{"check":null,"uid":"aee97748f11506f2","title":"COLIN BIDEWELL v THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-28","summary":"Суд рассмотрел заявление гражданина Колина Байдвелла о признании нарушения порядка судопроизводства со стороны различных государственных органов и организаций, включая Информационный комиссар и Кабинет министров. Заявитель утверждал, что органы сфальсифицировали данные и ввели трибунал в заблуждение относительно соблюдения ими требований законодательства. Суд пришёл к выводу, что заявление заявителя недостаточно обосновано и не имеет разумных перспектив успеха, поэтому оно было отклонено.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":12946,"versions":2,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1480","first_seen":"2026-10-29","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:32","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"data breach","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"орган","name":"ICO","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":21,"ctx":"COLIN BIDEWELL v THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER Суд рассмотрел заявление гражданина Колина Байдвелла о признании нарушения порядка судопр","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"ICO","weak":false,"pos":1251,"ctx":"t was alleged to have committed a contempt. The application form named: “ Cabinet Office, ICO, Government Legal Department (Department of Transport, CIPS, Charity Commission, PHSO, MC","zone":"орган","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-11-12","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01480 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1480","text":"Introduction\n\n1.\n\nBy form GRC4 dated 5 September 2026, the Applicant applied for certification of a contempt to the Upper Tribunal. The proceedings giving rise to the application are identified in the application form as case no FT/EA/2024/0400 in which the Applicant brought an appeal against the Information Commissioner under the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\n. The Cabinet Office was Second Respondent. An annotated version of the Tribunal’s Decision in that appeal given on 3 October 2025 under [2025] UKFTT 1164 (GRC) accompanied the application.\n\n2.\n\nIt was unclear from the application which potential Respondent was alleged to have committed a contempt. The application form named: “\nCabinet Office, ICO, Government Legal Department (Department of Transport, CIPS, Charity Commission, PHSO, MCGA)\n”.\nThe basis of the application was also unclear. That being so, Judge Harris proposed to strike out the application in Case Management Directions dated 16 September 2026 under Rule 8(3)(c) and/or Rule 8(2)(a). In accordance with Rule 8(4) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the 2009 Rules”) the Applicant was given opportunity to make representations in response to the proposed striking out of his application.\n\n3.\n\nIn response, the Tribunal first received, on 21 September 2026, an emailed response from the Applicant sent on 19 September 2026. Further representations and attachments followed up to and including 9 October 2026.\n\n4.\n\nI have set aside my previous decision given on 28 October 2026, which omitted to refer to responses prior to 9 October 2026. In re-making my decision I have considered the application afresh. In doing so, I have also taken into account the further representations received from the Applicant up to the time of writing. The attachments had included an internal review outcome letter from the Cabinet Office dated 23 September 2026 upholding its response of 17 August 2026, which had referred to the outcome in case no FT/EA/2024/0400.\n\nConsideration\n\n5.\n\nUnder Rule 7A of the 2009 Rules an application may be made to the Tribunal to certify an offence to the Upper Tribunal. Under Rule 8(2)(a) the Tribunal must strike out the whole or part of proceedings if it has no jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings. Under Rule 8(3)(c), the Tribunal may strike out the whole or part of the proceedings if there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.\n\n6.\n\nThe application is said to be made under\nsection 61\nof the\nFreedom of Information Act 2000\nand “perversion of the course of natural justice, misconduct”.\nSection 61(3)\nof\nthe 2000 Act\nprovides that the First-tier Tribunal may certify an offence to the Upper Tribunal in the circumstances set out in subsection (3), being where:\n\n(a)\n\na person does something, or fails to do something, in relation to proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal on any appeal under those provisions, and\n\n(b)\n\nif those proceedings were proceedings before a court having power to commit for contempt, the act or omission would constitute contempt of court.