it fails on that ground. It would in any event have failed on the application of the merits test bearing in mind not only the merits of the claim themselves but also the delay in bringing this application and the consequent prejudice to which I have referred. In those circumstances, with I can only repeat considerable sympathy for the position of Kyrrex, in my judgment this application must be dismissed.”

35.The Judge gave effect to the Judgment by an Order dated 10 June 2025 which dismissed Kyrrex’s application and made orders for costs.

Grounds of Appeal and Respondent’s notice

36.Kyrrex appeals with permission granted by Males LJ. Its (amended) Grounds of Appeal can be summarised as follows:

(1)(Ground 1) The Judge was wrong to find that Kyrrex was not directly affected by Mr Cooper’s Order.

(2)(Ground 2) The Judge was wrong to decide that if he had found that Kyrrex was directly affected, the application would have failed in any event on the basis of delay or the merits. In particular he was wrong on the question of delay.

(3)(Ground 3) The Judge was wrong on the question whether Kyrrex’s underlying defence lacked merit.

(4)(Grounds 4 to 6) Mr Cooper’s Order for summary judgment was obtained without notice to Kyrrex and was thus a breach of natural justice, a breach of the right to be heard and a breach of Kyrrex’s rights under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights ( “ECHR” ).

37.Mr Jones has served a Respondent’s notice which seeks to uphold the Judgment on alternative grounds, namely that if the Court finds that Kyrrex was directly affected and therefore has standing, the application to set aside the judgment should be refused because of the reasons given by the Judge (delay, consequent prejudice, and uncertain merits) and in addition because Kyrrex has, and has known since September 2022 at the latest that it has, a remedy against Huobi.

Ground 1 – “directly affected”

38.I have set out the text of CPR r 40.9 at paragraph 1 above, but repeat it here for convenience:

“40.9

Who may apply to set aside or vary a judgment or order

A person who is not a party but who is directly affected by a judgment or order may apply to have the judgment or order set aside or varied.”

As the Judge noted (Judgment at [26]), this makes it clear that the person applying first has to show that they are directly affected by the order, this being a threshold or gateway issue. As set out at paragraph 34 above he dismissed Kyrrex’s application on the ground that Kyrrex was not a person directly affected by Mr Cooper’s Order and that this was a bar to the application succeeding (Judgment at [52]).

The authorities

39.So what is it for a person to be directly affected by an order? A number of cases were put before us on this question, and it is I think worth referring to them as they help to elucidate this concept. In what follows I will refer to the person obtaining the original order as A, the person against whom the original order was obtained as B, and the person applying to set aside or vary the order as C.

40.In

Latif v Imaan Inc

[2007] EWHC 3179 (Ch)

(

“Latif”

), A (Hamra) obtained a default money judgment against B (Imaan) for non-payment of an alleged loan. C (Lexi) had in separate proceedings established that it had been the victim of misappropriations and had obtained a judgment against Imaan and a charge over Imaan’s assets on the basis that these were the product of the misappropriations. Lexi later successfully applied to be made a party to the proceedings commenced by Hamra. Lexi then applied to set aside the judgment that Hamra had obtained because it wished to challenge a purported charge ostensibly granted by Imaan to secure repayment of the supposed loan to Hamra, Lexi’s case being that there never was a loan and hence no effective charge. Briggs J (as he then was) held that Lexi had a sufficient interest. He said (at [9]) that there must be “some proper basis” for a person who wishes to set a judgment aside, ie that there must be some “appropriate form of locus standi”. It was submitted that this was limited to the case where C had a proprietary interest in a judgment relating to property, or an interest as insurer in the liability established by the judgment, and that since Hamra’s judgment was a pure personal money judgment with no immediate effect on property, and Lexi was not an insurer, Lexi was not within the rule (at [10]). He rejected this submission: Lexi had a reason to put in issue the question whether there was any loan by Hamra to Imaan because the existence or non-existence of that loan was highly material to the validity or otherwise of the Imaan/Hamra charge (at [11]). Briggs J noted the difficulty Lexi might face in challenging the existence of the debt in the proceedings it had commenced, while being a party to proceedings in which judgment for such a debt had been entered, but he did not determine that the default judgment would give rise to an issue estoppel on the existence of the debt if not set aside (at [13]). That suggests that he adopted a wide concept of what it means to be directly affected, embracing prejudice to the assertion of a right rather than requiring loss of a right.

41.In

Abdelmamoud v The Egyptian Association in Great Britain Ltd

[2015] EWHC 1013 (Ch)

, [2015] Bus LR 928

(

“Abdelmamoud (HC)”

), A (a businessman) obtained a default judgment for repayment of a loan from B (EAGB), a charitable company limited by guarantee. C were four members of (and claimed also to be directors of) EAGB. They applied to have the judgment set aside on the ground that EAGB had a defence to the claim on the loan. Mr Edward Murray (as he then was), sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, held that they were not directly affected and did not have standing under CPR r 40.9. For an applicant to be directly affected it was sufficient that the relevant judgment or order would prima facie be capable of materially and adversely affecting some interest of theirs capable of recognition by law, or that the enforcement of the judgment would materially and adversely affect an interest capable of recognition by law (at [58]-[59]); but C did not have such an interest, because as members they had no interest in the funds of EAGB and no liability for its debts. Mr Murray stated (at [59]) that:

“Since the “directly affected” test is for the purpose of establishing locus standi, it is sufficient that the relevant judgment or order would prima facie be capable of materially and adversely affecting a legal interest. It is not necessary to show that it would, in fact, do so, for that would be the subject of the application itself”.

42.An appeal to this Court was dismissed, for reasons given by Newey LJ, with whom Longmore and McCombe LJJ agreed: Abdelmamoud v The Egyptian Association in Great Britain Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 879 , [2018] Bus LR 1354 ( “Abdelmamoud (CA)” ). At [27] Newey LJ considered a submission for the appellants that the rule was “flexible and can be used as a platform for case management”, as to which he said:

“It is clear from its terms, however, that CPR r 40.9 does not empower the court to set aside a judgment or order wherever it might think that appropriate. It is a precondition that the applicant is “directly affected” by the judgment or order. That the power should not be untrammelled makes obvious sense. In general, a defendant to a claim should be left to decide for himself whether to defend it. Further, it could hardly be appropriate to allow a third party to apply to have a judgment set aside unless he would then be in a position either to defend the claim on the defendant’s behalf or to put forward a defence of his own.”

On the facts he held that C neither had a sufficient interest as directors nor as members of EAGB. After referring to Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 at 224, where this Court had said that shares in a commercial company are not directly affected by wrongdoing against the company, he continued (at [40]):

“It is still clearer that membership rights in a charitable company cannot be so affected, since members of such a company have no economic interest in it and their membership rights do not have any financial value. Likewise, individual members of a charitable company such as EAGB (or, in fact, of an ordinary commercial company) cannot be considered to be “directly affected” by a judgment or order against the company. Any other conclusion would allow particular members to take upon themselves matters allocated to the board and, moreover, to do so without having to satisfy requirements such as those laid down by the Companies Act 2006 for derivative claims.”

43.In

Ageas Insurance Ltd v Stoodley

[2019] Lloyd’s IR 1 (

“Ageas”

), A (Ageas) was an insurance company that had issued a motor policy to B (Mr Stoodley). Mr Stoodley was involved in an accident and facing a large claim for damages. A obtained an order avoiding the policy for non-disclosure. C (Advantage) was another insurer who had also issued a policy to Mr Stoodley. It applied to set aside the order. It was common ground that if the judgment was not set aside, Advantage “would be required to pay a greater sum by way of damages in respect of the accident by virtue of its obligations under Article 75” of the Motor Insurer’s Bureau’s Articles of Association (at [26]). HHJ Cotter QC (as he then was), sitting in the Bristol County Court, held that Advantage was directly affected and had standing. He said (at [40]-[43]):

“40.

In my judgment the requirement to be “directly affected”, which should be considered flexibly in light of the overarching need to ensure that injustice is not done to those affected by judgment or order, has two elements; first, that the non-party be materially and adversely affected by the judgment or order; and secondly that the effect is direct and not indirect.

41.In the present case the effect of the declaration materially and adversely affects Advantage “in its pocket” given its liability as an insurer in respect of the relevant accident. Put simply the bill goes up substantially.

42.Secondly the effect is direct and not indirect in that the axiomatic result of the declaration is the significantly increased financial liability. That increased liability arises without any further intermediate step and through legal obligation. I see no need to add a gloss to the requirement that it is necessary that the direct effect must result from direct rights against or liability to a party to the action.

43.As a result it is my view that Advantage satisfies the requirement of being directly affected by the declaration.”

44.In

Tolmie v Taylor

[2019] EWHC 3424 (Ch)

(

“Tolmie”

), A claimed as trustees of a settlement and obtained default judgment against B (Ms Taylor) for a large sum of money on the basis that she was liable as a constructive trustee for knowing receipt. The trustees then joined C (her husband, Mr Massey) and obtained a freezing order against him on the basis that he was holding assets that belonged to her, or alternatively that if she had transferred assets to him any such transfer could be set aside under

s. 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 as being intended to defraud creditors. Mr Massey applied to set aside the default judgment. Mr David Rees QC, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, held that any such application had to be made under CPR r 40.9 as Mr Massey was not a party when the order was made, and that he did not have standing as he was not directly affected. The judgment itself was a money judgment against Ms Taylor alone; no relief was sought against Mr Massey or given against him or any asset belonging to him. As such this was not a case where a legal interest belonging to him had been materially and adversely affected by the judgment itself (at [46]). He was indirectly affected by the judgment to the extent that he was or might be currently holding assets which belonged to his wife and which were liable to meet her debts (at [49]).

