{"check":null,"uid":"97911691436baf28","title":"Dean Wilson v The Information Commissioner","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-09-16","summary":"Спор касался заявления в Трибунал о понуждении Уполномоченного по информации (ICO) к прогрессу жалобы на задержку полиции Ланкашира с ответом на запрос субъекта данных. ICO дал итоговый ответ 3 июля 2026 года и разъяснения 6 августа 2026 года, но не стал проводить углублённое расследование ввиду приоритетов ресурса и системных задержек у контролёра. Заявитель просил обязать полицию раскрыть данные и потребовать от ICO отчётов и сроков. Суд указал, что по статье 166 DPA 2018 он вправе рассматривать лишь процедурные вопросы обработки жалобы ICO, а не предписывать раскрытие или оценивать существо; иск отклонён за отсутствием юрисдикции и перспектив.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":22970,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1313","first_seen":"2026-09-17","last_checked":"2026-09-17 01:29","relevance":"hit","score":13,"query":"personal data","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":13,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"орган","name":"Information Commissioner","topic":"Персональные данные"},{"kind":"акт","name":"Data Protection Act 2018","topic":"Персональные данные"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":93,"ctx":"these proceedings concern an application (the “application”) under section 166(2) of the data protection act 2018 (“dpa 2018”) for an order to progress the applicant’s complaints against lancash","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"gdpr","weak":false,"pos":5148,"ctx":"•  comply with the applicant’s subject access request (sar) submi tt ed under article 15 gdpr and part 3 dpa 2018.  •  provide full disclosure of all personal data held.  •  provide a","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":5209,"ctx":"submi tt ed under article 15 gdpr and part 3 dpa 2018.  •  provide full disclosure of all personal data held.  •  provide a lawful justification if relying on any exemption.  •  provide the dis","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":5825,"ctx":"pplication, the applicant stated:  “i am making this application under section 166 of the data protection act 2018 because the information commissioner has failed to take appropriate steps to pro","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":5939,"ctx":"because the information commissioner has failed to take appropriate steps to progress my data protection complaint (reference ic ‑ 513151 ‑ h9k4). the ico has confirmed:“ we still have your data","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"data protection","weak":false,"pos":6040,"ctx":"tion complaint (reference ic ‑ 513151 ‑ h9k4). the ico has confirmed:“ we still have your data protection complaint, which hasn’t been allocated to a case officer yet.” and: “you may be able to a","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Information Commissioner","weak":false,"pos":18,"ctx":"Dean Wilson v The Information Commissioner 1.  These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of","zone":"орган","weight":3},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"Data Protection Act 2018","weak":false,"pos":136,"ctx":"These proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Lancashire Const","zone":"акт","weight":0}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-09-17","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] UKFTT 01313 (GRC)","court":"United Kingdom First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukftt/grc/2026/1313","text":"1.\n\nThese proceedings concern an application (the “Application”) under\nsection 166(2)\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\n(“DPA 2018”) for an order to progress the Applicant’s complaints against Lancashire Constabulary (“LC”) concerning the way in which LC dealt with a Subject Access Request submitted in March 2026. The complaint was submitted to the Information Commissioner (“IC”) on 6 May 2026 and was dealt with under reference IC-511552-Y7L3.\n\n2.\n\nThe Applicant, in his form GRC3 stated that his Application is in relation to the IC’s complaint reference IC-513151-H9K4. The IC has confirmed that this complaint reference refers to a separate complaint against a data controller other than LC. I note that the Applicant in his Reply relies on responses sent by the IC on reference IC-511552-Y7L3. I also note that the Applicant in his initial evidence bundle wrote to the IC concerning the SAR to LC being overdue on 22 June 2026 using reference IC-513151-H9K4, but it is possible that this was an error given that the Applicant has a number of ongoing complaints with the IC. As the Applicant specified that his complaint was in connection with LC’s handling of his SAR, for the purposes of this decision I have considered only the complaint to which this corresponds concerning LC, which as a matter of fact I find is IC-511552-Y7L3.\n\n3.\n\nThere is no evidence currently before the Tribunal of the substance of the complaint reference IC-513151-H9K4 so the Tribunal is currently unable to consider it. The Applicant states on the form GRC3 that his complaint on IC-513151-H9K4 was submitted on 17 April 2026. This means that the time for filing a\nsection 166\napplication in relation to this complaint, relating to another data controller, has not yet expired, so it is still open to the Applicant to make such an application if he wishes.