\n\n7.\n\nThe date on which the act or omission giving rise to a contempt is said to have occurred is 14 August 2026. Section 4 of the application form asked for details of the act or omission relied upon to make the application and why the act or omission, if the proceedings in which it occurred were in court, constitute contempt. The Applicant stated:\n\n“\nClause 4 of FTT's first iteration of proceedings defined the standard required for accessibility of hotel real estate in the public sector supply chain ie to include the dimension of time with the agile on-demand digital environment overcoming and neutralising barriers and inequalities of the physical environment, together with UV warning: risk proximity for skin cancer prevention at point of risk\n\nThe Respondents to this claim withheld key data from Tribunal, that being the true state of existing Clause 4 compliance during proceedings across multiple public sector framework agreements including and beyond that of the Respondent themselves, causing a material misdirection in Tribunal's decision aka perverting the course of natural justice, impacting our entire UN community\n\nSubsequent \"vexatious\" FOI disclosures from parties including devolved governments relying on the legality and propriety of the Respondent's agreements revealed widespread non-compliance with Clause 4 of the FTT decision. The Respondent made no effort to inform Tribunal of such non-compliance - there is no evidence that the Respondent discharged their statutory Duties of Enquiry under DWP v Bracking when attempting to repel the FOI request currently in appeal (which deals with CIPS x GCF correspondence, not legality of public sector contracts in itself)\n\nThe Respondent owes a heightened Duty of Candour to Tribunal in the pursuit of natural justice. It kept silent, betraying that duty\n\nIt is the objective of this application that the Respondent, together with parties aiding and abetting, caused beyond all reasonable doubt a material misdirection of the Tribunal's proceedings in full knowledge and intent of such misdirection aka a contempt of court\n\nThe impact of this misdirection is a continued non-disclosure of key correspondence between CIPS and GCF on suspicion of conspiracy to defraud the public and/or CIPS members, sponsors and other counterparties including other governments of our UN community. It is a *significant* breach of statutory duties\n.”\n\n8.\n\nFollowing Judge Harris’ proposed striking out of the certification application, the Applicant replied as follows:\n\n“\nFurther evidence in the contempt and remittal applications from Scottish government – they don’t appear to accept that RM6217 on which they relied on to be compliant with Clause 4 Bidewell v ICO and Cabinet Office first decision of October actually HAS a problem – despite no evidence of itself being compliant with Clause 4 Bidewell v ICO and Cabinet Office, so defaulting to a suspected fraud offense by false representation.\n\nTribunal is reminded of EWHC1841 in terms of illegality until and unless legality is confirmed – the Scottish government would appear therefore to be accessory to a suspected fraud offense (that’s not been knowingly resolved in the positive sense, therefore defaults to the negative as a result)\n\nI look forward to the outcome of the applications:\n\n1.\n\nunder contempt of court in the Respondent misleading the court given case evidence submitted to this tribunal, causing its unanimous misdirection\n\n2.\n\nto escalate the case to the Upper Tribunal given FTT’s apparent refusal to remit the case given the new case evidence provided for by Kent County Council, Scottish government and other framework owners on the true state of Clause 4 compliance in public sector contracts (and by extension ATOL licenses issued by the CAA)”\n\n9.\n\nThe Applicant attached a letter (and Excel document with data) sent to him by the Scottish Government dated 14 August 2026 in reply to his request of 5 July 2026 made under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002. As this letter is dated the same date as the alleged contempt, it would appear to be the content of this letter alleged giving rise to the application. The Applicant also produced a second letter from the Scottish Government of 5 October 2026 stating: “\nThe Scottish Government has considered the issues raised in your correspondence. We have not identified evidence requiring urgent corrective action in relation to our travel and accommodation arrangements.”\n\n10.