{"check":null,"uid":"8a27e6a2897cfaaa","title":"WONG WING HEI v. COMMISSIONER FOR TRANSPORT AND OTHERS, [2026] HKCFI 5820, HCAL35/2025","title_generated":false,"country":"Гонконг","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-23","summary":"Суд рассмотрел жалобу гражданина на действия Комиссии по транспорту и двух школ вождения, связанные с выдачей водительских удостоверений и проведением экзаменов на мотоциклетное вождение. Заявитель оспорил требования предоставления сертификата об окончании курсов обучения вождению, обязательность прохождения инструктажа перед сдачей теоретического экзамена и взимание платы за аренду транспортных средств при пересдаче экзаменов. Суд отклонил жалобу заявителя, признав отсутствие оснований для судебного пересмотра действий ответчиков.","snippet":"","topics":["Персональные данные"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":54903,"versions":1,"url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=186268&currpage=T","first_seen":"2026-10-24","last_checked":"2026-11-16 07:35","relevance":"hit","score":11,"query":"","source_key":"legalref_hk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":11,"topics":["Персональные данные"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":1145,"ctx":"istration of motor cycle driving tests and the retaking of tests, and the distribution of personal data in the administration of tests.  2. the form 86 sought multiple forms of relief in relati","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":2141,"ctx":"schools in providing a department personal information collection statement (“pics”) and privacy policy statement (“pps”) required under the personal data (privacy) ordinance (“pdpo”) in","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":2193,"ctx":"ion collection statement (“pics”) and privacy policy statement (“pps”) required under the personal data (privacy) ordinance (“pdpo”) in the course of processing applications of part a and part","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":2208,"ctx":"statement (“pics”) and privacy policy statement (“pps”) required under the personal data (privacy) ordinance (“pdpo”) in the course of processing applications of part a and part b motor c","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"privacy","weak":true,"pos":3160,"ctx":"nkt unlawfully failed to provide a correct personal information collection statement and privacy policy statement required under the pdpo in the course of processing applications of part","zone":"текст","weight":0},{"topic":"Персональные данные","term":"personal data","weak":false,"pos":43720,"ctx":"d by hksm (and nkt), it provides that hksm (and the ddss by extension) may use and retain personal data provided by an applicant for the purpose of, amongst others, processing of their service","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[]},"last_changed":"2026-10-24","meta":{"case_no":"HCAL35/2025","ncn":"[2026] HKCFI 5820","parties":"WONG WING HEI v. COMMISSIONER FOR TRANSPORT AND OTHERS","lang":"English","uploaded":"2026-10-23","organ":"Судебная система Гонконга"},"source_url":"https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=186268&currpage=T","text":"HCAL35/2025 WONG WING HEI v. COMMISSIONER FOR TRANSPORT AND OTHERS\n\nHCAL 35/2025\n\n[2026] HKCFI 5820\n\nIN THE HIGH COURT OF THE\n\nHONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION\n\nCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCE\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 35 OF 2025\n\n________________________\n\nBETWEEN\n\nWONG WING HEI\n\nApplicant\n\nand\n\nCOMMISSIONER FOR TRANSPORT\n\n1\nst\nPutative Respondent\n\nTHE HONG KONG SCHOOL OF MOTORING LIMITED\n\n2\nnd\nPutative Respondent\n\nNKT DRIVING SCHOOL LIMITED\n\n3\nrd\nPutative Respondent\n\n________________\n\nBefore:\n\nHon Coleman JA, sitting as an additional Judge\nof the Court of First Instance, in Chambers (Open to Public)\n\nDate of Decision:\n\n23 October 2026\n\n__________________\n\nD E C I S I O N\n\n__________________\n\nA. Introduction\n\n1.\nBy his Form 86, the Applicant sought leave to apply for\njudicial review, so as to challenge multiple ‘decisions’ of the Commissioner for Transport (“Commissioner”), the\nHong Kong School of Motoring Limited (“HKSM”), and NKT Driving School Limited (“NKT”), in relation to the\nissuing of driving licences, the administration of motor cycle driving tests and the retaking of tests, and the\ndistribution of personal data in the administration of tests.\n\n2.\nThe Form 86 sought multiple forms of relief in relation\nto each Putative Respondent. In relation to the Commissioner, the Applicant sought the following relief:\n\n(1) a\nmandamus\nthat directs and compels the Commissioner to accept and process applications\nfor Part A and Part B motor cycle driving tests;\n\n(2) a declaration that there is no power for the Commissioner to accept applications for motor\ncycle driving tests if an applicant cannot provide a course certificate issued under Part 9B of the\nRoad Traffic Ordinance Cap 374 (“RTO”);\n\n(3) a declaration that the Commissioner unlawfully delegated part of his power to the Designated\nDriving Schools;\n\n(4) a declaration that any applicant for a motor cycle driving test is entitled to use his own\nvehicle; and\n\n(5) a declaration that the Commissioner unlawfully failed to regulate the Designated Driving\nSchools in providing a department Personal Information Collection Statement (“PICS”) and Privacy Policy\nStatement (“PPS”) required under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (“PDPO”) in the course of processing\napplications of Part A and Part B motor cycle driving tests.\n\n3.\nIn relation to both HKSM and NKT, the Applicant sought:\n\n(1) an injunction restraining HKSM and NKT from acting for or on behalf of the Commissioner;\n\n(2) a declaration that the Applicant is entitled to refund of the unlawful charging;\n\n(3) a declaration that there is no power for HKSM and NKT to receive and accept applications for\nmotor cycle driving tests;\n\n(4) a declaration that HKSM and NKT illegally bundled and forced general applicants applying for\nmotor cycle driving tests to rent their vehicles, and for re-take applicants, illegally bundled and forced\nthem to pay for unwanted lessons;\n\n(5) a declaration that any applicant for a motor cycle driving test is entitled to use his own\nvehicle; and\n\n(6) a declaration that HKSM and NKT unlawfully failed to provide a correct Personal Information\nCollection Statement and Privacy Policy Statement required under the PDPO in the course of processing\napplications of Part A and Part B motor cycle driving tests.\n\n4.\nTogether with the Form 86, the Applicant filed an\naffirmation and two diagrams (that were said to show the\nde jure\nand\nde facto\nprocedures to obtain\na motor cycle driving licence).\n\n5.\nI gave directions permitting the Commissioner, HKSM and NKT\nto file an Initial Response, and for the Applicant to file a Reply. After lengthy extensions of time (due\nto without prejudice attempts at settlement between the parties, which were eventually unsuccessful), the\nCommissioner’s Initial Response was filed by Ms Jaqueline Hung and Ms Amiel Lee, Government\nCounsel, of the Department of Justice. A joint Initial Response from HKSM and NKT was also filed by\nMr Jimmy Ma and Mr Keith Tam of Counsel. The Applicant, acting in person, then filed\nhis Reply.