{"check":null,"uid":"856941336cf5e7f8","title":"Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025","title_generated":false,"country":"США","organ":"Конгресс США","kind":"law","kind_name":"Законодательство","lang":"en","date":"2025-09-18","summary":"Запрещает за 60 дней до федеральных выборов распространять или изготавливать сведения о голосовании, заведомо ложные по существу, если цель — помешать другому человеку проголосовать. Отдельно запрещается с той же целью создавать такие сведения системой искусственного интеллекта. Под запрет попадает и воспрепятствование голосованию и регистрации избирателей, а запрет на запугивание распространяется на обработку бюллетеней, подсчёт, сверку и удостоверение результатов. Пострадавший вправе сам требовать пресечения нарушения в суде, вводится и уголовная ответственность. Получив достоверное сообщение о ложных сведениях, Министерство юстиции обязано публично сообщить верные данные, если этого не сделали избирательные органы штата.","snippet":"","topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"status":"ok","error":"","text_len":27324,"versions":2,"url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119-congress/s/2912","first_seen":"2026-08-19","last_checked":"2026-09-17 02:01","relevance":"hit","score":13,"query":"","source_key":"congress_us","verdict":{"relevance":"hit","score":13,"topics":["Искусственный интеллект"],"need_body":3,"authorities":[],"evidence":[{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"искусственн","weak":false,"pos":319,"ctx":"веку проголосовать. отдельно запрещается с той же целью создавать такие сведения системой искусственного интеллекта. под запрет попадает и воспрепятствование голосованию и регистрации избирателе","zone":"название","weight":3},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":631,"ctx":"y, the bill prohibits any person, within 60 days before a federal election, from using an artificial intelligence system to produce certain information on voting, if the person has the intent to use the","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":13203,"ctx":"sing the right to vote in an election described in paragraph (4). ``(b) use of generative artificial intelligence.-- no person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall use an artificial int","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":13302,"ctx":"l intelligence.-- no person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall use an artificial intelligence system, including a generative artificial intelligence system, to produce information des","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":13357,"ctx":"of law or otherwise, shall use an artificial intelligence system, including a generative artificial intelligence system, to produce information described in subparagraph (c) within 60 days before an ele","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":15135,"ctx":"s, or delegate or commissioner from a territory or possession. ``(5) definitions.-- ``(a) artificial intelligence.--the term `artificial intelligence' has the meaning given the term in section 5002 of th","zone":"текст","weight":1},{"topic":"Искусственный интеллект","term":"artificial intelligence","weak":false,"pos":15171,"ctx":"a territory or possession. ``(5) definitions.-- ``(a) artificial intelligence.--the term `artificial intelligence' has the meaning given the term in section 5002 of the national artificial intelligence i","zone":"текст","weight":1}],"dropped":[{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":6842,"ctx":"by russian government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ``trolls''. these influence operations included messaging that targeted african","why":"только многозначные термины"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":7442,"ctx":"lection principally through two operations: first, through a russian government sponsored social media influence campaign, and second, by russian intelligence ``computer-intrusion'' operations","why":"только многозначные термины"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":7836,"ctx":"sent black social justice groups in order to spread disinformation and sow division. (15) social media makes the mass dissemination of misleading information easy and allows perpetrators to ta","why":"только многозначные термины"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":8866,"ctx":"red with other influential twitter users and with members of private online groups to use social media platforms, including twitter, to disseminate fraudulent messages that encouraged supporte","why":"только многозначные термины"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":9045,"ctx":"aged supporters of presidential candidate hillary clinton to ``vote'' via text message or social media. however, in 2025, the u.s. court of appeals for the second circuit reversed mackey's con","why":"только многозначные термины"},{"topic":"Цифровые платформы и сервисы","term":"social media","weak":true,"pos":9966,"ctx":"tion was targeted at latino communities in florida and other states, particularly through social media. (18) during the 2020 presidential election, voters in some precincts faced voter intimid","why":"только многозначные термины"}]},"last_changed":"2026-09-11","meta":{"congress":"119","billType":"S","number":"2912","policyArea":"Government Operations and Politics","subjects":[],"latestAction":"2025-08-05 Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.","textVersion":"is"},"source_url":"https://www.congress.gov/bill/119-congress/s/2912","text":"SUMMARY\nDeceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025\nThis bill generally prohibits deceptive communications and voter interference regarding federal elections.