1. This decision relates to an appeal brought by the Appellant p ursuant to section 57 Freedom of Information Act 2000 ("FOIA"). It is in respect of a decision notice issued by the Information Commissioner ("the IC") on 5 August 2025 with reference IC-363407-W2F6 ("the DN") and concerns a request for information of 23 December 2024 ("the Request") about Grants of Letters of Administration ("LoA") made to His Majesty's Courts and Tribunals Service ("HMCTS"). 2. What follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and our view of the law. It does not seek to provide every step of our reasoning. The absence of a reference to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered. In this decision, any page numbers indicated by their inclusion in brackets refer to pages of the bundle. Evidence and matters considered at the appeal hearing 3. We heard from the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent ("the MoJ"). We had a bundle, an authorities bundle, skeletons from both and various other items such as the MoJ's response to the Directions of 6 March 2026 and the Appellant's note and material dated 19 March 2026. 4. Within the bundle was a witness statement made by Stephen Burgess (108). He is a SEO level civil servant who has worked for HMCTS since 1997 and whose lengthy experience came mostly from within the Probate Service. Mr Burgess was at the hearing and was asked to provide clarity on one question. Other than that, he was not called upon to give evidence or be cross examined. The Appellant said he did not disagree with what was in the statement and had provided written submissions on it including in his skeleton in which he said: - "The Statement focuses almost entirely on the court function of HMCTS, to the exclusion of HMCTS’s public authority function, so presents an incomplete picture and is therefore of limited relevance for the Appeal...The Statement does not contradict anything in the Grounds of Appeal or my Replies to the MoJ and IC Responses to the Appeal. The Statement does not offer any evidence that countermands the requirement for information in the Request to be provided..." Submissions after the appeal hearing 5. The day before the hearing the MoJ drew attention to the Upper Tribunal ("UT") decision in Farfán v (1) The Information Commissioner (2) The Governing Body of the University of Central Lancashire [2026] UKUT 16 (AAC) . At the hearing the Tribunal indicated that the parties might also wish to consider the decision of the UT in Holt v The Information Commissioner & The Ministry of Justice [2026] UKUT 87 (AAC ). A short adjournment was taken to enable both parties to consider those authorities. When the hearing resumed, the MoJ made submissions on both decisions. The Appellant indicated that he had no submissions to make on them at that stage but requested a short period after the hearing in which to consider the authorities further and provide any written observations. The Tribunal granted that request and directed that any such submissions be provided within 7 days. The Appellant provided submissions, as allowed, on 22 July 2026. Further correspondence was subsequently received from the Appellant on 27 July 2026 to which the MoJ objected. The Appellant challenged these objections on 29 July 2026. The Tribunal reached its own view on Farfan and Holt and the relevance of these decisions to this appeal. In doing so the Tribunal had regard to the MoJ's submissions made at the appeal and the Appellant's note on these cases of 22 July 2026. The Appellant's update of 27 July 2026 was seen but not considered because it did not have submissions on Farfan and Holt as its focus. In our view this approach was fair to the Appellant and the MoJ and was in accordance with what had been agreed at the appeal hearing. Background to the Request 6. On 14 November 2024, prior to the Request, the Appellant asked (190) for: - "I. The number of applications for Letters of Administration (LoA) that were received in the year from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024 as a direct result of a previous application for Grant of Probate in respect of the same estate being rejected by HM Courts & Tribunal Service. 2. The number of LoA applications from 1 above where the estate had a liability for Inheritance Tax (IHT). 3. The number of LoA applications from 1 above where the estate had a IHT liability that exceeded £146,000" 7. On 15 November 2024 (190) the MoJ said, in summary, that this information was not held because "...there is no legal or business requirement for MoJ to do so..." The Appellant asked HMCTS for an internal review. This resulted in the MoJ, on 26 November 2024 (192), saying the information was held but "...to comply with the request as it currently stands would exceed the cost limit set out in the FOIA." The Request (158) was then made on 23 December 2024. Probate 8. Non-contentious probate business, such as applications for Grants of LoA, are assigned to the Family Division. Section 25 Senior Courts Act 1981 provides that: - "(1) ... the High Court shall, in accordance with section 19(2), have the following probate jurisdiction, that is to say all such jurisdiction in relation to probates and letters of administration as it had immediately before the commencement of this Act , and in particular all such contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction as it then had in relation to...(b) the grant, amendment or revocation of probates and letters of administration;..." 