45.In

Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Breen

[2022] EWHC 2600 (KB) (

“Esso”

), A was a petrochemical company that had obtained an ex parte injunction against B (a named defendant and a class of persons unknown) restraining them from interfering with the construction of a pipeline. C were two environmental objectors who intended to engage in lawful protests and wished to make submissions on the return date as to the scope of the injunction. They did not wish to be joined as defendants, and applied under CPR r 40.9. Ritchie J held that they had standing to do so. On the question of what it is to be directly affected he said (at [43.1]):

“A person can be directly affected in many ways. The order may affect the person financially. It may affect the person’s property rights or possession of property. It may affect the person’s investments or pension. The order may affect a person’s ability to travel or to use a public highway. The order may affect the person’s ability to work or enjoy private life or social life or to obtain work and in so many other ways. It may affect rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act 19[9]8.”

On the facts he held that C were directly affected by the injunction. They were long term conscientious objectors against fossil fuel use. They sought to protest lawfully but actively; the injunction bound them and could have put them in breach by various protests they had carried out (at [55]). They intended to continue protesting in a lawful way and outside the terms of the injunction (at [57]). In short, the judgment made unlawful what would otherwise have been lawful activity by the applicants and clearly directly affected them as a result.

46.That decision of Ritchie J was followed by Hill J in Shell UK Ltd v Persons Unknown

[2023] EWHC 1229 (KB), [2023] 1 WLR 4358

(

“Shell”

). That was a very similar case in which A (Shell) had obtained an injunction against B (persons unknown) restraining protests at an oil refinery and other locations, and C (Ms Branch), a member of a key protest group, applied under CPR r 40.9 to be heard on A’s application to continue the injunctions. Hill J held that Ms Branch had standing to be heard: she accepted that a final decision in the litigation would adversely affect Ms Branch’s civil rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, and that if Ms Branch breached any of the injunctions this would affect her financial interests and expose her to the risk of a prison sentence.

47.Finally, there is

Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority v Azima

[2023] EWHC 2108 (Ch)

(

“Ras Al Khaimah”

). There was a long and complex history to these proceedings but, simplifying it, A (Mr Azima) applied for judgment in default of defence on a counterclaim against B (RAKIA). RAKIA had previously obtained a judgment against Mr Azima (the First Judgment) and by his counterclaim Mr Azima sought to set aside the First Judgment on the grounds that it was procured by fraud. RAKIA did not defend the application but C (Dechert and Mr Gerrard) sought to do so. They were not defendants to the set aside counterclaim, but they were defendants to another counterclaim brought by Mr Azima in which he sued them (and RAKIA) for hacking into his e-mails. Michael Green J held that whether Dechert and Mr Gerrard had standing to oppose Mr Azima’s application for judgment setting aside the First Judgment depended on whether they were directly affected (within the meaning of CPR r 40.9) (at [18]); and concluded that they were indeed directly affected as follows:

“26.

Mr Adam KC and Mr Pilbrow KC [counsel for Dechert and Mr Gerrard] argued that Dechert’s and Mr Gerrard’s interests would be significantly impaired by a default judgment on the Set Aside Counterclaim. They do seek effectively to defend the Set Aside Counterclaim on RAKIA’s behalf, principally by pleading and alleging that the materiality condition cannot be satisfied. Furthermore they submit that they will be deprived of one part of their defences to the Hacking Counterclaim in which they rely on the findings of fraud made against Mr Azima in the First Judgment.

27.In my view these are sufficient interests for Dechert and Mr Gerrard to say that they have standing by virtue of being “directly affected” within the meaning of CPR 40.9 by any default judgment that may be granted on the Set Aside Counterclaim.”

48.The judge held, therefore, that Dechert and Mr Gerrard would be “directly affected” by the default judgment setting aside the First Judgment because that would prejudice their defence of the Hacking Counterclaim, by depriving them of their ability to rely on findings of fraud made against Mr Azima in that judgment.

Legal principles

49.What can be drawn from these decisions? None except the decision of this Court in Abdelmamoud (CA) is of course binding on us, but it was not submitted that any of them was wrongly decided, and I am content to proceed on the basis that they were all correct on their own facts (subject, as explained below, to a reservation in respect of the decision in Tolmie ). I think they illustrate a number of points.

50.First, the rule, which is in entirely general terms, can apply in a very wide range of cases. In those circumstances one should be wary of saying anything too prescriptive as it is difficult to envisage all the many types of situation in which the rule might be invoked.

51.Second, however, there is a minimum requirement that C’s interests must be affected by the judgment or order. I agree with Mr Murray in Abdelmamoud (HC)

that this refers to some interest “capable of recognition at law”. So although a member of a company limited by guarantee might well be thought in a colloquial sense to have an interest in whether a judgment is given against the company (something that might very well concern him), Abdelmamoud establishes that he does not have a legal interest which is affected, or at any rate (see below) not one that is directly affected. Similarly one might have thought that a husband would often have a very real interest in the question whether a judgment was given against his wife (something that might have significant practical consequences for him), but he is not in law liable for her debts and again does not have a legal interest that is affected. (In fact I have reservations about the actual decision in Tolmie as there the husband was not simply in the position of a person whose wife had had judgment given against her, but was himself being proceeded against on the basis that assets held by him in fact belonged to her and so could be taken in satisfaction of the judgment. I think it distinctly arguable that in those circumstances he was directly affected by the judgment against his wife, although it is not necessary to resolve the point.)

52.Third, however, there is no narrow or limited class of legal interests that may be affected. I agree with Ritchie J in Esso that a person may be directly affected in many ways. As he says, a judgment may affect their proprietary rights or rights of possession, or other rights including rights under the Human Rights Act 1998

. And the cases illustrate the wide range of legal rights that can qualify. They include the right of an insurer to share liability with a co-insurer, as in Ageas where judgment setting aside Ageas’s policy affected Advantage’s liability. They can also include the rights of litigants to pursue a particular claim, as in Latif where Hamra’s judgment on the supposed loan to Imaan affected Lexi’s right to contend that the charge was invalid; or to maintain a particular defence, as in Ras Al Khaimah where a judgment in favour of Mr Azima against RAKIA setting aside the First Judgment would have affected the right of Dechert and Mr Gerrard to defend the Hacking Counterclaim in the way that they wished.

53.Fourth, it is not necessary for the applicant to show that they have lost their rights. In Latif Briggs J did not base his decision on Lexi having lost the right to contend that the charge was invalid. It was sufficient that the judgment materially prejudiced the assertion of that right. Similarly in Ras Al Khaimah setting aside the First Judgment would not have caused Dechert and Mr Gerrard to lose their right to defend the Hacking Counterclaim, but would have materially prejudiced it.

54.Fifth, on the other hand, it is necessary that the applicant’s rights should be directly affected. A judgment against a person may indirectly affect any number of people. A shareholder in a commercial company may find that the value of his shares is affected by a substantial judgment being given against the company. So too a creditor of the company may be affected. But this does not mean that they are directly affected: they are merely indirectly affected, and have no standing to challenge the judgment as such.

55.Sixth, I agree with Mr Murray in Abdelmamoud (HC) that it is only necessary for the applicant to show that the relevant judgment or order would prima facie be capable of materially and adversely affecting his legal interests. It is not necessary to show that it would in fact do so.

56.I do not think the authorities take one much further than that, although some other points are perhaps worth noticing. First, there is the statement of Newey LJ in Abdelmamoud (CA) that “it could hardly be appropriate to allow a third party to apply to have a judgment set aside unless he would then be in a position either to defend the claim on the defendant’s behalf or to put forward a defence of his own.”

57.Second, it seems to me that in some cases it may assist to consider whether the applicant would have succeeded if he had applied to be joined as a party to the action before judgment. The joinder of new parties into existing proceedings is dealt with by a different rule of the CPR, namely CPR r 19.2(2). This provides that the Court may order a person to be added as a new party if (a) it is desirable to add the new party so that the Court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party and an existing party which is connected to the matters in dispute in the proceedings and it is desirable to add the new party so that the Court can resolve that issue. This wording is not identical to that in CPR r 40.9, and in particular CPR r 19.2(2)(b) is rather wider than CPR r 40.9. It cannot therefore be assumed that the scope of the two rules will coincide. But that said, the underlying purpose of at least CPR r 19.2(2)(a) and CPR r 40.9 seems to me quite similar. In each case C applies to intervene in an action between A and B, and the essential question is much the same: does C have a sufficient interest in the proceedings between A and B to be allowed to intervene? See the discussion of this point by HHJ Cotter in Ageas at [35ff], where among other things he cited from the decision of Roth J in IPCom GmbH & Co KG v HTC Europe Co Ltd

[2013] EWHC 2880 (Ch)

, who in turn cited (at [43]) a statement in the commentary in The White Book at §40.9.1 to the effect that:

“Generally where a non-party is likely to succeed in an application it will be in circumstances where, at least arguably, they are entitled to be made a party to the proceedings.”

