{"check":null,"uid":"89a58fe74b414aa1","title":"Barry McCaffrey & Anor v Chief Constable of Police Service of Northern Ireland & Ors","title_generated":false,"country":"Великобритания","organ":"Суды Англии и Уэльса","kind":"case","kind_name":"Судебная практика","lang":"en","date":"2026-10-29","summary":"Суд рассматривает вопрос о полномочиях трибунала по расследованию полномочий (ИПТ) принимать решения о возмещении судебных расходов. В деле рассматривались жалобы журналистов, чьи дома были незаконно обысканы полицией Северной Ирландии. ИПТ постановил, что полиция действовала неправомерно и присудил компенсацию каждому из заявителей. Заявители также просили возместить расходы за два неэффективных слушания. Однако ИПТ счел, что у него нет юрисдикции для определения судебных издержек и отклонил их просьбу. Суд поддержал решение ИПТ, указав, что компенсация за дополнительные расходы может быть предоставлена через увеличение компенсации ущерба, но не через прямое возмещение судебных издержек.","snippet":"","topics":["Цифровые платформы и сервисы"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":58206,"versions":1,"url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2026/1374","first_seen":"2026-10-30","last_checked":"2026-11-16 05:32","relevance":"hit","score":3,"query":"data protection","source_key":"caselaw_uk","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":3,"topics":["Цифровые платформы и сервисы"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[{"kind":"акт","name":"DSA","topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы"}],"evidence":[{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"DSA","weak":false,"pos":689,"ctx":"rib 8. By that decision, the Tribunal quashed a Directed Surveillance Authorisation (“the DSA”) and made an award of compensation to each Appellant of £4000. The Appellants then appli","zone":"акт","weight":3}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"dsa","weak":false,"pos":604,"ctx":"rib 8. by that decision, the tribunal quashed a directed surveillance authorisation (“the dsa”) and made an award of compensation to each appellant of £4000. the appellants then appli","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"dsa","weak":false,"pos":3903,"ctx":"ies, in particular compensation. each of the claimants was awarded £4,000 in respect of a dsa. on some other aspects of the matter, no award of damages was considered necessary to aff","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Телеком и инфраструктура","term":"telecommunication","weak":true,"pos":10237,"ctx":"ications sent by or to him, or intended for him, or  (iv)  his use of any postal service, telecommunications service or telecommunication system, in any conduct falling within section 65(5) ;  (b)","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"},{"topic":"Телеком и инфраструктура","term":"telecommunication","weak":true,"pos":10267,"ctx":"intended for him, or  (iv)  his use of any postal service, telecommunications service or telecommunication system, in any conduct falling within section 65(5) ;  (b)  to investigate the authority","why":"одиночное упоминание (нужно 3)"}]},"last_changed":"2026-10-30","meta":{"neutralCitation":"[2026] EWCA Civ 1374","court":"The Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Civil Division)"},"source_url":"https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2026/1374","text":"Lord Justice Bean (Vice President, Court of Appeal, Civil Division)\n\n1.\n\nThe question in this case is whether the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (“the IPT”) has jurisdiction to make orders for costs. A five-judge panel of the Tribunal, including its President and Vice-President, decided that it had no such power.\n\n2.\n\nThat costs decision followed a decision on the merits of a three-judge panel of the Tribunal (Lord Justice Singh (President), Lady Carmichael and Stephen Shaw KC) on 17 December 2024 [2024] UKIPTrib 8. By that decision, the Tribunal quashed a Directed Surveillance Authorisation (“the DSA”) and made an award of compensation to each Appellant of £4000. The Appellants then applied for costs against the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“the PSNI”). We are asked to say whether the tribunal was right or wrong, although as will be seen there is a dispute as to the capacity in which we should sit. To set the scene, I should outline some of the factual history as found by the IPT.\n\nThe facts\n\n3.\n\nMr McCaffrey and Mr Birney, the appellants, are journalists. Mr McCaffrey is a senior reporter with The Detail. Mr Birney is a documentary producer who co-founded The Detail in 2011, after founding the independent television production company Below the Radar in 2005. He also founded Fine Point Films in 2012.\n\n4.\n\nThey produced a documentary film entitled No Stone Unturned (\"NSU\"). The film is about the murder of six unarmed men by members of the Ulster Volunteer Force at the Heights Bar in Loughinisland, County Down, on 18 June 1994. No-one has ever been prosecuted for those murders. The premiere of the film took place at the New York Film Festival on 30 September 2017. The IPT were invited to view the film and described it as \"a serious investigative documentary addressing a matter of obvious public interest and concern.\"\n\n5.\n\nOn the 20\nth\nof October 2017, representatives of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland became aware that the film mentioned two documents that the Ombudsman had not disclosed. They reported the matter to the PSNI, which commissioned the Durham Police to investigate what appeared to be the leaking of those two documents.\n\n6.\n\nOn 18 August 2018 HHJ Rafferty granted a search warrant authorising the search of the claimants' homes and business premises. The PSNI executed the warrants on 31 August 2018. The claimants were arrested on suspicion of theft and a breach of the\nOfficial Secrets Act 1989\n. That same day, they made a successful emergency leave application in the High Court of Northern Ireland before Morgan LCJ, who directed Mr Ellis and a senior officer of the PSNI to sign an undertaking on behalf of Durham Constabulary and PSNI not to examine certain data seized under the warrants, until further order of the court.\n\n7.\n\nAt a later date Morgan LCJ, Treacy LJ and Keegan J (as she then was), sitting in the Divisional Court in Northern Ireland, held that the claimant journalists were subjected to unlawful search warrants. The warrants were granted in an ex parte hearing that \" ….fell woefully short of the standard required to ensure that the hearing was fair\", in circumstances where there was “no overriding requirement in the public interest which could have justified an interference with the protection of journalistic sources...\".\n\n8.\n\nIn June 2019, both Claimants issued proceedings under\nsection 7(1)\n(a) of the\nHuman Rights Act 1998\n(\"HRA\") and made complaints to the IPT on the basis that they thought it likely that the warrants executed against them were \"not the only attempt made to identify their confidential sources\". Those proceedings and complaints were directed against the first to seventh respondents.\n\n9.\n\nThe IPT found that the PSNI had acted unlawfully in certain respects. The Tribunal also granted remedies, in particular compensation. Each of the Claimants was awarded £4,000 in respect of a DSA. On some other aspects of the matter, no award of damages was considered necessary to afford just satisfaction.\n\n10.\n\nThe proceedings were dogged by late and inadequate disclosure by the PSNI. Two hearings in February and May 2024 proved to be ineffective. On each occasion, the IPT, when vacating the hearing, reserved the issue of costs. They did so again when handing down their substantive judgment dated 17 December 2024.