9. LoA are sought by those seeking to be appointed as a deceased person's personal representative usually where there is no valid will, where a will exists but does not name an executor or where the named proposed executors are unwilling or unable to apply for a grant of probate. Grants of LoA are also sought where, for example, an appointed personal representative dies or becomes mentally incapable without there being an automatic successor to that appointment or to avoid prejudicial delay. In some circumstances they can also be issued to creditors. 10. Section 105 of the 1981 Act provides that: - "Applications for grants of probate or administration and for the revocation of grants may be made to—(a)the Principal Registry of the Family Division (in this Part referred to as “the Principal Registry”); or (b) a district probate registry." 11. In his statement Mr Burgess said (110) that " 12. The Probate Registry operates in effect as a court, with judges and District Probate Registrars authorised to issue grants and determine probate business". 12. Rule 6(1) of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules 1987 ("NCPR") provides that " A registrar shall not allow any grant to issue until all inquiries which he may see fit to make have been answered to his satisfaction." 13. HMCTS is an administrative agency tasked with running the courts and tribunals. It is not a court and does not carry out judicial functions. We understand from Mr Burgess (109) that its role is set out in a Framework Document by which it is accountable to the Lord Chancellor, the Lady Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals. This Framework (hyperlinked in the DN) sets out that the role of HMCTS is "2.2 To run an efficient and effective courts and tribunals system, which enables the rule of law to be upheld and provides access to justice for all." There is no dispute that the MoJ is the relevant public authority to deal with FOIA requests made to HMCTS. 14. Mr Burgess was asked by the Tribunal how, in practical terms, the published probate statistics are produced from the probate applications received by HMCTS. He said that the data that is published and seen in the appeal is the only statistical data that is extracted for publication. Data from the application forms is entered onto the HMCTS system then once a grant has been issued to an applicant the data is published. He confirmed that publication was by the date of receipt of an application and then as at the date of issue. The Probate Service 15. The Request was made to HMCTS but asked about "The Probate Service" There is no statutory definition of "The Probate Service" and no single entity with this name. A difference of view was expressed about what was meant by "The Probate Service. " In summary the MoJ said that these words are an umbrella term for all parts of the justice system that deals with probate applications. The Appellant said he was referring to HMCTS and the three names were interchangeable and synonymous with each other. He considered the MoJ's definition to be limiting (despite it saying "all parts...") as it might not include the part of the justice system that had issued the information at part 1(a) or who were responsible for the information published on www.gov.uk. In our view these apparent differences were most likely not real differences and, in any event, had no actual impact on the outcome of the appeal as under both approaches " HMCTS" encapsulates the Probate Registry which is a court. Role of the Tribunal 16. The Tribunal's role in an appeal by section 57 FOIA is set out in section 58 FOIA which provides that: - (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers— (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. 17. This appeal is a full rehearing on the merits and in Peter Wilson -v- The Information Commissioner [2022] UKFTT 0149 the First- tier Tribunal ("FtT") said (with which we agree) "30...the Tribunal’s statutory role is to consider whether there is an error of law or inappropriate exercise of discretion in the Decision Notice. The Tribunal may not allow an appeal simply because it disagrees with the Information Commissioner’s Decision. It is also not the Tribunal’s role to conduct a procedural review of the Information Commissioner’s decision making process or to correct the drafting of the Decision Notice.” 18. We also had regard to authorities such as NHS England -v- Information Commissioner and Dean [2019] UKUT 145 (AAC) and Information Commissioner v Malnick and Advisory Committee On Business Appointments [2018] UKUT 72 (AAC) and Forstater v Information Commissioner and others [2023] UKUT 303 (AAC) where the UT at para 40 said that the “ordinary presumption is that it is for an appellant to prove their case...""... however, the concept of the burden of proof is of secondary importance in tribunal proceedings which involve a full merits review, since to apply strict burdens of proof may prevent the tribunal from properly discharging its responsibility to decide the facts for itself and/or exercise any discretion afresh..." The Request and response 19. By the Request the Appellant asked: - “(a) Could the Probate Service send by e-mail the following information for the period 1 January to 31 March 2024: 1. The number of applications received for Letters of Administration (LoA). 2. The number of LoA applications that were received as a direct result of a previous application for Grant of Probate in respect of the same estate being rejected by HM Courts & Tribunal Service. 3. The number of LoA applications from 2 above where the estate had a liability for Inheritance Tax (IHT), as shown in box 6 on Schedule IHT421. 