{"check":null,"uid":"b513d6af030f40be","title":"Anzhela Nikolenko v The Information Commissioner","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-07","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу заявительницы на нарушение сроков рассмотрения жалобы органом по защите данных. Заявительница утверждала, что после подачи жалобы прошло более девяти месяцев, но она получила лишь частичную информацию о ходе рассмотрения. Суд установил, что хотя ранее имела место значительная задержка, текущие действия органа по защите данных свидетельствуют о принятии мер и предоставлении информации о ходе рассмотрения жалобы. Суд счёл, что жалоба больше не содержит оснований для продолжения разбирательства в соответствии с разделом 166 Закона о защите данных 2018 года, и прекратил дело.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":15861,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1387","first_seen":"2026-10-08","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:35","relevance":"hit","score":11,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":11,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"GDPR","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"UK GDPR","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":95,"ctx":"duction  1.  on 18 august 2026 the applicant made an application under section 166 of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”). it concerned a complaint made to the information commissioner on 8","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":1939,"ctx":"ata subjects to complain to the commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. under section 166 dpa a data subject can make an application to this tribuna","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":2221,"ctx":"s where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or article 77 of the uk gdpr, the commissioner -  (a)  fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,  (","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":5430,"ctx":"concerning her and her minor grandson, and that ngn had refused a request for erasure of personal data contained in the articles.  11.  the applicant asked the commissioner to assess the lawfu","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":5673,"ctx":"d to consider appropriate remedial action. her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. the applicant was acting in a representative cap","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":5691,"ctx":"opriate remedial action. her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. the applicant was acting in a representative capacity in relation","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":24,"ctx":"Anzhela Nikolenko v The Information Commissioner Introduction  1.  On 18 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under section 166 o","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"GDPR","weak":false,"pos":2270,"ctx":"s where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner -  (a)  fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,  (","zone":"акт","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"UK GDPR","weak":false,"pos":2267,"ctx":"lies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner -  (a)  fails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,  (","zone":"акт","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":144,"ctx":"duction  1.  On 18 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under section 166 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”). It concerned a complaint made to the Information Commissioner on 8 November","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-10-08","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01387 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1387","text":"Introduction\n\n1.\n\nOn 18 August 2026 the Applicant made an application under\nsection 166\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n(“DPA 2018”). It concerned a complaint made to the Information Commissioner on 8 November 2025 about the publication by The Sun of personal information and images relating to a child and family members, and the refusal by News Group Newspapers Ltd (“NGN”) of a request for erasure.\n\n2.\n\nThe Commissioner filed a response to the present application dated 16 September 2026. The Commissioner invited the Applicant to withdraw because an update had been provided and, in the alternative, applied for strike out under rule 8(3)(c).\n\n3.\n\nThe Applicant opposed strike out in a reply dated 25 September 2026. She submitted that the update was not an outcome or adequate progress, that the requested authority had been supplied on 13 September 2026, and that an order remained necessary.\n\n4.\n\nAlso on 25 September 2026 the Commissioner wrote substantively to the Applicant. The Tribunal has considered that later letter with the application, response and reply. The strike out application can fairly be decided without a hearing.\n\nLegal Framework\n\n5.\n\nUnder Rule 8(2)(a) of the\nTribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009,\nthe Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers it does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them; and does not exercise its power under rule 5(3)(k)(i) (transfer to another court or tribunal) in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.\n\n6.\n\nUnder Rule 8(3)(c) of the\nRules,\nthe Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.\n\n7.\n\nSection 165 DPA sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the Commissioner about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under\nsection 166\nDPA a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:\n\n166 Orders to progress complaints\n\n(1)\n\nThis section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section\n165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner -\n\n(a)\n\nfails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,\n\n(b)\n\nfails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the\ncomplaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period\nof 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or\n\n(c)\n\nif the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during\nthat period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a\nsubsequent period of 3 months.