\n\n11.\n\nThe Tribunal recorded that the Claimants were not asking for their costs in full, in particular the costs of the substantive hearing which did eventually take place in October 2024; what they sought was the wasted costs of the two hearings in February and May 2024.\n\nSubmissions to the IPT on costs\n\n12.\n\nIn the Claimants’ original application for costs dated 23 December 2024, it was submitted:-\n\n“The Tribunal’s jurisprudence on costs is not yet fully developed. The Applicants respectfully suggest that the proper approach is as follows:\n\na)\n\nThe Tribunal has power under s. 67(7) of RIPA when determining proceedings to make any “other order as they think fit”. This broadly worded power includes a power to award costs where appropriate.\n\nb)\n\nThere is no presumption that costs should follow the event. Indeed, there are strong policy reasons for costs not to be awarded against Applicants and for orders against public authorities to be confined to cases where there has been unreasonable conduct. This is the approach generally adopted in other Tribunals.”\n\n13.\n\nAt paragraph 29 it concluded by submitting that an order for costs was appropriate because:-\n\n“a)\n\nFirst, the Tribunal relies on accurate and complete returns and a high degree of co-operation from public authorities.\n\nb)\n\nSecondly, the effect of PSNI’s conduct of the litigation has been to increase greatly the work of Counsel to the Tribunal, whose costs are borne by the Tribunal and ultimately the public.”\n\n14.\n\nIn its submissions in response dated 23 January 2025, the PSNI opposed the making of an order for costs both on the facts and on the grounds that the IPT had no jurisdiction to make it.\n\n15.\n\nAlthough the Appellants were only seeking an order for costs against the PSNI, the IPT invited submissions from the other Respondents to this appeal on the issue of jurisdiction which is plainly of general importance to parties before the Tribunal. The other Respondents generally followed the PSNI. On the issue of whether an alternative basis of compensation is available, the Metropolitan Police Service submitted that:-\n\n“13.\n\nIt follows that:\n\na)\n\nAggravated damages may be awarded taking account [of] the respondent’s conduct of litigation before the Tribunal; but\n\nb)\n\nThe respondent’s conduct of the litigation must aggravate the compensatable injury to the claimant; and\n\nc)\n\nAn award of aggravated damages taking account [of] the respondent’s conduct will not be the same, notably as to quantum, as if a costs order were made.\n\n14.\n\nIn answer to the question posed in the subheading above:\n\na)\n\nIf the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make an award of costs, the Tribunal may adjust its award of damages where the respondent’s conduct of litigation has aggravated the compensatable injury to the claimant;\n\nb)\n\nBut the Tribunal may not do so “to reach an analogous result” to having jurisdiction to make an award of costs, because the award of aggravated damages taking account the respondent’s conduct:\n\ni.\n\nrequires not only the type of bad behaviour in litigation that would justify a costs award per\nChatwani / Dias\nbut, additionally, that the behaviour has aggravated the compensatable injury to the claimant; and\n\nii.\n\ndoes not have the same consequences as if a costs order is made. The aggravation caused by the respondent’s conduct may justify an increase in the amount of the damages award, but this will not be computed based on the costs the applicant has incurred (or, usually, to the amount of those costs, taking into [account] the modesty of damages awards made by the Tribunal).”\n\n16.\n\nIn a reply submission dated 4 March 2025, the Claimants took up the issue of an alternative basis of an award in the following terms:-\n\n“…it appears to be common ground between the Applicants, the PSNI, the intelligence services and the Met that if there is no jurisdiction to award costs, an increased award of damages may, in principle, be made. Such an award will not necessarily include all of the costs wasted or incurred. PSNI’s suggestion that no increased award should be made because it is too late to increase damages is wrong. Issues of costs (and an increased award of damages if costs are not available) were reserved to this hearing. The Applicants have throughout sought an award of costs on a free-standing basis or on the basis of the approach in\nDias\n. This does not involve circumvention of RIPA, but ensuring that an adequate award of just satisfaction is made under the\nHuman Rights Act 1998\n.”\n\nThe relevant statute and rules\n\n17.\n\nThe IPT was established by\ns 65(1)\nof the\nRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000\n(“RIPA”) and its jurisdiction is as set out in\ns 65(2)\n. In essence, that jurisdiction consists of dealing with “proceedings” brought under\nsection 7\nof the HRA and “complaints” brought by a person who is aggrieved by any conduct falling within\ns 65(5)\nof RIPA.\n\n18.\n\nSection 67 of RIPA provides as follows:\n\n“(1)\n\nSubject to subsections (4) and (5), it shall be the duty of the Tribunal—\n\n(a)\n\nto hear and determine any proceedings brought before them by virtue of\nsection 65(2)\n(a) or (d); and\n\n(b)\n\nto consider and determine any complaint or reference made to them by virtue of\nsection 65(2)\n(ba) or (c).\n\n(2)\n\nWhere the Tribunal hear any proceedings by virtue of\nsection 65(2)\n(a), they shall apply the same principles for making their determination in those proceedings as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.\n\n(3)\n\nWhere the Tribunal consider a complaint made to them by virtue of\nsection 65(2)\n(b), it shall be the duty of the Tribunal—\n\n(a)\n\nto investigate whether the persons against whom any allegations are made in the complaint have engaged in relation to—\n\n(i)\n\nthe complainant,\n\n(ii)\n\nany of his property,\n\n(iii)\n\nany communications sent by or to him, or intended for him, or\n\n(iv)\n\nhis use of any postal service, telecommunications service or telecommunication system, in any conduct falling within\nsection 65(5)\n;\n\n(b)\n\nto investigate the authority (if any) for any conduct falling within\nsection 65(5)\nwhich they find has been so engaged in; and\n\n(c)\n\nin relation to the Tribunal’s findings from their investigations, to determine the complaint by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.\n\n(4)\n\nThe Tribunal shall not be under any duty to hear, consider or determine any proceedings, complaint or reference if it appears to them that the bringing of the proceedings or the making of the complaint or reference is frivolous or vexatious.\n\n…\n\n(6)\n\nSubject to any provision made by rules under section 69, where any proceedings have been brought before the Tribunal or any complaint or reference has been made to the Tribunal, they shall have power to make such interim orders, pending their final determination, as they think fit. ”\n\n(7)\n\nSubject to any provision made by rules under section 69, the Tribunal on determining any proceedings, complaint or reference shall have power to make any such award of compensation or other order as they think fit; and, without prejudice to the power to make rules under section 69(2)(h), the other orders that may be made by the Tribunal include—\n\n(a)\n\nan order quashing or cancelling any warrant or authorisation;\n\n(aza)\n\nan order quashing or cancelling a notice under Part 3 of the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016\nor a retention notice under Part 4 of\nthat Act\n;\n\n(azb)\n\nan order quashing or revoking a direction under\nsection 225\nof\nthat Act\n;\n\n(azc)\n\nan order quashing or revoking a notice under\nsection 252\nor 253 of\nthat Act\n;\n\n(aa)\n\nan order quashing an order under\nsection 23\nA or 32A\nsection 75\nof the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016\nor\nsection 32\nA of\nthis Act\nby the relevant judicial authority (within the meaning of that section); and\n\n(b)\n\nan order requiring the destruction of any records of information which—\n\n(i)\n\nhas been obtained in exercise of any power conferred by a warrant or authorisation or by a notice under Part 3 of the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016\n; or\n\n(ii)\n\nis held by any public authority in relation to any person.