4. The number of LoA applications from 2 above where the estate had a IHT liability that exceeded R146,000. (b) If the Probate Service determines that the request in (a) is exempt as the cost of providing the information exceeds statutory limits, could the Probate Service advise the maximum period from 1 January 2024 for which the information can be provided within statutory cost limits; and then send by e-mail the information in (a) for this maximum period. (c) In providing the information, could the Probate Service confirm it is incorrect to say that there is no business requirement for the information to be held by the Probate Service. (d) If the Probate Service considers that there is no business requirement to hold the information requested, could the Probate Service provide its reasons for that conclusion, taking into consideration the comments in my email on 21 November copied below.” 20. On 20 January 2025 the MoJ replied (196) and said that it held all the information requested but to comply with the Request would exceed the cost limit set out in the FOIA. This was repeated after an internal review. Complaint to the IC and the DN 21. The Appellant complained to the IC (204). During the course of the IC's investigation the MoJ's response was revised and on 17 July 2025 (224) the MoJ wrote to the Appellant and said that it did not hold in scope information because the information "is held only on behalf of a court or only on behalf of a judge acting in their judicial capacity" and "Those records are held in the custody of the court for the purpose of court proceedings only; the court is not a public authority and any court record information it holds is not subject to disclosure under the FOIA. Therefore, this information is not held by MOJ for the purposes of the FOIA." 22. On 5 August 2025 the DN was issued (5) in which the IC's decision was reported namely that: - "36. The Commissioner acknowledges the MoJ's position is that FOIA only applies to the information held by public authorities for their public authority functions: it does not apply to courts and tribunals. For this reason, information held by the courts, or held by a public authority on behalf of the court, is not within the scope of FOIA. In this case the relevant court is the probate court/service. 37. The Commissioner also accepts that it is a difficult concept to understand why although the MOJ physically holds information of the nature requested it does not hold this information for the purposes of FOIA.. 38 However from the evidence he has seen the Commissioner is satisfied that the requested information is held by the MOJ (HMCTS) in the course of exercising its function as a court rather than in its capacity as a public authority. It follows that he is satisfied that it is not held by the MOJ for the purposes of FOIA" 23. The DN concluded "2... the MOJ does not hold the requested information for the purposes of FOIA for the reasons set out in this notice." Appeal 24. On 20 August 2025 the Appellant commenced this appeal (15). It is supported by grounds of appeal (30-47). He said that what was being requested was parts (b),(c) and (d) of the Request but that "Part (a) of the FOI request is redundant". The outcome requested was "The Ministry of Justice to provide the information requested in parts (b), (c) & (d) of my Freedom of Information request dated 23 December 2024". In summary in its response the MoJ relied upon section 3(2) FOIA and/or in the alternative section 32 FOIA. The Appellant replied on 14 November 2025 (64). FOIA 25. FOIA provides that any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled to be informed in writing if that information is held (section 1(1) (a) FOIA) and if it is held to be provided with that information (section 1 (1) (b) FOIA). 26. “Information” means information recorded in any form and b y section 1(4) FOIA "information" in section 1(1) is "the information in question held at the time when the request is received..." in this case in December 2024. 27. Section 3(2) FOIA states that information is held by a public authority if: - "(a) it is held by the authority, otherwise than on behalf of another person, or (b) it is held by another person on behalf of the authority." 28. Section 32 FOIA is an absolute exemption and provides that: - "(1) Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it is held only by virtue of being contained in—(a) any document filed with, or otherwise placed in the custody of, a court for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter, (4) In this section (a) “court” includes any tribunal or body exercising the judicial power of the State." Issues 29. In response to Directions of 6 March 2026 the Appellant said that the information requested at paragraph (a) 1 of the Request had already been published and was at page 367 of the bundle. The Appellant confirmed that this information was not part of this appeal. 30. In the GRC1 the Appellant said that part (a) of the Request was now "redundant." and the outcome sought was for the MoJ to provide information in reply to parts (b), (c) and (d) only. At the appeal he confirmed that his view on this had changed and asked to be allowed to revive part (a) 2-4 of the Request. After being given time to consider the question, the MoJ did not oppose the reintroduction of (a) 2-4 and the Tribunal agreed to proceed on that basis. 