\nSpecifically, the bill prohibits any person, within 60 days before a federal election, from communicating, causing to be communicated, or producing for communication certain information on voting, if the person (1) knows such information to be materially false, and (2) has the intent to impede or prevent another person from voting in an election.\nAdditionally, the bill prohibits any person, within 60 days before a federal election, from using an artificial intelligence system to produce certain information on voting, if the person has the intent to use the system to (1) produce false information, and (2) impede or prevent another person from voting in an election.\nThe bill also prohibits hindering, interfering with, or preventing voting or registering to vote.\nA private right of action for preventive relief is established for persons aggrieved by violations of these prohibitions.\nCriminal penalties are also established for violations.\nIf the Department of Justice (DOJ) receives a credible report that materially false information has been or is being communicated in violation of the prohibitions on deceptive communications, and state and local election officials have not adequately communicated corrected information, then DOJ must communicate to the public accurate information designed to correct the materially false information.\nThe bill extends the prohibition on certain types of intimidation in federal elections to also prohibit intimidation for processing ballots or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying votes.\n\nFULL TEXT\n[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n[S. 2912 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n\n<DOC>\n\n119th CONGRESS\n1st Session\nS. 2912\n\nTo prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nIN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n\nSeptember 18 (legislative day, September 16), 2025\n\nMs. Alsobrooks (for herself, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Padilla,\nMs. Hirono, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Merkley, and Mrs.\nGillibrand) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and\nreferred to the Committee on the Judiciary\n\n_______________________________________________________________________\n\nA BILL\n\nTo prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.\n\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\nUnited States of America in Congress assembled,\n\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n\nThis Act may be cited as the ``Deceptive Practices and Voter\nIntimidation Prevention Act of 2025''.\n\nSEC. 2. FINDINGS.\n\nCongress makes the following findings:\n(1) The right to vote by casting a ballot for one's\npreferred candidate is a fundamental right accorded to United\nStates citizens by the Constitution, and the unimpeded exercise\nof this right is essential to the functioning of our democracy.\n(2) Historically, certain citizens, especially racial,\nethnic, and language minorities, were prevented from voting\nbecause of significant barriers such as literacy tests, poll\ntaxes, and property ownership requirements.\n(3) Some of these barriers were removed by the 15th, 19th,\nand 24th Amendments to the Constitution.\n(4) Despite the elimination of some of these barriers to\nthe polls, the integrity of today's elections is threatened by\nnewer tactics aimed at suppressing voter turnout. These tactics\ninclude ``deceptive practices'', which involve the\ndissemination of false or misleading information intended to\nprevent voters from casting their ballots, prevent voters from\nvoting for the candidate of their choice, intimidate the\nelectorate, and undermine the integrity of the electoral\nprocess.\n(5) Furthermore, since the decision in Shelby County v.\nHolder in which the Supreme Court struck down the coverage\nformula used by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to determine\nwhich States with a history of racial discrimination must\naffirmatively receive government permission before changing\nlocal voting laws, there have been Federal court decisions\nfinding or affirming that States or localities intentionally\ndiscriminated against African Americans and other voters of\ncolor.\n(6) Denials of the right to vote, and deceptive practices\ndesigned to prevent members of racial, ethnic, and language\nminorities from exercising that right, are an outgrowth of\ndiscriminatory history, including slavery. Measures to combat\ndenials of that right are a legitimate exercise of\ncongressional power under article I, section 4 and article II,\nsection 1 of, and the 14th and 15th Amendments to, the United\nStates Constitution.\n(7) For the last few decades, there have been a number of\ninstances of deceptive or intimidating practices aimed towards\nsuppressing minority access to the voting booth that\ndemonstrates the need for strengthened protections.