\n\n6.\nHaving considered the materials provided with the\napplication, I am satisfied that this application can appropriately be dealt with on the papers.\n\n7.\nThis is my Decision.\n\nB.\n\nLegal Context\n\n8.\nIt may be helpful first to set out the relevant legal\nprinciples and statutory provisions in relation to this case (in particular, driving licences and driving\ntests), before going into the particular facts giving rise to the Applicant’s claims.\n\n9.\nIn Hong Kong, the Transport Department (“TD”), headed by the\nCommissioner, is the government agency responsible for transport-related policies, particularly the\nadministration of the RTO. Their duties include, amongst other things, traffic management, maintenance and\ncontrol of all roads, registration of vehicles, and licencing for all sorts of vehicles (including buses, rail,\nand private vehicle). Thus, they are responsible for the issuing of all driver’s licences, and the\nadministration of driving tests (which is, of course, a prerequisite to the issue of a licence).\n\n10.\nIt can be kept in mind throughout that road safety is the\noverriding policy objective of the TD, relevant to and of paramount importance in TD’s regulation of driver\ntraining and the application process and conduct of motorcycle driving tests.\n\n11.\nSince the 1980s, the Government has adopted a two-pronged\napproach with respect to driver training. The first approach, which was the traditional (and only)\napproach to driver training prior to the 1980s, was to allow students to be trained by private driving\ninstructors (“PDIs”), who would instruct students through “on-street” driving training (i.e. on public\nroads). However, with the increase in traffic congestion in the 1970s, the Government adopted a policy to\nestablish designated driving schools (“DDSs”), which would instruct students through “off-street” driving\ntraining, by providing training on their own premises, with their own vehicles.\n\n12.\nThe Government has since maintained this two-pronged\napproach by ensuring that there is a sufficient supply of PDIs, alongside the approved DDSs. As of\nNovember 2025, there are five licenced DDSs in Hong Kong, four of which are operated by HKSM through\nwholly-owned subsidiaries of HKSM (with one of the four operated by NKT).\n\n13.\nThe statutory power of the Commissioner to designate DDSs\nand regulate their operations is provided in Part 9B of the RTO. In particular, section 88K of\nthe RTO provides the Commissioner the power to designate in writing any place as a driving school and impose\nsuch conditions relating to the designation as she thinks fit. The section also provides that the\ndesignation shall authorise the proprietor to operate that place as a driving school in accordance with Schedule\n9 and the conditions as may be specified by the Commissioner in the designation.\n\n14.\nUnder section 88N of the RTO, the ancillary power is\ngranted to the Commissioner to issue a code of practice setting out the requirements, procedures and standards\nin respect of the content and duration of driving instruction courses and “any other matter he thinks fit”.\n\n15.\nFor a person to be issued a driving licence, he has to\ncomplete the relevant examinations that are administered by the TD. Generally, for normal motor vehicles,\nthe examination consists of two parts: a written test (“Part A”), and a road test. Part A, which\nis uniform amongst all types of vehicles, is a written test that requires the candidate to satisfy an authorised\nexaminer that he is fully conversant with the Road Users’ Code (promulgated under section 109 of the\nRTO). Since the content of Part A goes to the general knowledge that any road user should possess, a\ncandidate who has previously passed Part A may be exempt from retaking it for the purposes of obtaining a\nlicence for another type of vehicle (for instance, where a person already holding a light goods vehicle licence\nis attempting to obtain a motor cycle licence).\n\n16.\nBut unlike for other vehicles, candidates wishing to\nobtain a licence for motor cycles are required to pass an additional test. According to\nregulation 12C and the Eleventh Schedule of the Road Traffic (Driving Licences) Regulations Cap 374B\n(“Regulations”), to obtain a licence candidates must pass a Part B test (“Part B”) and a Part C\ntest (“Part C”), both of which are practical tests. Part B, which can only be done after the\ncompletion of a driving instruction course at a DDS, is a basic driving skills test (or in other words, a\ncompetence test) conducted at a DDS. It requires the candidate to perform basic skills, such as reading a\nlicence plate at a distance of 23 metres, being able to start the engine of the motor cycle, moving straight or\nat an angle, turning corners correctly, and being able to stop the motor cycle properly. Part C, on\nthe other hand, is the equivalent to the road test for other vehicles.\n\n17.\nThe additional requirement for a mandatory competence test\nfor motor cycles is justified by the Government through statistics and the general view that motor cycles are\nmuch more dangerous to operate as compared to all other motor vehicles. For example, the Commissioner\nidentifies that according to LegCo, the accident rate of learner motorcyclists in 1988 was 9.3 per 1000 learners\nas compared to 0.5 per 1000 learners for private cars.\n\n18.\nIt is also important to note the difference in the\ncandidates taking the Part B and Part C tests. Under the usual practice (for other vehicles), a\ncandidate may apply for a learner’s driving licence (“LDL”) under regulation 12 of the Regulations, so long\nas he delivers a signed application together with his identity document to the Commissioner, and pays the\nprescribed fee of $510. However, for candidates applying for an LDL in relation to a motor cycle,\nregulation 12A of the Regulations stipulates that the candidate must also have passed, within 2 years\nprior to date of application, the Part A and Part B tests referred to under regulation 12C.\n\n19.\nIn other words, a candidate taking the Part B test\n(which is a practical test) will not hold an LDL. This is crucial, because an LDL provides the holder the\npermission to drive on certain public roads (subject to designated time windows, routes and other\nrestrictions). As a result, it naturally follows that the Part B test cannot be administered on\npublic roads, but rather only on private premises (i.e. at DDSs). Indeed, this is explicitly\nmentioned in paragraph 2 of the Eleventh Schedule of the Regulations. The purpose is to ensure\nmotorcycle learner drivers are properly trained and well-equipped off-road facilities under the guidance of\nexperienced driving instructors, before they are allowed to take the Part B Test and, thereafter, practice\non the roads.\n\n20.\nAlso relevant for the purposes of this application, is the\nexact procedure that a candidate is to follow from start to finish, in obtaining their motor cycle driving\nlicence. As noted by the Applicant (and partly acknowledged by the Commissioner in some regards), there\nmay be some differences between the statute and actual practice. I shall, however, first recite the legal\nframework here, and leave discussing the actual practice to my later analysis of the Applicant’s submissions.\n\n21.