Mr Pomfret accepted that this was so.

58.In the context of joinder of non-parties it has long been recognised that the rule should be flexibly applied so as to allow a person whose rights will be affected by the litigation to participate in the proceedings: see for example the cases cited by HHJ Cotter in Ageas of Gurtner v Circuit [1964] 2 QB 587 at 595D-E per Lord Denning MR and at 602G-603A per Diplock LJ; and Penang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 per Lord Diplock. To these can be added In re Pablo Star Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1768 , [2018] 1 WLR 738 at [60] per Sir Terence Etherton MR where he said:

“In considering whether or not it is desirable to add a new party pursuant to CPR r 19.2(2) two lodestars are the policy objective of enabling parties to be heard if their rights may be affected by a decision in the case and the overriding objective in CPR Pt 1.”

Much the same seems to me to be applicable to CPR r 40.9.

59.Third, the decisions of Ritchie J and Hill J in Esso and Shell respectively take account of particular considerations that arise in claims against persons unknown. Such actions have features that make them rather different from claims against named persons. Mr Pomfret in his submissions placed some weight on this on the basis that the present case too was one brought against persons unknown, and that this should incline the Court to adopt a generous approach to the application of CPR r 40.9. But I do not think this particular point is of any assistance. It is true that Mr Jones did sue various classes of persons unknown, and that he obtained from Mr Cooper judgment against the first two classes requiring them to deliver up the 89.6 Bitcoin to Mr Jones’s nominated wallet, and to pay the further 8.6 Bitcoin to that wallet in satisfaction of the order for costs. But since the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants have never been identified, and have not done anything to comply with the Order, I do not think this aspect of Mr Cooper’s Order has had any effect on Kyrrex at all. What has affected Kyrrex is that Mr Cooper also ordered Huobi to transfer the 89.6 and 8.6 Bitcoin, and that Huobi did comply with that part of the Order. But insofar as the Order was made against Huobi, it was obviously not made against persons unknown. Exactly the same would have happened if Mr Jones had simply sued Huobi and obtained judgment against Huobi alone. In those circumstances even if it is right that there are particular considerations that affect the operation of CPR r 40.9 in claims against persons unknown (something on which we heard no real argument and on which I express no view), I do not see how that point assists Mr Pomfret here.

The evidence

60.Those being the principles, the next question is how they apply here. Before answering this question, it is helpful to say a bit more about what the evidence showed, in particular as to the use of the tHEL wallet.

61.Evidence in support of Kyrrex’s application was given by Mr Kevin Plumpton, Kyrrex’s chief executive officer, in his 2 nd witness statement of 31 October 2024. His evidence was to the following effect (among other things). Kyrrex, a company incorporated in St Vincent and the Grenadines, is a crypto-exchange platform that provides its customers with the ability to trade cryptocurrency. It is operational in the European Economic Area and regulated by the Malta Financial Services Authority. It only accepts deposits from its customers in cryptocurrency.

62.Huobi is (or rather was) a Seychelles-based cryptocurrency exchange platform. Kyrrex opened an account with Huobi in October 2021. On the opening of the account Huobi assigned Kyrrex with the tHEL wallet address for Bitcoin deposits. Kyrrex deposited cryptocurrency it had received from its customers into this account. It did not have separate wallets for each customer but mixed its clients’ coins in the tHEL wallet. Huobi was the exclusive owner and controller of this wallet and Kyrrex had no ownership or control of it; it was only provided with access to a dashboard that allowed it to monitor balances related to customer deposits and withdrawals.

63.Mr Plumpton referred to the arrangements between Kyrrex and Huobi as follows:

“From time to time, Kyrrex deposits cryptocurrency into this account, pursuant to Huobi’s platform user agreement ( Huobi User Agreement ). Pursuant to clause 5(i) of the Huobi User Agreement, Huobi holds digital assets in their customer’s account on a custodial basis.”

We have not seen the Huobi User Agreement, and Mr Plumpton does not give any further explanation as to what is meant by Huobi holding the assets “on a custodial basis”.

64.Mr Plumpton also gave evidence as to the exchanges between Huobi and Kyrrex in September 2022 when the 98.2 Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet were first locked, and then transferred out. On 9 September 2022 Kyrrex discovered that 98.2 Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet had been locked. On 15 September Kyrrex wrote to Huobi asking for an explanation. On 16 September Huobi replied to the effect that:

“Your account is currently involved in an investigation. We will share more information once the investigation is complete.”

On 19 September Huobi provided Kyrrex with a copy of Mr Cooper’s Order of 7 September 2022, and of the freezing orders made the same day. On 21 September Huobi wrote to Kyrrex, and said:

“The matters raised in your letter are essentially substantive matters in the dispute between you (as the account holder for the account holding the BTC to which the relevant injunctions and other court orders relate) and the Claimant and are therefore for you to take up with the Claimant and/or the court of England & Wales that issued the injunctions and orders.”

65.Kyrrex replied reiterating its objection to the locking. It included a screenshot showing that the total balance on the account at the time was approximately 1,546.76 Bitcoin, despite the fact that Kyrrex only held approximately 192.57 Bitcoin in its account (including the 98.2 that had been locked).

66.On 27 September 2022 Kyrrex discovered that the 98.2 Bitcoin had been transferred with the comments “From locked position” and “Transfer to System” with the result that there was a shortfall on its account. It wrote to Huobi asking for an explanation. Huobi replied on 30 September. Its reply stated among other things:

“tHEL wallet is associated exclusively with the [Kyrrex] BTC account at Huobi … tHEL wallet address was solely to be used for Kyrrex to deposit BTC into the customer account it held with Huobi.”

67.I should also refer to the expert evidence. The original report(s) relied on by Mr Jones from CiRO, as I have already said, are not before us, but his pleaded case was that the reports concluded that the tHEL wallet had been used by the scammers (see paragraph 13 above), and Mr Cooper in his judgment referred to the CiRO report of 5 April 2022 as evidencing that the tHEL wallet was connected to the fraud, and contained some 488.7 Bitcoin (or perhaps 489.7) as at 1 April 2022 (see paragraph 15 above).

68.More detail of the CiRO report can be found in the report of Mr Davison dated 17 October 2024 relied on by Kyrrex in support of its application. He was asked a number of questions, including whether the CiRO report accurately established that Mr Jones’s stolen Bitcoin ultimately reached the tHEL wallet. Mr Davison was very critical of the CiRO report, and his answer in summary was that there was no evidence to link the stolen Bitcoin to the tHEL wallet, either in the CiRO report, or from his own review of the wallet and transactions. He reproduced a graph from the CiRO report which appeared to show some of the stolen Bitcoin being transferred to a Binance deposit address, and thence via wallets referred to as “3AmMt” and “1G5d1” to tHEL. But this was, he said, the only apparent tangible link between Mr Jones’s stolen Bitcoin and the tHEL wallet, with the final amount sent from the 1G5d1 wallet to the tHEL wallet, according to the CiRO graph, being a negligible amount (0.58 Bitcoin) in comparison with Mr Jones’s loss; it was unclear from the report how the final two addresses had been identified; and they did not feature in the tracing of the stolen Bitcoin as seen in the rest of the report. Mr Davison’s own analysis was that although the 1G5d1 wallet did receive a number of transfers totalling 1.31 Bitcoin from the 3AmMt wallet, these, once received, were almost immediately each sent to wallet addresses other than tHEL, leaving a zero balance each time, so that none of the Bitcoin sent from the 3AmMt wallet were in fact sent to tHEL.

69.Mr Davison also analysed the source of Bitcoin sent to the tHEL wallet. This analysis concluded that about 85% of Bitcoin were sent to the tHEL wallet directly from exchanges, over 99.9% of which were sent from Kyrrex; 96% of Bitcoin that were sent indirectly to the tHEL wallet were also from exchanges, again the vast majority (over 88%) from Kyrrex. A very small percentage came from illicit activity, including 1,109 Bitcoin from a very wide range of scams and other frauds. But this was a very minor number given the amount of Bitcoin moving through the wallet (which was active between 25 February 2022 and 10 September 2023, during which period it sent and received 103,232 Bitcoin); and no direct link could be found with the fraud on Mr Jones.

70.Mr Jones adduced a further expert report from Mr Scott Pounder of Prometheus Insights. This did not address the criticisms made by Mr Davison of the CiRO report, or engage with his analysis. Instead Mr Pounder dealt with a number of discrete points. The first was that the Bitcoin transferred by Huobi to Mr Jones in compliance with Mr Cooper’s Order did not come from the tHEL wallet but from a wallet labelled RwrmV, and none of the Bitcoin in that wallet could be identified as coming from an address attributed to Kyrrex. The second was that it was not possible to determine at the material time that the tHEL wallet was operated or controlled by Kyrrex: contemporary attribution only identified Huobi as the service provider with custody of the wallet. Third, Mr Pounder agreed with Mr Davison that several incoming transactions into the tHEL wallet came from illicit activities; and that there was evidence that the tHEL address had been the subject of concern in international fraud investigations.

Was Kyrrex directly affected?

71.On this evidence, a number of points were argued in relation to the question whether Kyrrex was directly affected by Mr Cooper’s Order.