\n\n(8)\n\nExcept as provided by virtue of section 67A, determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.”\n\n19.\n\nSection 68 of RIPA provides for the Tribunal’s procedures as follows:\n\n“(1)\n\nSubject to any rules made under section 69, the Tribunal shall be entitled to determine their own procedure in relation to any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to them.\n\n[…]\n\n(4)\n\nWhere the Tribunal determine any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to them, they shall give notice to the complainant which (subject to any rules made by virtue of section 69(2)(i)) shall be confined, as the case may be, to either—\n\n(a)\n\na statement that they have made a determination in his favour;\n\n(b)\n\na statement that no determination has been made in his favour.\n\n[…]\n\n(4C)\n\nWhere the Tribunal make any decision which—\n\n(a)\n\nis a final decision of a preliminary issue in relation to any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to them, and\n\n(b)\n\nis neither a determination of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) nor a decision relating to a procedural matter,\n\nthey must give notice of that decision to every person who would be entitled to receive notice of the determination under subsection (4) or (4A).”\n\n20.\n\nSection 69 provides for the making of rules regulating proceedings in the Tribunal as follows:\n\n“(1)\n\nThe Secretary of State may make rules regulating—\n\n(a)\n\nthe exercise by the Tribunal of the jurisdiction conferred on them by or under\nsection 65\n; and\n\n(b)\n\nany matters preliminary or incidental to, or arising out of, the hearing or consideration of any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to the Tribunal.\n\n(2)\n\nWithout prejudice to the generality of subsection\n\n(1), rules under this section may— […]\n\n(h)\n\nprescribe orders that may be made by the Tribunal under section 67(6) or (7); […].”\n\n21.\n\nThe current rules which have been made by the Secretary of State are the Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018 (SI 2018/1334), which came into force on 31 December 2018 (“2018 Rules”). The 2018 Rules (and their predecessor) contain no express provision as to costs. Rule 14(3) provides that where the Tribunal “propose to make any other order (including an interim order) affecting the respondent, the Tribunal must give the complainant and the respondent an opportunity to make representations as to the proposed order”.\n\n22.\n\nIt is necessary also to set out\nsection 67\nA of RIPA, added by the\nInvestigatory Powers Act 2016\n:-\n\n“\nAppeals from the Tribunal\n\n(1)\n\nA relevant person may appeal on a point of law against any determination of the Tribunal of a kind mentioned in section 68(4) or any decision of the Tribunal of a kind mentioned in section 68(4C).\n\n(2)\n\nBefore making a determination or decision which might be the subject of an appeal under this section, the Tribunal must specify the court which is to have jurisdiction to hear the appeal (the “relevant appellate court”).\n\n(3)\n\nThis court is whichever of the following courts appears to the Tribunal to be the most appropriate—\n\n(a)\n\nthe Court of Appeal in England and Wales,\n\n(b)\n\nthe Court of Session.\n\n(4)\n\nThe Secretary of State may by regulations, with the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly, amend subsection (3) so as to add the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland to the list of courts mentioned there.\n\n(5)\n\nThe Secretary of State may by regulations specify criteria to be applied by the Tribunal in making decisions under subsection (2) as to the identity of the relevant appellate court.\n\n(6)\n\nAn appeal under this section—\n\n(a)\n\nis to be heard by the relevant appellate court, but\n\n(b)\n\nmay not be made without the leave of the Tribunal or, if that is refused, of the relevant appellate court.\n\n(7)\n\nThe Tribunal or relevant appellate court must not grant leave to appeal unless it considers that—\n\n(a)\n\nthe appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or\n\n(b)\n\nthere is another compelling reason for granting leave.\n\n(8)\n\nIn this section— “relevant appellate court” has the meaning given by subsection\n\n(2), “relevant person”, in relation to any proceedings, complaint or reference, means the complainant or—\n\n(a)\n\nin the case of proceedings, the respondent,\n\n(b)\n\nin the case of a complaint, the person complained against, and\n\n(c)\n\nin the case of a reference, any public authority to whom the reference relates.\n\nThe decision of the IPT on its jurisdiction to order costs\n\n23.\n\nAt paragraphs 67-80 the Tribunal said:-\n\n“67.\n\nAs is common ground, this Tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the powers of this Tribunal are those set out (expressly or impliedly) in RIPA and the rules made under it and no more and no less.\n\n68.\n\nWe have reached the conclusion that this Tribunal does not have the power to make an order for costs for the following reasons.\n\n69.\n\nFirst, there is no express reference to costs orders at all in either RIPA or in the 2018 Rules. There could easily have been such express provision. Where Parliament intended to confer such a power on a Tribunal, or at least to confer the power to make rules enabling such orders to be made, it has done so expressly: see e.g.\nsection 13\nof the\nEmployment Tribunals Act 1996\n.\n\n70.\n\nAlthough Mr Jaffey is right to observe that the wording of\nsection 67(7)\nof RIPA is broad, and the specific orders which are then listed are set out in a non-exhaustive list, nevertheless they do provide the context in which the broad language should be interpreted. They are all examples of substantive remedies which the Tribunal has power to grant on finding that there has been a breach of the law.\n\n71.\n\nNext, Mr Jaffey accepts that his submission would have the effect that there would be a power to award costs only against one side in litigation before this Tribunal (that is against respondents). Although it is possible that that is what Parliament intended, it would be surprising that that has not been spelt out clearly in the terms of the governing legislation. Mr Jaffey is right to observe that there are other powers available to this Tribunal to dismiss a claim for example because it is frivolous or vexatious and otherwise to control abuse of its own procedures. Nevertheless, as he fairly acknowledges, his construction of the legislation would have the effect of an asymmetry in the power of the Tribunal to award costs. We would have expected that to be set out clearly on the face of the legislation.\n\n72.