31. Part (b) of the Request asked " (b) If the Probate Service determines that the request in (a) is exempt as the cost of providing the information exceeds statutory limits, could the Probate Service advise..." C osts (ie section 12 FOIA) had been raised by the MoJ at one time but it did not feature in the DN nor had it been raised by the MoJ since the start of the appeal and was not part of the appeal. The Appellant said, at the appeal, that he may have mistakenly thought that there was still a question about the cost limit. After having had time to consider the point the Appellant accepted that, because the cost limit was not a live issue, part (b) of the Request was not applicable. 32. Part (c) of the Request asked " In providing the information, could the Probate Service confirm it is incorrect to say that there is no business requirement for the information to be held by the Probate Service." At the appeal, having been given time to consider the question, the Appellant said he accepted that request (c) was posing a question and was not the way to request information. 33. In summary therefore the questions for the appeal (which also determine the Appellant's specific grounds of appeal) were:- (a) whether there was any issue caused by the MoJ's change of its position which the Appellant had asked the Tribunal to note; (b) whether the Request at (d) was a FOIA request for information; and (c) whether the information requested at parts (a) 2-4 was held for the purposes of FOIA and, if it was, whether the absolute exemption at section 32(1)(a) FOIA applied. Change of position 34. The MoJ's changes of position were not relevant issues for the Tribunal following various legal authorities such as Court of Appeal in Birkett v The Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2011] EWCA Civ 1606 (21 December 2011), Information Commissioner v E Malnick and The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments [2018] UKUT 72 (AAC) (1 March 2018) and Ingle - v- the Information Commissioner & Cambridgeshire CC [2023] UKUT 80 in which the UT said: - "33. The doctrine of estoppel is a common law notion which must give way to the principles of a statutory scheme. There is ample authority in the case law for the principle that a public authority is not estopped from relying on an exemption under FOIA simply because it has failed (whether consciously or by oversight) to rely on that same exemption at some earlier stage in the proceedings" Part (d) of the Request 35. As set out above prior to the Request the Appellant had, in November 2024, made an earlier request to which the MoJ had responded by saying that the information was not held because there was no business requirement for the MoJ to do so. This response then led to questions (c) and (d) in the Request namely: - "(c) In providing the information, could the Probate Service confirm it is incorrect to say that there is no business requirement for the information to be held by the Probate Service. "(d) If the Probate Service considers that there is no business requirement to hold the information requested, could the Probate Service provide its reasons for that conclusion, taking into consideration the comments in my email on 21 November copied below.” 36. In the DN at para 39, the IC said (13) that both parts (c) and (d) were unlikely to constitute requests for recorded information. The Appellant in the GRC1 said "In relation to parts (c) & (d) of the FOI request the ICO says in paragraph 39 of the Decision Notice that it is unlikely there is any recorded information held. It is more likely than not that documentation is held..." 37. This was a misinterpretation of the DN which was not saying that the requested information was not held but that the Request was not for recorded information as defined. The MoJ agreed with the IC and in its response at para 44 said "...Requests C and D are on a proper examination not requests under FOIA at all since they are asking the MoJ to state its reasons for something." 38. In the Reply the Appellant repeated his submission that (67) " It is more probable than not that such evidence is available as discussions are likely to have taken place when the claim there is no business requirement to hold the information was originally made " 39. The Appellant said request 1(d) had derived from the MoJ's response to the November 2024 request (190) in which the MoJ had referred to there being "no business requirement." This had given the Appellant the " strong indication" that there would be documentary evidence showing the discussions within MoJ before it answered the November 2024 Request before it later withdraw that argument. In effect, this part of the Request was seeking information to show the MoJ's internal thought process as to how it answered a previous FOIA request. At the appeal, in response, the Appellant also said that in his view request (d) was not a question but was asking for information. 40. Meta requests have no special status but in any event our conclusion is that request (d) is not a request for recorded information as defined because: - • it is a follow-on supplemental question to request (c) on which it is "parasitic" and tied and which is not a FOIA request; • it is reliant and conditional upon an answer being given to request (c), but no answer has been given; • it is reliant and conditional upon a particular answer being given to request (c) but no answer has been given; • it seeks an explanation of the MoJ's reasons for a particular answer to Request (c), but no answer has been given; and • it is in the form of a question seeking an answer or explanation and is more akin to an interrogatory than a request seeking recorded information. The Appellant's case on (a) 2-4 41. In summary the Appellant's submissions were that: - (a) a probate applicant's purpose is to be issued with a