\n\n4.\n\nOn 3 July 2026, the IC wrote to the Applicant stating that he had considered the information the Applicant had provided in line with the IC’s published framework and decided not to undertake a more detailed investigation take any further action. The IC stated that he would however record the complaint for information purposes as he was aware of difficulties LC was experiencing in responding to requests and the steps they were taking to address this. He explained that the IC was making recommendations to LC about how they can improve the way they handle personal information rights. The IC advised the Applicant of his right to take proceedings to court.\n\n5.\n\nOn 6 August 2026, although the Applicant had not specifically requested a review, the IC considered the concerns raised by the Applicant about the time taken to provide an outcome and wrote to the Applicant again. While the IC had handled the Applicant’s complaint within the timeframe set out in its service standards, the IC acknowledged that there had been a delay by LC in responding to the Applicant’s SAR which may have exceeded the statutory timeframe for the response. However, in applying his published framework, the IC considered the scale, seriousness, and wider implications of the delay and that the issue reflects a broader pattern of delays already identified at LC as opposed to an isolated failing, specific to the Applicant’s\nrequest. The IC acknowledged the impact that the delay had on the Applicant\npersonally, but concluded, that it was not proportionate to take further action at this stage.\nHowever, the IC went on to state that the information provided would be used\nto inform wider regulatory activity, and that the information provided would contribute to\nan understanding of the wider issues at LC\nconcerning handling of requests. The IC acknowledged the impact that the delay had on the Applicant personally, but concluded, that it was not proportionate to take further regulatory action based on the Applicant’s individual complaint at this stage. However, the IC went on to state that the information provided would be used to inform wider regulatory activity, and that the information provided would contribute to an understanding of the wider issues at LC. The IC advised the Applicant of his right to take his case to court and claim compensation and of his right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (PHSO).\n\nThe Application\n\n6.\n\nThe Applicant applied to the Tribunal by way of form GRC3 dated 8 July 2026. On 7 July 2026, he also submitted an evidence bundle and written application. He stated in his form GRC3 that the outcome he was seeking was as follows:\n\n“I request that the Tribunal order the Information Commissioner to:\n\n• Take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint\n\n• Provide information about its progress\n\n• Provide an outcome within a specified period\n\n• Confirm what action is being taken regarding Lancashire Constabulary’s continued SAR non\n‑\ncompliance”\n\n7.\n\nIn the application submitted on 7 July 2026, the Applicant stated that he was seeking two parallel orders under\nsection 166\nDPA 2018, namely:\n\na.\n\nThat the Tribunal require Lancashire Constabulary to:\n\n•\n\nComply with the Applicant’s Subject Access Request (SAR) submi\ntt\ned under Article 15 GDPR and Part 3 DPA 2018.\n\n•\n\nProvide full disclosure of all personal data held.\n\n•\n\nProvide a lawful justification if relying on any exemption.\n\n•\n\nProvide the disclosure within a fixed deadline set by the Tribunal.\n\n•\n\nProvide an explanation for the extended period of non-compliance\n\nb.\n\nThat the Tribunal require the ICO to:\n\n•\n\nTake appropriate steps to progress the Applicant’s complaint.\n\n•\n\nProvide updates on the progress of the complaint.\n\n•\n\nExplain the reason for the delay.\n\n•\n\nConfirm allocation to a case o\nffi\ncer within a reasonable\ntimeframe\n.\n\n8.\n\nIn his grounds for the Application, the Applicant stated:\n\n“I am making this application under\nSection 166\nof the\nData Protection Act 2018\nbecause the Information Commissioner has failed to take appropriate steps to progress my data protection complaint (reference IC\n‑\n513151\n‑\nH9K4). The ICO has confirmed:“ We still have your data protection complaint, which hasn’t been allocated to a case officer yet.” And: “You may be able to apply to the First\n‑\ntier Tribunal to require us to respond to your complaint or to provide you with information about its progress.” More than three months have passed since my complaint was made and the ICO has not:\n\n• taken appropriate steps to respond\n\n• provided progress updates\n\n• allocated the complaint\n\n• provided an outcome\n\nMy complaint concerns Lancashire Constabulary’s continued non\n‑\ncompliance with my Subject Access Request. As confirmed in my notices: “To date, no disclosure has been provided.” The SAR is now significantly overdue, and the ICO has failed to progress the matter. I therefore seek an order requiring the ICO to take appropriate steps to respond to my complaint and provide updates within a Tribunal\n‑\nspecified period.”\n\nThe strike-out application\n\n9.