\n\nMr Jaffey’s construction also faces the difficulty that the power to award costs would only arise, on his submission, once the Tribunal has made a “determination”. It is possible that that word could be construed as being sufficiently broad to include a “no determination in favour” of a complainant but the more fundamental difficulty this gives rise to is that there would be no power to award costs at an earlier stage in a case. In an extreme example, if the claim were to be withdrawn, there would be no power to award costs even against a respondent which had behaved unreasonably. That might have been the scenario in the present case if, after the abortive hearings in February or May 2024, the Claimants had simply decided they had had enough and withdrawn their applications to the Tribunal.\n\n73.\n\nMr Jaffey sought to avoid this difficulty at the hearing before us by suggesting that the power to make an interim order, which the Tribunal undoubtedly enjoys under\nsection 67(6)\nof RIPA, could be used to make an interim order for costs. The difficulty with that submission is that an interim order is an order pending a final decision, whereas what Mr Jaffey would need to cater for is the making of a final order as to costs albeit made at an interim stage in the case. Those are not the same thing.\n\n74.\n\nWe also consider that this interpretation of the legislation is consistent with the need for legal certainty. Although Mr Jaffey and Ms McGahey are agreed, and this Tribunal has previously said, that the Tribunal should be a cost-free regime at least so far as applicants are concerned, there is nothing on the face of legislation to say that. If the Tribunal does have power to award costs, it is difficult to see any principled basis on which that could be limited to orders only against respondents. In effect the Tribunal would be engaging in legislation, rather than judicial decision-making. This would also not be conducive to the interests of legal certainty. Applicants and indeed respondents are entitled to know what the criteria will be for the award of costs but those criteria do not appear in any legislation.\n\n75.\n\nIn our view, if there is to be a jurisdiction to award costs conferred on the Tribunal, it would be better for this to be achieved either by rules made by the Secretary of State or in primary legislation enacted by Parliament. This would have the merit of creating legal certainty, so that everyone concerned would know what the criteria are for the award of costs. It would make it clear whether the power to award costs could only be exercised against respondents or whether it would also be available against applicants. It would also make it clear whether the Tribunal should have a general discretion to award costs or whether it should be confined to situations where a party had acted unreasonably.\n\n76.\n\nThis would also have the merit that any legislative change would only be made after there had been the opportunity for public consultation. The Tribunal is not institutionally well-equipped to engage in setting up a costs regime.\n\n77.\n\nFinally, we have reached the conclusion that there is no decision of this Tribunal that leads to the conclusion that there is the power to award costs. In any event, this Tribunal has sat on this occasion as a five-member panel, including the President and Vice President and other senior members, so that the legal position can be reviewed definitively. Insofar as there is any decision of this Tribunal which has previously held that the Tribunal does have the power to award costs, we make it clear that it was wrong.\n\n78.\n\nIn our judgment, it is possible that the Secretary of State could make rules to create a costs regime exercising the power in section 69(1)(b), since the issue of costs can properly be said to be a matter which is “incidental to, or arising out of, the hearing or consideration of any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to the Tribunal.”\n\n79.\n\nBut the fundamental difficulty is that no such rules have been made. We have reached the conclusion that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to award costs.\"\n\nI shall come to paragraph 80 of the judgment later.\n\n24.\n\nThe Tribunal added a significant postscript:-\n\n“87.\n\nWe do not regard the outcome as entirely satisfactory. We have not needed to reach a final view on the merits of the particular application for costs made in this case but the facts of the present case illustrate why it would be helpful at least in principle for this Tribunal to have the power to award costs. No one has suggested that the power to award costs would be used so that costs orders were routinely made nor that the principle should be that “costs follow the event”. We see force in Mr Jaffey’s submission that there is a need for the Tribunal to have the power to award costs, in particular against respondents, where there has been expenditure wasted as a result of their conduct and where, in particular, orders of the Tribunal are persistently breached. But, as we have explained above, that will be a matter for the Secretary of State or for Parliament.”\n\nPermission to appeal\n\n25.\n\nThe Tribunal were asked for permission to appeal to this court. They refused permission both on the grounds that the decision was not appealable and on other grounds. They said:-\n\n“Is there an appealable decision?\n\n1.\n\nSection 67\nA(1) of the\nRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000\n(“RIPA”) provides that a relevant person may appeal on a point of law against any determination of the Tribunal of a kind mentioned in section 68(4) or any decision of a kind mentioned in section 68(4C).\nSection 67(8)\nprovides that, except as provided by virtue of\nsection 67\nA, “determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court.”\n\n2.\n\nSection 68(4) of RIPA provides that, where the Tribunal determine any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to them, they shall give notice to the complainant, comprising either (a) a statement that they have made a determination in his favour; or (b) a statement that no determination has been made in his favour.\n\n3.\n\nSection 68(4C) refers to any decision which (a) is “a final decision of a preliminary issue in relation to any proceedings, complaint or reference” and (b) is “neither a determination of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) nor a decision relating to a procedural matter”.\n\n4.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is of the view that the refusal of the application for costs is not a determination or decision which may be the subject of an appeal either under section 68(4) or section 68(4C). The “determination”, which was in the applicants’ favour to an extent, in this case was given on 17 December 2024. The costs decision does not fall within section 68(4). Nor was it “a final decision of a preliminary issue”. Further, it is “a decision relating to a procedural matter”. Accordingly, it does not fall within section 68(4C) either.\n\n…\n\nThe application for permission to appeal\n\n8.\n\nIf there is an appealable decision, the Tribunal must not grant leave to appeal unless it considers that (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or (b) there is another compelling reason for granting leave: see\nsection 67\nA(7) of RIPA. We consider that the issue as to whether the Tribunal has the power to award costs does raise an important point of principle or practice. As the Tribunal said in its judgment of 17 April 2025, we do not consider it to be satisfactory that the Tribunal has no power to award costs in any circumstances at all, even if a respondent has acted unreasonably and so caused unnecessary costs to be incurred by a complainant.\n\n9.\n\nHowever, we do not grant permission to appeal ourselves because we do not consider that the relevant decision is appealable. Even if it were, we do not consider that there is a real prospect of success. This is essentially for the reasons set out in the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17 April 2025. Nor do we think that there is any other compelling reason to grant permission. Accordingly, we refuse permission to appeal.