1. These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaint against HarperCollins Publishers Limited (“HCP”) regarding the processing of his personal data and its publication in a book. The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 19 September 2025 and was dealt with under reference IC-428645-Q3V3. 2. On 17 December 2025, the IC wrote to the Applicant, apologised for the delay in handling the complaint, requested an update on whether the complaint remained unresolved and asked the Applicant to provide any further correspondence with HPC, including evidence that its complaints process had concluded, before the complaint could be allocated for review. The Applicant responded on the same day, confirming there had been no further correspondence from HPC and that he wished to proceed with the complaint. 3. On 14 January 2026 and 21 April 2026, the Applicant requested an update on his complaint. 4. On 28 April 2026, the IC’s case officer wrote to the Applicant. They concluded that HPC had likely complied with its data protection obligations when refusing the Applicant's erasure request based on the journalistic exemption under Schedule 2, Part 5, Paragraph 26 of the DPA 2018 and that HPC was probably correct to do so. The latter view was expressly stated to be non-binding. The case officer considered that the Applicant's concerns primarily related to the content and context of the Applicant’s personal data within the book, rather than a failure to comply with data protection law. The Case Officer therefore did not propose taking regulatory action, stated that the IC would keep a record of the complaint and advised that, given the IC’s views are non-binding, the depth of the argument meant any dispute regarding the inclusion, accuracy or removal of material from the book may be more appropriately resolved through the courts. 5. On the same day, the Applicant responded, expressing concerns about the application of the journalistic exemption and the accuracy of the data. He informed the case officer that he intended to appeal the decision to the Tribunal. In response, the case officer advised the Applicant of his option to request a case review. The Applicant subsequently requested a review of his complaint. 6. On 1 June 2026, the IC’s reviewing officer wrote to the Applicant. They informed the Applicant they were satisfied that the complaint had been handled appropriately and in accordance with the IC's case handling procedures and the reviewing officer agreed with the explanations and reasons provided in the case officer's assessment. They explained that a record of an opinion is unlikely to be considered inaccurate for the purposes of data protection law; it does not mean an opinion is proven to be true. They explained that the IC was not able to determine the Applicant's allegations regarding the attribution of certain quotations in the book and was satisfied that HPC had taken appropriate steps in response to the Applicant's request for erasure. The review upheld the original outcome and confirmed that no further regulatory action would be taken. The letter advised the Applicant of his right to take cases to court and to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO). The Application 7. The Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC1 dated 28 June 2026, which was accepted by the Tribunal as an application under section 166 DPA 2018. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was as follows: “ I ask the Tribunal to find that the Commissioner failed to take appropriate steps in response to my complaint, contrary to section 166(1) (a) of the Data Protection Act 2018 , by reaching a determination that HarperCollins could rely on the journalistic purposes exemption (Schedule 2, Part 5, paragraph 26 DPA 2018) without requiring HarperCollins to evidence, and without itself assessing, (i) that HarperCollins held a reasonable belief that compliance with the contested provisions would be incompatible with journalistic purposes, and (ii) that HarperCollins had regard to the codes of practice specified in paragraph 26(6) in reaching that belief, both being matters the Commissioner's own published guidance states it expects to be addressed in each case. I accept that the Tribunal cannot determine whether the exemption was correctly applied on the merits, evaluate the accuracy of the quotations in dispute, or direct enforcement action against HarperCollins. I ask only that, pursuant to section 166(2) (b), the Tribunal order the Commissioner to take the further appropriate step of requiring HarperCollins to evidence the above matters and to issue a fresh response to my complaint addressing them .” 8. In his grounds for the Application, the Applicant, in summary, made the following points: a. The complaint pertained to quotations attributed to him in a book published in April 2025 by a subsidiary of HPC. He stated “10. I objected to these quotations on the grounds that they were either fabricated or altered to such a degree as to obstruct their meaning. I had not given permission for any quotations to be recorded or reproduced by the author” b. He noted from the IC’s guidance on its website that quotations, especially those 'that relate[s] to an identified or identifiable individual' constitute personal data under GDPR legislation and, further, that inaccurate information 'is still personal data, as it relates to the individual.' He therefore complained to the IC. c. He said that the IC’s response to his complaint stated that HPC was exempt from its obligations under DPA 2017 on the grounds of journalistic purposes, as outlined in Schedule 2, Part 5, Paragraph 26. However, he did not believe the conditions for this exemption have been met. d. He identified that the IC’s case officer in responding to his complaint made the following errors: • The case officer incorrectly stated that the Applicant was contacted by the author of the book. • The case officer expressed the view that the Applicant’s personal data including his views on particular topics is widely available on the internet and that HPC “ were probably correct ” to refuse the erasure request. The Applicant stated “T his is a concerning admission that the case officer believed that, because my views about a given