\nAccording to regulation 12B(1) of the Regulations, a\ncandidate may only apply for a motor cycle driving test (including all Parts A, B, and C), by delivering the\nfollowing documents to the Commissioner: (1) his identity document, (2) a course certificate issued\nunder Part 9B of the RTO, and (3) a signed application in a form specified by the Commissioner.\nA course certificate, as defined under section 88J of the RTO, refers to a certificate in a form specified\nby the Commissioner indicating that a person has completed a driving instruction course at a DDS.\nTherefore, a person wishing to apply for a motor cycle driving test must first enrol in a driving instruction\ncourse at a DDS (paying the Commissioner-approved fees), fully attend the course and complete it, in order to\nreceive a course certificate.\n\n22.\nAfter the candidate submits the abovementioned documents\nand pays the prescribed fee, the Commissioner will, according to regulation 12B(2), issue a motor cycle\ndriving Test Form (“Test Form”) to the candidate, which shall notify the candidate of the date, time and place\nof the driving test, and it is valid for 18 months. It is only after this that the candidate proceeds\nto the three parts of the motor cycle driving test. Regulation 12C(1) also specifies that no part of\nthe test shall be taken until the preceding part is completed (i.e. the candidate has to pass Part A\nto take Part B, and pass Part B to take Part C).\n\n23.\nAfter completing Parts A and B, the candidate may apply\nfor an LDL to take Part C. Upon successful completion of the Part C test, the candidate may\napply for a probationary driving licence under regulation 12G, which will eventually turn into a full\ndriving licence upon completion of the probationary period.\n\nC.\n\nFactual Background\n\n24.\nThe factual background, as provided by the Applicant in\nthe Form 86, can be briefly summarised as follows.\n\n25.\nOn 3 August 2024, the Applicant enrolled in the\ndriving instruction course provided at the Yuen Long Driving School (“YLDS”), another one of the DDSs run by\nHKSM, intending to obtain a motor cycle driving licence. As a holder of a light goods vehicle driving licence,\nthe Applicant was exempt from taking Part A for the purposes of this application.\n\n26.\nFor this enrolment, the Applicant paid HK$3,460 to YLDS,\nwhich consisted of: (1) a fee charged by TD for Part B, (2) a vehicle rental fee, and (3) a\ntraining course fee. YLDS then provided the Applicant with a “motor cycle driving Test Form for\nPart B”, which provided a fixed test date and time apparently picked by the Applicant upon enrolment.\nIt is the Applicant’s submission that this Test Form was not in the standard form as usually provided by the TD,\nas the Applicant was required by YLDS to download its app to access the time and date (instead of a typical A4\nsheet of paper).\n\n27.\nThe Applicant then completed the driving instruction\ncourse with full attendance by 28 September 2024. However, he failed the Part B test which\nwas conducted two days later on 30 September 2024 at YLDS.\n\n28.\nThe Applicant immediately attempted to reapply for\nPart B upon failing, but through TD instead of YLDS. However, TD’s web system did not provide any\noption to reapply, and the Applicant was informed by a TD officer over the phone that applications for\nPart B may only be made through DDSs.\n\n29.\nThe Applicant then reapplied for Part B through\nYLDS. It is his case that despite only requesting to reapply for Part B, he was told by YLDS that a\nperson cannot directly reapply solely for Part B. Instead, he must also rent a vehicle from the DDS and\nalso pay for training lectures and practice sessions from the DDS. He also asserted that YLDS informed him\nthat a reapplication would only be accepted if it was made within two months of the initial failure (of\nPart B).\n\n30.\nAccording to the Applicant, when he emphasised that he did\nnot want to partake in any lecture or practices, he was told that there was a “minimum spending plan” of\nHK$2,590 to retake Part B, which included the application fee, a vehicle rental fee, two lectures and one\nself-practice session. As the staff told him that attendance at these two lectures and self-practice\nsession would not affect the ability to re-sit Part B, he paid the HK$2,590 fee on that same day.\n\n31.\nThe Applicant then passed Part B in his retake at\nYLDS on 6 December 2024, where he used YLDS’s rental vehicle.\n\nD.\n\nGrounds of Review\n\n32.\nLeave to apply for judicial review will not be granted\nunless the applicant presents a reasonably arguable public law ground of review which enjoys realistic prospects\nof success.\n\n33.\nIn his Form 86, the Applicant has submitted multiple\ngrounds of review. They are, however, not listed in clear order. For the sake of uniformity, I will\ntherefore adopt the “decisions” listed in the Commissioner’s Initial Response (and repeated in the Applicant’s\nReply), as the grounds of review.\n\n34.\nIn her Initial Response, the Commissioner listed and\nresponded to seven ‘decisions’ that the Applicant apparently challenged, and also responded to an eighth point\nwhich she listed under “Other Matters”. The Applicant, in his Reply, then contended that the eighth point\nwas actually an eighth ground of review. As a result, I will proceed to consider the following eight\nintended grounds of review, being:\n\n(1) Ground 1: unlawful delegation by the Commissioner of her power to accept and handle\napplications for motor cycle driving tests to DDSs;\n\n(2) Ground 2: unlawful practice of the Commissioner in not accepting direct applications for\nPart A and Part B tests;\n\n(3) Ground 3: the Commissioner unlawfully acquiesced in DDSs requiring applicants who failed\nPart B to take a Repeater Course (and thereby charging “hidden” fees);\n\n(4) Ground 4: the Commissioner unlawfully acquiesced to the DDSs’ practice of not allowing\ncandidates to use their own vehicles for Part B, forcing candidates to pay a vehicle rental fee to hire\na vehicle from a DDS;\n\n(5) Ground 5: the Commissioner unlawfully acquiesced to the DDSs’ practice of not allowing an\napplication to retake Part B to be made, unless it is made within two months after the candidate failed\nsaid test;\n\n(6) Ground 6: the Commissioner unlawfully acquiesced in not providing a course certificate\nunless upon request;\n\n(7) Ground 7: the Commissioner failed to require the DDSs to provide a PICS and PPS (as\nrequired under the PDPO) in the course of processing applications for motor cycle driving tests;\n\n(8) Ground 8: unlawful practice of the Commissioner in issuing Test Forms without Course\nCertificates (i.e. inconsistency between legislation and practice).\n\n35.\nAs will be seen (and as was not denied by the Applicant in\nhis Reply), some of the Grounds have since become academic. I will, however, proceed to deal with each\nintended ground of review in order.\n\nE.\n\nGround 1\n\n36.\nThe Applicant’s submission under Ground 1 goes to the\nalleged unlawful delegation by the Commissioner of her power to accept and handle applications for motor cycle\ndriving tests to DDSs. Essentially, the Applicant argued that DDSs are delegated power by the Commissioner to\naccept applications, which can be seen by (1) DDSs not issuing Test Forms in the TD’s style (and instead\nprovides test information on its own mobile applications), (2) that the DDSs can select the intended test\ndate for the applicant upon request (as compared to the TD’s usual practice of only providing an “end-of-list”\nappointment), and (3) that the DDS’s header is shown on the receipt for the Test Form payment (and not the\nTD’s).