\n\n10.\n\nFinally, we bear in mind the possibility that, if an application is made to the Court of Appeal, that Court may consider, that, even if the decision is not appealable, it is amenable to judicial review. It is a matter for that Court but, in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal may wish to consider whether one or more of its members could reconstitute themselves as the High Court and consider an application for permission to bring a claim for judicial review.”\n\n26.\n\nThe IPT had designated this court as the appropriate appeal court pursuant to\ns 67\nA(3) of RIPA (the reason for this court rather than our counterparts in Northern Ireland being designated was, we were told, because there are no rules in place under which an appeal from the IPT to the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland could take place).\n\n27.\n\nThe grounds were:-\n\n“Ground 1: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal erred in law in finding that it had no jurisdiction to award costs under\nsection 67(7)\nof the\nRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000\n.\n\nGround 2: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal erred in law in finding that it would not be just and appropriate to increase the amount of compensation awarded to the Appellants to reflect their costs.\"\n\n28.\n\nThe application was considered on the papers by Popplewell LJ. He ordered that:-\n\n“There be a rolled up hearing before the full court to determine\n\n(a)\n\nwhether the Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal either pursuant to the provisions of the\nRegulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000\nor by treating the application for permission to appeal as an application for judicial review; and\n\n(b)\n\nif so whether the appeal should be allowed.”\n\nHe also ordered, pursuant to CPR 52.19, that the applicants should not be liable to pay any of the costs of the application or the appeal to this court.\n\n29.\n\nHis reasons were as follows:-\n\n“1.\n\nIf there is jurisdiction it would be appropriate to grant permission to appeal because:\n\n(a)\n\nGround 1 is arguable despite the eminence of the senior panel convened for deciding it; whilst ground 2 is less obviously so as a freestanding ground, it would be appropriate to allow both points to be argued if ground 1 is available;\n\n(b)\n\nThe grounds raise an important point of principle and practice, as the IPT itself concluded when deciding on 17 June 2025 that there was no jurisdiction to grant permission to appeal (see [8]); that is reinforced by the fact that the IPT’s decision was treated as influential in the recent decision of the Divisional Court (\n[2025] EWHC 2019 (Admin)\n) in relation to the powers of SIAC to make costs orders;\n\n(c)\n\nI am persuaded, moreover, that there are additional compelling reasons why an appeal should be heard namely (i) there are previous decisions of the IPT which do not all speak with one voice and (ii) the IPT recognised that if there is no jurisdiction to make costs orders against respondents who behave unreasonably and breach orders of the Tribunal that is an unfortunate lacuna;\n\n.........\n\n2.\n\nIt is arguable that there is jurisdiction to hear an appeal under\ns. 67\nA(1) by reason of the costs decision being part of a determination governed by s. 68(4); whether that is so is an important point of principle which ought to be determined with the benefit of oral adversarial argument, and be the subject matter of a decision by the full court. It is for that reason that I have ordered a rolled up hearing rather than granting permission myself. Whether the decision is appealable as one made under s. 68(4C) seems to me less obviously arguable but it may be addressed orally.\"\n\n30.\n\nThe Appellants contended that we had jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Alternatively, if we did not, we should adopt the suggestion of the IPT that we could reconstitute ourselves as a Divisional Court and treat the application as one for judicial review. The Respondents submitted that the IPT was right to hold that there was no jurisdiction for this court to hear an appeal but did not oppose our hearing the application as a Divisional Court. It was agreed on all sides that it was desirable, given the general importance of the decision of the specially constituted five-judge panel of the IPT, that we should decide whether they were right or wrong rather than saying that we were precluded from doing so. Mr Jaffey informed us that, in case we took the view that only the judicial review route was open, a precautionary application for judicial review had been issued and stayed by consent in order to avoid any difficulties with time limits.\n\nOur jurisdiction to hear an appeal\n\n31.\n\nI am satisfied, as my colleagues are, that we do have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. The starting point is\ns 67(8)\nof RIPA which provides that determinations, orders and decisions of the IPT “shall not be subject to appeal or liable to be questioned in any court” except as provided by virtue of\nSection 67\nA.\n\n32.\n\nSection 67\nA(1) states that a party may appeal against any determination of the Tribunal of a kind mentioned in s 68(4) or s 68(4C. Section 68(4) begins with the words “where the tribunal determine any proceedings, complaint or reference.” I cannot accept the Respondents’ argument that the “determination” of these proceedings ended with the handing-down of the substantive judgment on 17 December 2024. As recorded earlier, the Tribunal had in two earlier orders (in February and May 2024) reserved the issue of costs. They did so again when handing down the substantive decision in December. Their decision not to make any order for costs was part of their determination of the complaints. The case is no different from what it would have been if the substantive judgment had been handed down or read out in open court in the presence of counsel who then made an oral application for costs on the spot. The Tribunal had not finished its work on the case or become\nfunctus officio\n.\n\n33.\n\nAccordingly, we informed the parties, after hearing brief argument at the outset of the hearing, that we considered that we did have jurisdiction to sit as the Court of Appeal; the permission granted by Popplewell LJ took effect: and we proceeded to hear the appeal.\n\nThe previous case law relating to the IPT’s power to award costs\n\n34.\n\nIn\nW v Public Authority\n(case number IPT/09/134/C) (judgment of 1 February 2011), an application was made for costs against the complainant. The Tribunal observed, at para 5:\n\n“The issue which we are deciding in this case is limited to the following, namely whether costs can (and if so should) be awarded to (i) a respondent against a complainant (ii) upon a withdrawal by the complainant.”\n\n35.\n\nIn addressing that issue, Mummery LJ (President) and Burton J (Vice-President) said, at para 6, that, since this Tribunal is a creature of statute, any power to award costs must be drawn from statute: there is no inherent power.\n\n36.\n\nAt para 7, they said that the only available provisions from which such a power could be drawn are\nsection 67(7)\nand section 68 of RIPA, and rule 12 of the 2000 Rules. However, the Tribunal continued:\n\n“Even assuming that ‘any … other order as they think fit’ could include an order for costs, the context appears to be referring to, and certainly only exemplifies, orders in favour of a complainant. However, significantly for the determination of the issues before us, even if it could be read as including the possibility of an order for costs in favour of a respondent, such order could only be made ‘on determining any proceedings, complaint or reference’, and the Tribunal has not made any such determination, because the complaint was withdrawn prior to determination.”