\n\nIn addition, the Applicant provided his email reply to the Scottish Government on 5 October 2026, as below:\n\n“\nThank you Scottish Government team,\n\nFor additional clarity in case it helps:\n\n1.\n\nClause 4 Bidewell v ICO and Cabinet Office at FTT GRC confirmed for all that accessibility under\nEquality Act 2010\nhas a dimension of time. The decision (that being from a competent court of a UN Member State is here [link inserted to Bidewell v Information Commissioner and Cabinet Office [2025] UKFTT 1164 (GRC)].\n\n2.\n\nThe dataset previously provided by the Scottish Government identified loungers in RM6217 supply chain issued by proceedings’s Respondent in Cabinet Office – RM6217 being the framework agreement declared as being central to the Scottish Government’s travel and accommodation arrangements, as previously confirmed\n\n3.\n\nCabinet Office has been unable to prove how these loungers comply with Clause 4 of the FTT decision\n\n4.\n\nIn the absence of such confirmation, the supply chain cannot be deemed legal\n\n5.\n\nIn the absence of such legality, the supply chain must be deemed not legal ie illegal (EWHC1841)\n\nI hope this clarifies the claim and why investigation is required – please note that the case has been remitted back to Tribunal for due treatment in addition to a contempt of court certification application in the Respondent unanimously misleading a court of law (in presenting its supply chains as compliant with Clause 4 Bidewell v ICO and Cabinet Office, when there’s no such evidence; and evidence to the opposite effect), given the previous response by the Scottish Government\n\nUnfortunately, this renders the Scottish Government accessory to a suspected fraud offense – which FTT failed to resolve (ie failed to confirm existing supply chain legality, therefore illegality prevails – EWHC1841)\n\nWe await an update from FTT GRC in respect of the remittal application under Takhar v Gracefield Developments Limited and others\n[2019] UKSC 13\n, plus the contempt of court application, given the new evidence provided by the Scottish Government subsequent to initial proceedings - thank you for your co-operation in building supply chains demonstrably identically accessible to all under Clause 4 Bidewell v ICO and Cabinet Office at FTT GRC\n\ncc: Scottish police”\n\n11.\n\nThe Applicant subsequently flagged the importance of the duty of candour with reference to the Second Respondent and that inferences should be drawn on its continued silence. I also note matters raised concerning the French and Scottish Governments, and “\nthe precedent concerning Kent County Council’s dissolution of its framework\n”.\n\n12.\n\nHaving considered the voluminous submissions, the basis of the application remains wholly unclear. Despite the Applicant’s provision of additional information, as supplemented, I cannot glean who in this application is alleged to have acted in contempt. The supplemental information suggests the application is directed at the Cabinet Office, but it remains unclear. The letters from the Scottish Government cannot be reconciled with the application form for certification which names various other bodies. Moreover, I cannot identify from what has been said (or from the attachments) any legal basis upon which the application could possibly succeed.\n\n13.\n\nIf the application is directed at the Cabinet Office with reference to the Tribunal’s Decision in FT/EA/2024/0400, that Decision of 3 October 2025 had found that the Information Commissioner was correct to find the Applicant’s request for information from The Cabinet Office was vexatious. The appeal was dismissed.\n\n14.\n\nAs identified by Judge Harris, the Applicant in referring to “clause 4” appears to rely upon paragraph 4 of the Tribunal’s Decision of 3 October 2025. That is reinforced by the Applicant having highlighted this paragraph in the decision within the link in his 5 October 2026 email set out above. That paragraph reads:\n\n“\nWe understand that the Appellant is the inventor of, or may have a commercial interest in the invention of, a device called the “Lounger Logger”. The device indicates whether a sun lounger is occupied or available for use. The Appellant explains that the device would enable disabled persons to access sun loungers on a footing equal to that of those without disabilities, and that it could also reduce the risk of exposure to ultraviolet radiation\n.”\n\n15.\n\nThis paragraph appears in the “Background” section of the Decision. It was not making a decision, direction or order of any kind that was capable of being breached. It merely set out the Tribunal’s understanding of the background to the appeal. It was not a “\nbinding benchmark\n” as the Applicant puts it.\n\n16.