\n\n37.\nIn response, the Commissioner submitted that DDSs, in\nreceiving and handling applications, were merely acting as agents, and that she did not delegate any\nauthority. She submitted that the Applicant’s submission is premised on misunderstandings of fact.\nIn his Reply, the Applicant noted the details provided in the Initial Response, and expressly made no further\nreply.\n\n38.\nIn any event, I accept the Commissioner’s\nsubmission. The application process shows that the DDSs are acting, essentially, as an agent or\n‘middleman’ for the purpose of facilitating application processing. The DDSs in no way holds any power or\ndiscretion to accept or deny any driving test applications (which remains with the Commissioner).\n\n39.\nAccording to Appendix G of the Code of Practice of YLDS,\nwhich dictates the procedures and arrangements for student enrolment and allotment of driving test appointments\nat YLDS, and the Commissioner, the procedure works as follows:\n\n(1) When a student attends one of the enrolment channels for training courses offered by YLDS,\nstaff will explain to him the details of the training courses, and assist him in completing course enrolment\nand the various arrangements in relation to a driving test appointment.\n\n(2) There are two integrated computerised systems which handle course enrolment and arrangements\nfor driving test appointments: the Student Enrolment System (“SES”) and the Driving Test Appointment System\n(“DTAS”).\n\n(3) Both the SES and DTAS communicate and exchange data with the TD’s own computerised\nsystem. They strictly comply with the TD’s requirements in terms of communication protocols, and the\nDTAS itself also strictly complies with the TD’s rules on allotting driving test appointments to students\n(to ensure fairness).\n\n(4) The SES is responsible for: (a) registering students’ personal information,\n(b) handling student enrolment, (c) setting up training packages, (d) handling LDL and Test\nForm application forms, and (e) exchanging data files with TD for LDL and Test Form applications.\n\n(5) The DTAS, on the other hand, is responsible for: (a) setting up test slots,\n(b) reserving tests for students, and (c) delivering data files of test appointments to the TD.\n\n(6) Upon receipt of the student’s personal information (through enrolment), the SES automatically\nfills in the LDL/Test Form application forms (using the information). These forms, of course, are\nsigned and checked by students prior to submission to the TD.\n\n(7) The SES then generates a “master checklist” of LDL/Test Form applications, for processing of\nLDL/Test Form application forms in batches. It also generates LDL/Test Form application data files\nbased on the TD-specified format. These data files are then delivered to the TD (daily), and are\nuploaded to TD’s system.\n\n(8) The DDS then books a test appointment through the DTAS on behalf of the student\n(first-come-first-served), pending TD approval. It will also notify the student of the test date,\ntime, location and test part using a “Test Appointment Notice”, which is either in paper form or electronic\nform (through the DDS’s mobile application).\n\n(9) After the TD accepts the Test Form applications, it will assign Test Form numbers and create\nthe proper forms (see Form TD553) in its own system, for use in Part B and Part C tests.\nThese forms are valid for an 18-month validity period.\n\n(10) Afterwards, the TD will provide the DDS with a compact disc containing the Test Form number,\nvehicle class, transaction number and Test Form issue date of each successful application.\n\n(11) The DTAS will then generate a test booking confirmation list in paper form and test\nappointment data files in a compact disc, which will be delivered to the TD 14 days prior to the\ncorresponding test appointment date, for TD’s approval.\n\n(12) Upon the TD’s approval, it will make the necessary arrangements with the DDS test centre in\nrelation to the test, and the test will be conducted by an authorised examiner of the TD.\n\n40.\nThus, the internal procedure for applications shows that\nDDSs work hand in hand with the TD in processing data and test applications. The TD has not delegated its\npower to approve or disapprove test applications as suggested by the Applicant. I also do not see how the\nthree points/evidence provided by the Applicant reasonably support the contention that the DDSs are acting under\na power delegated by the Commissioner.\n\n41.\nThe first point is that DDSs do not issue Test Forms in\nthe “style” of the TD, but rather provide test information on their mobile applications. However, there\nseems to be confusion from the Applicant between the Test Appointment Notice that is issued by DDSs and a\ndriving test appointment letter that is issued by TD (for direct applications to the TD – which, of course, is\nnot possible for Part Bs as in the present case). Whilst the appointment letter issued by TD includes\ninformation such as test date, time, centre, and Test Form number, it is not a strict, mandated form that the\nCommissioner must follow under all situations. I find it reasonable for DDSs to have their own\nadministrative arrangements as to how test information is to be communicated to candidates. I agree with\nMs Lee that such administrative arrangements, like the use of the Test Appointment Notice, do not, in form,\nturn DDSs into a delegated authority.\n\n42.\nThe second point as asserted by the Applicant is that DDSs\ncan select the intended test date for the applicant upon request. It is unclear as to what is the\nApplicant’s basis for this statement. As clarified by the Commissioner, DDSs do not have the right to do\nso – the TD administers all test appointments, and the first-come-first-served principle is upheld strictly.\n\n43.\nThe third point is that the receipt for Test Form payment\nshows the DDS’s title and not the TD. I do not accept this submission. Under the agency\narrangements, the DDS clearly accepts the payment from the student, and passes it on to the Commissioner in\nfull, given that the applications are made through the DDS. This does not provide any support for the\nsubmission that the DDS is a delegated authority.\n\n44.\nIt has also been brought up by both the Commissioner and\nHKSM that the driving test application form as provided under regulation 12B(1)(c) of the Regulations\nexplicitly allows the use of an agent in submitting the application. Indeed, paragraph 7 of the\ndeclaration of the application form (TD 82) provides the applicant with the power to appoint a person “as\nthe agent to submit and handle the application on [his/her] behalf, including the collection of related licence,\npermit and/or other documents”. Therefore, it is clearly within the power of the Commissioner to engage\nDDSs as agents.\n\n45.