Acronyms used DPA the Data Protection Act 2018 FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber ICO Information Commissioner’s Office SAR Subject Access Request Background 1. This Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress. Mr Ezsias had made a SAR to the Motor Ombudsman on 11 March 2026 and a SAR to Sky Group plc on 01 June 2026. 2. In his GRC3 dated 26 August 2026, Mr Ezsias states the date of complaint to the ICO as 24 April 2026. This indicates that he sought an Order to Progress for the complaint he made to the ICO about the Motor Ombudsman (his SAR to Sky Group plc had not even been made on 24 April 2026). 3. By letter dated 06 July 2026, Mr Ezsias complained to the ICO about Sky Group plc’s handling of his SAR. 4. By letter dated 10 July 2026, the ICO told Mr Ezsias that reference number IC-537773-J9T6 had been allocated to a complaint. That correspondence from the ICO does not clarify which of Mr Ezsias’s complaints had been allocated that reference – by then, he had sent a complaint letter about each of the Motor Ombudsman and Sky Group plc. A further letter from the ICO and with the same reference was sent, dated 07 August 2026. 5. On 27 July 2026, Mr Ezsias sent to the ICO a complaint and a letter before action. 6. The FtT issued standard Initial Case Management Directions dated 28 August 2026. 7. By GRC5 dated 23 September 2026, supported by a Response and submissions document of the same date, the ICO applied to the FtT for the application to be struck out as, they submitted, there was no reasonable prospect of it succeeding. 8. The ICO in their response and Annexes thereto explains: a. ICO complaint reference IC-537773-J9T6 is the complaint made about Sky Group plc. This was confirmed to Mr Ezsias by letter dated 13 August 2026 (Annex 7). b. The ICO allocated complaint reference IC-508958-N0J3 to the complaint made (by letter dated 24 April 2026) about the Motor Ombudsman. Confirming this case number by letter dated 14 August 2026 (Annex 2). c. On 14 August 2026, the ICO wrote to Mr Ezsias asking that he raise his complaint directly with the Motor Ombudsman and to notify the ICO if no response was received within one month. d. On 14 September 2026, the ICO sent further correspondence to Mr Ezsias about his complaint about the Motor Ombudsman. e. The response also sets out what was done in connection with the complaint about Sky Group plc, including that in letters dated 1 and 14 September 2026, the ICO had sent to Mr Ezsias an outcome concerning that complaint. 9. By case management directions dated 24 September 2026, the FtT invited Mr Ezsias to make representations about the ICO’s application to strike out the application for an Order to Progress. Mr Ezsias made representations in a document dated 05 October 2026 and provided supporting documents. 10. The issue for the Tribunal is not whether the Commissioner reached the correct conclusion about the underlying complaint. The issue is whether there is any realistic prospect that the Tribunal could appropriately make a section 166 order requiring a further step to be taken in relation to the complaint. The Law 11. The key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are Killock and VeaIe v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 ( Killock ), R (Delo) v Information Commissioner ( Delo ) in the High Court ( [2023] 1 WLR 1327 ) and Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) and Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) ( Smith ). 12. In Killock , the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances in which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section 165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an appropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The Upper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast a critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to achieve a different complaint outcome.” 13. In Killock , the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in terms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the ICO as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed the view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any particular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal indicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources effectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special position. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in Killock . 14. In R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 , in the Court of Appeal, Warby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant legislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a complaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that, having done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80). 15. In Delo , Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits would clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader connotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in Killock that the word “outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also agreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in Delo in the High Court that outcome would properly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint, having informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with UK GDPR. 16. Therefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the merits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision in Smith confirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the ICO has issued a complaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application. But, as Judge Stout also explained in Smith at [60], in a case where the ICO has carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a section 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons. 17. The first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a procedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether the ICO has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application to the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages against the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the ICO’s decision (see further [74] of Killock ). 18. The second reason is because the ICO has a wide discretion under section 165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the scope for the FtT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is limited. EW , decided alongside Killock , was an exceptional case where the ICO, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at all. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Delo , the ICO is not required to determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further ([64]), the ICO is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78]) and has a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent” ([80]). Application of law to the facts 19. Mr Ezsias’s representations opposing strike out include: a. His application succeeded. The ICO had not responded to his complaint and only did so after they received his application to the FtT. i. I infer from that submission that the principal objective of the application was to obtain an outcome to the complaint and that that objective has now been achieved. ii. Striking out is not about winning or losing; it is about whether there is a reasonable prospect of the FtT making an Order to Progress. b. His application was on narrow grounds – section 166 – he invited the FtT to make comment on other matters. i. The FtT will confine itself to application of section 166 of the DPA. c. His application was only about the lack of response to the Motor Ombudsman complaint, the ICO wrongly conflates it with the complaint about Sky Group plc. i. I have deduced from the date set out for “complaint made” that the application was about the Motor Ombudsman complaint. ii. It was quite proper for the ICO to clarify the history of Mr Ezsias’ engagement with them as Mr Ezsias had been unable to provide the complaint number (only the date). It was, in fact, helpful as the clarification assisted the FtT to understand what had happened about the two separate complaints and may have assisted Mr Ezsias to also understand the position with both his complaints. d. The ICO only applies for strike out because they have now remedied the error and the ICO should have contacted Mr Ezsias to find a mutually agreeable and satisfactory outcome. i. Whether or not the application prompted further action by the ICO, the position now is that an outcome has been provided. ii. There was no need for the ICO to see if Mr Ezsias could agree an outcome to Mr Ezsias’s application under section 166, and I note that he does not specify what other outcome may have been agreeable to him. e. Mr Ezsias should be permitted to amend and substitute the originally suggested draft order. 20. An outcome has now been provided to Mr Ezsias. The FtT must consider whether, notwithstanding that outcome, there remains any realistic basis upon which it could appropriately make an order under section 166(2). 21. I consider that there is no realistic basis upon which the FtT could appropriately make such an order. The proceedings have achieved the objective of the application, namely obtaining an outcome to the complaint dated 24 April 2026. Mr Ezsias has not identified any further step which could realistically be required of the Commissioner under section 166(2), beyond providing an outcome to the complaint, which has now occurred. 22. Therefore, and pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) of the GRC Rules, I strike out the application for an Order to Progress. Signed: Judge Worth Date: 06 November 2026