issue are available on the internet, this means that any false and inaccurate use of my personal data, in some cases about non-related issues, is therefore permissible”. • The case officer was wrong to suggest that the Applicant was “ attempting to use data protection legislation in order to edit the content of the book and that this is probably exactly why the journalism, academia, art and literature exemption exists ”. The Applicant submits “ I am attempting to use data protection legislation to have my data protected, as outlined in the ICO’s guidance on the use of attributed quotations. My complaint to the ICO was narrowly focused on that purpose. The ICO’s duty as I understand it is to protect against the misuse of such personal data and this may inevitably require either the correction or erasure of misused data. That is an appropriate and commonplace use of the ICO’s powers. To abdicate its duty in this regard, on the basis of speculation about my motives, is negligent .” • The interpretation of journalistic exemption also appears to be the speculation of the case officer (“probably”), rather than an interpretation grounded in a genuine understanding of the law concerning such exemptions. He stated: “ There is no evidence that addressing the misuse of my data would be incompatible with those purposes and the ICO does not demonstrate otherwise, nor has it asked HarperCollins to explain why it held a ‘reasonable belief’ that it was. In fact, the dissemination of false or inaccurate data is actively deleterious to the public interest. As a result, it is not apparent that the conditions for such exemptions were met nor that HarperCollins could have held a reasonable belief they had been met or were necessary for the public interest ”. • As to the extent of the investigation conducted by the IC, the Applicant states: “ While I understand the ICO has discretion over the extent of its investigation, I would expect that some level of basic investigation is necessary for almost all judgments it might make about whether personal data has been used appropriately. Instead the ICO has opted to make no investigation .” The IC’s failure to test whether the conditions for the journalistic exemption are met meant it failed to take appropriate steps in considering the case. • The Applicant expressed the view that the IC ought to have asked HPC to evidence why it considered the journalistic exemption was engaged and/or reviewed HPC’s correspondence with the Applicant. He stated “ The ICO cannot refuse to make any investigation or review of the accuracy or legitimacy of the use of such data where it has been contested and make the judgment that journalistic exemptions must apply, since those exemptions are conditional on HarperCollins being able to demonstrate why they apply and how they have met the relevant criteria ”. • The IC’s refusal to take any investigatory measures in this case contravenes its own Regulatory Action Policy. • The IC’s review dated 1 June 2026 did not directly address the points that the Applicant had made about the IC’s decision that the journalistic exemption was engaged. Instead it explained that in the IC’s view journalism “ can be interpreted broadly, meaning it is not limited to traditional news media and can include a range of published materials, such as books, where they are intended to inform the public or contribute to a debate ”. • The Applicant objects to the IC’s view that the journalistic exemption was engaged and states “ The effect of this position is to extend to HarperCollins and all non-fiction book publishers the privileges of journalistic exemption with none of the responsibilities or accountability which are expected of journalistic practice. It seems unlikely this was the intention of parliament, as indicated by the exemptions outlined in the DPA; which is why the Act makes reference to exemptions being granted with due regard for editorial codes of practice aligned to the standards enforced by regulators such as IPSO, Impress and Ofcom.” • He argues that “ The ICO's broad interpretation of where journalistic exemptions apply, and narrow interpretation of where its duties fall, have the effect of creating a regulatory gap, since ‘traditional news media’ are regulated by organisations like Ofcom, IPSO and Impress, whereas book publishers have no regulatory oversight except that which ought to be extended by the ICO for the protection of personal data ”. • Finally, the Applicant observed that “the ICO notes the importance it places on whether “ the organisation or individual involved is representative of a sector or group, raising the possibility of similar issues arising again across that group or sector if not addressed”. It is clear from recent scrutiny of editorial standards in the publishing industry that both these criteria are met .” The strike-out application 9. The IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 22 July 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”). 10. The reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 32 to 36. In summary, these were as follows: a. The remedies sought by the Applicant in relation to this matter are not within those available to the Tribunal under section 166 DPA18. An Application under section 166 DPA18 permits a Tribunal to make an order against the IC only if he has failed in some procedural respect. b. The IC has taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint and has provided an outcome to him. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 166(1) of the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under section 166(2) DPA18. c. It is clear that the Applicant disagrees with the outcome provided on his complaint. However, as set out above, section 166 DPA18 does not provide a mechanism by which complainants can challenge the substantive outcome of a complaint. The relief available from the Tribunal on an application under section 166 DPA18 only applies where it is satisfied that the IC has failed in some procedural respect to comply with the requirements of section 166(1) DPA18, limited solely to those orders that are set out in section 166(2) . d. If the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against the data controller for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18. 