grant of probate or LoA which was a court purpose however the purpose for which something is held, for the FOIA definition, is determined at the point the information is received by HMCTS; (b) probate application information, when received, has a court purpose but simultaneously it has a public authority purpose such as the obligation to publish data on a web page; (c) these two purposes exist " side by side " at the time when the information is received and are both "historic purposes " not "continuing purposes"; (d) (65) LoA applications are not sent to HMCTS purely for court purposes even though that purpose is an important part because probate is a public duty service assigned to HMCTS and part of that is the public duty to publish information and "part (b) of the FOI request is taken from probate applications held for these public authority purposes". (e) sometimes the statistical information about applications might be published before a grant is issued indicating that the information in an application has been used for public authority purposes before it has been accessed for court purposes; (f) information relevant to Request (a) 1 has been published on the .gov web page which means that it must be for public authority purposes and if (a) 1 was for public authority purposes it followed that the information relevant to requests (a) 2-4 was also held for public authority purposes (and the Appellant set out why in each case); (g) the Request asked for information from probate applications held by HMCTS for public authority purposes only (which also does not disclose any personal information); (h) because the information being requested only existed for public authority purposes the information is legally held by HMCTS as well as being physically in its custody and can be disclosed; (i) the conditions of section 3(2) FOIA are satisfied and the exemption at section 32 FOIA does not apply because the information requested is held for public authority purposes (although it is also held for court purposes); and (j) because the MoJ did not rely on section 32 FOIA for the information that has been published it would be unreasonable for section 32 FOIA to be relied upon in relation to the information requested at (a) 2-4 because it is so closely related to the published data. 42. The Appellant asserted that the process for the extraction and collation of the information requested would be very similar to that which is undertaken for the data that is published and so answering the Request would not require the creation of new data. This point was only relevant to a theoretical future request and response and was not considered further. 43. When responding at the appeal the Appellant also referred to a decision notice IC- 253193-Q3R2 (178) of 6 November 2023 where at para 22 the IC recorded that the MoJ had told the IC " HMCTS functions in more than one capacity, one as a court officer when conducting business for the court under the direction of the court and the other as a public authority (such as reporting and analytics of court services). Even though HMCTS holds information it does not necessarily mean it is always held under a public authority capacity." The MoJ's case on (a)2-4 44. The MOJ's case was that: - (a) the information requested by the Appellant was not held by HMCTS for the purposes of FOIA but was in the possession of HMCTS solely on behalf of the Probate Service (ie including the Probate Registry) and was therefore subject to section 3(2) FOIA; and (b) even if it was held by HMCTS for the purposes of FOIA it was held because it was contained in documents filed only for the purpose of obtaining a Grant of LoA from a court (and not a co-existing public authority purpose) and therefore exempt by section 32 FOIA. Section 3(2) FOIA 45. The MOJ's case relied in part on the decision in Farfan. Its submissions included that: - (a) the word "held" was not a question of whether the information is physically in the custody of the particular authority but whether its possession of it was for itself or on behalf of another; (b) HMCTS is a service provider which carries out administrative functions such as, in this case, having physical custody of information on behalf of the Probate Service which includes the Probate Registry which is a court that has jurisdiction to deal with applications for LoA; (c) HMCTS does not hold the requested information for the purpose of producing management information or in any other way for itself; (d) as can be seen from (a) 1 sometimes specific information is extracted from probate applications for management purposes such as for the publication of statistical data and in that specific situation such extracted data is held by HMCTS for its own purposes or with a dual purpose and is not then covered by section 3(2) FOIA (e) HMCTS is entitled to decide not to apply section 3(2) FOIA and publish some probate statistics that derive from applications for Grants but in doing so HMCTS is not thereby precluded from deciding to apply section 3(2) FOIA to other similar data; and (f) the information requested at request (a) 1 (and published) does not resemble the information requested at (a) 2-4 because for example the information requested for (a) 1 was a simple, record of an application being made and then issued but to collate the information requested for request (a) 2-4 would necessitate probate documents being examined. Section 32(1)(a) FOIA 46. It was the MoJ's position that: - (a) the Appellant's "reasonableness" argument has no relevance to an absolute exemption; (b) the question to be answered is what was