\n(8) In addition, in at least one instance in 1990,\nthousands of voters reportedly received postcards providing\nfalse information about voter eligibility and warnings about\ncriminal penalties for voter fraud. Most of the voters who\nreceived the postcards were African American.\n(9) During the 2004 elections, Native American voters in\nSouth Dakota reported being required to provide photographic\nidentification in order to vote, despite the fact that neither\nState nor Federal law required such identification.\n(10) In the 2006 midterm elections, thousands of Latino\nvoters received mailings warning them in Spanish that voting in\na Federal election as an immigrant could result in\nincarceration--despite the fact that any immigrant who is a\nnaturalized citizen of the United States has the same right to\nvote as any other citizen.\n(11) In 2008, fliers were distributed in predominantly\nAfrican American neighborhoods falsely warning that people with\noutstanding warrants or unpaid parking tickets could be\narrested if they showed up at the polls on election day. In the\nsame year, there were reports of people receiving text messages\non election day asking them to wait until the following day to\nvote.\n(12) In 2012, there were reports of voters receiving calls\nfalsely informing them that they could vote via telephone.\n(13) On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of\nNational Intelligence published a report titled ``Assessing\nRussian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections'',\nnoting that ``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an\ninfluence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential\nelection.''. Moscow's influence campaign followed a Russian\nmessaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operation--\nsuch as cyber activity--with overt efforts by Russian\nGovernment agencies, State-funded media, third-party\nintermediaries, and paid social media users or ``trolls''.\nThese influence operations included messaging that targeted\nAfrican American voters with misinformation.\n(14) On April 18, 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller\nreleased a report titled ``Report on the Investigation into\nRussian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election'', which\nconcluded that ``the Russian government interfered in the 2016\npresidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.''.\nThe report details that Russia interfered in the 2016\nPresidential election principally through two operations:\nfirst, through a Russian government sponsored social media\ninfluence campaign, and second, by Russian intelligence\n``computer-intrusion'' operations against those associated with\nboth Presidential campaigns. The Mueller Report details how\nRussian agents intentionally targeted Black social justice\ngroups and created fake accounts purporting to represent Black\nsocial justice groups in order to spread disinformation and sow\ndivision.\n(15) Social media makes the mass dissemination of\nmisleading information easy and allows perpetrators to target\nparticular audiences with precision. One analysis documented\nhundreds of messages on Facebook and Twitter designed to\ndiscourage or prevent people from voting in the 2018 election.\nIn 2016, these false statements were extremely prevalent with\nboth domestic and foreign actors. Russian operatives engaged in\na concerted disinformation and propaganda campaign over the\ninternet that aimed, in part, to suppress voter turnout,\nespecially among Black voters. These efforts by the Russian\nGovernment continued and became more aggressive in the 2020\nelection cycle.\n(16) In 2023, Douglass Mackey was convicted for his role in\nthe conspiracy to interfere with potential voters' right to\nvote in the 2016 Presidential election, in violation of section\n241 of title 18, United States Code. The Department of Justice\nalleged that Mackey conspired with other influential Twitter\nusers and with members of private online groups to use social\nmedia platforms, including Twitter, to disseminate fraudulent\nmessages that encouraged supporters of Presidential candidate\nHillary Clinton to ``vote'' via text message or social media.\nHowever, in 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second\nCircuit reversed Mackey's conviction on the ground that\nprosecutors had not proven that his deceptive conduct was part\nof a conspiracy. This ruling underscores the need for Congress\nto update the law to more effectively protect against voter\nsuppression through deceptive practices, regardless of whether\nit is accomplished through a conspiracy or by one bad actor\nalone.\n(17) During the 2020 Presidential election, Texas voters\nreceived robocalls stating that the Democratic primary would be\ntaking place after its actual date. In the same year,\ncommunities of color in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois,\nand New York were targeted by robocalls sharing false\ninformation about how their data would be shared if they voted\nby mail. Widespread disinformation was targeted at Latino\ncommunities in Florida and other States, particularly through\nsocial media.\n(18) During the 2020 Presidential election, voters in some\nprecincts faced voter intimidation during early voting and on\nelection day. The Election Protection hotline received nearly\n32,000 calls on election day. Reports from the Voting Rights\nDefender and Prepared to Vote project teams and the NAACP Legal\nDefense and Educational Fund, Inc., showed that minority voters\nwere disproportionately impacted by voter intimidation.