72.Some of them can I think be disposed of relatively simply. First, I do not think it makes any difference that Huobi appears to have transferred the 98.2 Bitcoin to Mr Jones’s nominated wallet from the RwrmV wallet and then reimbursed itself from the tHEL wallet (which is what I take “transfer to system” to mean), rather than transferring them directly from the tHEL wallet. Mr Cooper’s Order had specifically directed Huobi to transfer the requisite Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet to the wallet nominated by Mr Jones: see paragraphs 3 and 9 of his Order, dealing with the 89.6 Bitcoin and the 8.6 Bitcoin in respect of costs respectively, (set out at paragraphs 19 and 21 above). But the parties are agreed that Bitcoin is, as Mr McIlroy put it, “entirely fungible”; as he explained, each Bitcoin does have the equivalent of a serial number on a banknote, but no-one is concerned as to which particular Bitcoin they receive, any more than a person receiving banknotes is concerned with which particular notes they receive. So it made no difference to Mr Jones that he in fact appears to have received Bitcoin from the RwrmV wallet. As I have stated, the transfer made by Huobi was treated by both Mr Jones and Huobi as performing the obligation to “restore” to Mr Jones “his” 89.6 Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet.

73.No doubt it did make a difference to Huobi, an exchange with a large number of wallets, presumably held for different customers, which wallet bore the cost of the transfer. But as already referred to, Mr Cooper’s Order directed Huobi to transfer Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet, so it is entirely unsurprising that it should have funded the transfer from that wallet. And I do not think it makes any difference that the way in which Huobi did this was by transferring Bitcoin out of another wallet (RwrmV) first, and then reimbursing itself from the tHEL wallet, rather than by transferring Bitcoin directly from the tHEL wallet. This is simply a question of mechanics: the overall effect is the same, namely that Huobi transferred 98.2 Bitcoin to Mr Jones, and took the requisite 98.2 Bitcoin out of the tHEL wallet as Mr Cooper’s Order had directed it to. As Peter Jackson LJ said in argument, there is no doubt that the reason Huobi took the 98.2 Bitcoin out of the tHEL wallet was because that is what the Order said.

74.The point can be illustrated by supposing a claimant who had traced stolen money into a trust fund and had obtained an order requiring the trustee to repay £100,000 out of the fund. I do not think it would make any difference to the rights of the beneficiaries, or to the question whether they had standing to apply under CPR r 40.9, whether the trustee paid the claimant £100,000 directly out of the fund, or first paid the £100,000 out of his own pocket, and then transferred £100,000 out of the fund to himself. The practical effect is precisely the same in each case. The present case seems to me to be on all fours.

75.Second, I do not think it matters that the evidence left rather obscure the precise relationship between Kyrrex and Huobi, and in particular did not elucidate what was meant in the Huobi User Agreement by Huobi holding digital assets in the customer’s account “on a custodial basis” (see paragraph 63 above). That might mean that Kyrrex retained a proprietary interest in the Bitcoin that it deposited in the account (whether in specific Bitcoin or as one of a number of beneficiaries in the amounts deposited in the wallet as a whole); but it might mean that Kyrrex only had contractual rights against Huobi.

76.Mr McIlroy submitted that Kyrrex had failed to show that it had a proprietary interest in the Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet, and that this was a classic case of a party not adducing the evidence necessary to make out its case. It is indeed somewhat surprising that Kyrrex did not do more to establish the nature of its interest in the Bitcoin in the wallet. Had Kyrrex adduced evidence to establish a proprietary interest, establishing that Kyrrex was “directly affected” by the order requiring Huobi to transfer Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet to Mr Jones is likely to have been a relatively straightforward task. We were told however that Kyrrex made no attempt before the Judge to establish that it had a proprietary interest (although the Huobi User Agreement was in evidence before him); and before us we were not even provided with that agreement, and it formed no part of the Grounds of Appeal that the Judge should have found that Kyrrex had a proprietary interest in the Bitcoin in the wallet. I therefore accept Mr McIlroy’s submission that it has not been established before this Court that Kyrrex had a proprietary interest.

77.Nevertheless I do not think it matters for present purposes. Let it be assumed that Kyrrex’s rights in relation to the Bitcoin deposited in its account with Huobi and transferred to the tHEL wallet were merely contractual rights against Huobi. (This would be analogous to that of a bank customer depositing money in a bank account, where it has been established ever since

Foley v Hill

(1848) 2 HL Cas 28 that the customer retains no proprietary interest in the money and the relationship between banker and customer is simply that of debtor and creditor.) I do not think this would by itself mean that Kyrrex was not directly affected by the Order. As can be seen from the analysis of the cases above, although it is necessary for the party applying under CPR r 40.9 to show that his legal rights have been affected (and hence the interest that a member of a charitable company has in the company’s affairs, or the interest that a husband has in his wife’s affairs, do not count), this is not confined to proprietary interests, and indeed a very wide range of legal rights have been accepted as sufficient for this purpose. I see no reason why that should not include contractual rights, which are often among the most valuable rights that a person has. In

Ageas

Advantage was directly affected by the judgment against Ageas because it affected its right to share liability for the loss and hence directly affected it “in its pocket” as HHJ Cotter held: it had the effect of imposing on Advantage a significantly increased financial liability (see paragraph 43 above). If an effect on a person’s financial liability under a contract can be sufficient to mean that they are directly affected, which I accept it can, I see no reason why an effect on a person’s rights under a contract cannot also be.

78.Here Huobi in response to Mr Cooper’s Order took 98.2 Bitcoin out of the tHEL wallet, and deducted them from Kyrrex’s account. Whether Kyrrex had a proprietary interest in the Bitcoin, or a mere contractual right to withdraw that number of Bitcoin from its account, the practical effect on Kyrrex was the same: its rights to that number of Bitcoin were prejudicially affected as it could no longer simply withdraw them when it wanted to; or as the Judge put it in the Judgment at [17], Kyrrex “is out of pocket as things stand and will remain out of pocket if this application does not succeed.”

79.The value of those rights depends on the date one looks at it but on any view the value was substantial: taking the exchange rate used in Mr Cooper’s Order of one Bitcoin to £17,194.11, 98.2 Bitcoin would have then been worth nearly £1.7m. Mr Plumpton’s evidence was that by the time he made his witness statement in October 2024 one Bitcoin was worth approximately $65,000, which would make the 98.2 Bitcoin at that date worth over $6m (over £5m at then exchange rates). Kyrrex’s rights in respect of that number of Bitcoin have undoubtedly been affected, whether they are classified as proprietary rights or merely contractual rights, and I do not think it matters for present purposes which they were. Even if merely contractual, that does not in my judgment prevent Kyrrex’s legal interests from having been affected.

80.That leaves the third and main point argued by Mr McIlroy, which is this. The evidence was that there were many more Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet than were credited to Kyrrex’s account. There is no dispute that this is so, Mr Plumpton’s evidence being that as at 21 September 2022 the tHEL wallet had a total balance of approximately 1,546.76 Bitcoin, significantly more than Kyrrex’s account balance of some 192.57 Bitcoin (see paragraph 65 above). That means that there were some 1,354 Bitcoin which were not attributable to Kyrrex’s account. (I leave out of account the statement in Mr Cooper’s judgment at paragraph 11 that the tHEL wallet held a balance of 14,986 Bitcoin as at 20 July 2022 (see paragraph 15 above); this is out of line with the other evidence and counsel were unable to explain it. It may refer not to the amount of Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet alone but to the total held by Huobi in its “cluster” of wallets: Mr Davison explains that a cluster refers to a group of blockchain addresses controlled by a single entity or group of entities, and he says that Huobi’s cluster had a balance of 10,813 Bitcoin at the time of his report in October 2024, which is a similar order of magnitude.)

81.In those circumstances Mr McIlroy submitted that it was not Mr Cooper’s Order (which merely required Huobi to take the 98.2 Bitcoin out of the tHEL wallet) which affected Kyrrex. It was Huobi’s decision to debit the 98.2 Bitcoin to Kyrrex rather than to anyone else who might be interested in the tHEL wallet. That was not something required by the Order (which did not refer to Kyrrex at all, Mr Jones not having any information about Kyrrex). Mr McIlroy submitted that the Judge was therefore right to say that this was a classic example of an indirect effect as Huobi did not need to access any Bitcoin that belonged to Kyrrex (or Kyrrex’s clients) in order to satisfy the judgment.

82.This argument was attractively advanced and is I think a rather better one. A default judgment obtained by A against B will frequently have an adverse economic or other effect on a non-party, C, but not all such effects will be “direct”. But in the end I prefer Mr Pomfret’s submission that the effect of the judgment on Kyrrex was sufficiently direct to bring Kyrrex within CPR r 40.9.

