{"check":null,"uid":"f9061305c7abbee7","title":"Parmjit Singh Flora v The Information Commissioner","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-16","summary":"Заявитель оспаривал в Трибунале действия Уполномоченного по информации (ICO) по двум жалобам на колледж Carlisle College, включая предполагаемое изменение текста запроса субъекта доступа. ICO отказал в дальнейших мерах после проверки ответов колледжа. Суд отклонил заявление как неподсудное по ст. 166 DPA 2018: эта норма позволяет давать указания только за процедурные нарушения регулятора, а не пересматривать суть решения или обязывать расследовать нарушение UK GDPR; требования об истребовании доказательств у колледжа также вне компетенции трибунала. Жалоба отклонена из-за отсутствия юрисдикции и перспектив успеха.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":29438,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1312","first_seen":"2026-09-17","last_checked":"2026-09-17 01:29","relevance":"hit","score":17,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":17,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"орган","name":"ICO","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":93,"ctx":"these proceedings concern an application (the “application”) under section 166(2) of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”) for an order to progress the applicant’s complaints against carlisl","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":2462,"ctx":"ncg appeared to have undertaken appropriate searches and provided the applicant with the personal data to which he was entitled. the case officer further explained the scope of the right of ac","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":2576,"ctx":"e was entitled. the case officer further explained the scope of the right of access under data protection legislation and advised that any concerns regarding specific information which the applic","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":3600,"ctx":"e officer acknowledged the applicant's continued concerns regarding ncg's handling of his personal data but advised that it did not consider it necessary or appropriate to pursue further regula","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":8166,"ctx":"to seek an order of compliance against the data controller for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":11604,"ctx":"right of data subjects to complain to the ic about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. under section 166 dpa 2018 a data subject can make an application to this tr","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":26,"ctx":"Parmjit Singh Flora v The Information Commissioner 1.  These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"ICO","weak":false,"pos":3057,"ctx":"oversight of the data controller.  7.  On 26 April 2026, the Applicant requested that the ICO reconsider its decision, arguing that his complaint concerned the alleged alteration of t","zone":"орган","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":144,"ctx":"These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Carlisle College","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-09-17","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01312 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1312","text":"1.\n\nThese proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under\nsection 166(2)\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n(“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Carlisle College (“NCG”) regarding its response to a Subject Access Request (“SAR”). The first complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 28 March 2025 (the “First Complaint”) with a further complaint about alteration of the same SAR being made by the Applicant on 25 April 2026 (the “Second Complaint”). The complaints were dealt with under reference\nIC-378184-T9Q4.\n\n2.\n\nOn 10 October 2025, the Applicant requested an update on their complaints.\n\n3.\n\nOn 13 October 2025, the IC acknowledged the complaints and advised that it was at that time taking approximately 29 weeks from the date of submission for complaints to be allocated for investigation.\n\n4.\n\nOn 24 December 2025, the case officer acknowledged receipt of the Applicant's complaints and apologised for the delay in responding. It was explained that, although two separate complaints had been submitted, they raised similar concerns regarding the handling of the Applicant's SAR and would therefore be considered together under a single case reference. The case officer explained the IC’s regulatory role and noted that, before the complaints could be considered further, additional evidence was required from the Applicant, including copies of the original SAR. related correspondence with NCG, and evidence demonstrating that the College's complaints process had concluded. The Applicant was advised that, without the requested information, the IC may be unable to take the matter forward.\n\n5.\n\nOn 31 December 2025, the Applicant provided further information and supporting documentation in response to the case officer's request. This included additional submissions regarding NCG's handling of his subject access request, copies of relevant correspondence and further information which the Applicant considered material to his complaint. The information provided was considered as part of the IC’s investigation before an outcome was reached.\n\n6.\n\nOn 21 April 2026, having considered the Applicant's complaints and the information subsequently provided, the case officer wrote to the Applicant. It was concluded that no further regulatory action was required. The case officer explained that NCG appeared to have undertaken appropriate searches and provided the Applicant with the personal data to which he was entitled. The case officer further explained the scope of the right of access under data protection legislation and advised that any concerns regarding specific information which the Applicant believed had not been disclosed should be raised directly with NCG. The Applicant was informed that the IC would take no further action on the complaint, although the information provided would contribute to its broader regulatory oversight of the data controller.\n\n7.\n\nOn 26 April 2026, the Applicant requested that the ICO reconsider its decision, arguing that his complaint concerned the alleged alteration of the wording of his subject access request rather than the interpretation of its scope. The Applicant maintained that NCG had deliberately amended the wording of his request, resulting in the exclusion of information. The Applicant asked the IC to investigate the circumstances of the alleged alteration and to require NCG to provide a response to the original wording of the request.