Acronyms used DPA the Data Protection Act 2018 FtT the First-tier Tribunal General Regulatory Chamber ICO Information Commissioner’s Office SAR Subject Access Request under the DPA Background 1. This Tribunal is concerned with an application for a Section 166 Order to Progress made about ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2. 2. Mr Hewitt’s complaint which was given reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 was provided to the FtT as Annex 1 to the ICO’s response. That document records that on 29 April 2026 at 13:03, Mr Hewitt’s complaint was about Ackroyd Legal, and he gave an email address of [name]@ackroydlegal.com. Documentation provided indicates that a SAR was made to Ackroyd Legal on Fri 19 Jun (which I take to be 2026 as 19 June 2026 fell on a Friday). 3. Mr Hewitt provided further information to the ICO in which he alleged he was the victim of an equity-stripping scheme, naming other entities “We Buy Any Homes / Associated Entity” and “PX Hub”. Within the documentation provided for this application, I see that Mr Hewitt wrote to We Buy Any Home making a SAR on Tue 16 Jun; (16 June 2026 was a Tuesday). 4. On 29 April 2026, Mr Hewitt filed a complaint with the ICO. 5. By GRC3 dated 29 July 2026, Mr Hewitt sought an Order to Progress. 6. It appears that, in error, Mr Hewitt was told by HMCTS that he needed to wait 6 months from the date of complaint before making application. On 16 September 2026, at a hearing, Chamber President O’Connor, consented to the withdrawal of the application, notice of seeking to withdraw having been filed by Mr Hewitt in correspondence dated 11 August 2026. 7. Mr Hewitt, by email sent on 17 September 2026 at 12:34, wrote “I want it reinstated”. No GRC5 was, it appears, submitted. A Legal Officer gave written instructions by email sent on 29 September 2026 at 16:15 to admit the application dated 29 July 2026 (it being in time). It is unclear whether they were told of the application being withdrawn with the Chamber President’s consent. I have not seen any order reinstating the application or permitting Mr Hewitt to make the application without completing a GRC5. 8. In any event, Initial Case Management Directions were then issued on 01 October 2026, despite the application having previously been withdrawn (with proper consent by the FtT at a hearing). 9. On 12 October 2026 the ICO provided its outcome for the complaint allocated ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2; that is Annex 4 to the ICO Response. They informed Mr Hewitt they had written to Ackroyd Legal LLP and asked them to provide a response to the SAR. 10. By GRC5 dated 29 October 2026, the ICO applied to the Tribunal for the application to be struck out. 11. The directions dated 01 October 2026 gave Mr Hewitt the opportunity to respond to such application; by email sent on 29 October 2026 at 13:07, Mr Hewitt opposed the application to strike out. Procedural irregularity 12. There has been a clear procedural irregularity. HMCTS issued directions at a time when the application was withdrawn and, therefore, ended. There was no legal basis upon which they could be sent out as no judicial decision had been made to reinstate the application. Despite that, the ICO has responded to the application and applied for strike out. 13. It seems, from what I have read, that Mr Hewitt requested to withdraw the application because he was told to wait for a 6-month period which is not required in law (6 months plus 28 days is the maximum time period not the minimum – see rule 22(6)(f) of the GRC Rules). 14. The ICO has filed a response and applied for strike out and Mr Hewitt has made representations about that application to strike out. 15. I consider it appropriate, in the unique circumstances of this application, to waive the requirement that an application is made on GRC5 and, pursuant to Mr Hewitt’s request made by email on 17 September 2026, reinstate the application. No hearing 16. Both sides have been given opportunity to put their case in writing. I note that Mr Hewitt’s GRC3 recorded his request for the application to be dealt with without a hearing. I consider it appropriate to deal with the ICO’s application to strike out the proceedings without holding a hearing. The Law – Section 166 17. The key authorities about the scope of the FtT’s jurisdiction are Killock and VeaIe v Information Commissioner [2022] 1 WLR 2241 ( Killock ), R (Delo) v Information Commissioner ( Delo ) in the High Court ( [2023] 1 WLR 1327 ) and Court of Appeal ( [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 ) and Smith v Information Commissioner [2025] UKUT 74 (AAC) ( Smith ). 18. In Killock , the Upper Tribunal explained it did not rule out circumstances in which a complainant who had received an outcome to their complaint under section 165(b) might ask the Tribunal to ‘wind back the clock’ and make an order for an appropriate step to be taken in response to the complaint under section 166(2)(a). The Upper Tribunal went on to explain: “However, should that happen, the Tribunal will cast a critical eye to assure itself that the complainant is not using the s.166 process to achieve a different complaint outcome.” 19. In Killock , the Upper Tribunal also explained that in considering appropriateness (in terms of a step), the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The Upper Tribunal expressed the view that in the sphere of complaints, the ICO has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigation they should undertake into any particular issue and how they should conduct those investigations. The Upper Tribunal indicated these matters will be informed, not only by the nature of the complaint itself, but also by a range of other factors such as the ICO’s own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same area and their judgement on how to deploy limited resources effectively. The Upper Tribunal emphasised the need for the FtT to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the ICO’s special position. See paragraph 85 of the judgment in Killock . 