83.There are two aspects to this. First, the evidence is that the tHEL wallet was very much Kyrrex’s wallet. Mr Davison says in his report that “a deposit address [such as the tHEL wallet] is normally associated with one user”, and this accords both with what Kyrrex understood and with what Huobi said. Mr Plumpton in his evidence said that he was told (by the team responsible for technical issues at Kyrrex) that the tHEL wallet was for Kyrrex’s exclusive use; and Huobi’s correspondence with Kyrrex in September 2022 not only referred to the account as “your account” and to Kyrrex as “you … the account holder”, but also said in terms that the tHEL wallet “is associated exclusively with the [Kyrrex] BTC account at Huobi” and “was solely to be used for Kyrrex to deposit BTC into the customer account it held with Huobi” (see paragraphs 64 and 66 above). To this can be added Mr Davison’s evidence as to the actual use made of the tHEL account, namely that 85% of Bitcoin were sent to the tHEL wallet directly from exchanges, over 99.9% of which were sent from Kyrrex; and that 96% of Bitcoin that were sent indirectly to the tHEL wallet were also from exchanges, again the vast majority (over 88%) from Kyrrex (see paragraph 69 above). By my calculation that means that over 97.5% of the Bitcoin transferred in came directly or indirectly from Kyrrex so although on this evidence it was not the only user of the wallet, it was responsible for the vast majority of deposits into it.

84.None of this explains why there should be so many more Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet in September 2022 than were attributable to Kyrrex’s account. The evidence leaves this somewhat obscure but Mr Plumpton does provide a possible explanation, as follows. The balance on Kyrrex’s account and the amount of Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet are not the same thing. For example if Kyrrex deposited 50 Bitcoin into the account and later withdrew 10, its account would show a balance of 40. But Huobi might decide to settle the withdrawal request out of a different wallet; as explained above, because Bitcoin is fungible, Kyrrex would not be concerned about receiving back the very same Bitcoin that it had deposited. That would mean that the tHEL wallet would still contain 50 Bitcoin although Kyrrex’s account showed 40. The other 10 would be available for Huobi to use for other purposes.

85.The evidence leaves it unclear if this is the explanation or not. Nor is there any evidence as to who else other than Kyrrex had rights in respect of the other Bitcoin. Mr McIlroy said that the Judge found that the wallet contained Bitcoin from several parties, and that some of the assets were the proceeds of illicit activities. I do not think either statement is strictly accurate. The Judge indeed accepted that the wallet contained Bitcoin beyond assets that Kyrrex or its customers could lay claim to (Judgment at [18]), that it seemed other Bitcoin went in there as well (Judgment at [21]), and that there was sufficient Bitcoin within the tHEL wallet to which Kyrrex and its customers laid no claim to satisfy the judgment (Judgment at [41]). All these statements were justified by the evidence, but I do not think the evidence established, nor did the Judge say, that there were several other people interested in the Bitcoin in the wallet. For all that the evidence disclosed, it may have all been Huobi’s. As Mr McIlroy himself said, it is simply a feature of the terms on which Huobi holds the wallet that it is impossible to know the identity of those interested without the co-operation of the person operating the exchange, that is Huobi; and despite Mr Jones obtaining an order that Huobi provide information on affidavit and give disclosure as to the identity of the account holders, Huobi completely failed to comply.

86.Nor do I think the evidence established that the Bitcoin in the wallet at the time of Mr Cooper’s Order included the proceeds of illicit activities. Mr Davison’s evidence was that some 1,109 Bitcoin that had been paid into the wallet came from scams; Mr Pounder agreed (although he put the figure at 1,095). But this does not mean that that number of illicitly obtained Bitcoin were still in the wallet in September 2022: Mr Davison’s evidence was that some 103,232 Bitcoin had been received by and sent from the wallet, so that it was what he called a hugely active wallet, with only a very small percentage of the Bitcoin moving through it representing the proceeds of illicit activities. I do not think this evidence establishes that any of the illicitly obtained Bitcoin was still in the wallet at the time of Mr Cooper’s Order; if anything one might expect those who had obtained Bitcoin illicitly to move it on quickly.

87.The result is that I think the evidence left it entirely unclear whether anyone other than Kyrrex and Huobi itself were interested in the Bitcoin in the wallet, or whether any of it was derived from illicit activities. That may or may not have been the case. Nevertheless if, as the evidence indicates, the tHEL wallet was both intended to be Kyrrex’s wallet and in fact primarily used by Kyrrex, I do not find it surprising that Huobi chose to debit the 98.2 Bitcoin to Kyrrex when complying with Mr Cooper’s Order. Nor, in those circumstances, do I think that the effect on Kyrrex of Mr Cooper’s Order requiring the 98.2 Bitcoin to be taken from the tHEL wallet can be described as “indirect”. We do not in fact know why Huobi debited Kyrrex’s account, and although this question was touched on by the parties – both at the hearing, and in some post-hearing submissions – I do not think it is necessary to resolve why; where the wallet identified in Mr Cooper’s Order was very much Kyrrex’s wallet, I think this by itself is sufficient to mean that Kyrrex was directly affected by the Order. It is true that Huobi could have had recourse to the other Bitcoin in the wallet – which may have meant bearing the cost itself – but it was at least foreseeable, if not probable, that Huobi would charge the cost to Kyrrex whose wallet (to the extent explained above) it was. Kyrrex was not just one person out of many interested in the wallet that was chosen at random, but was on the evidence the primary account holder. I have come to the conclusion that this is sufficient by itself to mean that Kyrrex was directly affected by the Order.

88.But even if this is wrong (and it is only fair to add that this was not really the point relied on by Mr Pomfret), I accept his submissions which were as follows. The Order directing Huobi to take the 98.2 Bitcoin out of the tHEL wallet was bound to result in a loss to someone interested in the Bitcoin in the wallet, that being a fixed and identifiable class of persons. So if one takes the whole class of those interested, it is not difficult to conclude that that class was directly affected, as there would inevitably be 98.2 less Bitcoin to share between them. That was not the result of some extraneous decision but necessarily flowed from the judgment itself. And once one reaches that conclusion, I agree with Mr Pomfret that since the impact of the judgment would necessarily fall on one or more members of the class, those who do end up bearing the cost of it can claim to be directly affected. The alternative would mean that although the class as a whole could claim to be directly affected (and hence they could all apply together), the individual member(s) of the class actually affected could not (despite the fact that none of the other members of the class would have lost anything or have any interest in applying). That does not seem a very sensible reading of the rule.

89.In this connection I find it helpful to consider what the position would have been had Huobi informed Kyrrex of the proceedings before Mr Jones had obtained summary judgment and indicated that it did not intend to defend them. If Kyrrex had in those circumstances applied to join in the proceedings under CPR r 19.2(2), I think it very likely that it would have been successful. That is because it would have had an obvious interest in seeing that judgment was not given for payment out of the tHEL wallet, namely that it was one of those interested in the wallet who might end up bearing the cost; in the words of Sir Terence Etherton MR in In re Pablo Star Ltd (see paragraph 58 above), it would have been a person whose “rights may be affected by a decision in the case”. That, for reasons given above, is not necessarily determinative of the question under CPR r 40.9, but I think it does provide a useful cross-check and tends to support the view that I have come to.

90.I would therefore accept that Ground 1 of the appeal is made out, and hold that Kyrrex had standing to apply under CPR r 40.9 as a person directly affected by Mr Cooper’s Order.

Ground 3 – merits of Kyrrex’s case

91.That is not however sufficient by itself to lead to the appeal being allowed. The question of standing is a threshold or gateway issue (or as Newey LJ put it in Abdelmamoud (CA) a precondition), but, as the Judge correctly identified in the Judgment at [26] (see paragraph 31 above), the rule then requires the Court to exercise its discretion or judgment as to whether to set aside the judgment or order in question.

92.I have set out the Judge’s conclusions (Judgment at [52]) at paragraph 34 above but repeat the relevant parts here for convenience. The Judge dismissed the application on the question of standing, but went on to say:

“Moreover, on the merits issues that arise in the case, whilst I have every sympathy with Kyrrex who are entirely innocent losers, I see some considerable difficulties in the manner in which the case is advanced in a way that would justify the setting aside of the order. I have referred to what I see as the difficulties in treating Huobi as a custodian in order to bring a claim against them. I do not reject those difficulties out of hand but this would plainly be a problematic claim in which the merits are far from clear cut. In those circumstances, my finding on Kyrrex Limited not being directly affected is a bar to the application succeeding and it fails on that ground. It would in any event have failed on the application of the merits test bearing in mind not only the merits of the claim themselves but also the delay in bringing this application and the consequent prejudice to which I have referred.”

93.Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal addresses the question of delay and Ground 3 the question of the merits. I propose to take Ground 3 first.

94.What did the Judge mean by the merits of the claim? In the Judgment at [29] he said:

“It will always be important in an application of this kind to consider whether the person seeking to apply has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim against it were the judgment to be set aside – see the judgment of HHJ Cotter QC as he then was in Ageas Insurance Ltd v Stoodley [2019] Rep IR.1 where at paragraph 53 he considered the test, considered previous authorities on the issue and was satisfied that the application must ordinarily “establish that there is... a real prospect of successfully defending the claim,” reflecting the test under CPR 13.3.”

95.I did not understand Mr McIlroy to take issue with this (although strictly speaking I think the Judge spoke loosely when referring to successfully defending the claim “against it”; the question is whether there is a realistic prospect of showing that there is a defence to the claim on which judgment has been given). In any event it seems to me to be right. If the applicant has a real prospect of successfully showing that there is a defence to the claim, then it is prima facie an injustice to him for the Court to give a judgment which ex hypothesi directly affects his interests without his having had an opportunity to argue the case. If however the applicant is unable to put forward a case with at least a real prospect of success, then there is no injustice in allowing the judgment to stand. This is what happened in Ageas itself: HHJ Cotter examined the evidence and arguments put forward by Advantage as to why Ageas’s policy should not have been avoided, but found that they did not disclose any real prospect of obtaining a different result (at [88]).