\n\n37.\n\nAt para 10, the Tribunal said the following:\n\n“We conclude for all the above reasons our answer to the question set out in paragraph 5 above should be negative. We do not conclude that there is power to award costs in favour of a respondent against a complainant who has withdrawn his complaint. Notwithstanding the matters which, because they have been so helpfully canvassed, have been set out above, we reach no other decision than that in the instant case and on this occasion.”\n\nThis case is of limited assistance given that the issue was whether costs could be\nawarded against a complainant after withdrawal of the complaint.\n\n38.\n\nIn\nChatwani v National Crime Agency\n[2015] UKIPTrib 15_84_88-CH (judgment of 20 July 2015), Burton J (President), giving the judgment of the Tribunal, said, at para 48:\n\n“Mr Jones sought costs, either as compensation or in the ordinary way. So far as the former is concerned he drew our attention to no authority and we are satisfied that legal costs are not a recognised head of damages. Mr Bird further pointed out that if costs were to be treated as compensation then that would mean that a respondent could never recover costs, and that concepts such as mitigation would arise. As for a claim of costs on the ordinary basis, we see no reason to differ from our previous conclusion in\nW v Public Authority\nIPT 09/134 that for reasons given at length in that judgment it was not appropriate to award costs in what is intended to be a ‘costs free’ jurisdiction……We make no award of costs in the complainants’ favour.”\n\n39.\n\nSubsequently, however, on 9 September 2015, the Tribunal made the following order in\nChatwani\nat para 3:\n\n“The Respondent is to pay to the Claimant within 14 days £10,000 in respect of the Claimant’s costs incurred as a result of the Respondents’ persistent breaches of the said Order. The Tribunal takes the view that the circumstances are wholly exceptional.”\n\nNo reasons appear to have been given, or at least recorded, to explain the making of that order. On its face, it appears to be contrary to what the Tribunal had said in\nChatwani\nitself in the passage cited above.\n\n40.\n\nIn\nDias v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police\n(case numbers IPT/15/586/CH and others) (judgment of 9 August 2017), there was an application for costs against the respondent. The procedural background was that there had been resistance by the respondent to disclosure of certain documents “presumably hoping that the Tribunal would arrive at a false conclusion as to the facts”: see para 12 of the judgment of a five-member Tribunal given by Sir Michael Burton (President). At para 24, the Tribunal said:\n\n“Further, it is important to recall that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is essentially a costs free jurisdiction, unlike the European Court of Human Rights. There is no statutory power to award costs, and none appears in the Rules of the Tribunal. There is a plausible explanation for this. For obvious reasons claimants frequently do not know how strong their claim is when they issue it, and it is strongly in their private interest but also in the public interest that complainants to the Tribunal should not be deterred by the possibility of an adverse order for costs. The function of the Tribunal cannot be performed if no complaints are made. If no costs are to be awarded against a claimant then the same result should follow in respect of a respondent, or the ‘costs-free’ jurisdiction would be skewed in favour of the claimant. The position was affirmed in\nChatwani and Others v National Crime Agency\n[2015] UKIPTrib 15-84-88-CH. Ironically, at a later stage of those proceedings an order for costs was made, but that was at a time when the Respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the Tribunal’s orders and the Tribunal concluded that it had no other means of enforcement. It is clear that orders for costs will be highly unusual in this jurisdiction. Thus, where the conduct of a respondent in the proceedings can plausibly said to have aggravated the injury to the victim the better way in which an acknowledgment of that fact can be made is by taking it into account in deciding whether to make an award of damages and, if so, at what level.”\n\n41.\n\nAt paras 25-26, the Tribunal said:\n\n“25.\n\n… where a Respondent has apologised, admitted fault to the Tribunal, and taken remedial steps to prevent recurrence, that conduct will have contributed substantially to just satisfaction. Where it has done none of those things, until fault is found by the Tribunal, and instead conducted the proceedings in a way which prolongs and adds to the injury inflicted by the unlawful conduct, then an award of compensation is much more likely to be necessary.\n\n26.\n\nThe consequences of this approach will not be the same as if a costs order were made. The size of awards of damages for non-pecuniary losses in this jurisdiction is modest because they will always reflect the fact that the finding of a violation in this context is itself a very substantial element of just satisfaction, for the reasons explained above. The conduct of the Respondent in the investigation and proceedings may tip the balance in favour of making an award and may lead to a somewhat greater award than otherwise would be the case but the sums awarded by the Tribunal will continue to reflect the approach of the ECtHR rather than the levels of damages awarded in domestic tort claims.”\n\n42.\n\nIn\nWilson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis\n[2019] 1 Costs LR 11, there was an application for costs against the respondent. In its judgment given by Singh LJ (President) the Tribunal said at para 5:\n\n“There is no clear authority which states that this Tribunal has jurisdiction to make an award of costs at all. There is authority to the effect that it does not have that jurisdiction:\nW v Public Authority\n(IPT/09/134(C) (1 February 2011). That was a reasoned decision given by the then President (Mummery LJ) and Vice-President (Burton J).”\n\n43.\n\nAt para 6 the Tribunal said:\n\n“More recently the Tribunal has made an order for costs but has only done so in one case:\nChatwani v National Crime Agency\n(cited below). That order was made on 9 September 2015. However, neither counsel for the Tribunal have been able to find a transcript of a judgment setting out the reasons why the earlier decision in\nW\nwould not be followed. In any event, the order was made in circumstances which were described as being wholly exceptional. The defendant in that case had been guilty of repeated failures to comply with orders made by the Tribunal.”\n\n44.\n\nAt para 8 the Tribunal said the following:\n\n“In a future case the Tribunal may have to consider further the question of law whether it has jurisdiction to make an award of costs at all. It would be appropriate to do so only after full argument given the earlier decision in\nW\n. If such a case arises, it may also provide an opportunity for this Tribunal to set out the principles on which it should act if it is suggested that it should not follow one of its own earlier decisions. However, for present purposes we are prepared to proceed on the assumption that the jurisdiction exists but is only to be exercised in rare cases which are highly unusual.”\n\n45.\n\nIn the circumstances of that case, the Tribunal declined to make the orders sought, even on the assumption that it had jurisdiction to make an award of costs.