{"check":null,"uid":"b07e7c4bbe60dc15","title":"Insider Threat Reporting and Security Guidance Act of 2026","title_generated":false,"country":"США","organ":"Конгресс США","kind":"law","kind_name":"Законодательство","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-29","summary":"Закон требует от секретаря обороны установить требования к отчётности и добровольные рекомендации для компаний-подрядчиков, работающих с крупными системами искусственного интеллекта. Полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","snippet":"","topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":17100,"versions":2,"url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5601","first_seen":"2026-10-07","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:19","relevance":"hit","score":41,"query":"","source_key":"congress_us","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":41,"topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"искусственн интеллект","weak":false,"pos":215,"ctx":"сти и добровольные рекомендации для компаний-подрядчиков, работающих с крупными системами искусственного интеллекта. полный текст документа в базе пока отсутствует.","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":276,"ctx":"secretary of defense to establish reporting requirements and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.  _______________________________________________________________________  in","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":774,"ctx":"secretary of defense to establish reporting requirements and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.  be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the united stat","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1110,"ctx":"uidance act of 2026''.  sec. 2. insider threat reporting and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.  (a) covered artificial intelligence contractor defined.--in this section, t","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1160,"ctx":"orting and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.  (a) covered artificial intelligence contractor defined.--in this section, the term ``covered artificial intelligence contract","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1241,"ctx":"covered artificial intelligence contractor defined.--in this section, the term ``covered artificial intelligence contractor'' means a contractor that-- (1) has entered, or seeks to enter into, one or mo","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":1456,"ctx":", with a total value of not less than $100,000,000, with the department of defense for an artificial intelligence system or services that use an artificial intelligence system; and (2)(a) has incurred, d","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Интеллектуальная собственность в цифровой среде","term":"intellectual property","weak":true,"pos":5484,"ctx":"uthorized access to, acquire, influence, or exfiltrate sensitive information, systems, or intellectual property relating to any artificial intelligence model developed, controlled, or used by the contr","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-08","meta":{"congress":"119","billType":"S","number":"5601","policyArea":"","subjects":[],"latestAction":"2026-09-29 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.","textVersion":"is"},"source_url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5601","text":"FULL TEXT\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n[S. 5601 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n\n<DOC>\n\n119th CONGRESS\n2d Session\nS. 5601\n\nTo require the Secretary of Defense to establish reporting requirements\nand voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n\nSeptember 29, 2026\n\nMr. Banks (for himself and Mrs. Gillibrand) introduced the following\nbill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed\nServices\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nA BILL\n\nTo require the Secretary of Defense to establish reporting requirements\nand voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.\n\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\nUnited States of America in Congress assembled,\n\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n\nThis Act may be cited as the ``Insider Threat Reporting and\nSecurity Guidance Act of 2026''.\n\nSEC. 2. INSIDER THREAT REPORTING AND VOLUNTARY GUIDANCE FOR LARGE\nARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTORS.\n\n(a) Covered Artificial Intelligence Contractor Defined.--In this\nsection, the term ``covered artificial intelligence contractor'' means\na contractor that--\n(1) has entered, or seeks to enter into, one or more\ncontracts, with a total value of not less than $100,000,000,\nwith the Department of Defense for an artificial intelligence\nsystem or services that use an artificial intelligence system;\nand\n(2)(A) has incurred, during the 3-year period preceding the\ndate on which any such contract was entered into, not less than\n$1,000,000,000 in artificial intelligence-related research and\ndevelopment expenditures, measured on a rolling basis and\naggregated with any other person that controls, is controlled\nby, or is under common control with such contractor; or\n(B) uses or proposes to use, in the performance of such\ncontract or contracts, an artificial intelligence model\ndeveloped or controlled by a person that meets the expenditure\ncriteria described in subparagraph (A).