\n\n(2)\n\nThe Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring\nthe Commissioner -\n\n(a)\n\nto take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or\n\n(b)\n\nto inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome\nof the complaint, within a period specified in the order.\n\n8.\n\nThe Tribunal can only make an order as prescribed by\nsection 166(2)\n, it does not have the power to make an order beyond the scope of\ns166(2)\n, and even then, only if one of the conditions at\nsection 166(1)\n(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of\nsection 166\n. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint. Some key decisions are:\n\na.\n\nScranage v Information Commissioner\n[2020] UKUT 196 (AAC)\n, paragraph 6\n\n-\n\"In my experience – both in the present appeal and in many other cases – there\nis a widespread misunderstanding about the reach of\nsection 166\n. Contrary to\nmany data subjects’ expectations, it does not provide a right of appeal against\nthe substantive outcome of the Information Commissioner’s investigation on its\nmerits. Thus,\nsection 166(1)\n, which sets out the circumstances in which an\napplication can be made to the Tribunal is procedural rather than substantive in\nits focus.\"\n(emphasis in original).\n\nb.\n\nKillock v Information Commissioner\n\n[2022] 1 WLR 2241\n, Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 - \"…\nIt is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under\nsection 166\n, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the\nmerits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and\nordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory\nNotes to\nthe Act\nwhich regard the\nsection 166\nremedy as reflecting the provisions\nof article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal\nfrom the procedural failings listed in\nsection 166\ntowards a decision on the merits\nof the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals\n.\"\n\n9.\n\nThe Tribunal’s task in this application is to decide whether there remains any procedural failure within\nsection 166\nfor which the Tribunal could grant the statutory remedy.\n\nBackground\n\n10.\n\nOn 8 November 2025, the Applicant complained to the Commissioner about a number of articles published by The Sun. News Group Newspapers Ltd (“NGN”) is the organisation responsible for the publication. The Applicant said that the articles contained identifiable personal information and photographs concerning her and her minor grandson, and that NGN had refused a request for erasure of personal data contained in the articles.\n\n11.\n\nThe Applicant asked the Commissioner to assess the lawfulness, fairness and necessity of the processing and to consider appropriate remedial action. Her complaint therefore concerned both her own personal data and personal data relating to the child. The Applicant was acting in a representative capacity in relation to the child’s data.\n\n12.\n\nThe Commissioner acknowledged receipt on 8 November 2025. The acknowledgement explained that, because of the volume of complaints, it was taking approximately 29 weeks to assign new complaints. It also indicated that a case officer would assess the complaint, request further information if required and provide an outcome.\n\n13.\n\nThe Applicant waited beyond the estimated 29-week period. By the end of May 2026 she had received no complaint reference, confirmation of allocation, request for further information, substantive progress update or outcome. She continued to receive no substantive response during June and July 2026.\n\n14.\n\nOn 18 August 2026, more than nine months after the complaint, the Applicant made the present application. She stated expressly that she was not asking the Tribunal to determine the merits of the complaint, order removal of the articles or award compensation. She sought an order requiring the Commissioner, within 28 days or such other period as the Tribunal directed, to take appropriate steps to respond, provide the complaint reference and confirm assignment, report the progress made and the steps taken, and provide an outcome or a defined timetable.\n\n15.\n\nAfter the application was lodged, the Commissioner wrote to the Applicant on 8 September 2026. The Commissioner supplied case reference IC-445412-J5Q5. The Commissioner asked the Applicant to provide evidence that she was the child’s legal guardian and copies of any further correspondence between her and NGN since the complaint had been submitted.\n\n16.\n\nOn 13 September 2026 the child’s mother emailed the Commissioner from her own email address. She provided a written authority appointing the Applicant to act as her representative for the purposes of case IC-445412-J5Q5. The authority permitted the Applicant to correspond with the Commissioner, submit evidence and representations, receive correspondence, requests and the outcome, provide relevant documents, and communicate with NGN where necessary for the complaint.\n\n17.\n\nThe authority made clear that it was limited to the Commissioner’s complaint process. It did not confer parental responsibility, guardianship or custody. The child’s mother authorised the Commissioner to communicate with the Applicant and to disclose personal data reasonably necessary for the Applicant to act as representative. Supporting identity and court documentation was also provided.\n\n18.\n\nThe Applicant explained that she had not had further direct correspondence with NGN after submitting the complaint. She said that there had been separate correspondence through the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which she could provide if required. She also clarified that she had never claimed to be the child’s legal guardian and that she relied on the mother’s express authority to act.\n\n19.\n\nThe Commissioner’s response to the application was dated 16 September 2026 and served on 18 September 2026. The Commissioner accepted that there had been delay in initially communicating with the Applicant and apologised. The Commissioner relied on the letter of 8 September 2026 as an update on progress and submitted that the application should be withdrawn or struck out.\n\n20.\n\nIn her reply dated 25 September 2026, the Applicant pointed out that the Commissioner’s response did not mention the authority sent on 13 September 2026. She maintained that the 8 September letter was a request for information rather than a substantive account of progress, steps taken, an outcome or a defined timetable. She opposed strike out and asked for confirmation that the authority and her explanation had been considered.