Nancy Carol Smithers и др. против неустановленных лиц, [2026] EWHC 1907 (Comm)

Mr Justice Bright:

1.The judgment is concerned with the application of the Claimants for summary judgment against some of the Defendants, as I explain below.

2.The First Claimant, Ms Nancy Smithers, is a Canadian national, who resides in Lawrencetown in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia.

3.The Second Claimant, Ms Angelina Usanova , is a Maltese national of Ukrainian origin, who resides in Zug, Switzerland.

4.Their claim is brought on the basis that they are the victims of a sophisticated cryptoasset fraud, which induced them to invest the equivalent of around £10.5 million with what they understood to be a genuine cryptoasset trading business based in London. It at first used the name Raliplen, but later changed its name to Servelius.

5.Neither Claimant is a professional investor or trader, but both are interested in cryptocurrency. Ms Smithers was interested in the Raliplen/Servelius cryptocurrency trading system, having read about it online. On 5 May 2025 she received a call from a man who introduced himself as Mr Richard Coleman, who said he was one of its expert traders. He persuaded her to set up an account, and, over time, to transfer both money and cryptocurrency assets.

6.Ms Smithers then introduced Ms Usanova to Servelius, who also transferred cryptoassets so that (as she thought) they could be traded by Servelius.

7.The final such transfer occurred on 10 October 2025, and was for Bitcoin with a value at that time of about US$2.8 million, into an account which Ms Smithers regarded as hers, but which the man calling himself Mr Coleman was able to access and control. All the cryptoassets were removed.

8.There are two groups of Defendants who are the focus of the substantive claim. The first group are Defendants who perpetrated the fraud – notably the man calling himself Richard Coleman, but also someone who gave the name Steve Arcos and another person known to Ms Smithers and Ms Usanova only as Joseph. The Claimants were given email addresses and a UK mobile phone number, but have no other way of identifying the Defendants in this first group.

9.The second group of Defendants are those who received the cryptoassets. The Claimants engaged specialist investigators to trace the cryptoassets, and the investigators succeeded in establishing the exchange deposit addresses and final destination private addresses in question. The identification details of all these addresses are set out in appendices and schedules to the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim. In relation to some of these addresses, it has been possible to identify the individual persons who own or control the addresses. For most, however, the identity of those individuals is not known.

10.In December 2025, the proceedings were sent to the email addresses that ‘Richard Coleman’ and others had provided to Ms Smithers and Ms Usanova. This was relied on as effective service pursuant to an order made by Robin Knowles J on 31 October 2025, which gave permission for alternative service in relation to this first group of Defendants. In the course of the hearing, some queries arose about the efficacy of this service. In the event, Mr McIlroy, for the Claimants, did not pursue the application for summary judgment against these particular Defendants and I therefore need say no more.

11.The Defendants in the second group were served in March 2026, by way of the transfer to each receiving address of either (i) a non-fungible token containing a link to the documents or (ii) an OP_RETURN message containing a link to the documents (depending on the nature of the receiving address). This was by way of alternative service, pursuant to an order of Waksman J dated 19 February 2026.

12.There were three receiving addresses in relation to which it was not possible to effect service in this manner. Judgment is not currently sought in relation to those three receiving addresses or anyone who may be associated with them.

13.Following service, responses were received from three of the individuals notified by this service. They explained their involvement and what they said was essentially exculpatory. The Claimants’ application for summary judgment did not extend to these individuals.

14.Otherwise, none of the Defendants in either the first group or the second group acknowledged service or responded in any manner. I was satisfied, having had regard to the principles set out in R v Jones [2001] EWCA Crim 168 at [22.5] (as applied in European Union v Syria [2023] EWHC 1116 at [1-6], Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v Syrian Arab Republic

[2018] EWHC 385 (Comm) at [3], and African Export-Import Bank v South Sudan

[2025] EWHC 1079 (Comm) at [17])), that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the Defendants.

15.Having received Mr McIlroy’s submissions on behalf of the Claimants, and having considered the evidence, I am satisfied both that the Claimants have a good claim in principle, and that, with the exceptions that I have mentioned, the Defendants in the second group have been properly served. With the exception of the three individuals who explained their involvement, none of the Defendants has provided any answer to the claim. I therefore am satisfied that there is no defence.

16.The claim can be put in a number of ways, but primarily it is a claim for deceit – that is, fraudulent misrepresentation.

17.Assuming that the Claimants’ property can still be identified, it remains their property. In so far as any of the Defendants are in possession of such property, they can be ordered to return it to the Claimants.

18.The most significant components of the overall claim relate to Bitcoin assets. As set out in the evidence of the Claimants’ specialist investigator Mr Eastick, Bitcoin transaction outputs do not merge or blend into a single homogeneous balance. Each unspent transaction output remains a discrete and identifiable unit until it is spent. In that sense, Bitcoin transaction outputs are not akin to liquid funds that mix irreversibly upon co-mingling. Rather, they resemble distinct assets that coexist without losing their individual identity.

19.Thus, the Bitcoin assets received and held by the relevant receiving addresses were precisely the same assets as were taken fraudulently from the Claimants. They remain the Claimants’ property. They should be returned to the Claimants.

20.The same is not true of USD Coin or Ethereum, which are the other significant species of cryptocurrency that make up the claim. They are fungible assets. They will have lost their identify upon transfer to and receipt by the receiving addresses. It therefore is not possible to identify precisely the same assets as were removed fraudulently from the Claimants or to order that the very same assets be returned to them. In relation to these assets, Mr McIlroy therefore sought a compensatory remedy, expressed in fiat currency. He rightly pointed out that, in the case of USD Coin (which is pegged to the US Dollar), this makes no real difference to the Claimants.

21.The result is that my judgment is in favour of Ms Smithers and Ms Usanova, against the second group of Defendants (with the exceptions that I have identified above). The precise consequences, in the sense of what Bitcoin or US Dollar amount must be returned or paid to Ms Smithers and Ms Usanova, will be set out in detail in the Order that will give effect to this judgment.

22.The Claimants are also entitled to their costs from the same Defendants, on the indemnity basis. The costs of the Claimants’ current solicitors I summarily assess in the sum of £230,000, to be paid within 14 days. The costs of their former solicitors I have not been able to review in sufficient detail for a summary assessment. The Claimants must be entitled to the disbursements incurred by their former solicitors, but otherwise the former solicitors’ costs should be assessed, if not agreed.