\nIncidents included 3,000,000 robocalls telling people to stay\nhome on election day and armed people at polling sites on\nelection day in Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana.\nAdditionally, election officials, volunteers, and electors\nfaced unprecedented intimidation including doxxing, death\nthreats, and other intimidating communication.\n(19) Those responsible for these and similar efforts should\nbe held accountable, and civil and criminal penalties should be\navailable to punish anyone who seeks to keep voters away from\nthe polls by providing false information.\n(20) Moreover, the Federal Government should help correct\nsuch false information in order to assist voters in exercising\ntheir right to vote without confusion and to preserve the\nintegrity of the electoral process.\n(21) The Federal Government has a compelling interest in\n``protecting voters from confusion and undue influence'' and in\n``preserving the integrity of its election process''. Burson v.\nFreeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).\n(22) The First Amendment does not preclude the regulation\nof some intentionally false speech, even if it is political in\nnature. As the Supreme Court of the United States has\nrecognized, ``[t]hat speech is used as a tool for political\nends does not automatically bring it under the protective\nmantle of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a\ntool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic\ngovernment and with the orderly manner in which economic,\nsocial, or political change is to be effected. . . . Hence the\nknowingly false statement and the false statement made with\nreckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional\nprotection.''. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).\n\nSEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON DECEPTIVE COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL\nELECTIONS.\n\n(a) Prohibition.--Subsection (b) of section 2004 of the Revised\nStatutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)) is amended--\n(1) by striking ``No person'' and inserting the following:\n``(1) In general.--No person''; and\n(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:\n``(2) Prohibition on deceptive communications regarding\nfederal elections.--\n``(A) False statements.--No person, whether acting\nunder color of law or otherwise, shall, within 60 days\nbefore an election described in paragraph (4), by any\nmeans, including by means of written, electronic, or\ntelephonic communications, communicate or cause to be\ncommunicated information described in subparagraph (C),\nor produce information described in subparagraph (C)\nwith the intent that such information be communicated,\nif such person--\n``(i) knows such information to be\nmaterially false; and\n``(ii) has the intent to impede or prevent\nanother person from exercising the right to\nvote in an election described in paragraph (4).\n``(B) Use of generative artificial intelligence.--\nNo person, whether acting under color of law or\notherwise, shall use an artificial intelligence system,\nincluding a generative artificial intelligence system,\nto produce information described in subparagraph (C)\nwithin 60 days before an election described in\nparagraph (4) if such person--\n``(i) has the intent to use the system to\nproduce false information; and\n``(ii) has the intent to use the system to\nimpede or prevent another person from\nexercising the right to vote in an election\ndescribed in paragraph (4).\n``(C) Information described.--Information is\ndescribed in this subparagraph if such information is\nregarding--\n``(i) the time, place, or manner of holding\nany election described in paragraph (4); or\n``(ii) the qualifications for or\nrestrictions on voter eligibility for any such\nelection, including--\n``(I) any criminal, civil, or other\nlegal penalties associated with voting\nin any such election; or\n``(II) information regarding a\nvoter's registration status or\neligibility.\n``(3) Hindering, interfering with, or preventing voting or\nregistering to vote.--No person, whether acting under color of\nlaw or otherwise, shall intentionally hinder, interfere with,\nor prevent another person from voting, registering to vote, or\naiding another person to vote or register to vote in an\nelection described in paragraph (4), including by operating a\npolling place or ballot box that falsely purports to be an\nofficial location established for such an election by a unit of\ngovernment.\n``(4) Election described.--An election described in this\nparagraph is any general, primary, runoff, or special election\nheld solely or in part for the purpose of nominating or\nelecting a candidate for the office of President, Vice\nPresident, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member\nof the House of Representatives, or Delegate or Commissioner\nfrom a Territory or possession.\n``(5) Definitions.--\n``(A) Artificial intelligence.--The term\n`artificial intelligence' has the meaning given the\nterm in section 5002 of the National Artificial\nIntelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401).\n``(B) Generative artificial intelligence.