\n\n8.\n\nOn 13 May 2026, the case officer acknowledged the Applicant's continued concerns regarding NCG's handling of his personal data but advised that it did not consider it necessary or appropriate to pursue further regulatory action. The case officer explained the IC’s obligations under section 165 of the DPA 2018 and confirmed that it had reached a final decision on the complaints. The Applicant was informed that, if dissatisfied with the outcome, he could request a case review in accordance with the IC's published process. No further review request was received by the IC within the relevant timeframe.\n\nThe Application\n\n9.\n\nThe Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC1 dated 7 May 2026. He subsequently submitted a form GRC3 dated 10 July 2026. He stated that the outcome he was seeking was an order that the IC:\n\na.\n\nReopen the investigation into both complaints, directing the IC to determine whether the SAR dated 25 February 2025 was deliberately altered.\n\nb.\n\nDirect NCG to produce server-side records within 21 days for the period 25 February to 10 March 2025.\n\nc.\n\nRequire NCG to produce written consent evidence or formally admit its absence and address the structural conflict of interest in its SAR search methodology.\n\nd.\n\nDirect a fresh SAR search using the original unaltered wording\n\ne.\n\nDirect an expedited investigation as the Applicant has separate ongoing Employment Tribunal proceedings.\n\n10.\n\nIn his grounds for the Application, the Applicant, in summary, made the following points\n:\n\na.\n\nThe First Complaint concerned NCG's failure to conduct a proper SAR search. NCG admitted in writing that staff on personal drives determined the relevance of their own communications to the SAR — a structural conflict of interest rendering the search methodology fundamentally unreliable. The IC did not examine this admission at any stage of its investigation.\n\nb.\n\nIn the Second Complaint, the Applicant complained that his SAR document had been deliberately altered after submission without his consent. He described that forensic analysis has confirmed three versions of the document.\n\nc.\n\nThe IC investigated the wrong document. The IC focused on the 7 February 2025 draft rather than the operative 25 February 2025 SAR, despite the Applicant’s correction of this error on 31 December 2025, which was not addressed in the IC’s response dated 21 April 2026.\n\nd.\n\nThe document metadata was not held by the IC and was not before it during the investigation. The IC could have used its powers to require NCG to produce the metadata but did not do so which he says is “\nan independent investigative inadequacy\n”.\n\ne.\n\nThe review response on 13 May 2026 did not engage with the forensic material provided by the Applicant and provided no reasoning.\n\nf.\n\nIn light of the Applicant’s ongoing tribunal proceedings, he and his family have suffered irreversible prejudice.\n\nThe strike-out application\n\n11.\n\nThe IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 13 August 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).\n\n12.\n\nThe reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 36 to 40. In summary, these were as follows:\n\na.\n\nThe remedies sought by the Applicant in relation to this matter are not within those available to the Tribunal under\nsection 166\nDPA18. An Application under\nsection 166\nDPA18 permits a Tribunal to make an order against the IC only if he has failed in some procedural respect.\n\nb.\n\nThe IC has taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaints and has provided an outcome to him. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has complied with the procedural requirements set out in\nsection 166(1)\nof the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under\nsection 166(2)\nDPA18.\n\nc.\n\nIt is clear that the Applicant disagrees with the outcome provided on his complaints. However, as set out above,\nsection 166\nDPA18 does not provide a mechanism by which complainants can challenge the substantive outcome of a complaint. The relief available from the Tribunal on an application under\nsection 166\nDPA18 only applies where it is satisfied that the IC has failed in some procedural respect to comply with the requirements of\nsection 166(1)\nDPA18, limited solely to those orders that are set out in\nsection 166(2)\n.\n\nd.\n\nIf the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against the data controller for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18.\n\n13.\n\nThe Applicant provided a Reply to the Response dated 15 August 2026, which deals with the strike-out application as well as the substantive response, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4).\n\n14.\n\nThe Applicant stated that his case was now only advanced on two free-standing grounds, namely:\n\na.\n\nGround 1 (delay) –breach of\nsection 166(1)\n(b)–(c) of the DPA 2018 during the period 25 April 2025 to 24 December 2025; and\n\nb.\n\nGround 2 (No outcome on the second complaint): the absence of any outcome, in the\nDelo\nsense, on the distinct complaint of\n25 April 2025\n\n15.\n\nIn relation to Ground 1, he argued that there was no progress made on his complaints between 25 April 2025 and 24 December 2025. A later outcome letter cannot retrospectively cure an antecedent failure to progress the investigation and the duties under\nsection 166(1)\nwere repeatedly breached over eight months. He says that Killock (paragraph 87) does not hold that an accrued breach of the distinct, free-standing information duties in\nsection 166(1)\n(b)–(c) is extinguished or rendered unenforceable merely because a later outcome is eventually produced. He seeks an order that the IC inform him of what steps were taken in that period to progress the complaint.\n\n16.\n\nIn relation to Ground 2, the Applicant argues that his Second Complaint, concerned with deliberate alteration of the SAR wording, is procedurally unresolved, although he accepts an outcome has been provided in relation to the First Complaint. He considers that the IC’s response dated 21 April 2026 does not refer to alteration, victimisation, sections 26 or 27 of the Equality Act or any of the specific allegations set out in that complaint. He relies on another decision of this Tribunal, in Hooper v IC [2026] UKFTT 1102 (GRC) as authority for where correspondence does not address the substance of the complaint and no subsequent concluded outcome is evidenced, the complaint remains procedurally unresolved. He contests the IC’s characterisation of the two complaints as “similar”.