\n(b) Reporting Requirements.--\n(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of\nthe enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue\nregulations establishing reporting requirements for covered\nartificial intelligence contractors to support the protection\nof Department of Defense systems, missions, personnel,\noperations, and supply chains from counterintelligence,\nsecurity, and other national security risks arising from the\nsecurity practices of such contractors.\n(2) Required matters.--\n(A) In general.--The regulations issued pursuant to\nparagraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that a\ncovered artificial intelligence contractor reports to\nthe Secretary--\n(i) all policies, practices, and security\nmeasures relating to--\n(I) personnel vetting;\n(II) insider threat mitigation;\n(III) access controls, including\nthe circumstances under which\ncontractors, subcontractors, cloud\nproviders, and other third parties are\ngranted access to any artificial\nintelligence model, model weights,\ntraining infrastructure, or other\nsensitive assets, and the material\nsecurity controls governing such\naccess;\n(IV) supply chain security; and\n(V) the prevention of theft,\ntampering, sabotage, or any other\nunauthorized transfer or modification\nof any artificial intelligence model or\nmodel weights;\n(ii) any known or suspected material\nincident affecting the security, integrity, or\navailability of any artificial intelligence\nmodel or model weights developed or used,\nincluding any incident in which a person\ncompromises or exploits any artificial\nintelligence model or model weights in a manner\nthat could materially affect the performance of\na Department contract, national security, or\nthe operations, security, or mission\neffectiveness of the Department, including\nthrough--\n(I) espionage;\n(II) unauthorized access;\n(III) theft;\n(IV) exfiltration;\n(V) sabotage;\n(VI) manipulation;\n(VII) a compromise of the software,\nhardware, cloud, data, or other supply\nchain component used to develop, train,\nfine-tune, evaluate, secure, or deploy\nany such model or model weights;\n(VIII) the poisoning, corruption,\nmanipulation, or unauthorized\nalteration of training data, fine-\ntuning data, retrieval corpora, model\ncheckpoints, system prompts, safety\nfilters, monitoring systems, evaluation\npipelines, or model-update mechanisms;\n(IX) the discovery of a material\nvulnerability, exploit, backdoor, or\nfailure of access controls that could\npermit unauthorized modification,\nextraction, degradation, or misuse of\nany such model or model weights; or\n(X) any other effort;\n(iii) the defense-relevant and national\nsecurity-relevant capabilities, access\npathways, and material misuse risks, as\ndetermined by the Secretary, of the most\npowerful artificial intelligence models\ndeveloped, controlled, or used by such\ncontractor in the performance of a contract\nwith the Department;\n(iv) any materially concerning model\nbehavior, including materially increased\ncapability for a cyber offense, evasion of\nsafeguards, deceptive behavior, unauthorized\nautonomous action, or other behavior that could\nmaterially affect national security, the\nperformance of a Department contract, or the\noperations, security, or mission effectiveness\nof the Department;\n(v) any attempt to obtain unauthorized\naccess to, acquire, influence, or exfiltrate\nsensitive information, systems, or intellectual\nproperty relating to any artificial\nintelligence model developed, controlled, or\nused by the contractor; and\n(vi) any other known or suspected acute\nnational security risk relating to the\ncompromise, misuse, loss, exfiltration,\nmisalignment, or exploitation of artificial\nintelligence models developed, controlled, or\nused by the contractor that could materially\naffect national security, the performance of a\nDepartment contract, or the operations,\nsecurity, or mission effectiveness of the\nDepartment.\n(B) Scope.--The required matters described in\nsubparagraph (A) apply to a covered artificial\nintelligence contractor, including with respect to any\nartificial intelligence model developed or controlled\nby another person and used, or proposed for use, by the\ncovered artificial intelligence contractor in the\nperformance of a contract with the Department. The\nSecretary may require the covered artificial\nintelligence contractor to obtain from the person who\ndeveloped or controls such model any information the\nSecretary determines necessary to carry out this\nsection.\n(C) Timing of reporting requirements.--\n(i) Initial submission.