--The term\n`generative artificial intelligence' means the class of\nartificial intelligence models that emulate the\nstructure and characteristics of input data in order to\ngenerate derived synthetic content. This can include\nimages, videos, audio, text, and other digital\ncontent.''.\n(b) Private Right of Action.--\n(1) In general.--Subsection (c) of section 2004 of the\nRevised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(c)) is amended--\n(A) by striking ``Whenever any person'' and\ninserting the following:\n``(1) In general.--Whenever any person''; and\n(B) by adding at the end the following new\nparagraph:\n``(2) Civil action.--Any person aggrieved by a violation of\nthis section may institute a civil action for preventive\nrelief, including an application in a United States district\ncourt for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining\norder, or other order. In any such action, the court, in its\ndiscretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable\nattorney's fee as part of the costs.''.\n(2) Conforming amendments.--Section 2004 of the Revised\nStatutes (52 U.S.C. 10101) is amended--\n(A) in subsection (e), by striking ``subsection\n(c)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)''; and\n(B) in subsection (g), by striking ``subsection\n(c)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)''.\n(c) Criminal Penalties.--\n(1) Deceptive acts.--Section 594 of title 18, United States\nCode, is amended--\n(A) by striking ``Whoever intimidates'' and\ninserting ``(a) In General.--Whoever intimidates'';\n(B) by striking ``at any election'' and inserting\n``at any general, primary, runoff, or special\nelection''; and\n(C) by adding at the end the following new\nsubsections:\n``(b) Deceptive Acts.--\n``(1) False statements regarding federal elections.--\n``(A) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any\nperson, whether acting under color of law or otherwise,\nwithin 60 days before an election described in\nsubsection (d), by any means, including by means of\nwritten, electronic, or telephonic communications, to\ncommunicate or cause to be communicated information\ndescribed in subparagraph (B), or produce information\ndescribed in subparagraph (B) with the intent that such\ninformation be communicated, if such person--\n``(i) knows such information to be\nmaterially false; and\n``(ii) has the intent to impede or prevent\nanother person from exercising the right to\nvote in an election described in subsection\n(d).\n``(B) Information described.--Information is\ndescribed in this subparagraph if such information is\nregarding--\n``(i) the time or place of holding any\nelection described in subsection (d); or\n``(ii) the qualifications for or\nrestrictions on voter eligibility for any such\nelection, including--\n``(I) any criminal, civil, or other\nlegal penalties associated with voting\nin any such election; or\n``(II) information regarding a\nvoter's registration status or\neligibility.\n``(2) Penalty.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall\nbe fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 1 year,\nor both.\n``(c) Hindering, Interfering With, or Preventing Voting or\nRegistering To Vote.--\n``(1) Prohibition.--It shall be unlawful for any person,\nwhether acting under color of law or otherwise, to corruptly\nhinder, interfere with, or prevent another person from voting,\nregistering to vote, or aiding another person to vote or\nregister to vote in an election described in subsection (d).\n``(2) Penalty.--Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall\nbe fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 1 year,\nor both.\n``(d) Election Described.--An election described in this subsection\nis any general, primary, runoff, or special election held solely or in\npart for the purpose of nominating or electing a candidate for the\noffice of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Senator,\nMember of the House of Representatives, or Delegate or Resident\nCommissioner to the Congress.''.\n(2) Sentencing guidelines.--\n(A) Review and amendment.--Not later than 180 days\nafter the date of enactment of this Act, the United\nStates Sentencing Commission, pursuant to its authority\nunder section 994 of title 28, United States Code, and\nin accordance with this section, shall review and, if\nappropriate, amend the Federal sentencing guidelines\nand policy statements applicable to persons convicted\nof any offense under section 594 of title 18, United\nStates Code, as amended by this section.\n(B) Authorization.--The United States Sentencing\nCommission may amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines\nin accordance with the procedures set forth in section\n21(a) of the Sentencing Act of 1987 (28 U.S.C. 994\nnote) as though the authority under that section had\nnot expired.\n(3) Payments for refraining from voting.--Subsection (c) of\nsection 11 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C. 10307)\nis amended by striking ``either for registration to vote or for\nvoting'' and inserting ``for registration to vote, for voting,\nor for not voting''.\n\nSEC. 4. CORRECTIVE ACTION.\n\n(a) Corrective Action.--\n(1) In general.