\n\nThe IC applied by way of form GRC5 dated 28 August 2026 to strike out the Application on the basis that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it under Rule 8(2)(a) and/or that there is no reasonable prospect of it succeeding under Rule 8(3)(c) (the “strike-out application”).\n\n10.\n\nThe reasons which the IC gave for striking out the application were set out in its Response, particularly at paragraphs 31 to 36 In summary, these were as follows:\n\na.\n\nIn respect of the relief against the IC, an outcome was provided to the Applicant on 3 July 2026, with additional reasons given on 6 August 2026. Even, if there were no adequate reasons provided for the outcome (which is denied), this was cured by the additional reasons given for the IC’s decision, following review (see\nInformation Commissioner v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care & Another\n[2025] UKUT 177 (AAC)\nat [49]\n\nb.\n\nIn respect of the separate relief sought against LC, those are remedies that fall outside of the scope of\nsection 166\nof the DPA18, and are more akin to an application for a compliance order under section 167 of the DPA as explained below. As the UT confirmed,\nsection 166\nof the DPA should not be used as a back door remedy to direct remedies against either the controller for a breach of the Applicant’s rights, or against the LC challenging the lawfulness of the decision either under the DPA, or a judicial review claim in the Administrative Court (see\nSmith v Information Commissioner\n\n[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)\nat [60] and [136])\n\nc.\n\nThe IC has taken appropriate steps to investigate and respond to the Applicant’s complaint and has provided an outcome to him on 3 July 2026, together with a review outcome on 6 August 2026. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the IC has complied with the procedural requirements set out in\nsection 166(1)\nof the DPA18, and there is therefore no basis for the Tribunal to make an order under\nsection 166(2)\nDPA18.\n\nd.\n\nIf the Applicant wishes to seek an order of compliance against LC for any alleged breach of his data protection rights, the correct route for him to do so is by way of separate civil proceedings in the County Court or High Court under section 167 of the DPA18.\n\n11.\n\nThe Applicant provided a Reply to the Response dated 28 August 2026, which deals with the strike-out application as well as the substantive response, so I am satisfied that the Applicant has had an opportunity to make representations on the proposed striking out under rule 8(4). The points made by the Applicant, in summary, were as follows:\n\na.\n\nThe IC’s response relies on a different complaint reference and asserts that this is an outcome. This is procedurally improper.\n\nb.\n\nThe IC did not investigate the complaint, progress it or provide an outcome. The Applicant asserts that the ‘outcome’ was a “\npolicy-based refusal to act\n”.\n\nc.\n\nThe IC did not contact LC, request evidence, assess compliance, investigate the SAR breach, progress the complaint or take any regulatory steps. The IC simply refused to investigate.\n\nd.\n\nThe IC acknowledged LC’s backlog in dealing with requests but took no regulatory action. The Applicant states “\nthis is precisely the scenario\nsection 166\nwas enacted to address\n”.\n\ne.\n\nThe IC did not provide an outcome within 3 months; the Applicant says the complaint was made on 17 April 2026 and he did not receive the outcome until 6 August 2026.\n\nf.\n\nThe IC’s ‘outcome’ is based on policy, not law and cannot override statutory duties under section 165 or 166 DPA 2018.\n\ng.\n\nThe IC prematurely closed the complaint involving ongoing infringement.\n\nh.\n\nNone of the authorities relied on by the IC support strike out where the IC, amongst other things refused to investigate, take appropriate steps, relied on policy instead of law and admitted an infringement but refused to act.\n\ni.\n\nThe IC failed to take appropriate steps and should be ordered to progress the complaint under rule 166(2).\n\nLegal framework\n\n12.\n\nSection 165 DPA 2018 sets out the right of data subjects to complain to the IC about infringement of their rights under the data protection legislation. Under\nsection 166\nDPA 2018 a data subject can make an application to this Tribunal for an order as follows:\n\n“Orders to progress complaints\n\n(1)\n\nThis section applies where, after a data subject makes a complaint under section 165 or Article 77 of the UK GDPR, the Commissioner -\n\na.\n\nfails to take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,\n\nb.\n\nfails to provide the complainant with information about progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the Commissioner received the complaint, or\n\nc.\n\nif the Commissioner's consideration of the complaint is not concluded during that period, fails to provide the complainant with such information during a subsequent period of 3 months.\n\n(2)\n\nThe Tribunal may, on an application by the data subject, make an order requiring the Commissioner -\n\nd.\n\nto take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint, or\n\ne.\n\nto inform the complainant of progress on the complaint, or of the outcome of the complaint, within a period specified in the order.”\n\n13.\n\nThe Tribunal can only make an order under\nsection 166(2)\nif one of the conditions at\nsection 166(1)\n(a), (b) or (c) is met. There have been a number of appeal decisions which have considered the scope of\nsection 166\n. It is clearly established that the Tribunal’s powers are limited to procedural issues, rather than the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.