\nWhilst it is not strictly necessary for me to comment on\nwhether the Government should engage DDSs as private sector agents in this process, I note the Commissioner’s\nargument that it is reasonable and justified as a matter of policy from the perspectives of costs, resource\nallocation, and administrative convenience – particularly given that both Part B and the driving\ninstruction course must be conducted within the private premises of a DDS. In any event, there is no\narguable unlawful delegation – or any illegality in relation to the engagement of DDSs in the acceptance and\nhandling of driving test applications. The DDSs operate in accordance with the relevant legislation and\nthe code issued by the Commissioner.\n\n46.\nAs a result, Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with\nany realistic prospect of success.\n\nF.\n\nGround 2\n\n47.\nGround 2 goes to the alleged unlawful practice by the\nCommissioner in not accepting direct applications for the Part A and Part B tests. The Applicant\ncontended (in his Reply) that regulation 12B(1) of the Regulations clearly mandates that all applications\nbe delivered to the Commissioner, and that there is no provision that requires submission through DDSs.\n\n48.\nI disagree. The Applicant’s arguments are premised\non a strict, overly literal interpretation of the statute – which is not the modern approach to statutory\ninterpretation.\n\n49.\nThe law in relation to statutory interpretation is\nwell-settled, and a summary can be rehearsed as follows. Words are construed in their context and purpose,\nwhich is considered alongside their natural and ordinary meaning. A purposive and contextual\ninterpretation, however, does not disregard the actual words used. Rather, the Court is to ascertain the\nintention of the legislature as expressed in the language of the statute: see, for example, my judgment in\nHa\nChe Wai v Medical Superintendent of the Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Psychiatric Observation Unit\n\n[2025] HKCFI 5681\nat §140.\n\n50.\nIn this case, I do not think that it was the intention of\nthe legislature to require an applicant personally to deliver their application to the Commissioner.\nRather, an application simply needs to reach the Commissioner (or the TD), and it is the Commissioner that has\nthe power to choose whether or not an application is approved. Whether it is directly delivered to the\nCommissioner by the Applicant himself or whether it goes through an agent (i.e. DDSs), does not change the\nreality that the Commissioner has the ultimate say on the admissibility of the application.\n\n51.\nI also do not accept the Applicant’s submission that\nadministrative convenience does not justify this practice. In my view, administrative convenience does\nindeed provide reasonable justification for how the TD carries out the application process by using DDSs as\nagents, as long as it does not infringe upon the underlying basis of the legislation. So long as the\napplications are delivered to the Commissioner in the form provided by the applicants to the DDSs (i.e. the\napplication was not altered in any way by the DDS), it is in theory, no different to the Applicant directly\nsubmitting the documents to the Commissioner.\n\n52.\nIt may also be of relevance to bear in mind that\nPart B can only be carried out in DDSs, given that Part B candidates do not hold LDLs. It is not\nreasonably arguable for the Applicant to say that the Commissioner is acting unlawfully by not accepting direct\napplications for Part B tests, and the use of DDSs as agents in this procedure is not, as the Applicant\nputs it, “an unlawful abdication of the Commissioner’s function”.\n\n53.\nThus, Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nG.\n\nGround 3\n\n54.\nThe initial premise of Ground 3 was that candidates\nwho failed Part B were forced to take a Repeater Course before they were allowed to retake the test.\nThis ground has since become academic, as the TD has, following this judicial review application (which was made\nin January 2025), requested all DDSs explicitly to offer the option of not taking the Repeater Course to\nensure full consistency with the RTO and the Regulations. This took effect from 18 April 2025.\n\n55.\nThe Applicant submitted that it would be unjust for the\nCourt to dismiss this ground simply because it has become academic, given that the TD and DDSs only amended the\npractice on 18 April 2025. He cited\nLaw Mei Mei v Airport Authority\n\n[2018] HKCFI 1940\nin support, where the Court held that dismissing an application for\njudicial review solely on the ground that it has become academic due to subsequent regulatory amendments would\nbe unjust, particularly where the amendments were made after the Applicant raised the issue. With respect,\nI do not think that\nLaw Mei Mei\nis directly applicable to the present situation.\n\n56.\nIn\nLaw Mei Mei\n, Chow J (as he then was) held\nat §45 that where an application is said to be academic (in the sense that the declaratory relief sought by the\napplicant would have no further utility), it did not necessarily follow that the Court should dismiss the\napplication without consideration of its substantive merits. Rather, whether the Court should do so involved the\nexercise of judicial discretion. For guidance, he cited the analysis of Ma CJHC (as he then was) in\n\nChit Fai Motors Co Ltd v Commissioner for Transport\n[2004] 1 HKC 465, which established a non-exhaustive\nlist that the Court may use in its determination:\n\n(1) Where a question is hypothetical or academic in the sense that there are simply no events that\nhave occurred that form the basis for the question to be answered, a Court will not entertain it.\nHowever relevant or even important the question may be, the Court will not give an advisory opinion on\nhypothetical facts. There are principally two reasons for this: first, the Court’s function is to\nadjudicate on real disputes, not imaginary ones, and secondly, to decide on points of law or principle when\nthere are no facts before the court is not only undesirable, it can have unfortunate or even dangerous\nconsequences. In this situation, the Court will not have any jurisdiction to determine the question.\n\n(2) Sometimes, however, the question before the Court is said to be hypothetical or academic only\nbecause the real dispute that drove the parties to litigation happens no longer to be in existence at the\ntime of the hearing, even though the relevant facts giving rise to the dispute were real and had actually\ntaken place.\n\n(3) In the type of situation referred to in the previous paragraph, the Court does have\njurisdiction to hear and determine the question in issue. However, in deciding whether or not to do so\n(and this can be said to be a matter of discretion), the Court will closely examine the relevance or utility\nof any decision. In the public law sphere, this may be easier to demonstrate than in relation to\nprivate rights. This is because very often in public or administrative law cases, the duties of public\nbodies fall to be exercised on a continuing basis not only in relation to the parties before the Court but\nalso perhaps to others in the future.\n\n57.\nIn that case, Chow J found that it fell within\nsub-paragraph (2) – and that there would be grave injustice if he dismissed the application for judicial\nreview without consideration of its substantive merits simply because the Secretary for Security had exercised\nthe power to amend the relevant regulations after the event. It was particularly relevant that the\nGovernment was plainly aware that an issue had been raised on whether the Airport Authority acted contrary to\nthe applicable regulations even before the commencement of the proceedings. The timing of the amendment of\nthe relevant provisions – only after the Court had rejected the academic contention at the leave hearing – was\nalso important.