--A covered\nartificial intelligence contractor shall submit\nto the Secretary of Defense the required\nmatters described in subparagraph (A) as part\nof any offer, proposal, bid, or other response\nto a solicitation for a contract.\n(ii) Continuing duty to certify.--Not less\nfrequently than once every 90 days, the covered\nartificial intelligence contractor shall\ncertify to the Secretary of Defense that the\ninformation submitted under clause (i) remains\naccurate and complete in all material respects.\n(3) Notification of acute national security incidents.--\n(A) In general.--The regulations issued pursuant to\nparagraph (1) shall require that not later than 72\nhours after becoming aware of any information,\nincident, or development that presents an acute\nnational security risk to the United States, the\ncovered artificial intelligence contractor shall--\n(i) notify the Secretary of Defense of the\nnature of national security risk, including any\nrisk relating to model weight security as\ndescribed in subparagraph (A)(ii), any risk\ndescribed in clauses (iv), (v), and (vi) or\nsubparagraph (A), and any other category of\nrisk the Secretary may specify; and\n(ii) include in such notification, to the\nextent known at the time of the notification--\n(I) a description of the\ninformation, incident, or development;\n(II) the date or approximate period\nof occurrence and discovery;\n(III) the affected model or\ndeployment environment;\n(IV) the actual or suspected means\nof compromise;\n(V) whether any model weights,\ntraining data, system prompts, source\ncode, evaluation data, safety systems,\nor software dependencies were accessed,\naltered, degraded, poisoned,\nexfiltrated, or otherwise compromised;\n(VI) an assessment of the actual or\npotential impact on Department of\nDefense missions, users, systems,\noperations, or decision making;\n(VII) any actions taken to contain,\nmitigate, remediate, or investigate the\ninformation, incident, or development;\n(VIII) whether the information,\nincident, or development has been\nreported to any other Federal\ndepartment or agency; and\n(IX) such other information as the\nSecretary determines appropriate.\n(B) Notification by the secretary.--If the\nSecretary of Defense receives a notification under\nsubparagraph (A), the Secretary shall promptly transmit\nsuch notification to the contracting officer for the\nrelevant contract, the Chief Digital and Artificial\nIntelligence Office, the Chief Information Officer of\nthe Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of\nDefense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Artificial\nIntelligence Security Center of the National Security\nAgency, the Commander of the United States Cyber\nCommand, and the head of any other component of the\nDepartment or Federal department or agency the\nSecretary determines appropriate.\n(C) Congressional notification.--If the Secretary\nof Defense receives a notification under subparagraph\n(A) or discovery an incident that would be reportable\nunder such clause, the Secretary shall--\n(i) not later than 7 days after the date on\nwhich the notification was received, submit to\nthe Committee on Armed Services of the Senate\nand the Committee on Armed Services of the\nHouse of Representatives notice of the\ninformation, incident, or development that\nincludes--\n(I) a summary description;\n(II) the date or approximate period\nof occurrence and discovery;\n(III) the affected model or\ndeployment environment;\n(IV) the actual or suspected means\nof compromise, exfiltration,\nmanipulation, degradation, or misuse;\n(V) an initial assessment of actual\nor potential impact on Department\nmissions, users, systems, or\noperations; and\n(VI) any action taken or planned to\ncontain, mitigate, remediate, or\ninvestigate the matter; and\n(ii) provide the committees with additional\nbriefings or updates on the information,\nincident, or development as material\ninformation becomes available.\n(D) Protection of information.--In the regulations\nissued under paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense\nshall include procedures for the submission of\nnotifications under this paragraph, including\nprocedures to protect--\n(i) classified information;\n(ii) proprietary information;\n(iii) trade secrets;\n(iv) security-sensitive information; and\n(v) information regarding vulnerabilities\nthat, if disclosed publicly, could reasonably\nbe expected to harm national security.\n(E) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this\nparagraph may be construed--\n(i) to require public disclosure of\ninformation in a manner inconsistent with\napplicable protections for classified or\notherwise protected information; or\n(ii) to limit any other reporting\nobligation imposed by statute, regulation, or\ncontract.\n(4) Clarity of requirements.