\n\nA decision relating to SIAC: the C7 case\n\n46.\n\nThe question whether the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”) has power to award costs was considered recently by this court in\nC7 v Secretary of State for the Home Department\n[2023] EWCA Civ 265\n;\n[2023] KB 317\n.\n\n47.\n\nThe particular issue which arose in that case was whether SIAC could order the Secretary of State to pay the costs of the appellant’s successful appeal under section 2B of the SIAC Act 1997 (“the 1997 Act”). As was pointed out at para 5, the issue did not concern SIAC’s powers in statutory reviews pursuant to sections 2C-2F of the 1997 Act. The Court reached the following conclusions on the issues of principle which arose in that case:\n\n“(1)\n\nSIAC does not have an inherent power to award costs on an appeal under section 2B;\n\n(2)\n\nSIAC does not have an implied power to award costs on such an appeal.”\n\n48.\n\nSection 2B of the 1997 Act, which was inserted in 2003, provides that a person may appeal to SIAC against a decision to make an order depriving them of citizenship under\nsection 40\nof the\nBritish Nationality Act 1981\n.\n\n49.\n\nThe central provision which fell to be construed in\nC7\nwas section 5 of the 1997 Act, which provides:\n\n“(1)\n\nThe Lord Chancellor may make rules –\n\n(a)\n\nfor regulating the exercise of the rights of appeal conferred by section 2 or 2B …\n\n(b)\n\nfor prescribing the practice and procedure to be followed on or in connection with appeals under section 2 or 2B … including the mode and burden of proof and admissibility of evidence on such appeals …\n\n(2A)\n\nRules under this section may, in particular, do anything which may be done by Tribunal Procedure Rules.”\n\n50.\n\nAt paras 72-79 Elisabeth Laing LJ held that SIAC does not have an inherent power to award costs. At paras 80-83 she held that it does not have an implied power to award costs either. She said:\n\n“80.\n\nMr Southey also submitted that SIAC has an implied, rather than an inherent, power to award costs. There are two points.\n\n81.\n\nFirst, I agree with the Judge that the test for an implied power in this context is whether a power to award costs is necessary to enable SIAC to do justice. I also agree with him that such a power is not necessary for that purpose. As he said, not all courts or tribunals have a power to award costs. Mr Southey did not show us any material which supported an argument that, in SIAC, a power to award costs is necessary to enable SIAC to do justice.\n\n82.\n\nSecond, whether such a power is necessary to enable SIAC to do justice is not the only question. There is a more fundamental question. That is whether such a power can be implied in this statutory scheme………. There is a detailed statutory code governing SIAC’s procedural powers. The rule-maker under that code is the Lord Chancellor, not SIAC. If the Lord Chancellor has not made a rule authorising SIAC to make an award of costs, SIAC does not have an implied power to do so.”\n\nA Scottish case: Global Santa Fe Drilling\n\n51.\n\nMr Jaffey relied on the decision of the Inner House of the Court of Session in\nGlobal Santa Fe Drilling (North Sea) Ltd v Lord Advocate\n[2009] CSIH 43; [2009] SC 575, in which the judgment was given by the Lord President (Lord Hamilton). The issue in that case arose out of a fatal accident inquiry conducted by a sheriff under the\nFatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiries (Scotland) Act 1976\n. The Sheriff awarded “expenses” for certain parts of the inquiry because the Crown’s position could properly be regarded as vexatious. The Lord Advocate presented a petition for judicial review challenging the competency of that award. The Lord Ordinary held that the award of expenses was ultra vires. The Inner House reversed that decision. It was held that the Sheriff does have a power to award expenses in administrative or ministerial processes: see para 26. A fatal accident inquiry falls within the class of proceedings to which that principle can be applied: see para 33. A Sheriff may award expenses against a party to a fatal accident inquiry whose conduct has been vexatious: see para 35.\n\n52.\n\nIn the present case the IPT distinguished\nGlobal Santa Fe Drilling\non the ground that, in Scots law, expenses were regarded as “merely an accident of the process” and, apart from statutory provisions, there exists a common law right inherent in every civil court to award expenses. As the Lord President said at para 26 of the judgment of the Inner House, a distinction is drawn in Scots law between ordinary actions before the Sheriff and administrative or ministerial processes. In the latter category of case the general rule that “expenses follow success” does not apply but in certain circumstances, where the conduct of a party can be described as vexatious or an abuse of process, it will be open to the Sheriff to make an award of expenses. In the particular context with which the Court was concerned in that case, that is a fatal accident inquiry, the Court concluded that the ordinary rule about the circumstances in which a Sheriff may award expenses applies. I agree with the IPT that this does not assist the Appellants in the present case.\n\nDiscussion: ground 1 (jurisdiction under RIPA)\n\n53.\n\nIt is common ground that tribunals established by statute have no inherent power to award costs. It is also clear that neither RIPA, nor the Rules made under it, contain any express reference to costs. It follows that for the Appellants to succeed they must squeeze a power out of the wording of\nss 67\n-68 of RIPA. But it is in my view impossible to find such a power.\n\n54.\n\nSection 67(7)\nof RIPA begins with very general words (“shall have power to make any such award of compensation or other order as they think fit”). It goes on to list six categories of “other order” that may be made by the Tribunal; but each of the six examples given is a substantive order. It would have been easy enough to include in this list an order for costs; but that was not done. Similarly, s 69 confers on the Secretary of State a rule-making power which extends to rules regarding “any matters preliminary or incidental to or arising out of, the hearing or consideration of any proceedings, complaint or reference brought before or made to the Tribunal.” Again, the section goes on to give a list of examples contained in 11 subparagraphs, none of which makes any reference to costs.\n\n55.\n\nThe Appellants face the further difficulty that it is not clear what costs power they are seeking to imply. A general discretion to award costs without further detailed provision would suggest that costs should follow the event. But, as the IPT pointed out both in\nDias\nand in the present case, such a general rule would be widely regarded as unfair to applicants since in most cases they do not have access to all the information which is placed before the Tribunal. A bespoke costs rule could be worded in a number of ways. A useful example is the rule applicable in employment tribunals (ETs). An ET is generally a costs-free jurisdiction but by Rule 74(2) of the current ET procedure rules:-\n\n“The tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that:-\n\na)\n\na party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively, or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted;\n\nb)\n\nany claim, response, or reply had no reasonable prospect of success; or\n\nc)\n\na hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins.”\n\n56.\n\nThe Secretary of State could make Rules introducing a similar regime for the IPT, whether against either party or against respondents only. But that is not a scheme which the IPT has any power to construct. As the IPT said, the Tribunal would be engaging in legislation rather than judicial decision-making; and such an invented power would not be conducive to legal certainty.