96.In the present case Mr Pomfret said that Kyrrex’s case, far from being a problematic one whose merits were not clear cut, was a very strong one: Mr Cooper’s Order should never have been made. This was not elaborated on orally, but in his written submissions he said that Mr Davison’s evidence was that none of Mr Jones’s Bitcoin ever reached the tHEL wallet; that there was no evidence challenging that as Mr Jones’s new expert Mr Pounder did not take issue with Mr Davison’s analysis but addressed a number of different issues; and that if Mr Davison were right, then the Order made by Mr Cooper should not have been made, as it was made on the basis, as recorded in paragraph 2 of his Order, that the tHEL wallet “has been used to store fraudulently obtained Bitcoin including those belonging to [Mr Jones]” (see paragraph 19 above). Mr Pomfret submitted that the Judge had lost sight of the strength of Kyrrex’s claim: he should have drawn the inference that Mr Jones could not counter Mr Davison’s tracing analysis.

97.I do not think that the Judge made the simple error here attributed to him. He was well aware that Mr Davison’s evidence was uncontested before him and that this meant that Mr Cooper’s Order had been obtained on a flawed basis, as his Judgment repeatedly makes clear. At [7] he noted that Mr Cooper’s judgment was wrong, both in attributing any cryptocurrency from Mr Jones as having arrived in the tHEL wallet and in saying that the Bitcoin held in the tHEL wallet could only be Bitcoin transferred to the wallet by individuals connected with the fraud: see paragraph 29 above. At [9] he said that Mr Cooper’s Order “identified (in the event wrongly as noted above) [89.6] Bitcoin said to have been transferred into the tHEL wallet.” At [18] he said that Kyrrex’s case started by asserting “as is now entirely accepted” that the application that Mr Jones brought had wrongly identified his Bitcoin as having been paid into the tHEL wallet; and went on to refer to the fact that very little of the Bitcoin in the wallet could be shown to be the result of arguably illicit conduct “and none of which related to Mr Jones”. Then at [32] he said this:

“I note at the beginning of summarising the submissions that it criticises two particular aspects of the conduct of the case on behalf of Mr Jones. The first is that, as I have indicated already, Mr Lorrell contends, and I accept this to be so, that the original order was made on misleading information both as to whether the stolen Bitcoin had been paid into the HEL account and whether the tHEL account was exclusively the subject of fraudulent credits or transfers into it. Neither of these statements was correct. They undoubtedly may in each case have influenced the order that Mr Cooper KC made. Indeed, given his express reference to the second point and given that his order contained reference to the tHEL wallet, it is probably the case that in both senses he was actually misled.”

98.In the light of this I think it entirely clear that the Judge well understood that the effect of the evidence before him was that Mr Cooper’s Order had been made on an incorrect basis. Indeed it appears from the Judgment that this was not really in dispute before him, and Mr McIlroy confirmed to us in terms that it was not contested, at any rate for the purposes of the application, that the original tracing exercise was sufficiently flawed to satisfy the Judge that Mr Cooper was wrong.

99.Why then did the Judge say that he saw considerable difficulties in the claim, and that it was a problematic one whose merits were far from clear cut?

100.The answer lies in the earlier parts of his Judgment. At [37] he summarised Kyrrex’s case on the merits as follows:

“It is simply not in dispute that Kyrrex has suffered loss because Bitcoin which it had deposited with Huobi has been used by Huobi to replenish sums paid by Huobi to Mr Jones. No defence has yet been filed but it is clear, says Mr Lorrell, that Kyrrex clearly has a right of action for the recovery of what in effect is its Bitcoin.”

101.At [43] he summarised Mr Jones’s case on the merits as follows:

“In any event, Mr Jones disputes that Kyrrex has suffered a recoverable loss. In this respect, my attention is drawn to Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners

[2018] AC 275 … At best Kyrrex can say that Huobi has deducted Bitcoin from an account in which Kyrrex held Bitcoin to make up a shortfall but it does not show any proprietary interest in the Bitcoin of a manner that could give rise to a constructive trust, to a claim in unjust enrichment or, indeed, to a tracing claim. In any event, a claim in unjust enrichment would fail, says Mr Jones, because of his change of position, a point I will deal with separately below when looking at the question of delay. Accordingly, the arguments advanced by Kyrrex lack the merits necessary not only because it is not a directly affected party but because it does not show a legal basis for depriving Mr Jones of the benefit of a judgment that he has obtained against other parties.”

He added at [44]:

“Further, Mr McIlroy on behalf of Mr Jones draws attention to the fact that the evidence before the court by way of the trading terms both of Huobi and of Kyrrex is that in both cases the wallets in which they held Bitcoin were custodial wallets with no specific identifiable Bitcoins held. In those circumstances, again Kyrrex simply does not have the proprietary interest sufficient to justify the right that it seeks to enforce.”

102.It is clear from these summaries of the parties’ respective submissions on the merits that the point that was in issue was not just whether Kyrrex had shown that Mr Jones’s Bitcoin did not reach the tHEL wallet, but whether that gave Kyrrex a claim to recover the Bitcoin.

103.The Judge’s views on that issue appear from the Judgment at [52] (see paragraph 92 above), where he says that he sees considerable difficulties in the manner in which the case is advanced in a way that would justify the setting aside of the order. Reading the Judgment as a whole, I think he must have come to the view that there were significant difficulties in Kyrrex’s claim to recover the Bitcoin. And given the way in which he summarised the arguments, that must have been because he thought there was considerable merit in the argument put forward by Mr McIlroy (i) that Kyrrex had not established that it had any proprietary interest in the Bitcoin transferred to Mr Jones and (ii) that in the absence of any such proprietary interest Kyrrex did not have a claim either under a constructive trust, or in unjust enrichment, or by way of a tracing claim. And it would appear from the arguments that the question was framed before him in terms of the merits of a claim by Kyrrex to recover the Bitcoin from Mr Jones

: see the reference in [37] to Kyrrex’s argument that it had “a right of action for the recovery of what in effect is its Bitcoin”, and in [43] to Mr Jones’s argument based on Investment Trust Companies v Revenue and Customs Commissioners

[2017] UKSC 29

, [2018] AC 275 and to a change of position defence (which the Judge said (at [47]) was a difficult one), both of which would only be relevant to a claim by Kyrrex in unjust enrichment against Mr Jones.

104.In the light of the way the case seems to have been argued before him I am not surprised that the Judge thought he should try and answer this question. But in fact I think the way the case was argued led him to address the wrong question, and all this is beside the point. The relevant question is not how strong the merits are of a restitutionary claim by Kyrrex to recover the Bitcoin from Mr Jones. The relevant question is the much simpler one of whether Kyrrex had an arguable claim that Mr Cooper’s Order was made on a completely false basis and should never have been made. Kyrrex plainly does have an arguable claim to that effect; moreover the merits of that claim are, as Mr Pomfret submitted, very strong – indeed it is not easy to see how Mr Jones will be able to answer Mr Davison’s analysis which on its face appears compelling, and which Mr Jones did not attempt to contest for the purposes of the application. If the matter were litigated afresh, it seems overwhelmingly likely on the material currently before the Court that Mr Jones would fail to establish that he ever had any claim to transfer of Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet, or indeed from Huobi at all (although I should make it clear that I am not finally deciding this: it will be a matter to be decided hereafter).

105.That I think makes this case rather different from the run-of-the-mill case in which a judgment has been entered, often by default, and an application is made to set it aside. In the ordinary case the question for the Court in assessing the merits of the applicant’s case is whether the applicant has an arguable defence to the claim, or whether, if the matter were re-opened and went to trial, the claimant would indeed show that he was entitled to judgment in his favour.

106.If one asks that question on the facts of the present case then as I have said there is really only one answer. There is nothing currently before the Court which would suggest that Mr Jones would be able, if the matter were re-opened, to establish any claim that any of the Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet were the proceeds of the fraud on him, or that he was truly entitled to the judgment that he obtained requiring payment of Bitcoin out of that wallet, or any judgment against Huobi.

107.It seems to me in those circumstances that once it has been shown both (i) that Kyrrex was directly affected by Mr Cooper’s Order (as I have accepted that it was) and (ii) that that Order, requiring transfer to Mr Jones from the tHEL wallet, should not have been made (as the Judge rightly accepted), then it follows that it would be prima facie grossly unjust to Kyrrex, which on the face of it has suffered a large loss as a result of a quite unjustified Order, to decline to set it aside.

108.The important point is that this does not require reaching any view about the merits of any claim by Kyrrex against Mr Jones in unjust enrichment or the like to recover the Bitcoin. It is a different question what the consequences of setting aside the Order may be, which I address below, but this does not affect the fact that Kyrrex has on the evidence sufficiently established that an Order which directly affects it should not have been made.

109.I therefore consider that the Judge was wrong to have taken into account the view he had formed as to the merits of Kyrrex’s claim to recover (although I should add that I think this was an entirely understandable error given the way the case appears to have been argued before him). In my view the relevant question was the strength of Kyrrex’s case that the Order was made on a false basis and should not have been made. That as I have said is overwhelming, and appears likely to be unanswerable.

