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United States v. Approximately 1,537,935 Usdt · редакция 1 → 2 · зафиксировано 2026-09-17 03:08 · +7 −7 строк

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
¶ 34–35. Some virtual currencies have value equivalent to real currency, such as Tether tokens (USDT), which has a value pegged to the U.S. dollar. Id. ¶ 19, 28–29. USDT is sent and received from USDT “addresses,” which are generally anonymous and represented as a 46 to 48character-long case-sensitive string of letters and numbers. Id. ¶ 30–31.
Cryptocurrency confidence scams, also known as “Pig Butchering,” are a type of internet-based cryptocurrency investment scam.1Id. ¶ 36. These scams typically involve four stages: 1) cold contact with a victim via text or social media where the perpetrator pretends to have contacted the wrong number but continues communication with the victim; 2) the perpetrator establishes a relationship with the victim by continuing to message them over an extended period of time that can span days, weeks or months; 3) the perpetrator creates a narrative to induce the victim to invest on some form of cryptocurrency in a fraudulent platform, and 4) after the victim stops sending payments or questions the platforms’ legitimacy, the perpetrator cuts off all contact. Id. A well-known type of confidence scheme is the “romance scam.” Id. ¶ 37.
Cryptocurrency confidence scams, also known as “Pig Butchering,” are a type of internet-based cryptocurrency investment scam.1 Id. ¶ 36. These scams typically involve four stages: 1) cold contact with a victim via text or social media where the perpetrator pretends to have contacted the wrong number but continues communication with the victim; 2) the perpetrator establishes a relationship with the victim by continuing to message them over an extended period of time that can span days, weeks or months; 3) the perpetrator creates a narrative to induce the victim to invest on some form of cryptocurrency in a fraudulent platform, and 4) after the victim stops sending payments or questions the platforms’ legitimacy, the perpetrator cuts off all contact. Id. A well-known type of confidence scheme is the “romance scam.” Id. ¶ 37.
These scams rely heavily on mobile banking and investment apps that, at first, seem legitimate but are created and controlled by the perpetrators. Id. ¶ 43–44. Perpetrators create a façade of balances and transactions that is not connected to any legitimate financial institution, and they use inflated numbers to entice victims into investing more. Id. ¶ 45–46. One stage of the scheme allows the victims to withdraw funds, which victims believe are gains but typically originate from other victims. Id. ¶ 47. Due to the highly technical nature of cryptocurrency, the perpetrators are successful at explaining otherwise convoluted terms to the victims, convincing them to invest in cryptocurrency. Id. ¶ 48.
Investigators traced $100,000 worth of USDT of Victim-1’s funds from Scam Address 580f through two other unhosted addresses and ultimately to the Subject Virtual Currency Address, where the funds remained until they were seized by law enforcement. Id. Investigators identified approximately 91 intermediary unhosted addresses involved in the movement of funds that were ultimately deposited in the Subject Virtual Currency Address. Id. ¶ 56. The intermediary addresses were established around the same timeframe as when Victim-1 was scammed (June
2024 to August 2024) and exhibited large dollar deposit transactions, followed by a pattern of rapid movement of funds with large corresponding withdrawals.2Id. ¶ 57(i)–(iii). Five intermediary addresses received and sent transactions over $100 million in total between June
2024 to August 2024, and two of the intermediary addresses received and processed approximately $400 million in cryptocurrency in just twelve months.3Id. ¶ 57(iii). The volume of transactions produced a string of blockchain transaction fees (“gas fees”) that allowed the
2024 to August 2024) and exhibited large dollar deposit transactions, followed by a pattern of rapid movement of funds with large corresponding withdrawals.2 Id. ¶ 57(i)–(iii). Five intermediary addresses received and sent transactions over $100 million in total between June
2024 to August 2024, and two of the intermediary addresses received and processed approximately $400 million in cryptocurrency in just twelve months.3 Id. ¶ 57(iii). The volume of transactions produced a string of blockchain transaction fees (“gas fees”) that allowed the
Government to track the movement of funds and deduce that it was performed in a manner meant to conceal or disguise the nature, source, ownership, or control of proceeds from an unlawful activity—in this case, wire fraud. Id. ¶ 58.
No. 2. Any verified claim in response to the notice had to be filed no later than January 20,
2026.4See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. G(5)(a)(ii)(B). No such claim was filed in this case. See Req.
2026.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. G(5)(a)(ii)(B). No such claim was filed in this case. See Req.
for Entry of Default ¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 3. Due to a lack of response to the notice, the Clerk of Court entered default judgment against all persons or entities that would otherwise claim an interest in
United States v. All Assets Held in Acct. No. XXXXXXXX, 330 F. Supp. 3d 150, 155–56 (D.D.C.
2018). Two steps must be followed by a party seeking default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see alsoBricklayers & Trowel Trades Int'l Pension Fund v. KAFKA Constr., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d
2018). Two steps must be followed by a party seeking default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see also Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int'l Pension Fund v. KAFKA Constr., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d
177, 179 (D.D.C. 2017). First, the party must request that the Clerk of Court enter default against the party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a);
$139,930 was allegedly laundered through nine intermediary addresses before being transferred to the Subject Virtual Currency Address. Id.
Taken together, the Government’s allegations,which must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion for default judgment, see, e.g., R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30, detail a wire fraud and money laundering scheme perpetrated by foreign actors and explain how Defendant Property constitutes a product of that scheme. Accordingly, the Government has satisfied its burden under Supplemental Rule G by alleging facts sufficient to establish “a reasonable belief” that it will be able to prove at trial that Defendant Property constitutes property involved in money laundering transactions and/or wire fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
Taken together, the Government’s allegations, which must be taken as true for the purposes of a motion for default judgment, see, e.g., R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d at 30, detail a wire fraud and money laundering scheme perpetrated by foreign actors and explain how Defendant Property constitutes a product of that scheme. Accordingly, the Government has satisfied its burden under Supplemental Rule G by alleging facts sufficient to establish “a reasonable belief” that it will be able to prove at trial that Defendant Property constitutes property involved in money laundering transactions and/or wire fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
R. G(2)(f). The Government has therefore sufficiently alleged that Defendant Property is subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and 981(a)(1)(C); Cf. Oil Tanker, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (explaining that a motion for default judgment may be denied “where the allegations of the complaint,” which must be taken as true, “are legally insufficient to make out a claim” (quoting
United States District Judge