\n\n14.\n\nSection 165 deals with the complainant’s right to make a complaint and states that:\n\n“(4)\n\nIf the Commissioner receives a complaint under subsection (2), the Commissioner must—\n\n(a)take appropriate steps to respond to the complaint,\n\n(b)inform the complainant of the outcome of the complaint,\n\n(c)inform the complainant of the rights under\nsection 166\n, and\n\n(d)if asked to do so by the complainant, provide the complainant with further information about how to pursue the complaint.\n\n(5)\n\nThe reference in subsection (4)(a) to taking appropriate steps in response to a complaint includes—\n\n(a)investigating the subject matter of the complaint, to the extent appropriate, and\n\n(b)informing the complainant about progress on the complaint, including about whether further investigation or co-ordination with foreign designated authority is necessary.”\n\n15.\n\nIn the case of\nKillock v Information Commissioner\n\n[2022] 1 WLR 2241\n, the Upper Tribunal at paragraph 74 stated - \"\n…It is plain from the statutory words that, on an application under\nsection 166\n, the Tribunal will not be concerned and has no power to deal with the merits of the complaint or its outcome. We reach this conclusion on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language but it is supported by the Explanatory Notes to\nthe Act\nwhich regard the\nsection 166\nremedy as reflecting the provisions of article 78(2) which are procedural. Any attempt by a party to divert a tribunal from the procedural failings listed in\nsection 166\ntowards a decision on the merits of the complaint must be firmly resisted by tribunals.\"\n\n16.\n\nMostyn J in the High Court in\nR (Delo) v Information Commissioner\n[2023] 1 WLR 1327\n, paragraph 57 - \"\nThe treatment of such complaints by the commissioner, as before, remains within his exclusive discretion. He decides the scale of an investigation of a complaint to the extent that he thinks appropriate. He decides therefore whether an investigation is to be short, narrow and light or whether it is to be long, wide and heavy. He decides what weight, if any, to give to the ability of a data subject to apply to a court against a data controller or processor under article 79. And then he decides whether he shall, or shall not, reach a conclusive determination...\n”.\n\n17.\n\nMostyn J’s decision in\nDelo\nwas upheld by the Court of Appeal (\n[2023] EWCA Civ 1141\n) – “\nFor the reasons I have given I would uphold the conclusion of the judge at [85] that the legislative scheme requires the Commissioner to receive and consider a complaint and then provides the Commissioner with a broad discretion as to whether to conduct a further investigation and, if so, to what extent. I would further hold, in agreement with the judge, that having done that much the Commissioner is entitled to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has been an infringement but sufficient to reach and express a view about the likelihood that this is so and to take no further action. By doing so the Commissioner discharges his duty to inform the complainant of the outcome of their complaint\n.” (paragraph 80, Warby LJ).\n\n18.\n\nThe decision of the Upper Tribunal in\nCortes v Information Commissioner\n(UA-2023-001298-GDPA) which applied both\nKillock\nand\nDelo\nconfirmed that the nature of\nsection 166\nis that of a limited procedural provision only. “\nThe Tribunal is tasked with specifying appropriate “steps to respond” and not with assessing the appropriateness of a response that has already been given (which would raise substantial regulatory questions susceptible only to the supervision of the High Court)….As such, the fallacy in the Applicant’s central argument is laid bare. If Professor Engelman is correct, then any data subject who is dissatisfied with the outcome of their complaint to the Commissioner could simply allege that it was reached after an inadequate investigation, and thereby launch a collateral attack on the outcome itself with the aim of the complaint decision being re-made with a different outcome. Such a scenario would be inconsistent with the purport of Article 78.2, the heading and text of\nsection 166\nand the thrust of the decisions and reasoning in both Killock and Veale and R (on the application of Delo). It would also make a nonsense of the jurisdictional demarcation line between the FTT under\nsection 166\nand the High Court on an application for judicial review.”\n(paragraph 33).\n\n19.\n\nThe case of\nDr Michael Guy Smith v Information Commissioner\n\n[2025] UKUT 74 (AAC)\n, noted at paragraph 60 that “\nit is for the Tribunal to decide, applying an objective test, if an “appropriate step” has been omitted, but observe that, in practice, that is unlikely to be the case where an ‘outcome’ has been produced. That is for two main reasons: first, because\nsection 166\nis a procedural provision and, as the principal mechanisms for enforcing rights or challenging the Commissioner are either claims against the data controller or judicial review of the Commissioner,\nsection 166\nshould not be used to obtain ‘by the back door’ a remedy normally only available in those proceedings; secondly, because, if the Commissioner has already produced an outcome then, given the very wide discretion that the Commissioner has, both as to what and how to investigate and as to outcome, the scope for the Tribunal to say that an appropriate step has been omitted is limited.” I\nn considering this the Tribunal must, as set out in paragraph 85 of\nKillick\n“when deciding objectively whether any (further) appropriate step needs to be taken by the Commissioner, take into account and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator.”