--In the regulations issued\npursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary shall provide clear\nrequirements with respect to the scope, timing, form, and\nmanner of the reporting, including--\n(A) the appropriate protections the Department will\ntake to prevent unauthorized disclosure of classified\ninformation, proprietary information, and controlled\nunclassified information;\n(B) any differentiated reporting requirements based\non--\n(i) the sensitivity of the contract;\n(ii) the capabilities of the relevant\nmodels;\n(iii) the degree of access of the\ncontractor or third parties to artificial\nintelligence models or model weights; and\n(iv) the significance of the risk to\nDepartment missions or national security; and\n(C) procedures to ensure that, if a covered\nartificial intelligence contractor uses, or proposes to\nuse, in the performance of a contract with the\nDepartment an artificial intelligence model developed\nor controlled by another person, any information\nrequired under this section is obtained from that\nperson.\n(5) Consultation.--In developing the regulations under\nparagraph (1), the Secretary may consult with--\n(A) covered artificial intelligence contractors;\n(B) the head of any Federal agency;\n(C) industry participants; and\n(D) any official of the Department that the\nSecretary considers relevant, including acquisition,\ncounterintelligence, digital modernization, and\noperational officials of the Department.\n(c) Study and Voluntary Guidance on Insider Threat Risk Reduction\nfor Covered Artificial Intelligence Contractors.--\n(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of\nthe enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall issue\nvoluntary guidance for covered artificial intelligence\ncontractors to reduce insider threat, espionage, and other\npersonnel-related security risks to sensitive artificial\nintelligence assets of such contractors, with a focus on\nthreats from highly capable nation-state adversaries that\npossess significant resources and the capability to conduct\nsophisticated espionage or related operations.\n(2) Assessment and updated guidance.--Not later than 1 year\nafter the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary\nshall--\n(A) complete an assessment of the risks described\nin paragraph (1); and\n(B) updated the guidance issued under such\nparagraph based on the findings of that assessment.\n(3) Contents.--The guidance required under paragraph (1),\nincluding any updated guidance issued under paragraph (2)(B),\nshall, at a minimum--\n(A) identify categories of roles, responsibilities,\nfunctions, systems, and access that may provide\nmaterial access to model weights, model internals,\ntraining infrastructure, sensitive research\ninformation, or other sensitive assets of the covered\nartificial intelligence contractor, the compromise of\nwhich could present a significant risk to Department\nmissions or national security;\n(B) establish a tiered framework based on the\ndegree of access, sensitivity, and national security\nrisk involved, under which the most sensitive roles,\nsystems, and categories of access are associated with\nthe most stringent suggested security measures;\n(C) assess the practices, and if appropriate\nsuggest preferred practices, relating to personnel\nvetting, role-based access controls, compartmentation,\naudit logging, anomaly detection, continuous\nmonitoring, incident escalation, and protection against\nespionage, theft, sabotage, or unauthorized transfer,\nincluding practices designed to address threats from\nnation-state adversaries;\n(D) address, for especially sensitive roles or\naccess, what personnel security measures, access\nrestrictions, or other safeguards are appropriate to\nreduce heightened risks from nation-state adversaries;\nand\n(E) address such other measures as the Secretary\ndetermines appropriate to protect Department missions\nand national security from insider threat and espionage\nrisks arising from the security practices of covered\nartificial intelligence contractors.\n(4) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall\nbe construed to require a covered artificial intelligence\ncontractor to adopt any measure, practice, personnel policy,\naccess restriction, or other safeguard described in the\nguidance issued under paragraph (1).\n(5) Consultation.--In carrying out this subsection, the\nSecretary may consult with covered artificial intelligence\ncontractors, the intelligence community, counterintelligence\nofficials, appropriate elements of the Department of Defense,\nthe heads of other Federal agencies, federally funded research\nand development centers, and other relevant experts, as\ndetermined appropriate by the Secretary.\n(d) Report to Congress.--\n(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of\nthe enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall\nsubmit to the congressional defense committees an unclassified\nreport, which may include a classified annex, on the\nimplementation of this section.