--If the Attorney General receives a\ncredible report that materially false information has been or\nis being communicated in violation of section 2004(b)(2) of the\nRevised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)(2)), as added by section\n3(a), and if the Attorney General determines that State and\nlocal election officials have not taken adequate steps to\npromptly communicate accurate information to correct the\nmaterially false information, the Attorney General shall,\npursuant to the written procedures and standards under\nsubsection (b), communicate to the public, by any means,\nincluding by means of written, electronic, or telephonic\ncommunications, accurate information designed to correct the\nmaterially false information.\n(2) Communication of corrective information.--Any\ninformation communicated by the Attorney General under\nparagraph (1)--\n(A) shall--\n(i) be accurate and objective;\n(ii) consist of only the information\nnecessary to correct the materially false\ninformation that has been or is being\ncommunicated; and\n(iii) to the extent practicable, be by a\nmeans that the Attorney General determines will\nreach the persons to whom the materially false\ninformation has been or is being communicated;\nand\n(B) shall not be designed to favor or disfavor any\nparticular candidate, organization, or political party.\n(b) Written Procedures and Standards for Taking Corrective\nAction.--\n(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of\nenactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall publish\nwritten procedures and standards for determining when and how\ncorrective action will be taken under this section.\n(2) Inclusion of appropriate deadlines.--The procedures and\nstandards under paragraph (1) shall include appropriate\ndeadlines, based in part on the number of days remaining before\nthe upcoming election.\n(3) Consultation.--In developing the procedures and\nstandards under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall\nconsult with the Election Assistance Commission, State and\nlocal election officials, civil rights organizations, voting\nrights groups, voter protection groups, and other interested\ncommunity organizations.\n(c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be\nappropriated to the Attorney General such sums as may be necessary to\ncarry out this subtitle.\n\nSEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.\n\n(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after each general\nelection for Federal office, the Attorney General shall submit to\nCongress a report compiling all allegations received by the Attorney\nGeneral of deceptive practices described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of\nsection 2004(b) of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)), as added\nby section 3(a), relating to the general election for Federal office\nand any primary, runoff, or a special election for Federal office held\nin the 2 years preceding the general election.\n(b) Contents.--\n(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)\nshall include--\n(A) a description of each allegation of a deceptive\npractice described in subsection (a), including the\ngeographic location, racial and ethnic composition, and\nlanguage minority-group membership of the persons\ntoward whom the alleged deceptive practice was\ndirected;\n(B) the status of the investigation of each\nallegation described in subparagraph (A);\n(C) a description of each corrective action taken\nby the Attorney General under section 4(a) in response\nto an allegation described in subparagraph (A);\n(D) a description of each referral of an allegation\ndescribed in subparagraph (A) to other Federal, State,\nor local agencies;\n(E) to the extent information is available, a\ndescription of any civil action instituted under\nsection 2004(c)(2) of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C.\n10101(c)(2)), as added by section 3(b), in connection\nwith an allegation described in subparagraph (A); and\n(F) a description of any criminal prosecution\ninstituted under subsection (b) or (c) of section 594\nof title 18, United States Code, as amended by section\n3(c), in connection with the receipt of an allegation\ndescribed in subparagraph (A) by the Attorney General.\n(2) Exclusion of certain information.--\n(A) In general.--The Attorney General shall not\ninclude in a report submitted under subsection (a) any\ninformation protected from disclosure by rule 6(e) of\nthe Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or any Federal\ncriminal statute.\n(B) Exclusion of certain other information.--The\nAttorney General may determine that the following\ninformation shall not be included in a report submitted\nunder subsection (a):\n(i) Any information that is privileged.\n(ii) Any information concerning an ongoing\ninvestigation.\n(iii) Any information concerning a criminal\nor civil proceeding conducted under seal.\n(iv) Any other nonpublic information that\nthe Attorney General determines the disclosure\nof which could reasonably be expected to\ninfringe on the rights of any individual or\nadversely affect the integrity of a pending or\nfuture criminal investigation.\n(c) Report Made Public.--On the date that the Attorney General\nsubmits the report under subsection (a), the Attorney General shall\nalso make the report publicly available through the internet and other\nappropriate means.\n\nSEC. 6. PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION BY ELECTION OFFICIALS.