110.That is not the end of the matter, as the application to set aside must be decided in accordance with the overriding objective, and I accept that that means that other factors, such as delay and prejudice, can therefore in principle be relevant. But it does I think mean that the Judge’s exercise of his discretion (or to be more precise his conclusion as to how he would have exercised his discretion had he held that Kyrrex had standing), which did take into account the difficulties as he saw them with Kyrrex’s claim to recover the Bitcoin, was to that extent flawed, with the result that it falls to us to exercise it again.

Ground 2 – delay and prejudice

111.The facts relevant to the question of delay are as follows.

112.Mr Jones transferred his Bitcoin to the EP Platform between January 2019 and 2020. His pleaded case is that correspondence with the platform ceased in July 2020 and that he obtained expert reports from CiRO in December 2020 and April 2022. He issued his proceedings in June 2022, and as referred to above, obtained summary judgment from Mr Cooper on 5 September 2022. Huobi locked the 98.2 Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet on 9 September 2022, and complied with the Order on 27 September 2022 by transferring 98.2 Bitcoin from the RwrmV wallet and then transferring the 98.2 Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet to system.

113.Kyrrex knew that the 98.2 Bitcoin had been locked on 9 September 2022, was provided with a copy of Mr Cooper’s Order (and his proprietary and worldwide freezing orders) on 19 September 2022, and knew that the 98.2 Bitcoin had been transferred to system on 27 September 2022. Mr Plumpton’s evidence (in a further witness statement) is that on 19 September 2022 Kyrrex formally informed Mr Jones’s solicitors of its intention to challenge the ruling.

114.In October 2022 Kyrrex instructed English solicitors who requested from Mr Jones’s solicitors copies of the underlying documents and evidence that had led to the orders made in the proceedings. This was not provided voluntarily and on 15 December 2022 Kyrrex filed an application under CPR r 5.4C and/or the Court’s inherent jurisdiction seeking access to the documents. Mr Jones’s solicitors initially resisted the application but ultimately agreed to provide the documents, and a consent order was approved by the Court on 15 March 2023.

115.Mr Plumpton’s evidence is that Kyrrex then considered whether to apply in the English Court to vary or set aside Mr Cooper’s Order, or to initiate a claim against Huobi. It decided on the former “after careful deliberation over the summer of 2023”. That required authorisation from Kyrrex’s Board which gave the green light “by the latter part of 2023”. Kyrrex decided that it needed expert evidence and ultimately chose AnotherDay (that is, Mr Davison). Mr Plumpton says that the process of engaging AnotherDay “took some months”; the instruction, drafting and approval process took place in late 2023; it took roughly 3 months to finalise the instructions to everyone’s satisfaction, and AnotherDay were formally instructed by around March 2024.

116.Mr Plumpton says that Mr Davison’s report was completed on 7 August 2024 (although the version served with the application is dated 17 October 2024). During September and October 2024 Kyrrex prepared the application to set aside, including Mr Plumpton’s 2 nd witness statement which was finalised on 31 October 2024. Mr Plumpton’s evidence is that Mr Jones’s solicitors were notified of the intention to apply in October 2024; the application itself was issued on 15 (or 17) November 2024; and it was served on 2 December 2024.

117.The application did not in fact come on for hearing until 10 June 2025 but the Judge said (Judgment at [15]) that the fact that it had taken some time to come on for hearing seemed to be entirely the consequence of matters outside the control of Kyrrex, most particularly that Kyrrex had to resist an application by Mr Jones for security for costs that failed, and that Mr Jones latterly decided to disavow the evidence from CiRO and seek expert evidence from Prometheus (that is, Mr Pounder).

118.That means that the relevant period is at most between Kyrrex first learning of Mr Cooper’s Order in September 2022 and bringing the application in November 2024.

119.The Judge’s assessment of the delay was as follows (Judgment at [48]):

“Starting with the issue of delay, this is not a case of gross delay. It would not be possible to look at [ Lombard North Central plc v European Skyjets Ltd

[2020] EWHC 679 (QB)

]

and think that a delay of this length of time was gross but Kyrrex could and should properly have pursued matters more quickly. I find the evidence as to the length of time taken to instruct an expert and then to obtain an expert’s report to be unconvincing. I have other experience of cryptocurrency cases on the Bench. I have seen cases where reports have been obtained really quite quickly. I have seen cases where reports have taken several months and I would not have criticised Kyrrex if it had taken several months to get a report together but crypto cases like so many other cases involving the challenging of a judgment need a timely response and to have taken more than two years or perhaps as a better measure more than eighteen months from the date at which disclosure was given is in my judgment difficult to justify.”

120.So far as prejudice is concerned, Mr Jones relied below on three matters of prejudice, namely (i) that Huobi had been struck off the Seychelles register on 13 October 2023 which made it impossible, or at least very difficult, for Mr Jones to proceed against it; (ii) that to go after anybody else would now be likely to be far more difficult than would have been the case in 2022 and 2023; and (iii) that Mr Jones’s financial position had changed.

121.As already referred to, the Judge did not think much of the third of these, saying that the evidence on that issue was not sufficiently clear cut to justify an argument either that an unjust enrichment claim would fail or that there was specific prejudice in the change of financial circumstances due to lack of promptness (Judgment at [47]).

122.But on the other two matters he said (Judgment at [49]):

“Furthermore, this is a case where the delay is likely to be of significance because I accept the argument that the demise of Huobi Global Limited and the passage of time generally will significantly affect Mr Jones’ ability to get any relief from any other source.”

123.That forms the basis for his conclusion (Judgment at [52]) that quite apart from Kyrrex’s lack of standing, the application:

“would in any event have failed on the application of the merits test bearing in mind not only the merits of the claim themselves but also the delay in bringing this application and the consequent prejudice to which I have referred.”

(See paragraph 92 above).

124.Mr Pomfret submitted that although it was true that Kyrrex had taken some 20 months from disclosure of information to issuing the application, the matter was very complicated and the time that Kyrrex took could be compared with the time that Mr Jones himself took to issue proceedings. Measured from the date when correspondence with the EP Platform dried up in July 2020 to the issue of proceedings in June 2022, that took a comparable amount of time.

125.Nevertheless I think the Judge’s carefully nuanced assessment, that the case was not one of gross delay but that Kyrrex could and should have pursued matters more quickly, was well within the range of conclusions reasonably open to him, and I am not persuaded that we should take a different view. Kyrrex seems to have adopted a quite leisurely approach to the application without any real appreciation of the need to act with reasonable promptness, something that is expressly mentioned in the overriding objective (see CPR r 1.1(2)(d)). Nor do I think that the comparison with the time taken by Mr Jones to issue proceedings (something we were told by Mr McIlroy was not relied on before the Judge) is of any great assistance. Within the limitation period a claimant can take as long as he likes to issue proceedings, and usually only prejudices himself if he delays. That seems to me quite a different situation from an applicant seeking to set aside a judgment already obtained by someone else.

126.I think Mr Pomfret’s arguments on prejudice are rather better. As he submitted, it may be true that Mr Jones cannot now sue Huobi as it has been struck off, but all the material before the Court suggests that it is unlikely that he had any real claim against Huobi anyway. And although it may indeed be difficult for him now to trace and pursue anyone else, it must be doubtful whether he would have been in any better position if Kyrrex had launched its application within a few months of the disclosure of information – say in late summer or early autumn of 2023.

127.But quite apart from the question of prejudice, for the reasons I have given above under Ground 3, I think the Judge’s exercise of his discretion – in which he weighed up what he saw as the doubtful merits of Kyrrex’s claim to recover the Bitcoin against the delay and prejudice to Mr Jones – was flawed, and it falls to us to exercise it again. And on that I think the real question is whether Kyrrex’s delay, and such prejudice as that might have caused Mr Jones, is sufficient to outweigh Kyrrex’s case that Mr Cooper’s Order should never have been made and should therefore be set aside.

128.For the reasons I have given above, I regard the strength of that case as overwhelming. I think it would take something very persuasive to outweigh the plain injustice of Mr Jones being able to hang onto a judgment that now appears quite insupportable. I do not regard the delays that Kyrrex was responsible for, and the possible prejudice that that might have caused Mr Jones, as sufficient for that purpose. Indeed I regard it as falling a long way short of outweighing the injustice to Kyrrex in the Order having been made on a false basis.

129.I would therefore accept that Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal is made out, and, subject to Mr Jones’s Respondent’s notice, would allow the appeal.

Respondent’s notice – alternative claim against Huobi

130.I have summarised Mr Jones’s Respondent’s notice at paragraph 37 above. In effect the question is whether despite the conclusion I have so far come to the application should be refused because Kyrrex has, and has known it has since September 2022 at the latest, a remedy against Huobi.

131.I can take this very shortly, as Mr Pomfret did. We do not in fact have the material to know whether Kyrrex does have a claim against Huobi, something that might be affected by the Huobi User Agreement, and the possible claims that Kyrrex might have were scarcely explored in argument. But I will assume that Mr Jones is right that Kyrrex might have – or might have had – a claim against Huobi. I add that qualification because Huobi is currently struck off and we have no information as to whether it would be possible for it to be restored to the register. The tHEL wallet is currently held by a company called HTX or HTX.com (the Judge said that it seemed from the material before the Court that Huobi’s operation had been “totally succeeded by a company called HTX and that names are interchangeably used with little or any care for corporate identity”), but there is no evidence that HTX would have any liability to Kyrrex.