\n(2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall\ninclude--\n(A) a summary of the progress made in developing\nand implementing the reporting requirements under\nsubsection (b)(1);\n(B) a summary of the progress made in issuing the\nvoluntary guidance under paragraph (1) of subsection\n(c), including the initial guidance and any updated\nguidance issued under paragraph (2) of such subsection;\n(C) an assessment of any challenges, gaps, or\nlimitations identified by the Secretary in carrying out\nthis section; and\n(D) any additional steps, authorities, resources,\nor policy recommendations the Secretary determines\nwould be useful to advance the purposes of this\nsection.\n(3) Congressional defense committees defined.--The term\n``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given the\nterm in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.\n<all>","changes":[{"id":1146,"doc_id":15478,"v_from":16644,"v_to":16710,"detected_at":"2026-10-08 03:52:43","added":419,"removed":1,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-The text of this bill is not yet available. Please check back soon.\n+[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n+[S. 5601 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n+\n+<DOC>\n+\n+119th CONGRESS\n+2d Session\n+S. 5601\n+\n+To require the Secretary of Defense to establish reporting requirements\n+and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n+\n+September 29, 2026\n+\n+Mr. Banks (for himself and Mrs. Gillibrand) introduced the following\n+bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed\n+Services\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+A BILL\n+\n+To require the Secretary of Defense to establish reporting requirements\n+and voluntary guidance for large artificial intelligence contractors.\n+\n+Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\n+United States of America in Congress assembled,\n+\n+SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n+\n+This Act may be cited as the ``Insider Threat Reporting and\n+Security Guidance Act of 2026''.\n+\n+SEC. 2. INSIDER THREAT REPORTING AND VOLUNTARY GUIDANCE FOR LARGE\n+ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTORS.\n+\n+(a) Covered Artificial Intelligence Contractor Defined.--In this\n+section, the term ``covered artificial intelligence contractor'' means\n+a contractor that--\n+(1) has entered, or seeks to enter into, one or more\n+contracts, with a total value of not less than $100,000,000,\n+with the Department of Defense for an artificial intelligence\n+system or services that use an artificial intelligence system;\n+and\n+(2)(A) has incurred, during the 3-year period preceding the\n+date on which any such contract was entered into, not less than\n+$1,000,000,000 in artificial intelligence-related research and\n+development expenditures, measured on a rolling basis and\n+aggregated with any other person that controls, is controlled\n+by, or is under common control with such contractor; or\n+(B) uses or proposes to use, in the performance of such"}],"passport":{"data":{"act":{"jurisdiction":"США","title_official":"Insider Threat Reporting and Security Guidance Act of 2026","title_short":"","level":"законопроект","date_adopted":"2026-09-29 (внесение)","date_in_force":"","date_version":"","phased":"","status":"законопроект: на рассмотрении","sunset":"","regulator":"секретарь обороны","related":""},"goal":{"problem":"обеспечение безопасности систем искусственного интеллекта, используемых подрядчиками Министерства обороны США, путём установления требований к отчетности и рекомендаций по снижению рисков внутренних угроз и шпионажа.","goal":"защита оборонных систем, миссий, персонала, операций и цепочек поставок от угроз национальной безопасности, возникающих вследствие практики подрядчиков.","targets":"отсутствуют","scope":"крупные подрядчики Министерства обороны США, использующие или планирующие использовать искусственный интеллект в своих контрактах.","exclusions":"отсутствуют"},"subjects_note":{"protected":"сотрудники подрядчиков, имеющие доступ к чувствительным данным и моделям ИИ"},"subjects":[{"role":"покрытый подрядчик искусственного интеллекта","who":"подрядчик, заключивший контракт стоимостью свыше 100 млн долларов США с Министерством обороны США на использование искусственного интеллекта или связанных услуг; подрядчик, осуществляющий исследования и разработки в области искусственного интеллекта на сумму более миллиарда долларов за последние три года; подрядчик, использующий или планирующий использовать модель искусственного интеллекта, контролируемую другим лицом.","criteria":"стоимость контракта, расходы на исследования и разработки, использование моделей искусственного интеллекта","count":""}],"norms":[{"address":"секция 2(д)","addressee":"покрытый подрядчик искусственного интеллекта","essence":"обязанность разрабатывать и внедрять меры по снижению внутренних угроз и шпионажа, связанные с использованием искусственного интеллекта.","type":"обязанность","mechanism":"операционные издержки","cost_channel":"административный","cost_kind":"регулярный","trigger":"заключение контракта","sanction":"отсутствует","refs":"","form":"цифровая","in_force":"не позднее 180 дней после принятия закона","ru_analog":"требует проверки"}]},"made_by":"GigaChat-2","made_at":"2026-10-08 09:42:38","edited_at":null,"edited_by":null}}