the "historical purpose" of the document from which answers to request (a) 2-4 would be found and if, its historical purpose (ie why was the probate application sent to the Court) was for the purpose of proceedings then it is exempt; (c) once information is exempt by section 32 FOIA, the information remains exempt whatever is then done with it including if the information is used for statistical purposes; (d) as Mr Burgess says at para 24 of his statement (112) a person making an application for LoA does so with the sole purpose of being the recipient of a grant of LoA and to be provided with the legal authority to act as the administrator of a deceased's estate but the applicant does not make that application with a view to assisting HMCTS to produce statistical information to publish on a web page; and (e) the Probate Registry is within the definition of "court" for section 32(4) FOIA and a LoA application is a document that is "...filed with , or otherwise placed in the custody of, a court for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter" and so section 32(1)(a) FOIA applies. The Tribunal's Review 47. In reaching this decision we: - (a) noted the existence of another decision notice but did not consider it to be binding in any way; (b) accepted the MoJ's submission that if section 32 FOIA or section 3(2) FOIA were at times not relied upon by the MoJ that was not a breach of FOIA and did not mean, on its own, that their right to refer to these sections at other times was in any way inhibited; and (c) accepted that the legal concept of "reasonableness" had no relevance when considering this appeal; and (d) accepted the evidence given in his statement by Mr Burgess. Section 3(2) FOIA 48. This provides that "(2) For the purposes of this Act , information is held by a public authority if (a) it is held by the authority, otherwise than on behalf of another person.." 49. The UT in Farfan at para 55 set out the meaning of "holds" and at para 57 said that "otherwise on behalf of another person" means "...that “information held by the authority on behalf of another is outside section 1 only if it is held solely on behalf of the other: if the information is held to any extent on behalf of the authority itself, the authority ‘holds’ it within the meaning of the Act ” (emphasis added)." 50. In Holt at para 104 the UT endorsed Coppel, on Information Rights where it said: - "There is, however, a distinction between a court or tribunal – that is to say, those exercising judicial power of the state – and the organisation providing administrative support to those exercising judicial power of the state (e.g. HM Courts Service). Documents for use in proceedings before a court, tribunal or like body will typically be filed with and be held by the organisation providing administrative support. Normally, each supporting organisation is a ‘public authority’ within the meaning of FOIA and the EIR. Although the right of access conferred by FOIA and by the EIR is a right to information ‘held’ by a public authority, FOIA provides that: i nformation is held by a public authority if it is held by the authority, otherwise than on behalf of another person.. . " 51. Those seeking a Grant of LoA send the relevant application form, fee and any supporting material to HMCTS. HMCTS receives and holds this information as part of its administrative support role to the Probate Registry and its Registrars. The application form and its information enables a Registrar of the Probate Registry to decide probate applications as required by the NCPR. 52. Providing answers to request (a) 2-4 would require information held by HMCTS in probate applications to be accessed, reviewed, extracted and collated. If this had been done by HMCTS then doing so would not be breach of FOIA and does not create a binding obligation to do so later and the resulting data might be information held by HMCTS for itself. 53. However, in this case we are satisfied as Mr Burgess confirmed that the information requested in (a) 2-4 (unlike (a)1) has not in fact been collated. What it holds therefore is the probate application forms and materials and in our view it holds this information for the Probate Registry to enable a probate application to be determined and does not hold it for its own management purposes and/or for the purpose of the collating and/or the publication of statistical data or for itself in any other way. 54. It is therefore our decision that the information requested is not held by HMCTS for the purposes of FOIA. Section 32(1)(a) FOIA 55. The decision on section 3(2) FOIA above makes consideration of section 32(1)FOIA unnecessary however for clarity we have gone on to deal with this issue on the basis that if, contrary to our decision, the information requested is held by HMCTS for the purposes of FOIA. Section 32 (1)(a) FOIA provides that: - "(1) Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it is held only by virtue of being contained in (a) any document filed with, or otherwise placed in the custody of, a court for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter.." 56. We are satisfied that the Probate Registry is a "court" as defined in section 32(4) FOIA and applications for a grant are "proceedings in a particular cause or matter" which are "filed with or otherwise placed in the custody of, a court. " 57. We were referred in particular to: - (a) Kennedy -v- the Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20 . (b) Peninsula Business Services Limited -v- The Information Commissioner & Others [2014] UKUT 284 (AAC) ; and (c) Brown -v- the Information Commissioner & the Ministry of Justice [2016] UKUT 0255 (AAC) . 