11. On 10 August 2026, the Tribunal directed that the Applicant should provide representations in relation to the strike out application by 28 August 2026 under Rule 8(4) 12. The Applicant provided submissions on 28 August 2026, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows: a. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine whether an appropriate step was omitted. b. The issuing of an outcome is not a complete answer to a section 166 application and is unsupported by authorities. c. Parts of his complaint have not been determined at all. d. No investigative step of any kind appears to have been taken. The IC did not contact HPC or engage with the correspondence between the Applicant and HPC e. He is asking for a step, not a conclusion. f. The authorities do not preclude an order for an appropriate step even when an outcome has already been provided, so it cannot be said the Application is bound to fail. 13. The Applicant also clarified that he sought an order from the Tribunal that the IC: a. Consider correspondence already submitted to him; b. Obtain answers from HPC as to why the exemption was required and how it was considered; c. consider and reach an outcome on the parts of the complaint relating to the accuracy of the personal data attributed to him and the manner in which it was obtained; and d. inform the Applicant of the outcome to these points within the period specified. Legal framework 14. Section 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under section 166 DPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows: “Orders to progress complaints (1) This section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner - a. fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, b. fails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or c. if the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months. (2) The Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner - d. to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or e. to inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.” 15. The Tribunal can only make an order under section 166(2) if one of the conditions at section 166(1) (a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of section 166 . It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. 16. Section 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that: “(4) If the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must— (a) take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, (b) inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint, (c) inform the complainant of the rights under section 166 , and (d) if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes— (a) investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and (b) informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.” 17. In the case of Killock v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 , the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - " …It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under section 166 , the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to the Act which regard the section 166 remedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in section 166 towards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals." 18. Mostyn J in the High Court in R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] 1 WLR 1327 , paragraph 57 - " The treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination... ”. 19. Mostyn J’s decision in Delo was upheld by the Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) – “ For the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint .” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ). 20. The decision of the Upper Tribunal in Cortes v Information Commissioner (UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both Killock and Delo confirmed that the nature of section 166 is that of a limited procedural provision only. “ The Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of section 166 and the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under section 166 and the High Court on an application for judicial review.” (paragraph 33). 21. The case of Dr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) , noted at paragraph 60 that “ it is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because section 166 is a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner, section 166 should not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I n considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of Killick “when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.” 22. Paragraph 85 of Killick reads as follows: “ However, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.” Discussion and conclusions 23. I have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing as both parties have consented to this and I consider it to be appropriate and proportionate to do so. I note also that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing. 24. Turning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 28 April 2026 and a response following review on 1 June 2026. 25. , I am satisfied that, when taken together, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law. 26. It appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint. In making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken. In line with the findings in the cases of Smith , Cortes and Killock referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above, if the Applicant wishes to challenge the adequacy of the investigation conducted by the IC in exercise of its discretion, then the appropriate course for this would be judicial review, not an application under section 166 DPA 2018 to reopen the investigation. 27. The Tribunal does not have power under section 166 to consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Section 166 is limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision. In an application under section 166 , the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of data protection legislation. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought. 28. Because I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant. 29. The proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.