\n\n17.\n\nThe Applicant clarified that as a result of commencing County Court proceedings he no longer sought:\n\na.\n\ncompensation,\n\nb.\n\na direction as to the scope, methodology, timetable or intensity of the IC’s investigation,\n\nc.\n\na determination of whether there was tampering or victimisation; or\n\nd.\n\na direction for a fresh SAR search.\n\n18.\n\nInstead he clarified that he wished to enforce the IC’s procedural duties under\nsection 166(1)\n“\nin respect of a distinct complaint that has been raised with\nthe Commissioner on multiple documented occasions and which, the Applicant contends, has never received a procedurally adequate response\n.” He clarified that the second complaint (dated 25 April 2026) “\nis a real and investigable one requiring a distinct outcome\n”. Accordingly he sought an order requiring the IC to identify and address the Second Complaint as a distinct complaint and an order requiring the IC to account for what steps it took to progress the complaints during a specified period.\n\nLegal framework\n\n19.\n\nSection 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under\nsection 166\nDPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:\n\n“Orders to progress complaints\n\n(1)\n\nThis section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner -\n\na.\n\nfails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,\n\nb.\n\nfails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or\n\nc.\n\nif the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.\n\n(2)\n\nThe Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner -\n\nd.\n\nto take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or\n\ne.\n\nto inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”\n\n20.\n\nThe Tribunal can only make an order under\nsection 166(2)\nif one of the conditions at\nsection 166(1)\n(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of\nsection 166\n. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.\n\n21.\n\nSection 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that:\n\n“(4)\n\nIf the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must—\n\n(a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,\n\n(b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint,\n\n(c)inform the complainant of the rights under\nsection 166\n, and\n\n(d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.\n\n(5)\n\nThe reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes—\n\n(a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and\n\n(b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”\n\n22.\n\nIn the case of\nKillock v Information Commissioner\n\n[2022] 1 WLR 2241\n, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - \"\n…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under\nsection 166\n, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to\nthe Act\nwhich regard the\nsection 166\nremedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in\nsection 166\ntowards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals.\"\n\n23.\n\nMostyn J in the High Court in\nR (Delo) v Information Commissioner\n[2023] 1 WLR 1327\n, paragraph 57 - \"\nThe treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...\n”.\n\n24.\n\nMostyn J’s decision in\nDelo\nwas upheld by the Court of Appeal (\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n) – “\nFor the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint\n.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).\n\n25.\n\nThe decision of the Upper Tribunal in\nCortes v Information Commissioner\n(UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both\nKillock\nand\nDelo\nconfirmed that the nature of\nsection 166\nis that of a limited procedural provision only. “\nThe Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of\nsection 166\nand the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under\nsection 166\nand the High Court on an application for judicial review.”\n(paragraph 33).\n\n26.\n\nThe case of\nDr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner\n\n[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)\n, noted at paragraph 60 that “\nit is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because\nsection 166\nis a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner,\nsection 166\nshould not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I\nn considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of\nKillick\n“when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”\n\n27.\n\nParagraph 85 of\nKillick\nreads as follows: “\nHowever, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”\n\nDiscussion and conclusions\n\n28.\n\nI have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing. The Applicant stated in his form GRC3 that he did not wish the Application to be determined at a hearing, but stated in his Reply that he wanted an oral hearing only if the Tribunal was minded to strike out his Application.\n\n29.\n\nThe reason why I have decided not to hold a hearing is that the issue I need to determine at this stage is a straightforward one, namely whether the Application should be struck out. The Applicant has already filed extensive written submissions and documentary evidence addressing the Tribunal on these points, including his Reply. I am not persuaded that additional oral or written evidence from the Applicant or IC is required in order fairly to determine the issue of strike out or would add anything substantive to the issues already ventilated. The IC has not at this stage provided any witness evidence, so cross-examination would be inappropriate. I have taken into account the overriding objective, particularly dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings; and using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively. While I recognise that the fair determination of this case is very important to the Applicant, I do not consider it a proportionate use of resources to require an oral hearing to determine the issue of strike out in the circumstances of this case. I note also that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing.\n\n30.