\n\n58.\nIn the present case, there have only been a few grounds of\nthis application that have been rendered academic. A ruling that this ground is academic does not in\nitself, dismiss the entire application. Further, the amendments made by the Transport Department were made\npromptly – unlike in\nLaw Mei Mei\n, where they were only made after leave had been granted. In any\nevent, the amendments made were not as substantial. The TD, through these amendments, merely clarified\ncertain pre-existing positions. It was not,\nper se\n, a complete\nvolte-face\n.\n\n59.\nIndeed, it is HKSM’s submission that a Repeater Course was\nnever compulsory. Rather, it was their long-standing practice to recommended every Part B re-taker to\nenrol in the Repeater Course. This is evidenced by the case of a former student Mr Cheung (who re-sat\nhis Part B test on 23 June 2023 at the New Kwun Tong Driving School), who decided not to do the\nRepeater Course but rather hire a motor cycle for self-practice.\n\n60.\nIt therefore seems to me that this is a case where there\nwas a lack of clarity in relation to the “requirement” of taking the Repeater Course, which has now been\ncorrected.\n\n61.\nI acknowledge that the Applicant has submitted that it is\nin the public interest for this Court to find the Repeater Course unlawful to enable other test applicants to\npursue civil claims for fees paid. However, in my opinion, the primary issue in relation to this ground was the\ntaking of the Repeater Course, and that fees may have been paid for the Course was a consequence of it. As\na matter of principle, I do not think that the potential retrospective seeking of fees constitutes sufficient\nutility for the Applicant to rely on in keeping this ground “alive”.\n\n62.\nAs this ground has been rendered academic by the\nenforcement of TD’s instructions since 18 April 2025, this Ground 3 cannot succeed.\n\nH.\n\nGround 4\n\n63.\nGround 4 goes to the Commissioner’s acquiescence to\nthe DDSs’ allegedly unlawful practice of not allowing candidates to use their own vehicles for Part B,\nwhich resulted in a “hidden” mandatory vehicle rental fee (paid to the DDS) that is not mentioned in the RTO.\n\n64.\nAccording to regulation 12C(5) of the Regulations, a\ncandidate who wishes to undergo Part B or Part C shall provide a motor cycle at his/her own expense,\nand an authorised examiner may refuse to conduct a test where they have reason to suspect that the motor cycle\nis not suitable for the purpose or is not in a good mechanical condition. In other words, the law provides\nthat candidates may use their own test vehicle.\n\n65.\nHowever, as pointed out by the Commissioner, this\nrequirement includes the insurance requirement under section 4 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party\nRisks) Ordinance Cap 272, which states that it is not lawful for any person to use a motor vehicle on a\nroad unless there is in force in relation to the user of the vehicle a policy of insurance or such a security in\nrespect of third-party risks – and section 3 extends this provision to cover private roads.\n\n66.\nAs noted by both the Commissioner and HKSM, it is\nvirtually impossible for candidates – as a person without an LDL (which can only be obtained after Part B)\n– to obtain third-party risks insurance coverage for their own vehicle for the purposes of taking Part B.\n\n67.\nIndeed, even in the transcripts of the recordings provided\nby the Applicant in his Reply, it can be seen that the representative for the TD repeatedly stated that it\nwould be difficult for candidates to use their own vehicles due to insurance-related issues, and it is the\nreason why the DDSs provide vehicles for hire for Part B: see, for example, the TD representative’s\nstatement at 07:16 of the transcript dated 13 December 2025 (which I note, was a call between the TD\nand the Applicant that took place several months after the Form 86).\n\n68.\nIt has also been put forward by both the Commissioner and\nHKSM that the DDSs, in principle, allow students to use their own vehicles if they are able to meet the\nrequirements. HKSM provides an example of a motor tricycle student Mr Ho (the motor tricycle test\nbeing identical to the motor cycle test). In Mr Ho’s case, he was allowed to use his own motor\ntricycle for the driving instruction course and Part B test in September 2016. After he\nencountered difficulties in securing the third-party risks insurance coverage for his motor tricycle for the\npurposes of attending the driving instruction course and Part B, HKSM assisted him in arranging insurance\n(on a discretionary basis).\n\n69.\nTherefore, I do not see any reasonably arguable basis for\nthe Applicant’s submission on the alleged unlawful practice of not allowing candidates to use their own motor\nvehicles for Part B. Rather, it was the case that given the difficulties in obtaining insurance and\nensuring that the motor vehicle met the test requirements, the DDSs, for the sake of making things convenient\nfor its students, provided vehicles for hire (which included third-party risk insurance).\n\n70.\nI also do not see the basis for the Applicant’s argument\nthat the vehicle rental fee was “hidden”. The RTO itself provides that the candidate should provide the\nmotor cycle for the test “at his own expense”. This clearly indicates that there is a cost to be paid for\nthe use of a motor cycle in relation to the test, regardless of how the or fee is paid or to whom the cost or\nfee is paid.\n\n71.\nGround 4 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nI.\n\nGround 5\n\n72.\nThe initial argument under this ground was stated to be\nthe practice of not allowing applications to retake Part B unless the application was made within two\nmonths of an applicant’s failure of Part B. The TD’s response was that this argument was misconceived,\ngiven that although it was the practice of the DDSs to ask re-take candidates to sign up for the Repeater Course\nwithin two months to refresh their techniques, there was never any imposition of any time limit on an\napplication to retake Part B.\n\n73.\nThe Commissioner further justified this practice by\nstating that most candidates would lose their riding skills if they did not practice over two months, which is\ncrucial for Part B, and candidates are unable to practice on their own on public roads, since they are not\neligible for an LDL. Therefore, if candidates applied to retake Part B more than two months after\ntheir failed attempt, DDSs would encourage them to retake the whole driving instruction course instead (as\nopposed to the Repeater Course).\n\n74.\nIn his Reply, the Applicant acknowledged that his initial\nphrasing was imprecise, and clarified that his ground actually referred to the “oppressive” practice of the\nDDSs, which despite not being a strict time bar, resulted in the imposition of additional costs on\nstudents. He also submitted that this ground should be considered under the same reasons provided under\nGround 3.\n\n75.