\n\nSubsection (c)(2) of section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (52\nU.S.C. 10101(b)), as added by section 3(b), is amended--\n(1) by striking ``Any person'' and inserting the following:\n``(A) In general.--Any person''; and\n(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:\n``(B) Intimidation, etc.--\n``(i) In general.--A person aggrieved by a\nviolation of subsection (b)(1) shall include,\nwithout limitation, an officer responsible for\nmaintaining order and preventing intimidation,\nthreats, or coercion in or around a location at\nwhich voters may cast their votes.\n``(ii) Corrective action.--If the Attorney\nGeneral receives a credible report that conduct\nthat violates or would be reasonably likely to\nviolate subsection (b)(1) has occurred or is\nlikely to occur, and if the Attorney General\ndetermines that State and local officials have\nnot taken adequate steps to promptly\ncommunicate that such conduct would violate\nsubsection (b)(1) or applicable State or local\nlaws, the Attorney General shall communicate to\nthe public, by any means, including by means of\nwritten, electronic, or telephonic\ncommunications, accurate information designed\nto convey the unlawfulness of proscribed\nconduct under subsection (b)(1) and the\nresponsibilities of and resources available to\nState and local officials to prevent or correct\nsuch violations.''.\n\nSEC. 7. MAKING INTIMIDATION OF TABULATION, CANVASS, AND CERTIFICATION\nEFFORTS A CRIME.\n\nSection 12(1) of the National Voter Registration Act (52 U.S.C.\n20511) is amended--\n(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end; and\n(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:\n``(D) processing or scanning ballots, or\ntabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting results;\nor''.\n<all>","changes":[{"id":604,"doc_id":518,"v_from":402,"v_to":13688,"detected_at":"2026-09-11 02:52:52","added":548,"removed":11,"summary":"--- \n+++ \n-Error occurred. The page you requested cannot be found.\n-\n-Please report this error to askGPO.\n-\n-Provide the following information to help us resolve this problem: the URL of the page you were trying to access, the steps you followed to produce the error, specific search or browse terms, and/or a screenshot of the page where the error occurred.\n-\n-Thank you for your patience.\n-\n-Homepage\n-\n-Search Tips\n+[Congressional Bills 119th Congress]\n+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]\n+[S. 2912 Introduced in Senate (IS)]\n+\n+<DOC>\n+\n+119th CONGRESS\n+1st Session\n+S. 2912\n+\n+To prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES\n+\n+September 18 (legislative day, September 16), 2025\n+\n+Ms. Alsobrooks (for herself, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Padilla,\n+Ms. Hirono, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Cantwell, Mr. Merkley, and Mrs.\n+Gillibrand) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and\n+referred to the Committee on the Judiciary\n+\n+_______________________________________________________________________\n+\n+A BILL\n+\n+To prohibit deceptive practices in Federal elections.\n+\n+Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the\n+United States of America in Congress assembled,\n+\n+SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\n+\n+This Act may be cited as the ``Deceptive Practices and Voter\n+Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025''.\n+\n+SEC. 2. FINDINGS.\n+\n+Congress makes the following findings:\n+(1) The right to vote by casting a ballot for one's\n+preferred candidate is a fundamental right accorded to United\n+States citizens by the Constitution, and the unimpeded exercise\n+of this right is essential to the functioning of our democracy.\n+(2) Historically, certain citizens, especially racial,\n+ethnic, and language minorities, were prevented from voting"}],"passport":{"data":{"act":{"jurisdiction":"США","title_official":"Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2025","title_short":"","level":"законопроект","date_adopted":"2025-09-18","date_in_force":"не вступил в силу","date_version":"версия от 2025-09-18","phased":"разработка процедур Минюста — не позднее 180 дней после вступления в силу; пересмотр руководств Комиссии по вынесению приговоров — не позднее 180 дней после вступления в силу; первый отчёт в Конгресс — не позднее 180 дней после общих выборов","status":"законопроект: на рассмотрении","sunset":"","regulator":"Министерство юстиции США (DOJ), федеральные суды, Комиссия США по вынесению приговоров","related":"Revised Statutes § 2004 (52 U.S.C. 10101); title 18 U.S.C. § 594; National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401); Voting Rights Act of 1965; National Voter Registration Act (52 U.S.C. 20511)"},"goal":{"problem":"распространение заведомо ложной информации о голосовании и запугивание избирателей вблизи федеральных выборов, включая использование ИИ, что подавляет явку и подрывает целостность процесса.","goal":"запретить обманные коммуникации и воспрепятствование голосованию за 60 дней до федеральных выборов, обеспечить оперативное опровержение ложных сведений и расширить защиту против запугивания при подсчёте голосов.","targets":"","scope":"любые лица, распространяющие или производящие информацию о времени/месте голосования и квалификации избирателей применительно к федеральным выборам; отдельно — пользователи систем искусственного интеллекта для создания таких сведений; также — любое лицо, препятствующее голосованию/регистрации или процессу обработки бюллетеней и подведению итогов.","exclusions":"корректирующая коммуникация DOJ должна быть объективной, необходимой по объёму и без предпочтения кандидатов/партий; исключаются сведения, защищённые законом об уголовном процессе."