\n\nTurning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to both the Applicant’s complaints. The IC provided the Applicant with a response to the complaints on 21 April 2026 with a further response on 13 May 2026. The Applicant accepts that this provided an outcome in relation to the First Complaint but not the Second Complaint. In effect, I consider this is a challenge to the IC’s administrative decision to deal with the First and Second Complaints together, which is a matter more properly suited to judicial review proceedings.\n\n31.\n\nI have reviewed the IC’s letters dated 21 April 2026 and 13 May 2026, together with the Applicant’s letter dated 26 April 2026, which asked the IC to reconsider its decision in relation to deliberate alteration of the wording of his SAR – in that letter he specifically stated “\nI am alleging document tampering”\nand requested that the IC reconsider this as a case of deliberate document alteration rather than scope interpretation, investigate who authorised the tampering, issue an Enforcement Notice to NCG and treat this as a victimisation complaint. However, in his Reply dated 15 August 2026 he explicitly said “\nThe Applicant does not ask the Tribunal to determine whether tampering or victimisation occurred. Those are substantive questions for the County Court claim and the Employment Tribunal. This application is confined to the procedural duties imposed by\nsection 166\n.” The Applicant is quite right that the question of whether tampering or victimisation occurred is not a matter for this Tribunal under\nsection 166\n.\n\n32.\n\nThe IC’s response dated 21 April 2026 explained clearly the regulatory approach which the IC takes to data protection complaints, which is with a view to improving compliance with data protection legislation for the organisation concerned. It stated that the IC’s decision did not affect the Applicant’s ability to enforce his rights through the courts. Given that the Applicant had stated in his complaint “I want the ICO to confirm that the organisation was in the wrong. I want the organisation to be fined” it appears to me that this was an appropriate way of explaining to the Applicant the limits of the IC’s regulatory role in the complaints process. Whether the data controller had tampered with the documents, infringed the Applicant’s rights under the\nEquality Act 2010\nwas not a matter which the IC intended to consider within the framework of determining whether the data controller had complied with their obligations to explain the searches undertaken and provide the information to which the Applicant was entitled in response to his SAR. I do not consider, in all the circumstances that this failed to provide an outcome to the Applicant’s second complaint – it did not need to mention the allegations of victimisation and tampering in order to be such – as it clearly stated that the IC had considered “\nthe issues that you have raised with us\n” and the information provided.\n\n33.\n\nIn my view this position is reinforced by the IC’s response dated 13 May 2026, when read in conjunction with the Applicant’s letter dated 26 April 2026 which sets out his specific concerns relating to the Second Complaint. The IC acknowledged the Applicant’s email and stated that the IC understood that the Applicant remained concerned about the processing of his personal data and would like the IC to look into it further. This letter continued as follows:\n\n“It may be helpful to explain that under data protection legislation (\nsection 165\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n) our obligation is to investigate a complaint about the handling of your personal data to an appropriate extent, and inform you of the outcome. Part of this process includes considering whether further action is necessary or appropriate, in line with our Regulatory Action Policy. We note your further requests, however in this case we do not consider that it is appropriate or necessary to pursue further action with Carlisle College. We have made our decision in relation to your complaint.”\n\n34.\n\nI am satisfied that, when taken together, the responses dated 21 April 2026 and 13 May 2026 have provided a final outcome to both the Applicant’s complaints, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of\nsection 165(4)\n. The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.\n\n35.\n\nIt appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint.\n\nIn making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.\n\n36.\n\nThe Applicant relies on the case of\nHooper\n, which was a decision of this Tribunal and so is persuasive but not binding on it; I consider that the circumstances of this case are not identical to that in\nHooper\n.\nHooper\nwas a case where there was an unresolved complaint process in that no final outcome had been produced and the Applicant had been invited to return with further information if dissatisfied. Here I consider that a final outcome had been produced and the IC had clearly conveyed that it would take no further action rather than leaving the complaints open-ended.\n\n37.\n\nThe second remedy sought by the Applicant is a retrospective order requiring the IC to account for the steps it took to progress his complaints between\n25 April 2025 and 24 December 2025. It does not appear to me the remedy sought is within\nsection 166(2)\nin that it is neither a direction that the IC take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or inform the complainant of progress or an outcome within a specified period. In light of my finding above that there was an outcome to both the Applicant’s complaints, there is no outstanding complaint in respect of which an order under\nsection 166(2)\ncan properly be made. In any event, challenging the past conduct of its complaint handling would be a matter for judicial review, not a matter for this Tribunal.\n\n38.\n\nSection 166\nis limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision.\n\nIn an application under\nsection 166\n, the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. I also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action; indeed the Applicant has ongoing civil proceedings. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.\n\n39.\n\nBecause I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaints and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaints has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the remedies sought by the Applicant are not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.\n\n40.\n\nThe proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.","changes":[]}