\n\nDiscussion: ground 2 (ECHR Article 41)\n\n57.\n\nThe second ground of appeal is that “the Investigatory Powers Tribunal erred in law in finding that it would not be just and appropriate to increase the amount of compensation awarded to the Appellants to reflect their costs”. It is clear that the focus of the argument before the IPT was the Appellants’ submission that the Tribunal had a jurisdiction derived from RIPA\ns 67\nto make an order for costs. The Appellants’ initial written submissions dated 23 December 2024 were made solely on that basis. The alternative argument based on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR at Strasbourg seems to have played a very limited part: it surfaced for the first time in a single paragraph of the Appellants’ reply submissions, to the IPT after the Respondents had cited\nDias.\nParagraph 3 argued that:\n\n\"Finally, it appears to be common ground between the Applicants, the PSNI, the intelligence services and the Met that if there is no jurisdiction to award costs, an increased award of damages may, in principle, be made. Such an award will not necessarily include all of the costs wasted or incurred. PSNI’s suggestion that no increased award should be made because it is too late to increase damages is wrong. Issues of costs (and an increased award of damages if costs are not available) were reserved to this hearing. The Applicants have throughout sought an award of costs on a free-standing basis or on the basis of the approach in\nDias\n. This does not involve circumvention of RIPA, but ensuring that an adequate award of just satisfaction is made under the\nHuman Rights Act 1998\n.\"\n\n58.\n\nIt is for that reason, no doubt, that the IPT dealt with the alternative approach as briefly as it did, where it said at paragraph 80:-\n\n“80.\n\nIn the circumstances of this case, we have also reached the conclusion that it would not be appropriate in effect to circumvent the absence of that power by disguising an award of costs as an adjusted award of compensation. The Tribunal has already decided what the relatively modest sum by way of compensation ought to be in the light of the violations found, in its substantive judgment of 17 December 2024. Although Mr Jaffey is right to say that it would not be procedurally precluded for the Tribunal to revisit that question, on the substantive issue which arises we do not consider that it would be just and appropriate to increase the amount of compensation that the Tribunal has thought fit to award.”\n\n59.\n\nIn the opening submissions to us on behalf of the Appellants, there was again a very substantial emphasis on the statutory jurisdiction issue. However, in the closing minutes of the hearing, in his submissions in reply, Mr Jaffey cited the Strasbourg decision in\nAssociated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) v United Kingdom\n(2007) 45 EHRR 34\n. ASLEF had expelled a member because of his activities in the British National Party. The member, a Mr Lee, successfully challenged his expulsion in an employment tribunal (there was then an appeal and remittal to a second ET which again found in Mr Lee's favour). The union, which had paid Mr Lee's legal costs, complained to the ECtHR that its rights under Article 11 of the Convention had been violated. This was upheld by the court. ASLEF applied for its costs both in the tribunals and at Strasbourg under Article 41 of the Convention, which provides:-\n\n\"If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\"\n\n60.\n\nASLEF had incurred costs of £11,958 in the employment tribunal, £12,799 in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and £17,343 at Strasbourg. They claimed all of this under Article 41. The Government argued, unsurprisingly, that the ET and EAT proceedings were in a jurisdiction where costs did not follow the event. Nevertheless, the whole of the costs incurred in the ET and EAT (as well as most of the costs at Strasbourg) were awarded. All that the court gave by way of reasoning was the following:-\n\n“58.\n\nThe Court recalls that only legal costs and expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and which are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities,\nNikolova v. Bulgaria\n[GC], no. 31195/96, 25 March 1999, § 79, and\nSmith and Grady v. the United Kingdom\n(just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 28, ECHR 2000-IX). This may include domestic legal costs actually and necessarily incurred to prevent or redress the breach of the Convention (see, for example,\nI.J.L., G.M.R. and A.K.P. v. the United Kingdom (Article 41)\n, nos. 29522/95, 30056/96 and 30574/96, § 18, 25 September 2001).\n\n59.\n\nConcerning, first, the domestic proceedings, the Court would note that it is not at all uncommon for courts and tribunals within Contracting States not to adopt the approach of costs following events. According to its long-established practice, where an applicant has, in such proceedings, incurred costs as a direct result of seeking redress for, or to prevent, a breach of his or her rights, these may be regarded as a financial loss flowing from that breach and thus recoverable in Strasbourg proceedings, regardless of whether these could have been reimbursed at the domestic level. The Court has already rejected above the Government’s argument that the applicant was in some way responsible for provoking the proceedings through its own conduct and it does not find it unreasonable, in a matter of vital concern, that it instructed senior counsel. Nor are the sums claimed here unreasonable. The Court has also found that the applicant did not fail, as alleged, to raise his Convention claims before the tribunals and even if, pursuant to the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision the Article 11 point was not considered by the second Tribunal, this does not detract from the fact that it was that Tribunal’s decision which finally decided that the applicant had acted contrary to section 174 in expelling Mr Lee and thus rendered the applicant a victim of a breach of Article 11 as found above. The Court awards the sum claimed, namely 38,900 euros (EUR)\n(equivalent approx. GBP 24,757.31)\n, inclusive of VAT.” (The court went on to add most, but not all, of the costs incurred in going to Strasbourg)”\n\n61.\n\nMr Jaffey did not go so far as to suggest that the\nASLEF\ncase was an authority which should lead tribunals in this jurisdiction to make awards of costs against respondent public authorities who are found to have violated an applicant’s human rights, even where the tribunal has no statutory jurisdiction to award costs. The\nASLEF\ncase seems to have been an outlier. It was not cited to the IPT. For my part, I prefer, and would respectfully endorse, the reasoning of the IPT in\nDias\n. Where a respondent has conducted the proceedings in such a way as to prolong and aggravate the violation of the applicant’s human rights, then that may make it just and appropriate to increase the monetary award made by way of just satisfaction to a \"somewhat greater\" amount than would otherwise have been the case; but the consequences will not be the same as if an order for costs had been made. The IPT in the present case, having made awards of £4,000 to each Appellant as set out above, decided that it would not be just and appropriate to increase those awards. That decision does not involve any error of law.\n\nConclusion\n\n62.\n\nI would dismiss this appeal.\n\nLord Justice Edis:\n\n63.\n\nI agree.\n\nLord Justice Lewis:\n\n64.\n\nI also agree.","changes":[]}