\nHowever, just like Ground 3, I find that this ground\nis premised on a misconception due to a lack of clarity. It is the DDSs’ practice to recommend candidates\nto re-enrol on the Repeater Course, particularly within two months to ensure that their skills remain\nfresh. This recommendation is not a mandatory requirement, and I do not see any reasonably arguable basis\nto find this practice unlawful.\n\n76.\nIf anything, this practice seems rather sensible and\nreasonable, given that re-take candidates cannot practice and refresh their skills elsewhere (as they do not\nhold an LDL). It is important to keep in mind the danger in driving motor cycles, in view of the TD’s\nresponsibility in ensuring road safety. Advising candidates to take the safest option is not, in my view,\nan “oppressive practice”.\n\n77.\nGround 5 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nJ.\n\nGround 6\n\n78.\nGround 6 pertains to the practice of the DDSs of not\nproviding any course certificate unless requested by the candidate. It has been submitted by the\nCommissioner that this ground is now academic, as the DDSs have since 11 March 2025, issued a course\ncertificate in paper form to every candidate as per the TD’s request.\n\n79.\nFurther, the Commissioner submitted that the original\npractice of not providing a course certificate (unless requested), which streamlined the driving test procedure\nfrom both an administrative and cost perspective, complied with the Regulations and the RTO. This is\nbecause in 2006, with the introduction of electronic records of road test results, the TD no longer required\napplicants to submit a physical course certificate as part of their test applications.\n\n80.\nThe Commissioner provided the following justifications in\nrelation to this practice:\n\n(1) Only those who had completed the driving instruction course at a DDS would be allowed to take\nPart B.\n\n(2) Part B is conducted in a DDS by an authorised examiner of TD, and the TD keeps records of\nPart B results in its system.\n\n(3) It follows that TD’s records of a candidate passing Part B would be sufficient in showing\nthat they must have had full attendance of the driving instruction course, and a paper certificate is no\nlonger needed to ascertain such information.\n\n(4) Likewise, TD’s electronic records indicate and ensure that a candidate has completed the\ndriving instruction course at a DDS before he/she is eligible to take Part C.\n\n81.\nThe Commissioner’s submissions were acknowledged by the\nApplicant’s reply, who made no further submission in relation to this ground.\n\n82.\nAs a result, I find that this Ground has been rendered\nacademic, and I need not deal with it for the purposes of this application.\n\nK.\n\nGround 7\n\n83.\nUnder Ground 7, the Applicant submitted that the\nfailure of the Commissioner to require DDSs to provide departmental PICSs and PPSs (under the PDPO) in the\ncourse of processing applications for motor cycle driving tests was unlawful. The Applicant further\npointed out in his Reply that the PICS provided by the DDSs did not clearly indicate data redistribution to TD\nor properly inform him about the potential for data transfer to third parties.\n\n84.\nI do not accept this ground. In the PICS and PPS\nprovided by HKSM (and NKT), it provides that HKSM (and the DDSs by extension) may use and retain personal data\nprovided by an applicant for the purpose of, amongst others, processing of their service application and\nprovisioning of the services. It also provides that HKSM may disclose and transfer the applicant’s\npersonal data to the following parties to use, disclose, process or retain for the purpose(s) mentioned above,\nwhich include (amongst others) HKSM’s agents, contractors and service providers for the provision of their\nservices, HKSM’s affiliated companies and business partners, and regulatory bodies, law enforcement agencies and\ncourts.\n\n85.\nIn my view, it is clear that the purpose of “processing an\napplicant’s application and provisioning of HKSM’s services” would encompass the use of personal data in\nregistering for motor cycle driving test applications. It also logically follows that this personal data\nmust be submitted to TD for the processing and approval of the driving test applications. This\nredistribution of data is clearly envisioned in the PICS, and it certainly does not contravene Data Protection\nPrinciple 3 in Schedule 1 of the PDPO, which prohibits the use of personal data for a new purpose without the\nprescribed consent of the data subject.\n\n86.\nThis is further supported by the fact that in each of\nHKSM’s sales receipts issued to students upon completion of enrolment, there is a Customer Declaration, which\nprovides (amongst other things) that based on the PDPO, HKSM may “collect, acquire, hold, store and use personal\nparticular and information given by [the student] during enrolment and the driving test forms and test results\nafter the driving test(s) for registration and recording purpose”, and that “HKSM or its relevant person or\nassociated entities may utilise such information for conducting any lawful business”.\n\n87.\nThus, it is evident that the redistribution of the\nApplicant’s personal data was included in HKSM’s PICS/PPS, and there was no failure by the DDSs to provide a\nclear statement in relation to such data redistribution (and no failure by the Commissioner to regulate this\npractice).\n\n88.\nIn any event, the Commissioner has noted that following\nthe Applicant’s complaints, the TD instructed all the DDSs to provide the full set of the TD’s driving test\napplication form (which include the “Notes About Personal Data” section) to applicants during the enrolment\nprocess since 13 January 2025. This, the Commissioner contended, rendered this ground academic.\n\n89.\nAlso, as Counsel for HKSM and NKT have rightfully pointed\nout, the Applicant has an available alternative remedy in making these complaints regarding non-compliance of\nthe PDPO, which is to the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, who is best placed to deal with these matters\nas the only authority in Hong Kong entrusted with investigatory and prosecutorial powers in relation to the data\nprivacy of individuals. Judicial review, therefore, is not the correct avenue to take with regards to this\nground.\n\n90.\nHence, Ground 7 is not reasonably arguable with any\nrealistic prospect of success.\n\nL.\n\nGround 8\n\n91.\nThe Applicant’s contention under Ground 8 was that\nthere was an inconsistency between legislation and the TD’s actual practice in relation to the issue of Test\nForms prior to the obtainment of course certificates, and that this practice was contrary to the regulatory\nintent.\n\n92.\nAs mentioned in Section B above, the Regulations provide\nthat a course certificate is one of the requirements for an application for a driving test, and accordingly it\nshould be obtained prior to applying for any part of the driving test (including Parts A, B, and C). Also\nmentioned under Ground 6, is the idea that course certificates were no longer issued on an automatic basis\n(prior to 11 March 2025), for the sake of administrative convenience (in terms of both time and\ncosts). This was justified on the basis that only a candidate who had completed the driving instruction\ncourse would be allowed to partake in Part B (which, in essence, meant that they in theory were eligible\nfor/had obtained a course certificate by the time of the Part B test), and that the records, now being kept\nelectronically, removed the need for the handing-in of physical certificates.