\n\n21.\n\nLater on 25 September 2026 the Commissioner wrote substantively to the Applicant. The Commissioner acknowledged receipt of the mother’s authority and accepted that the Applicant could act on the child’s behalf. The Commissioner identified the complaint as concerning information and images of the child and family published by The Sun and NGN’s refusal of the erasure request.\n\n22.\n\nThe Commissioner stated that, on the information provided, NGN did not appear to have appropriately addressed the erasure request. The Commissioner had written to NGN, provided guidance and advised NGN to review its handling and respond to the Applicant in detail within 14 days. The Commissioner also explained that data protection law contains a broad, though not absolute, journalism exemption, and that the right to erasure is likely to apply only in exceptional circumstances.\n\n23.\n\nThe Commissioner told the Applicant that, once she had received NGN’s response, she could provide a copy to the Commissioner for further consideration if she remained dissatisfied.\n\nParties’ submissions\n\n24.\n\nThe Commissioner submits that the statutory purpose of\nsection 166\nis to remedy a failure to take appropriate steps or provide information about progress or outcome. It is not a mechanism for supervising every stage of an investigation or directing the substantive result.\n\n25.\n\nThe Commissioner accepts the initial delay and apologises for it. The Commissioner nevertheless submits that the letter of 8 September 2026 provided an update by opening active correspondence, supplying the complaint reference and requesting information necessary to establish the Applicant’s authority and to understand any developments between the Applicant and NGN.\n\n26.\n\nThe Commissioner relies additionally on the letter of 25 September 2026. By then the representative authority had been accepted, the complaint had been identified, NGN had been contacted, guidance had been supplied and NGN had been given 14 days to provide a detailed response. The Commissioner submits that those steps and the information given to the Applicant remove any basis for an order under\nsection 166\n.\n\n27.\n\nThe Applicant submits that the application was properly made after the Commissioner failed for more than nine months to provide the updates required by\nsection 166\n. She says that the fact that the Commissioner acted only after proceedings were commenced does not show that the original application lacked merit.\n\n28.\n\nThe Applicant distinguishes a complaint reference and a request for documents from meaningful progress. She submits that the letter of 8 September 2026 did not say that the complaint had been assigned, identify any substantive step already taken, give an outcome or provide a timetable for determination. She also relies on the omission from the Commissioner’s response of any reference to the authority supplied on 13 September 2026.\n\n29.\n\nThe Applicant says that she has now provided all the information requested. She relies on the mother’s written authority and her clarification that there had been no further direct correspondence with NGN. She maintains that an order remained necessary to ensure that the Commissioner considered that material and progressed the complaint to an outcome within a defined period.\n\n30.\n\nIn light of the later letter of 25 September 2026, the Applicant has received confirmation that the authority was accepted and that substantive action was taken. The remaining issue is therefore whether\nsection 166\npermits or requires the Tribunal to make an order while the Commissioner awaits NGN’s response and has indicated a route to further consideration.\n\nConclusions\n\n31.\n\nThe Tribunal accepts that the application was properly and reasonably made. When lodged, there had been no meaningful progress information or outcome for more than nine months. The Commissioner accepts delay. This application was not an attempt to challenge the merits of a completed decision.\n\n32.\n\nThe issue is whether there is now a continuing failure for which an effective order can be made.\nSection 166\nis not punitive and does not provide a declaration or sanction for past delay which has since been remedied.\n\n33.\n\nThe communication of 8 September 2026 supplied the reference and sought information necessary to progress the complaint. Standing alone, it may not have resolved every aspect, particularly because the requested authority had been supplied but not acknowledged in the response.\n\n34.\n\nThe position materially changed on 25 September 2026. The Commissioner accepted the authority, identified the complaint, formed a provisional view about NGN’s handling, contacted NGN with guidance, required a detailed response within 14 days and explained the route to further consideration.\n\n35.\n\nThat letter may not be a final outcome closing the complaint.\nSection 166\ndoes not require a concluded outcome in every case. It expressly permits compliance by taking appropriate steps and providing information about progress. The letter gives substantive information about the assessment, action and next steps, and supplies a defined timetable.\n\n36.\n\nThe principal relief sought has therefore been provided. The complaint has a reference, authority has been accepted, the complaint is being substantively handled, NGN has been contacted, a 14-day period has been specified and the route to further consideration identified.\n\n37.\n\nThere is no basis for ordering an immediate final outcome while that process is current. Such an order would intrude upon the Commissioner’s conduct of an active complaint.\nSection 166\nalso creates no right to a named case officer or a particular internal allocation arrangement.\n\n38.\n\nThe concern about earlier delay is legitimate, but historic delay cannot sustain proceedings once appropriate steps and meaningful progress information have been provided. Any future failure would fall to be considered on the facts then prevailing.\n\n39.\n\nThe Tribunal does not determine the merits of the erasure request, the journalism exemption, the lawfulness of publication or the adequacy of a future response from NGN.\n\n40.\n\nThere is no present procedural failure for which an effective\nsection 166\norder can be made. Accordingly, the application has no reasonable prospect of succeeding and is struck out under rule 8(3)(c).\n\nSigned: Judge Peri Mornington\nDate:\n6 October 2026","changes":[]}