\n\n20.\n\nParagraph 85 of\nKillick\nreads as follows: “\nHowever, in considering appropriateness, the Tribunal will be bound to take into consideration and give weight to the views of the Commissioner as an expert regulator. The GRC is a specialist tribunal and may deploy (as in Platts) its non-legal members appointed to the Tribunal for their expertise. It is nevertheless our view that, in the sphere of complaints, the Commissioner has the institutional competence and is in the best position to decide what investigations she should undertake into any particular issue, and how she should conduct those investigations. As Mr Milford emphasised, her decisions about these matters will be informed not only by the nature of the complaint itself but also by a range of other factors such as her own regulatory priorities, other investigations in the same subject area and her judgment on how to deploy her limited resources most effectively. Any decision of a Tribunal which fails to recognise the wider regulatory context of a complaint and to demonstrate respect for the special position of the Commissioner may be susceptible to appeal in this Chamber.”\n\nDiscussion and conclusions\n\n21.\n\nI have decided to deal with this matter without a hearing, noting that the Applicant stated in his GRC3 that he wished the matter to be dealt with without a hearing. While I recognise that the fair determination of this case is very important to the Applicant, I do not consider it a proportionate use of resources to require an oral hearing to determine the issue of strike out. I note also that Rule 32(4) permits the Tribunal to strike out a case under Rule 8 without an oral hearing.\n\n22.\n\nTurning to the questions before the Tribunal, the first question is whether the IC provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint. I have dealt above with why I consider that the complaint in issue here is\nIC-511552-Y7L3.\nThe IC provided the Applicant with a response to his complaint on 3 July 2026, with a further response after review on 6 August 2026.\n\n23.\n\nI am satisfied that, when taken together, these responses have provided an outcome to the Applicant’s complaint, provided an answer to all outstanding issues and demonstrated that the IC had given consideration to whether there were other appropriate steps which could be taken to progress the Applicant’s complaint. This is sufficient in my view to demonstrate that the IC has complied with the requirements of section 165(4). The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the outcome does not render it wrong in law.\n\n24.\n\nIt appears to me therefore that there are no further appropriate steps which the IC ought reasonably to take to progress the complaint.\n\nIn making this decision I have given significant weight to the view of the IC as the expert regulator that there are no further appropriate steps he should have taken.\n\n25.\n\nThe outcome sought by the Applicant in the Application in relation to LC is not one which the Tribunal can grant.\nThe Tribunal has no power under\nsection 166\nto direct LC to make disclosure to the Applicant or comply with a SAR. Its powers are limited to ordering the IC to progress its handling of the Applicant’s complaint.\nI also agree with the IC’s position that it is not a court or ombudsman and that orders for compliance need to be sought through civil action.\n\n26.\n\nThe outcome sought by the Applicant in relation to the IC is, in effect, challenging the substantive outcome of the complaint to the IC. The Tribunal does not have power under\nsection 166\nto consider the merits or substantive outcome of a complaint.\nSection 166\nis limited to narrow procedural issues and there is no further procedural failing in respect of which the Tribunal can make a decision.\n\nIn an application under\nsection 166\n, the Tribunal has no power to direct the IC to investigate, in a particular way or at all, to take enforcement action to secure compliance with a request or determine whether or not there has been a breach of the UK GDPR. Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal does not have the power to grant the outcomes sought.\n\n27.\n\nBecause I consider that there was an outcome determining the complaint and that there were no further appropriate steps which should be taken, I find the complaint has already been determined and therefore the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over it. I am also satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the case, or any part of it, succeeding because the outcome sought by the Applicant is not something which is within the Tribunal’s power to grant.\n\n28.\n\nThe proceedings are therefore struck out under Rule 8(2)(a) because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with them and under Rule 8(3)(c) because there is no reasonable prospect of them succeeding.","changes":[]}