58. These are authorities for the following relevant propositions: - (a) "T he first issue...turns on whether the phrase in section 32(1) FOIA "for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter" and in section 32(2) "for the purposes of the inquiry or arbitration" represents a current or an historical condition for absolute exemption. More fully, do the relevant purposes relate to the time at which the request for disclosure is made and the document is held by the court or by the inquiry or arbitrator(s), as the case may be? Or do they relate to the earlier time at which the document was (in the case of a court) filed with or otherwise placed in its custody or served upon or by the relevant public authority or created by a member of the court's administrative staff or (in the case of an inquiry or arbitration) placed in the custody of, or created by, the person conducting the inquiry or arbitration? The Court of Appeal held the latter: the absolute exemption exists by reference to historical, rather than current, purposes." (see Kennedy at para 24); (b) the historical rather than current purpose is determinative ie the purpose is tested at the point "... the relevant information came to be filed with or placed with a court or tribunal" (see Peninsula at para 34-35); (c) if the relevant "recorded information came to be held within the Tribunals in ways within the scope of section 32 then HMCTS is entitled to claim an absolute exemption from having to comply with a request for disclosure under FOIA, whatever other courses of action might be open to seek disclosure." (see Peninsula at para 51); (d) where the information requested is statistical and can only be only be obtained " by interrogating the individual records of proceedings." Those individual records were exempt because they constituted information contained in a document created by court staff for the purposes of proceedings" (see Brown at para 37); (e) section 32 FOIA provides an absolute exemption " which would not cease abruptly at the end of the court, arbitration or inquiry proceedings, but would continue until the relevant documents became historical records..." ( Kennedy at para 34); (f) in Brown the appeal concerned "... the extent to which the class-based exemption for court records pursuant to section 32(1) (c) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 [FOIA] applies to statistical data drawn from but not disclosing the content of documents created by a court or a member of court staff for the purposes of proceedings in a particular cause or matter" and the UT concluded that " Section 32(1) (c) applies to such statistical information and so dismiss the requester’s appeal" (see Brown para 1-2). 59. We have no doubt that an historic purpose for which probate application information is filed is for the applicant to be granted LoA and become an administrator – which is a court process. For the Tribunal the central issue then was whether there was an additional co-existing simultaneous historic "public authority" purpose to collate and publish statistics as suggested by the Appellant. 60. Mr Burgess at para 24 of his statement under the heading " The Purpose of Holding the Information" says that "The purpose of requesting the information sought is to enable the registrar to determine applications..." and it is the MoJ's case that no such dual historic public authority purposes exist. 61. Our conclusion is also that no dual historic purpose exists on the basis of the legal authorities to which we were referred and because: - (a) the fact that HMCTS has decided to collate and publish some information, which it is entitled to do if it wishes, does not itself satisfy us that there is a dual historic public authority purpose; (b) for us to have been satisfied we would need to have been shown, for example, that a public authority purpose of the collation and publication of data from the probate application material was an obligation placed on HMCTS by the NCPR, the 1981 Act or in some other such as by the provisions of The Framework Agreement or the Records Retention and Disposition Schedule for Probate Registries referred to at para 20 of Mr Burgess' statement (111). This was not shown to be the case; (c) we are satisfied that the information requested (apart from at request (a)1) is not actually extracted or available which is indicative of the dual court and public authority purpose not existing; (d) we are satisfied that when a probate applicant completes the probate application form and inserts the required information they do so for the sole purpose of being granted LoA and they do not, at the same time, have in their mind that they are also doing so for the purpose of enabling HMCTS to carry out a public authority purpose to collate and publish data – even if they might know that from time to time HMCTS might do so; and (e) we accept Mr Burgess' evidence about the purpose for which the evidence is requested. 62. Accordingly, and if necessary, the absolute exemption at section 32(1) (a) FOIA applies to the information requested at (a)2-4 of the Request. Decision 63. In summary the outcome of the issues is that Request (d) was not a request for recorded information and, as regards Requests (a) 2-4, the information requested was not held for the purposes of FOIA but, if it was, it is exempt by the absolute exemption at section 32(1) (a) FOIA. Accordingly, the DN was in accordance with the law, and the appeal is dismissed. Signed: Judge Heald Date 1 September 2026 amended by rule 40 on 30 September 2026