20. In R (Delo) v Information Commissioner [2023] EWCA Civ 1141 , in the Court of Appeal, Warby LJ (with whom the other Court of Appeal judges agreed) concluded the relevant legislation should be interpreted as requiring the ICO to receive and consider a complaint and gives him a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and if so, to what extent. Warby LJ agreed with Mostyn J.’s decision that, having done this much, the ICO is entitled to conclude it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood this is so and to take no further action (paragraph 80). 21. In Delo , Warby LJ stated that while a conclusive determination or ruling on the merits would clearly amount to an outcome, the word used was intended to have broader connotations. Warby LJ agreed with the Upper Tribunal in Killock that the word “outcome” embraced a decision to cease handling a specific complaint. Warby LJ also agreed with the analysis by Mostyn J. in Delo in the High Court that outcome would properly capture the ICO’s decision to conclude considering Mr Delo’s complaint, having informed Mr Delo he considered the conduct in question was “likely” to be compliant with UK GDPR. 22. Therefore, the FtT on an application under section 166, has no power to deal with the merits of a complaint or its outcome. That said, Upper Tribunal Judge Stout’s decision in Smith confirms, at [59]-[60], that the mere fact that the Commissioner has issued a complaint outcome does not mean that there is no scope for a section 166 application. But, as Judge Stout also explained in Smith at [60], in a case where the Commissioner has carried out an investigation and provided an outcome, it is highly unlikely that a section 166 application will succeed. This is for two principal reasons. 23. The first reason is because the case law has established that section 166 is a procedural provision where the FtT’s jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating on whether the Commissioner has done any of the things identified in section 166(1), and cannot be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available on an application to the courts under sections 167/168 of the DPA 2018 for a compliance order/damages against the data controller or on a claim for judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision (see further [74] of Killock ). 24. The second reason is because the Commissioner has a wide discretion under section 165 as to whether to investigate a complaint at all and as to the outcome, so that the scope for the FtT to interfere with that judgement on a section 166 application is limited. EW , decided alongside Killock , was an exceptional case where the Commissioner, in breach of his own stated policy, had undertaken no investigation at all. Yet, as the Court of Appeal made clear in Delo , the Commissioner is not required to determine every complaint, an “outcome” may be a decision not to investigate further ([64]), the Commissioner is not required “to determine the merits of complaints” ([78]) and has a “broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent” ([80]). Application of law to the facts 25. Mr Hewitt’s opposition is on 4 grounds: a. The outcome was provided by the ICO only after the application was filed. i. I consider that such is an inevitable fact for each application which is made at a time when the ICO has not provided an outcome letter. It is not a good reason to say that there is a reasonable prospect of the FtT making an Order to Progress. b. Compliance is not complete. i. These proceedings at the FtT are confined to section 166; the FtT is not determining whether any underlying infringement occurred. c. Reasonable adjustment sought for provision of the information. i. The way in which a data controller or processor complies with its substantive obligations is not a matter for determination in these proceedings, which are confined to the FtT's jurisdiction under section 166 DPA 2018. d. The ICO’s response refers to “We Buy Any Homes / ASUS Investment Limited”. i. The only place at which I can find the ICO response referring to “We Buy Any Homes / ASUS Investment Limited” is at paragraph 19, where they record what Mr Hewitt wrote in his GRC3. ii. At Section 5.1 and 6.1 of his own document (the GRC3), Mr Hewitt refers to “we buy any homes” (formatting as in original); at 6.1 in his document, Mr also refers to “ASUS investment Limited” (again, formatting as in original). iii. Any reference to those entities appears to be in error because it is clear from the actual complaint document (Annex 1 to the ICO response) that ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 is about Mr Hewitt’s complaint about Ackroyd Legal LLP and not about those other entities. It does not appear to me that the ICO was confused by this reference, their response clearly sets out why they say they have now given an outcome for ICO reference number IC-508902-Q6J2 and why they say the application for an Order to Progress should be struck out. 26. An outcome has now been provided to Mr Hewitt. The FtT's role is to consider whether, notwithstanding the outcome now provided, there remains any realistic basis for making an order under section 166. For the reasons set out above, I consider there is no reasonable prospect of the FtT making an Order to Progress ICO complaint with reference number IC-508902-Q6J2. Therefore, and pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) of the GRC Rules, I strike out the application Signed: Judge Worth Date: 06 November 2026