},"subjects_note":{"protected":"избиратели из числа расовых, этнических и языковых меньшинств (контекст выявленных практик)."},"subjects":[{"role":"разработчик","who":"«any person» (любое лицо)","criteria":"использует систему искусственного интеллекта для производства информации о голосовании с намерением создать ложные сведения и помешать другому лицу проголосовать на федеральных выборах","count":"нет данных"},{"role":"посредник","who":"«any person» (любое лицо)","criteria":"осуществляет доведение информации о голосовании до других лиц любыми средствами","count":"нет данных"},{"role":"оператор","who":"«any person» (любое лицо)","criteria":"управляет площадкой/процессом подачи заявок на регистрацию или голосования","count":"нет данных"},{"role":"госорган","who":"Attorney General (Министерство юстиции США)","criteria":"получение достоверного сообщения о нарушении запрета на обманные коммуникации и недостаточность мер избирательных органов штата/местных властей","count":"нет данных"},{"role":"госорган","who":"United States Sentencing Commission","criteria":"федеральный орган, устанавливающий руководства по назначению наказаний","count":"нет данных"},{"role":"потребитель","who":"«person aggrieved by a violation»","criteria":"лицо, чьи права затронуты нарушением запретов разд. 3","count":"нет данных"}],"norms":[{"address":"Sec. 3(a)(2)(B)","addressee":"разработчик","essence":"Не вправе использовать систему ИИ для производства информации о голосовании с целью создать ложные сведения и помешать другому лицу проголосовать на федеральных выборах.","type":"запрет","mechanism":"ограничение модели","cost_channel":"административные, содержательные","cost_kind":"регулярные","trigger":"постоянно в пределах 60 дней до федерального выбора","sanction":"штраф и/или лишение свободы до 1 года (по поправкам к 18 U.S.C. § 594(b)); гражданский иск о пресечении нарушения","refs":"да; определение ИИ — sec. 5002 NIAA 2020 (15 U.S.C. 9401)","form":"цифровая/смешанная","in_force":"со дня вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"},{"address":"Sec. 3(a)(2)(A)","addressee":"посредник","essence":"Не вправе сообщать или обеспечивать сообщение информации о времени/месте голосования либо квалификациях избирателей, зная её материальную ложность и имея цель помешать другому лицу проголосовать на федеральных выборах.","type":"запрет","mechanism":"информирование, распределение риска","cost_channel":"административные, содержательные","cost_kind":"по событию","trigger":"по факту распространения в течение 60 дней до федерального выбора","sanction":"штраф и/или лишение свободы до 1 года (18 U.S.C. § 594(b)); судебный запрет по иску пострадавшего","refs":"нет","form":"смешанная","in_force":"со дня вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"},{"address":"Sec. 3(a)(3)","addressee":"оператор","essence":"Не вправе умышленно мешать, вмешиваться или препятствовать голосованию, регистрации или помощи в этом на федеральных выборах, в том числе через фальшивые участки/урны.","type":"запрет","mechanism":"барьер входа, операционные издержки","cost_channel":"административные, капитальные","cost_kind":"по событию","trigger":"по факту действий в период кампании","sanction":"штраф и/или лишение свободы до 1 года (18 U.S.C. § 594(c))","refs":"нет","form":"смешанная","in_force":"со дня вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"},{"address":"Sec. 4(a)(1)","addressee":"госорган","essence":"Обязан публично сообщить верные данные для исправления материальной лжи, если избирательные органы штатов/местные власти этого не сделали.","type":"обязанность","mechanism":"информирование","cost_channel":"прямые платёжные, административные","cost_kind":"по событию","trigger":"по обращению/получению достоверного сообщения","sanction":"","refs":"нет","form":"цифровая/смешанная","in_force":"со дня вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"},{"address":"Sec. 3(c)(2)(A)","addressee":"госорган","essence":"Обязана не позднее 180 дней после вступления закона в силу пересмотреть и при необходимости изменить федеральные руководства по назначениям для соответствующих преступлений.","type":"обязанность","mechanism":"административные процедуры","cost_channel":"административные","cost_kind":"разовые","trigger":"до начала деятельности (после вступления закона в силу)","sanction":"","refs":"yes; authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994","form":"бумажная/цифровая","in_force":"дедлайн 180 дней после вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"},{"address":"Sec. 3(b)(1) (поправка к 52 U.S.C. 10101(c)(2))","addressee":"потребитель","essence":"Вправе подать гражданский иск о пресечении нарушения (включая временные/постоянные судебные запреты) и взыскать разумные гонорары адвоката.","type":"право","mechanism":"распределение риска","cost_channel":"административные","cost_kind":"по событию","trigger":"по факту нарушения","sanction":"","refs":"no","form":"судебная","in_force":"со дня вступления закона в силу","ru_analog":"требует проверки"}]},"made_by":"GigaChat-3-Ultra","made_at":"2026-09-16 08:30:54","edited_at":null,"edited_by":null}}