132.But even assuming that a claim does, or did, lie, I do not think this affects matters. I can see that the existence of another claim might potentially be relevant when considering the respective prejudice of permitting or denying a delayed application to set aside a judgment. But here the possible existence of a claim against Huobi does not affect the fundamental merits of the set aside application, because there is a very strong case that Mr Jones was never entitled to the order and obtained it on the basis of (innocently) misleading evidence.

133.I would therefore dismiss the point taken in the Respondent’s notice. It follows that I would allow the appeal for the reasons I have given on Grounds 1 to 3. I do not think it necessary or helpful in those circumstances to lengthen this judgment by considering Grounds 4 to 6 and I do not propose to do so.

Disposal

134.I would allow the appeal and set aside the relevant paragraphs of Mr Cooper’s Order under CPR r 40.9.

135.That leaves the question of what further orders should be made. Before the Judge Kyrrex sought reversal of the transfer by immediate repayment of the 98.2 Bitcoin to the tHEL wallet, which is no longer operated by Huobi but by HTX. Before us, Mr Pomfret went further, perhaps concerned whether HTX would re-credit Kyrrex’s account, and sought immediate repayment of the 98.2 Bitcoin to Kyrrex itself.

136.But I do not think either is currently justified. In principle there is no difficulty in a Court that sets aside an Order also making consequential orders to reverse any payment or transfers made under it: see Delta Petroleum (Caribbean) Ltd v British Virgin Islands Electricity Corpn [2020] UKPC 23 at [50] per Lord Leggatt JSC. So if Huobi had still been in existence and operating the tHEL wallet it would not I think be difficult to reverse the transfer as between Mr Jones and Huobi. But Huobi does not (currently) exist and the relationship between Huobi and HTX is not evidenced.

137.Nor do I think that we should order transfer of the Bitcoin direct to Kyrrex. Setting aside the Order does not prevent Mr Jones from seeking to establish that he does have a claim to the Bitcoin, however difficult that appears at this stage. Nor has Kyrrex shown that it has a claim to the Bitcoin itself – that may depend on whether its rights are indeed proprietary or not. All of this is yet to be determined.

138.That leaves the question whether Mr Jones should secure the relevant amount of Bitcoin pending the trial of any such claims. There was some discussion at the hearing as to whether the Bitcoin could and should be held in a safe place, such as in a wallet acceptable to both parties, or by Mr Jones’s solicitor giving an undertaking not to dispose of them, or their being held to the order of the Court. Mr McIlroy did not strenuously oppose this, saying that it could be done, but that Mr Jones would have to re-purchase sufficient Bitcoin as he no longer has them.

139.I am strongly inclined to the view that some such security should indeed be put in place. But we received very little argument on the point. In those circumstances I would propose that the parties be given an opportunity to see if they can reach agreement, and in default of agreement to file brief written submissions as to the appropriate way forward which the Court can then resolve on paper.

Footnote on costs

140.I add a footnote on the way that costs were dealt with in Mr Cooper’s Order which I said (see paragraph 21 above) that I would come back to.

141.There are two points. The first is that the costs order in paragraph 8 was made only against the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants, but the effect of paragraph 9 was to require Huobi to pay the costs by transferring 8.6 Bitcoin from the tHEL wallet to Mr Jones. That was of course premised on the assumption that the Bitcoin in the tHEL wallet was the 1 st and 2 nd Defendants’ Bitcoin. But the practical effect was to impose an obligation on Huobi to discharge the costs, and to do so from a particular source.

142.We heard no argument on the point but I think this a most unusual provision. An order for costs is a money judgment, and in general a Court does not tell a defendant who has been ordered to pay money where the money is to come from. It was no doubt an ingenious attempt to avoid the problem that the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants had not been, and were unlikely to be, identified and so enforcement of the costs order by any of the ordinary methods would be likely to be impossible, but it involved the risk, which has unfortunately materialised, that the Bitcoin in the wallet would turn out not to belong to the 1 st and 2 nd

Defendants at all and the costs would therefore be borne by someone innocent of the fraud. It also incidentally imposed a positive obligation on Huobi that could in theory be enforceable by committal despite the fact that money judgments in general cannot be, and the fact that the costs order was not made against it anyway.

143.The other point is that paragraph 9 required the costs liability to be discharged in Bitcoin. Again we heard no argument on the point but this too seems to me a most unusual provision. The general rule is that costs should be awarded in the currency in which a party has paid, or is liable to pay, his solicitors:

Federal Republic of Nigeria v Process & Industrial Developments Ltd

[2025] UKSC 36

, [2026] AC 50

. But here that was presumably sterling, as paragraph 8 of the Order would seem to confirm. I am not aware of any precedent for the Court awarding costs in Bitcoin. I accept that paragraph 8 did award costs in sterling; but the practical effect of the inclusion of paragraph 9 was to entitle Mr Jones to payment in Bitcoin.

144.It seems to me very doubtful whether this was appropriate. Mr Cooper appears to have done this without being referred to any of the relevant material.

Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd

[1976] AC 443 permitted Court orders to be made for the payment of sums of money in currencies other than sterling, but in my view clearly contemplates that orders for payments which are not in sterling will be in a foreign currency (implicitly a fiat currency). English law treats cryptocurrency as a form of property, but it would be a very significant step to treat them as money (and we do not order costs orders to be discharged through the transfer of property).

145.The Law Commission Final Report on Digital Assets (Law Com No 412, June 2023) §9.9 expressed the view that cryptocurrencies were unlikely to be treated as cash and at §9.10 stated:

“an action to enforce an obligation to “pay” non-monetary units such as crypto-tokens would, under the existing law, be characterised or construed as a claim for unliquidated damages for failure to deliver a commodity, rather than as a monetary debt.”

146.At §9.98 the Law Commission stated:

“When a court orders a losing party to pay a sum of money, that sum is typically denominated in pounds sterling. However, since the decision in Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd , courts have recognised that they have the power to award monetary remedies denominated in foreign currencies. We are not aware of any precedent which suggests that courts in England and Wales have the power to award monetary remedies denominated in third category things including crypto-tokens.”

147.At §9.100 they continued:

“Consultees set out the policy arguments in favour of, and against, courts having the discretion to award a “monetary” remedy denominated in (certain types of) crypto-tokens (or third category things) in appropriate cases. We think that this point remains debatable on policy grounds, and therefore consider this matter to be best left to the courts if and when appropriate facts arise. The judgment in Miliangos makes clear that courts can award remedies in alternate currencies when the currency in question is considered “money”, although the reasoning for doing so was arguably broader. We recognise that, at present, crypto-tokens are unlikely to be regarded as money under the law of England and Wales. As with Miliangos

, we think that, if it so desired, a court could potentially exercise its discretion to award a “monetary” remedy denominated in (certain types of) crypto-tokens in certain circumstances, namely where doing so would provide a better reflection of the innocent party’s loss. However, we acknowledge that, on its face, this would be a novel step.”

148.Given this background I am very doubtful if a Court should order payment of costs in Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency without the point having been fully argued. In the present case among other things it could have had the effect of over-compensating Mr Jones. The amount of costs was fixed by paragraph 8 at £148,000. The exchange rate used for conversion into Bitcoin was taken at one Bitcoin to £17,194.11, which was presumably the prevailing rate on, or shortly before, the date of the Order (6 September 2022). But the Order did not require Huobi to transfer the Bitcoin until 14 days later (20 September 2022), and in fact Huobi did not do so until 27 September 2022. By then the value of Bitcoin might have risen significantly such that the net amount received by Mr Jones in respect of costs would exceed the £148,000 that had been assessed. None of this seems very satisfactory.

149.On both these grounds I think it is open to real doubt whether the Court should have made the Order in the form of paragraph 9. I do not propose to resolve the question in the absence of any argument but I do not wish to be taken to endorse the form of order here used.

Lord Justice Foxton:

150.I agree.

Lord Justice Peter Jackson:

151.I also agree, and I would allow the appeal for the reasons so lucidly given by Nugee LJ. As he has shown, Mr Jones, having been defrauded, sought and obtained a judgment that required restitution to be made from a named account without notice to the entity that was primarily interested in the account, namely Kyrrex. It now appears that Mr Jones’s property was not in the account, but he was nonetheless compensated with property that had (at least) been under Kyrrex’s control. Kyrrex was accordingly very significantly prejudiced and in the circumstances it was plainly a non-party that was directly affected by the judgment; it accordingly had the standing to apply under CPR r.40.9. In then exercising our discretion, the case for setting aside this summary judgment is to my mind compelling. The order was based on a misconception advanced on behalf of Mr Jones, yet its effect was to make Kyrrex the unwitting insurer of his loss. However much sympathy the court may have for a victim of fraud, it should not compound the matter by means of an apparently unjust order. That could only be warranted by strong counter-arguments that are not to be found in this case. The delay was not egregious and it is not persuasively suggested that the merits of any continuing claims cannot be fairly tried if they are pursued in the light of the fuller information that is now available.

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