\n\nHaving considered all the information provided, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has identified who and what has been done in relation to proceedings before this Tribunal that is, or could be, capable of amounting to an act or omission that might constitute a contempt to engage\nsection 61(3)\nof\nthe 2000 Act\nor any other provision.\n\n17.\n\nI consider that the Applicant’s application for certification of a contempt has no reasonable prospect of success.\n\nConclusion\n\n18.\n\nThe appeal shall be struck out under Rule 8(3)(c) of the 2009 Rules as having no reasonable prospects of success.\n\nSigned:\nJudge Saward\n\nDate:\n11 November 2026","changes":[{"id":1343,"doc_id":16760,"v_from":18395,"v_to":21965,"detected_at":"2026-11-12 02:43:21","added":38,"removed":22,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-(4)\n+1.\n-By form GRC4 dated 5 September 2026, the Applicant applied for certification of a contempt to the Upper Tribunal. The proceedings giving rise to the application are identified in the application form as case no FT.EA.2024.0400 in which the Applicant brought an appeal against the Information Commissioner under the\n+By form GRC4 dated 5 September 2026, the Applicant applied for certification of a contempt to the Upper Tribunal. The proceedings giving rise to the application are identified in the application form as case no FT/EA/2024/0400 in which the Applicant brought an appeal against the Information Commissioner under the\n-(5)\n+2.\n-The basis of the application was also unclear. That being so, Judge Harris proposed to strike out the application in Case Management Directions dated 16 September 2026 under Rule 8(3)(c) and/or Rule 8(2)(a). In accordance with Rule 8(4) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the 2009 Rules”) the Applicant was first given opportunity to make representations in response to the proposed striking out of his application by 1 October 2026.\n+The basis of the application was also unclear. That being so, Judge Harris proposed to strike out the application in Case Management Directions dated 16 September 2026 under Rule 8(3)(c) and/or Rule 8(2)(a). In accordance with Rule 8(4) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the 2009 Rules”) the Applicant was given opportunity to make representations in response to the proposed striking out of his application.\n-(6)\n+3.\n-The Applicant replied on 9 October 2026.\n+In response, the Tribunal first received, on 21 September 2026, an emailed response from the Applicant sent on 19 September 2026. Further representations and attachments followed up to and including 9 October 2026.\n+\n+4.\n+\n+I have set aside my previous decision given on 28 October 2026, which omitted to refer to responses prior to 9 October 2026. In re-making my decision I have considered the application afresh. In doing so, I have also taken into account the further representations received from the Applicant up to the time of writing. The attachments had included an internal review outcome letter from the Cabinet Office dated 23 September 2026 upholding its response of 17 August 2026, which had referred to the outcome in case no FT/EA/2024/0400.\n-(7)\n+5.\n-(8)\n+6.\n-(9)\n+7.\n-(10)\n+8.\n-(11)\n+9.\n-(12)\n+10.\n-(13)\n+11.\n-The application remains wholly unclear. Despite the Applicant’s provision of additional information, I am unable to glean who in this application is alleged to have acted in contempt. The letters from the Scottish Government cannot be reconciled with the application form for certification which names various other bodies. Moreover, I cannot identify from what has been said (or from the attachments) any legal basis upon which the application could possibly succeed.\n+The Applicant subsequently flagged the importance of the duty of candour with reference to the Second Respondent and that inferences should be drawn on its continued silence. I also note matters raised concerning the French and Scottish Governments, and “\n+the precedent concerning Kent County Council’s dissolution of its framework\n+”.\n-(14)\n+12.\n-As identified by Judge Harris, the Applicant appears to rely upon paragraph 4 of the Tribunal’s Decision of 3 October 2025 (which had dismissed the appeal). That is reinforced by the Applicant having highlighted this paragraph in the decision within the link in his 5 October 2026 email set out above. That paragraph reads:\n+Having considered the voluminous submissions, the basis of the application remains wholly unclear. Despite the Applicant’s provision of additional information, as supplemented, I cannot glean who in this application is alleged to have acted in contempt. The supplemental information suggests the application is directed at the Cabinet Office, but it remains un"}]}