\n\n93.\nAs I see it, the Applicant’s submission under this ground\nhence targeted Part A – namely that the Commissioner, in practice, will issue Test Forms to candidates for\nPart A even though they have yet to complete the driving instruction course. In his Reply, the\nApplicant sought to emphasise that allowing an applicant to take the Part A test before completing the driving\ninstruction course is not merely something potentially not entirely consistent with the regime, but a direct\nreversal of the sequence mandated by regulation 12B. He also pointed to potential inconvenience rather\nthan convenience caused by what the Commissioner referred to in her Initial Response as a “facilitation\nmeasure”, and that it removes choice from candidates who for valid reasons might prefer to follow the sequence\nset out in the Regulations. On the other hand, the Applicant recognised that some candidates may prefer\nthe current sequence, which allows a shorter gap between the course and the Part B test, so that he would be\nwilling to amend the relief sought by him in his declaration set out in the Form 86 in effect to permit\ncandidates to follow either sequence.\n\n94.\nFirstly, I would note that the issue advanced by the\nApplicant under this ground does not arise in the present situation. The Applicant was exempt from taking\nPart A in relation to his motor cycle driving test because he had previously passed Part A when\nobtaining his light goods vehicle driving licence. This means that this ground is premised on a\nhypothetical, which the Court, in usual circumstances, would not entertain.\n\n95.\nIn any event, I do not think that upon a proper reading of\nthe statute (including its context, purpose and actual language used), this practice can be seen as necessarily\nunlawful.\n\n96.\nTo provide the general legislative context (and as a basis\nof comparison), it may be useful to look to the provision governing the application for driving tests in\nrelation to general vehicles (i.e. all motor vehicles other than motor cycles, motor tricycles, taxis, and\nride-hailing vehicles), which is regulation 31 of the Regulations. Under regulation 31(1) (which\nis the general counterpart to regulation 12B), a person who wishes to apply for a driving test shall\ndeliver to the Commissioner a signed application in a form specified by the Commissioner. He shall also\nstate in the application the class of motor vehicle (in relation to which the test is) and the particulars of\nthe LDL or temporary driving licence, if any, that is held by the applicant.\n\n97.\nThe regulation, however, does not specify any course\ncertificate as a requirement. So long as the application is submitted to the Commissioner and the\nprescribed fee is paid, the Commissioner will, under regulation 31(2), issue a Test Form. Hence, the\ncourse certificate requirement is only valid for an application for a motor cycle driving test.\n\n98.\nIt is also worth noting that Part A is uniform across\nall driving tests for all types of vehicles – which can be seen by the exemption given to candidates who have\nalready passed Part A on a previous occasion (for example, the Applicant). Yet, an applicant for\nanother test (for example, a light goods vehicle driving test) is not required to take a driving instruction\ncourse prior to taking Part A.\n\n99.\nTherefore, in my view, the initial legislative purpose of\nthe course certificate was to ensure that the candidate wishing to take the motor cycle driving tests had\ncompleted the driving instruction course. Given that the driving instruction course provides the skills required\nto pass the practical tests (i.e. Parts B and C), the intention was to set a minimum threshold to ensure\nthe safety of both the candidate and the examiner – and other road users – in carrying out the practical\ntests. I think it less likely it could have been intended by the legislature to impose the driving\ninstruction course (i.e. course certificate requirement) on Part A, given that Part A is solely\non the Road Users’ Code.\n\n100.\nBut whilst I hold the Commissioner’s practice to be\nwithin her powers under the legislation, it may still be beneficial to reconcile the procedural inconsistencies\nidentified under regulation 12B – which the Commissioner described as technical and procedural, without\ncompromise of road safety. Indeed, the Commissioner undertook in her Initial Response to review and refine\nthe arrangements, or procure amendments to the Regulations where necessary. This may be helpful to prevent\nany misunderstandings in the application of the law. On that basis, the general point of the relief sought\nby the Applicant seems to be in train (with ultimate policy to be decided by the Commissioner, and not by the\nCourt).\n\n101.\nNevertheless, Ground 8 is also not reasonably\narguable with any realistic prospect of success, and/or is or has in effect become academic.\n\nM.\n\nNon-Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies\n\n102.\nCounsel for HKSM and NKT has put forward that the\nApplicant brought these judicial review proceedings without exhausting all available remedies. They\nsubmitted that YLDS (where the Applicant was a student) had put in place various means for students to express\nopinions or lodge complaints about the training and services, including a Service Improvement Program Slip\n(available at the reception of a DDS), emails, customer service hotline and contacting customer service\nrepresentatives at the YLDS Services Counter. Reference was also made to brief complaint procedures in\nrelation to HKSM that were provided under “Student’s Charter” in the HKSM Rules and Regulations, and under\nparagraph 14 of the “Important Notice to Student (Motorcycle Course)”. As there was no record of the\nApplicant lodging any complaint through these channels, the application was said to be premature and/or an abuse\nof the judicial process.\n\n103.\nI do not accept this submission. The submissions\nmade by the Applicant were in relation to the operation of the rules and regulations, as well as the procedure\nin taking exams. In my opinion, the complaint procedures provided by the YLDS or HKSM do not cover the\nissues and concerns raised by the Applicant.\n\n104.\nNevertheless, as I have found no reasonably arguable\nmerit in the Applicant’s intended grounds of review, this point is not determinative of this application.\n\nN.\n\nResult\n\n105.\nThe Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably\narguable grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success. Further, some of the points raised are\nor have become academic.\n\n106.\nThe application for leave to apply for judicial review\nis hence dismissed.\n\n107.\nI make no order as to costs.\n\n(Russell Coleman)\n\nJustice of Appeal of the Court of Appeal\nHigh Court\n\nThe applicant, acting in person\n\nMs Jacqueline Hung and Ms Amiel Lee, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice,\nfor\nthe 1\nst\nputative respondent\n\nMr Jimmy Ma and Mr Keith Tam of Counsel, instructed by Sun Lawyers LLP, for the\n2\nnd\nand 3\nrd\nputative respondents","changes":[]}